THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE SUDAN:


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## ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>East and Southern African Common Market</td>
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<td>COMESSA</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Formerly Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, IGADD)</td>
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<td>IPF</td>
<td>IGAD Partners Forum</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network</td>
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<td>KUNA</td>
<td>Kuwaiti News Agency</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>NSCC</td>
<td>New Sudan Council of Churches</td>
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<td>NUP</td>
<td>National Unionist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Popular Defence Force</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party</td>
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<td>PNC</td>
<td>Popular National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
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<td>SANU</td>
<td>Sudan African National Union</td>
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<td>SPDF</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Defence Force</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SPLA-United</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SRRA</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency</td>
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<td>SSIM</td>
<td>South Sudan Independence Movement</td>
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<td>SSLM</td>
<td>South Sudan Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SUNA</td>
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<td>TANA</td>
<td>Blue Nile Citizens Front</td>
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<td>TMC</td>
<td>Transitional Military Council</td>
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<td>UDSF</td>
<td>United Democratic Salvation Front</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>USAP</td>
<td>Union of Sudanese African Parties</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE SUDAN 1989-2001

Introduction

There has been civil war in Sudan off and on since 1955. The first phase of the conflict was brought to an end by the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement signed between the government and southern rebels led by General Joseph Lagu. Civil war re-ignited in 1983. The principal rebel protagonist since then has been the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang.¹ It is estimated that there have been two million deaths as a result of the conflict as well as over four million refugees.² There have been numerous attempts, both internationally and from within Sudan itself, to bring the war to an end. The longest running forum has been that sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional body consisting of Sudan and several of her neighbouring states.³ However, peace-making was made all the more difficult in the 1990s by United States policy and regional conflicts involving Sudan and some of her neighbours.

Sudan in 2002 is at a cross-roads. There are several reasons to believe that the chances for a peaceful solution to the Sudanese conflict are better now than they have ever been. Firstly, it would appear that there are constitutional and political offers on the negotiating table, up to and including an internationally-monitored referendum on southern Sudan’s status, that address the issues central to the Sudanese conflict. Secondly, there has been a distinct international shift in opinion and policy with regard to Sudan. Whereas in the mid-1990s Sudan had in effect been isolated by the policies of the United States and its regional allies, by the end of that decade Sudan had broken out of political and diplomatic isolation. In 1999, for example, the European Union entered into a political dialogue with Sudan, noting improvements within the Sudanese situation.⁴ A

¹ The SPLA is sometimes also referred to as the SPLM/A, a reference to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, presented as the political component of the organisation.
³ IGAD was originally known as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD): “Drought” was later dropped from the title to become IGAD.
peaceful solution to the war is now at the top of the international community’s Sudan agenda. The international community has also become increasingly resistant to demands to continue providing humanitarian aid to countries wrecked by civil war. Thirdly, there has also been a similar regional shift in attitudes towards Sudan and the Sudanese conflict. In 2001, for example, Sudan held the presidency of both the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA), a body which brings together eleven north African states. Fourthly, it would appear that the Bush Administration in the United States wishes to distance itself from the Clinton Administration’s discredited attempts to militarily, politically and economically destabilise Sudan. Fifthly, it is also clear that the political situation within Sudan has changed significantly. The opposition coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), has fragmented with the departure of pivotal parties such as the Umma. The former Prime Minister, and Umma Party leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, declared in 1999, for example, that: “There are now circumstances and developments which could favour an agreement on a comprehensive political solution.”

Another significant factor is that the Sudanese peace process has been re-energised by a new regional attempt to find a peaceful solution. Egypt has vigorously thrown itself into finding a peaceful solution to the Sudanese conflict. The Libyan-Egyptian initiative has emerged over the past two years to represent the continent as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The fifty-three African nations chose Sudan over Mauritius and Uganda to succeed Namibia as the African representative on the Security Council. Although ultimately unsuccessful as the result of intense American lobbying, The Egyptian Foreign Minister said that “There is an African and an Arab decision in Sudan’s favour concerning this issue.”


6 Sudan has over the past three years emerged as a leader of the region, developments which culminated in Sudan’s hosting of the Eighth Heads of State summit of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) body, as well as the February 2001 Heads of State summit of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States.

7 Sudan is amongst the first nine of twenty Common Market of East and Southern Africa member states to implement the first stage of the envisaged Free Trade Area. This will be Africa’s first step towards full regional integration and a common currency by 2025. See “Sudan to Join African Free Trade Area”, News Article by Reuters, 30 October 2000.


and seeks to secure a comprehensive political settlement of the Sudanese conflict including an all-party constitutional conference and a permanent cease-fire. Unlike the similarly regionally-based IGAD process, which only involved the Sudanese government and the SPLA, the Libyan-Egyptian peace plan called for the involvement of all other parties to the conflict, including the northern opposition parties. Sudan immediately accepted the Libyan-Egyptian proposals. The Egyptian government has stated with regard to the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative:

We are launching this mediatory initiative on consent by the legitimate government and the northern and southern opposition…I believe that if they sit down together at the negotiating table, the two sides will certainly reach agreement.

In August 2001 the chairman of the National Democratic Alliance, Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, reiterated that the NDA supported the Libyan-Egyptian proposals.

Repeated Calls for Cease-fire

In addition to having made unprecedented political and constitutional offers, the Sudanese government has also repeatedly called for a comprehensive cease-fire. Throughout 2001, the Sudanese government once again called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In April and in mid-May 2000, Khartoum continued to affirm its readiness to enter into “an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire” and to restart negotiations for the achievement of a lasting peace. It called upon the SPLA to do the same. For several months the government

adhered to a humanitarian cease-fire in Bahr al-Ghazal: this lasted until the SPLA abandoned the truce in 1999. Khartoum appears to have sought out every possible peace forum.\textsuperscript{15} It has also repeatedly requested international assistance in securing a peaceful end to the conflict.\textsuperscript{16} And while there are those who have claimed that the flow of oil from Sudan’s oil fields from 1999 onwards would make the government intransigent, Khartoum has offered numerous calls for cease-fire since then. It is difficult to see how much further towards a comprehensive solution the Sudanese government can go. There clearly has been a considerable shift in policy and position towards opposition aspirations. The seriousness of the government’s willingness to negotiate was clearly underlined by the fact that the biggest Sudanese opposition party, Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma Party, has left the opposition alliance, declared a cease-fire and entered into domestic politics within Sudan.

**Obstacles to Peace in Sudan**

**Ambivalence Towards Peace in Sudan**

It is clear that the SPLA has been an obstacle to peace in Sudan. This is perhaps best illustrated by John Garang’s statement, for example, regarding the SPLA’s participation in the crucial November 1997 round of IGAD peace talks in Nairobi (the first meeting after the government’s historic offer of an internationally-monitored referendum on self-determination) that “[w]e intended not to reach an agreement with the [Sudanese government]. This is what we did and we succeeded in it because we did not reach an agreement.”\textsuperscript{17} There is clearly growing frustration within the international community at the SPLA’s intransigence. This frustration has been highlighted as a result of the positive shift in international opinion with regard to Sudan. The United Nations, for example, has pointedly called upon the SPLA to accept Khartoum’s offers of cease-fire.\textsuperscript{18} In September 2001, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Sudan observed that: “sources…pointed out that among most of SPLM/A leaders there is no serious commitment to peace”.\textsuperscript{19} The SPLA

\textsuperscript{15} “Sudan Backs Combination of Arab and African Peace Drives”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 October 1999.
\textsuperscript{17} *Summary of World Broadcasts*, BBC, 15 December 1997.
\textsuperscript{18} See, for example, “Annan Calls on Sudan’s SPLM Leader to Sign Ceasefire”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 August 1999.
would appear to be either disinclined or unable to seriously enter into peace negotiations. This may be for any or all of several reasons.

Firstly, there is a clear question as to whether or not the SPLA can function, or even define itself, politically. The Economist has stated, for example, that “the rebels have always, in theory, been a political movement as well as an army. In practice, the army was the movement”.20 The British Independent newspaper has observed: “Unlike most rebel movements, the SPLA makes little attempt to formulate a vision for a future society. The rebels pay lip service to the creation of civil structures. But they and their leader, John Garang, show little sign of making that commitment real.”21 The ostensible political complexion of the SPLA movement has varied from professedly Marxist, at one stage even fighting to keep Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime in power, through to now opportunistically politically identifying with Christian fundamentalist American conservatives.22 The fact that the SPLA is first and foremost a military machine may explain its inability or reluctance to embrace anything other than a military process. Accusations of “warlordism”, fighting for the sake of fighting or for self-aggrandisement rather than for any specific political objectives, may also be disturbingly close to the mark. In October 1998, SPLA leader John Garang told a UN delegation investigating famine and relief operations in Sudan that “[t]he SPLA has decided to continue the war…It is up to the international community to provide humanitarian aid.”23 This was two months after the Roman Catholic Bishop of the starvation-affected diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar Mazzolari, stated that the SPLA was diverting 65 percent of the food aid going into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. This at the height of an acute famine in southern Sudan. Agence France Presse also reported that: “Much of the relief food going to more than a million famine victims in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan is ending up in the hands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), relief workers said.”24 This diversion runs to the value of millions of dollars per year.25

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20 The Economist, March 1998.
22 Even anti-government groups such as the British-based ‘Nuba Survival’ have observed that “Reflecting its Marxist-Leninist roots…the SPLM is engaged in a centralised, militaristic, single-party struggle that is antipathetic towards freedom of association”, ‘Committee of the Civil Project’, available at http://www.nubasurvival.com
What is it that the SPLA is actually fighting for? This question is clearly in the minds of many of those concerned about events in southern Sudan. In January 2001, for example, the Roman Catholic Comboni missionaries in southern Sudan publicly condemned the civil war as “immoral and a tragic farce”. They stated that “the number of victims is escalating, especially among women and children. Spiritual, human and cultural values are getting lost. Corruption, tribalism and fratricidal hatred are fostered. Degradation, underdevelopment and anarchy increase”. The Comboni missionaries also pointedly stated that: “[t]he word ‘liberation’ is abused” and that the civil war was “not any longer a struggle for freedom of the Sudanese people and for the defence of human rights”. Concerns by the mission society that “the Comboni missionaries now in southern Sudan are in grave danger” for having spoken out so publicly appear to have been borne out by the SPLA’s destruction of the Comboni mission and church in Nyal the following month.

Secondly, the SPLA’s claim to represent southern Sudan is, in any instance, questionable. After growing discontent with John Garang within the organisation, the SPLA fragmented in 1991 into several factions. This splintering has made negotiating a peaceful solution all the more difficult. Politically, John Garang would appear to be out of step with a considerable number of southern Sudanese politicians, including several of his former colleagues, in that he refused to come into the internal Sudanese peace process. Several of these southern politicians were parties to the Sudan Peace Agreement signed between them and the government of Sudan in April 1997, an agreement which built upon several political charters signed in 1996. These leaders had included former senior SPLA commander Dr Riek Machar and his South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), Commander Kerubino Bol Kuanyin and the SPLM/A (Bahr al-Ghazal Group), the late Arok Thon Arok and the SPLM/A Bor Group, Commander Mohammed Haroun Kafi and the Nuba Mountains United SPLM/A, Dr Theophilus Ochang Lotti and the Equatoria Defence Force, Samuel Aru Bol and the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP), as well as Dr Lam Akol and the SPLA-United group, all of whom are or were articulate southern Sudanese political leaders. Indeed many southern intellectuals and political leaders who represented southern Sudanese political interests both within and outside of the SPLA were either murdered or imprisoned by Garang. These include the SPLA’s March 1993 murder of Joseph Oduho, southern Sudan’s most respected political leader and the SPLM’s founding chairman.

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28 The mission and church were burnt to the ground on 22 February 2001. See “Sudan Rebels Raze Town, Comboni Mission”, News Article by Catholic World News on 15 March 2001.
Human Rights Watch has also recorded the murders of other key leaders such as Martin Majier, Martin Makur Aleu and Martin Kajiboro.30

It would appear that most if not all of the objectives that southern Sudanese have fought for since before independence appear to have been secured already or are guaranteed in the 1997 Peace Agreement and the new constitution. The present government has introduced a workable federal system, decentralising and devolving government down to 26 states, with southern states governed and administered by southerners – another long-standing southern Sudanese request. (Five of the ten elected governors in southern Sudan are former SPLA commanders.)31 And furthermore, while Dr Garang may not agree with the result, there is no doubt that in so doing there has been what the SPLA has long called for, “a radical restructuring of the power of central government”. It is also clear that the SPLA has not explored any of the offers that are on the negotiating table.

Thirdly, the SPLA has clearly failed in a leadership role for the southern Sudanese. Leaving the lack of a political capability or orientation aside, even on central issues such as unity or separation the SPLA has been ambiguous. The SPLA’s claim to represent southern Sudanese aspirations can only but be questioned. The SPLA, for example, has repeatedly declared itself to be in favour of a united Sudan. Garang, for example, has publicly stated that: “(A)s we have said many times before, we are not secessionists. And if anybody wants to separate even in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. It should not be allowed to disintegrate or fragment itself.” 32 The SPLA’s ambiguity, however, is clear.33 In the SPLA’s proposed agreement with the SPDF in 2001, for example, the stated objective is said to be the “independence of South Sudan”.34 In other statements the SPLA has called for a confederal state.

Fourthly, there also appear to be ethnic and tribal cleavages which would undermine the SPLA’s claim to leadership within southern Sudan. The 1991

34 See, for example, “Southern Sudan’s Two Rival Movements Announce Merger”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 May 2001 and “Sudan Rebel Group and former Rivals Reunite”, News Article by Reuters, 28 May 2001.
split in the SPLA was essentially along ethnic lines. Human Rights Watch has stated, for example, that “the Nuer and Dinka, the two largest tribes in the south, were on opposite sides of the war since 1991 when the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) split.”

In September 2001, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Sudan observed that: “sources…pointed out that…SPLM/A, far from being a genuine liberation movement for the southern tribes, only represents the Bor Dinka and has imposed its presence in the south thanks to the support of external actors.”

The Economist, for example, also summed up at least a passing international perception of the SPLA when it stated that: “[The SPLA] has…been little more than an armed gang of Dinkas…killing, looting and raping. Its indifference, almost animosity, towards the people it was supposed to be ‘liberating’ was all too clear.”

Given that the Dinka tribal grouping is one amongst nineteen major ethnic communities within southern Sudan, the implications are clear. That there has been considerable inter-ethnic conflict in southern Sudan is sadly all too well documented. Following splits in the SPLA, Amnesty International stated that the two groups which emerged attacked each other and civilian groups “for ethnic reasons”.

Thousands of southern civilians were killed and tens of thousands more displaced in these clashes. Lieutenant-General Joseph Lagu, the leader of the southern Sudanese rebels in the first civil war, has himself stated that the SPLA “broke up on ethnic lines”. The observations of a Washington-based Africa interest group, no friend of the Khartoum government, are instructive:

The largely Dinka, mostly southern SPLM/A is the main rebel organisation, although there has been significant fragmentation and rivalry, within the South. In 1991 the SPLM/A split roughly along ethnic lines, with most Dinka remaining in the SPLM/A and most Nuer breaking away to form a separate faction called the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A)...The war is being fought largely in the South, with devastating consequences for the southern Sudanese. Because the various factions use guerilla war tactics and target civilians, and because the factions are split along ethnic lines, rivalry and discord amongst southern Sudanese non-combatants flourish in the South.

In fact, factional fighting in the South is responsible for a

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37 The Economist, March 1998.
39 See, ‘The Sudan Peace Summit in Nashville (USA)’, posted on SudaneseList@MSU.EDU, 31 October 2001.
greater number of deaths than direct clashes between Sudanese government forces and southern rebels. Villages and villagers have become pitted against one another, competing for scarce resources, made scarcer through the many years of war.\(^{40}\) (emphasis added)

Even the Clinton Administration’s Sudan specialist, John Prendergast, a former development aid expert in the Horn of Africa, has confirmed the existence of ethnic tensions between the largely Dinka SPLA and the Nuer tribe as well as communities in Equatoria in southern Sudan ever since the SPLA came into being in 1983, with the SPLA showing what he termed an “absolute disregard for their human rights” \(^{41}\):

The SPLA has historically utilized…counter-insurgency tactics against populations and militias in Equatoria considered to be hostile… This has exacerbated relations between certain Equatorian communities…The common denominator between the attacks was the destruction or stripping of all assets owned by the community, creating increased dependence and displacement.\(^{42}\)

He cites one observer as saying that: “The overwhelmingly ‘Nilotic’ character of the early SPLA was…enough to alienate many Equatorians” and personally states that the SPLA is seen in Equatoria as “an army of occupation”.\(^{43}\) SPLA ethnic cleansing continues to this day. Throughout 1999, for example, the BBC, and other reliable sources, reported on SPLA violence towards non-Dinka ethnic groups, groups which also “accused the SPLA of becoming an army of occupation”.\(^{44}\) In 2000, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Sudan reported that “credible reports were received whereby SPLA, mostly Dinka, was behaving as an occupying army in Eastern Equatoria.”\(^{45}\)

Fifthly, it is also clear that the Dinka community is itself politically diverse: Dinka political leaders who have been opposed to John Garang and the SPLA have included Commander Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, a former deputy commander of the SPLA, Arok Thon Arok, another senior SPLA commander, and Samuel Aru Bol, a past deputy prime minister of Sudan. Dinkas also hold numerous

\(^{42}\) Ibid, p.56.
\(^{43}\) Ibid, p.57.
\(^{44}\) Ibid, p.56.
\(^{45}\) See, for example, “Growing Friction in Rebel-Held Southern Sudan”, News Article by BBC Online, 9 June, 1999
political offices within the Sudanese government. Given the inability of the SPLA to even establish itself as either politically or ethnically representative of southern Sudan or the southern Sudanese, its claim to be a national liberation movement is clearly unrealistic. Nevertheless, Dr Garang appears to wish to cling to the fiction that the SPLA is a national organisation. Given the fact that the SPLA is at best representative of one political and ethnic minority within southern Sudan itself, any demands which would infringe upon northern Sudan are clearly questionable.

The question is for how much longer must Sudan be held hostage by a militaristic faction unrepresentative even of its own tribal grouping, one amongst southern Sudan’s numerous tribal and ethnic groups, let alone Sudan as a whole?

A Reluctance to Negotiate

The SPLA’s apparent reluctance to seriously negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict is a matter of record. The SPLA has waged war since 1983 against several governments in Khartoum – military, transitional and democratic – and repeated attempts at a negotiated resolution of the conflict have failed. While it is true that several governments came and went in the 1980s – there were six coalition governments during Sadiq al-Mahdi’s tenure alone – the same government has now been in power in Sudan since 1989. The SPLA has constantly changed the conditions it has set for ending the war and negotiating. In the 1980s it demanded that Sudan’s military pacts with other countries be abrogated, that Nimeiri’s September 1983 sharia laws be repealed and that there should be a national constitutional conference. Sudan’s military pacts have been dropped, in 1991 the government exempted southern Sudan from sharia law and the Libyan-Egyptian initiative envisages a national dialogue conference. Yet the war continues, SPLA demands change and peace talks falter. Negotiation is about dialogue. John Garang’s stated position in 1999, however, was that “the [Sudanese government] cannot be reformed, it must be removed”.46 This was echoed again as recently as 2001 when he stated that “negotiations must lead to the dismantling of the NIF regime”.47 These statements perhaps explain some of the impasse within the peace process.

John Garang’s disdain for the IGAD peace process has also been illustrated by his launching of large-scale offensives often one or two days before, or on the same day as, IGAD-brokered peace talks. On one occasion, thirty minutes

46 “Sudan Opposition Divided Over Talks with Khartoum”, News Article by Reuters, 10 June 1999.
47 “Speech by the Chairman of SPLM and C-in-C SPLA Dr John Garang de Mabior on the 18th Anniversary of SPLM/SPLA”, 16 May 2001.
before the June 2001 IGAD peace summit was due to be held in Nairobi, the SPLA faxed a statement to Associated Press stating that its forces had captured the southern town of Raga, declaring “this is excellent timing”. 48 Similarly, during the September 2000 IGAD peace talks, the SPLA escalated its military activity claiming to have inflicted “heavy loss of life and equipment” on government forces and to have captured the garrison town of Tahajulbulis. 49 It has also not escaped the attention of the international community that on the occasions that the Sudanese government, conscious of international concerns about bombing, has declared a cessation of aerial bombardment within southern Sudan, the rebels have responded with new and vigorous military offensives; these offensives have themselves provoked a continuation of bombing in counter-response.

Despite clearly lacking legitimacy either as a national or even necessarily a regional force, the SPLA has nevertheless been unable to resist attempting to impose models on northern Sudan and Sudan as a whole. The SPLA, for example, has long demanded as a pre-condition for peace in Sudan that there be a total separation of religion and state in Sudan, that Islamic law be abolished throughout Sudan, north and south. This ignores the reality of Sudan’s religious make-up. The Sudanese people are overwhelmingly Muslim. Nationally, Christians account for perhaps five percent of the population. Even in southern Sudan, where Christians make up perhaps fifteen percent of the population, with Muslims also accounting for a sizeable minority, the majority of the people are animist. 50 As the SPLA has repeatedly been identified as a Christian rebel organisation, and given that John Garang has called the New Sudan Council of Churches the “spiritual wing of the Movement” 51, there are additional questions that must be asked about how representative the SPLA are of the southern Sudanese population. Considering also that the government has exempted

50 There is a certain amount of divergence in respect of estimates of the religious breakdown of the southern population. The United States government states that 70 percent of Sudanese are Muslim, 25 percent are animist and five percent Christian (‘Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy’, Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington-DC, 8 June 2001). Human Rights Watch states that 4 percent of the population are Christian and that about 15 percent of southern Sudanese are Christian (“Religious Persecution in Sudan”, Testimony of Jemera Rone, Human Rights Watch Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa, 25 September 1997). The Economist Intelligence Unit in its report entitled Sudan: Country Profile 1994-95 also puts the Christian population of southern Sudan at 15 percent. The definitive United States government guide, Sudan – A Country Study, published by the Federal Research division and Library of Congress, states that “In the early 1990s possibly no more than 10 percent of southern Sudan’s population was Christian.” Muslims may make up a similar percentage in southern Sudan.
southern Sudan from Islamic sharia law, for the very reason that it does not have a Muslim majority population, it is questionable that the SPLA, at best questionably representative of sections of southern Sudanese society, seeks to dictate the political and religious dispensation within northern Sudan. While it has become convenient to claim that the conflict in Sudan is a religious one, sparked by the Nimeiri regime’s introduction of Islamic laws in September 1983, the simple fact is that the second phase of the war began several months earlier, and was in a direct response to constitutional and political changes within southern Sudan. In September 2001, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Sudan stated that: “church interlocuters almost unanimously share the general opinion that the war has no religious motivation…”

The key issue of a referendum on self-determination has also shown SPLA contradictions. Given that the SPLA has been continually projected as fighting for southern Sudanese self-determination, the SPLA showed remarkable reluctance in embracing Khartoum’s repeated offers of a internationally-supervised referendum whereby the people of southern Sudan could choose either unity or separation – offers outlined in the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement and incorporated into Sudan’s 1999 constitution. Rather than seizing upon this offer, the SPLA chose first to downplay it and when the organisation did accept the concept of a referendum the SPLA then demanded that any such referendum should include a redrawing of the 1956 boundaries of what constituted southern Sudan. They additionally complicated matters by demanding that other areas of Sudan, namely the Nuba mountains and Ingessana hills, should also be afforded referenda on self-determination. It would be analogous to parties to a referendum in Canada on Quebec’s political status demanding that the province’s boundaries be redrawn and that parts of Ontario and Labrador be included. This attitude has been criticised by veteran southern Sudanese opposition politicians such as the Dinka elder Bona Malwal. Speaking out in May 2000, Malwal, a former culture and information minister, publisher of the opposition Sudan Democratic Gazette, and NDA executive member, stated: “I have noticed and revealed the duplicity with which you have participated in the peace process. Many Southerners have spoken for some time about the need to arrive at a Southern consensus over the question of Self-Determination. They recognise the need to fill the vacuum created by your vague goals for the war of liberation. After seventeen years of this bloody war

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54 “SPLA Plays Down Deal on Referendum in southern Sudan”, News Article by BBC, 7 May 1998
55 “Referendum Agreed at Sudan Peace Talks”, News Article by BBC World, 7 May 1998
in which two million of our people have perished, the Northern Sudanese political establishment as a whole has said that they would negotiate a political agreement with you to work out the modalities for a referendum on self-determination for the South. Yet, you have personally dodged this issue—as seen in the way you have briefed your delegations to the various rounds of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) peace talks. Perhaps your own tactics make you blind to this, but there is indeed increasing support among the Southern Sudanese people for pursuing peace, if peace is pursued honestly, diligently and in good faith by the other side. How many more millions of Southern Sudanese do you want to die to satisfy your ego? 56

The SPLA position with regard to the Libyan-Egyptian initiative has also been characterised by its usual ambiguity. In erratic shifts in position, for example, the SPLA in 1999 both accepted and then rejected Libyan-Egyptian attempts at peace-making, sometimes within the space of 48 hours. 57 In 2001 they repeated this pattern. 58

And, most recently, in April 2001, the SPLA has refused to accept the government’s repeated offers of a comprehensive cease-fire stating that it would only agree a cease-fire if the government ended oil production in Sudan 59 knowing all too well that it would be impossible for the Sudanese government to meet such a demand. It has repeatedly been claimed that oil revenues would encourage Khartoum to pursue a military solution to the conflict at the expense of negotiations. The fact is that since oil began to be exported from Sudan in September 1998, the government has offered or called for a cease-fire on at least twelve occasions. It has been the SPLA that has refused to respond to offers of a peaceful resolution of the war.

The Clinton Administration’s Sudan Policy

Any study of the search for peace in Sudan in the 1990s cannot ignore the impediment to that process posed by the Clinton Administration. In April 2001,

58 See, for example, “Sudanese Rebels Repeats Conditions for Joining Peace Bid” News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 August 2001.
for example, former United States President Carter, perhaps the single most respected and objective commentator on events within Sudan, said of this period: "For the last eight years, the U.S. has had a policy which I strongly disagree with in Sudan, supporting the revolutionary movement and not working for an overall peace settlement." 60 This echoed earlier concerns voiced by Carter. In December 1999 he had observed:

The people in Sudan want to resolve the conflict. The biggest obstacle is US government policy. The US is committed to overthrowing the government in Khartoum. Any sort of peace effort is aborted, basically by policies of the United States...Instead of working for peace in Sudan, the US government has basically promoted a continuation of the war. 61

Washington’s attempts to destabilise the biggest country in Africa, a politically delicate country made up of a number of ethnic groups, hundreds of tribes and languages, and an Islamic-Christian fault line is simply incomprehensible. Sudan has ten neighbouring states. A successful attempt to destabilise and fragment Sudan would very likely lead to the “Lebanonisation” of the country, with all the grave implications that would entail. Alternatively, Sudan might become another Somalia, an anarchic patchwork of clan and tribal allegiances. 62

As early as February 1997, commentators had outlined the regional dangers of Washington’s policies. In an article entitled ‘US Masterminds 3-Pronged War on Sudan’, Africa Analysis reported:

There is growing anxiety in eastern and central Africa that Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, the Americans and their European friends are steering into open warfare with Sudan. This is in turn stimulating contrary alliances extending to the shifting frontline of the Great Lakes region...The ramifications are alarming diplomats [in Nairobi]. 63

The dangers of this involvement were also clear to American newspapers such as The Boston Globe: “To the peril of regional stability, the Clinton

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Administration has used northern Uganda as a military training ground for southern Sudanese rebels fighting the Muslim government of Khartoum.\textsuperscript{64}

This American attitude was all the more regrettable since the Sudanese government has repeatedly invited constructive United States involvement within Sudan.\textsuperscript{65}

It is clear what effect the Clinton Administration’s military and political support for the SPLA had on the movement’s willingness to negotiate a political settlement. Former President Carter observed at the time: “I think Garang now feels he doesn’t need to negotiate because he anticipates a victory brought about by increasing support from his immediate neighbors, and also from the United States and indirectly from other countries”. Sadly, in 2000 and 2001, the United States Congress voted millions of dollars worth of assistance to Sudanese rebels.\textsuperscript{66} Again, these are actions which probably serve to reinforce SPLA intransigence with regard to peace talks.

The Clinton Administration’s message was also not lost on some of Sudan’s neighbours. Carter bluntly stated that the Clinton Administration’s millions of dollars in military aid to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda was “a tacit demonstration of support for the overthrow of the Khartoum government”. In addition to its involvement within the internal peace process within Sudan, therefore, the government also had to spend considerable attention in securing peaceful relations with its neighbours, neighbours that had been encouraged to wage war on Sudan. This encouragement took the form of political, financial and military support, including grants of tens of millions of dollars worth of military assistance to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda.\textsuperscript{67}

Sudan has successfully sought to re-establish peaceful relationships with these countries. In March 2000 Sudan and Ethiopia stated that their countries’ ties were “now much stronger” than they were in early 1990s. The two governments announced that they had signed agreements on cooperation in political, security,


\textsuperscript{67}This encouragement has included debt relief as well as significant increases in the levels of British and American aid to these countries. \textit{The Financial Times} of 26 February 1997 reported, for example, that Uganda was said to be expecting debt relief of between US$ 252 and US$ 386 million in April 1998.
trade, roads, communications, agriculture and other spheres.\textsuperscript{68} It was also announced in November 2000 that Sudan will be exporting oil to Ethiopia, and that an oil pipeline linking the two countries was being considered.\textsuperscript{69} In January 2000, Eritrea and Sudan resumed diplomatic relations with each other.\textsuperscript{70} Eritrea handed back the Sudanese embassy building to the Sudanese government. The Eritrean government had previously given it to the Sudanese rebels.

In December 1999, Sudan and Uganda signed an agreement brokered by Jimmy Carter which sought to normalise relations. This agreement sought to end support for combatants in their respective civil wars.\textsuperscript{71} Despite having signed this, and other, agreements pledging an end to military support for the SPLA rebels, Uganda has, however, continued such assistance. The first Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Eriya Kategaya, appearing before the Ugandan parliamentary committee on presidential and foreign affairs, stated for example that Uganda would not stop supporting the SPLA. He said that “To be seen to abandon them because we want peace with (Sudanese President) Bashir is not correct.”\textsuperscript{72} Six months after having signed the December 1999 Nairobi accord, Museveni admitted to the Ugandan newspaper \textbf{New Vision} that Uganda was still providing the SPLA with weapons.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, continuing Ugandan-Sudanese talks have seen progress.\textsuperscript{74} It is with Egypt, however, that Sudan has established a very constructive new relationship. Up until Sudanese independence in 1956, Egypt and Sudan had essentially been one country. Egypt still looks on Sudan as its hinterland, and has long been concerned about the unity of Sudan.\textsuperscript{75} Whatever the past differences may have been, from 1999 onwards Egypt and Sudan normalised their relations.\textsuperscript{76} The Egyptian government has also entered into a constructive dialogue with Sudan culminating in its involvement in the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative. In 1999 Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa stated that “Egypt sees al-Bashir as the

\textsuperscript{68} “Sudan, Ethiopia Say They Have Normalised Relations”, News Article by Agence France Press, 5 March 2000.
\textsuperscript{69} “Sudan Set to Begin Oil Export to Ethiopia”, News Article by PANA, 4 November 2000.
\textsuperscript{72} “Kategaya Takes Up Issue with Defence”, \textit{New Vision} (Kampala), 3 March 2000.
\textsuperscript{73} “Museveni Warns Sudan on LRA Rebels”, \textit{New Vision} (Kampala), 25 May 2000.
\textsuperscript{74} “Uganda, Sudan End Peace Talks, Report Progress”, News Article by Reuters, 27 September, 2000.
\textsuperscript{75} See, for example, statements by Osama El-Baz, political adviser to Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak: “El-Baz: Sudan is the Strategic Depth of Egypt”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 14 September 1999; “Egypt Reiterates Backing for Sudan’s Territorial Integrity”, News Article by Xinhua, 22 December 1999.
\textsuperscript{76} “Egypt and Sudan Restore ‘Full’ Diplomatic Relations”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 23 December 1999; “Focus – Egypt Restores Diplomatic Ties With Sudan”, News Article by Reuters, 23 December 1999.
head of the Sudanese state and as a representative of his country”. Egypt and Sudan were bound up, he said, by “eternal, special, historical, and future relations”. In 2000, Moussa further stated: “There’s now an openness in Sudan’s government. It is prepared to listen and negotiate and reach a vision for a new Sudan that accepts all opposition factions.”

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Process

The focus for many of the Sudanese peace talks has been the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Since the IGAD peace initiative commenced in September 1993, there have been 18 rounds of talks and meetings, including heads of state and ministerial summits. There has been a growing frustration with this particular forum. It has also been noted that the initial IGAD peace committee, made up of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda, has not always been the most neutral forum given that three of these countries charged with working to secure peace in Sudan were simultaneously involved in militarily destabilising Sudan at various points since 1993. Human Rights Watch reported, for example, that it “found growing involvement in the war in Sudan by Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda through arms flows, the hosting of armed opposition forces, and some direct intervention.” The IGAD initiative dealt exclusively with dialogue between the government and the SPLA. This excluded those northern opposition parties within the National Democratic Alliance. Given that the SPLA had come into the coalition in 1995 and had agreed the projection of the NDA as the single voice of Sudanese opposition, any attempt to resolve Sudan’s conflict – which included armed insurrection by several northern opposition groupings within the NDA – through a forum only addressing SPLA, and arguably southern Sudanese, concerns and issues was skewed. Additionally, neighbours such as Egypt and Libya were excluded from involvement in this process given the IGAD membership structure. Several of these concerns had been voiced by Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi. In July 1999 he outlined a threefold criticism of the IGAD process: its restriction to “only...two parties to the conflict”; and its exclusion of constitutional issues; its exclusion of “other equally concerned neighbours”.

Given the apparent stalemate that has characterised the IGAD process, the attraction of the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative, and particularly its inclusiveness politically, is clear.

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77 “Egypt Hails Sudanese President’s Visit”, News Article by Xinhua, 22 December 1999.
78 “Focus - Egypt’s Moussa in Sudan to Discuss Peace”, News Article by Reuters, 4 January 2000.
80 “Former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadek El-Mahdi Addresses the Sudan Issue”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 2 July 1999.
The History of Negotiations

Within days of coming to power in July 1989, the present government led by President Bashir invited the SPLA leader, John Garang, to take part in a negotiated settlement of the civil war. The government also declared a unilateral cease-fire, and announced a general amnesty for all those who had fought against the government since 1983. Garang rejected the call, and rebel forces continued their military activity, seizing, for example, the town of Kurmuk in eastern Sudan later that year.

At the Organisation of African Unity summit meeting in Addis Ababa in July 1989 President Bashir confirmed his government’s commitment to securing a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Sudanese conflict. The Government met with SPLA representatives in Addis Ababa from 18-22 August, and it was agreed to continue a dialogue. This was the first ever meeting between a government of Sudan and rebels since the beginning of the present civil war in 1983. The Sudanese government convened a national conference on peace issues, which lasted six weeks from 9 September until 21 October 1989; Garang and the SPLA were invited to participate. Attended by a large number of groups and organisations, this conference passed several resolutions, including calls for greater political participation and power sharing, the need to recognise cultural and ethnic diversity and the need for a more equitable sharing of the national wealth.

The government held a second round of negotiations with the SPLA in Nairobi from 28 November-5 December 1989, talks facilitated by the former United States President, Jimmy Carter. The Khartoum government presented an agenda for discussion and the representatives of the rebel movement acknowledged the resolutions of the national dialogue conference on peace as being constructive. This featured in the final communiqué. The government addressed the issue of federalism and decentralisation. A federal system was introduced, whereby Sudan was divided into nine states with devolved powers. The southern states, those with a non-Muslim majority, were exempted from the sharia law.

In June 1991, President Bashir accepted a peace initiative advanced by the Nigerian head-of-state, President Ibrahim Babangida. The Nigerian government drafted an agenda and fixed the date of this round of meetings. These peace talks were held in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, from 26 May-4 June 1992. Prior to this pivotal meeting, however, the SPLA had split into two factions in August 1991: the Nasir faction, led by Dr Riek Machar, had orchestrated the split, and the remaining faction, known then as the Torit faction, continued to be headed by John Garang. (The Torit faction would come to be known as SPLA-Mainstream and then just SPLA.) The Sudanese government met with representatives of the Nasir faction in both Nairobi, London and Frankfurt. This
range of meetings culminated in crucial proximity talks in Frankfurt in February 1992. The Nasir rebel grouping agreed to accept federalism as the basis for negotiating an end to the Sudanese civil war. The Torit faction declared itself in favour of confederation or self-determination for southern Sudan.

The Abuja peace talks ended with the following resolutions: that a negotiated, peaceful resolution of the Sudanese conflict was needed and it was agreed that President Babangida would continue to mediate between the two sides; that Sudan was a multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-faith country and that a constitutional and political dispensation similar to that within Nigeria should be explored; to agree on interim confidence-building measures; to establish a committee to examine equitable wealth-sharing measures during the interim period, and to resume Nigerian-sponsored talks. The Abuja peace talks were marred by continued schisms within the opposition ranks. William Nyuon, John Garang’s deputy within the Torit faction, had represented SPLA-Torit at the talks. At a subsequent press conference in Kampala, Garang claimed that Nyuon had exceeded his authority during the Abuja talks. This disagreement resulted in another split within the SPLA, with Nyuon leading a third faction. In the aftermath of Abuja 1, John Garang contradicted the resolutions agreed at Abuja 1, insisting on a confederal model of two nations with separate constitutional arrangements and political institutions, with separate sovereignty in the fields of defence and foreign affairs. The Nigerian-mediated peace process stalled for several months. This deadlock was broken during a meeting at Entebbe in Uganda in February 1993 sponsored by the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. Garang assured President Museveni that he did accept the Abuja 1 resolutions and that he would also accept whatever was agreed by his faction’s negotiators at the forthcoming Abuja 2 peace talks.

Preliminary discussions between the government of Sudan and the John Garang faction of the SPLA preceded the Abuja 2 negotiations. The official talks took place between 1-17 May 1993. A wide number of constitutional, political and social issues were discussed. The peace-talks focused on several themes: power-sharing between central authority and federated states, the powers of a central authority, the use of referendums as a means of judging the wishes of people in southern Sudan. It was agreed that any future dispensation would involve a distinct separation of powers within Sudan. A number of interim measures were discussed, including security and military considerations, the resettlement and rehabilitation of those affected by the civil war and the status of the south during any future interim period. A considerable amount of common ground was covered and agreed, and the Nigerian hosts of the talks began drafting the final communiqué. John Garang arrived in Abuja one day before the end of the talks and demanded the redrafting of what had previously been agreed upon to include that any residual powers not specifically vested with central government
would devolve to the states, a reversal of accepted federal models whereby those powers not vested with the states are reserved to the federal government. These demands effectively derailed the Abuja 2 peace-talks. The Nigerian government issued a statement outlining the course of the talks, the agreements and disagreements, and calling upon the two sides to continue their dialogue. Nigeria also declared its willingness to continue its mediation efforts.

The split in the SPLA had meant that for any meaningful attempt to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the government of Sudan had to engage in meetings with the various factions. At the same time as it was engaged in the Abuja 2 talks with that faction which then came to style itself SPLA-Mainstream, previously known as the Torit faction, the Khartoum administration was also involved in negotiations in Nairobi with that faction which came to be known as SPLA-United. (SPLA-United was an amalgamation of the Nasir faction with those groupings led by William Nyeon and Kerubino.)

The Nairobi talks were held from 10-25 May 1993. Both sides in these talks agreed that interim arrangements regarding the distribution of political power and wealth, religious issues, security arrangements and the referendum issue would be brought into being within a united, federal Sudan. There was also mutual agreement on power-sharing issues, the political and constitutional involvement of southern Sudan at a national level, human rights guarantees, and the need for a referendum to resolve key issues. With regard to sharia law, it was agreed that generally-agreed basic laws would be applied at national level, with the proviso that the states reserved the right to enact locally-specific legislation, such as traditional laws, in addition to federal laws. Areas of disagreement between the government and the SPLA-United grouping included whether or not Sudan should be administered as one or more units, the length of the transitional period and security arrangements during projected interim period.

Further meetings were held between the government and SPLA-United in August 1993, significantly inside Sudan itself, at Fashoda in the Upper Nile state. At both these meetings in Fashoda and before, the government and SPLA-United reached several agreements with respect to the logistics of humanitarian assistance, the opening up, for example, of land and river corridors for such aid, and non-hindrance of refugee and development projects in areas of conflict.

There were several subsequent rounds of peace negotiations between the government and the various rebel factions. Four rounds of peace-talks were held in Nairobi in 1994 under the auspices of the then Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development. IGADD drew up a declaration of principles which it hoped would constitute the basis for resolving the Sudanese conflict (agreement on this declaration was only reached in 1997). The government also
convened a conference in Juba itself in May 1994 for southern Sudanese leaders and groupings to discuss a peaceful resolution of the political and social problems facing Sudan. The convention called for peace within Sudan, following the process of “peace from within” and saw the establishment of a body dedicated to securing peace in Sudan, the Supreme Council for Peace. This was brought into being by Presidential Decree Number 80.

The 1996 Political Charter

The ‘Peace from Within’ process in Sudan was a reflection of concerns, in large part realised, that at that time the Sudanese people could not rely on outside guidance and assistance in their search for peace, given the antipathy and unwillingness of several states to assist in the search for a lasting peace in Sudan.

Dr Riek Machar, the leader of the South Sudan Independence Movement, and Commander Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, the leader of the SPLA/Bar-al-Gazal Group, signed a Political Charter with the government of Sudan on 10 April 1996 in Khartoum. While stating that Sudanese unity should be preserved, the charter agreed a referendum to determine the political aspirations of the people of southern Sudan. It also agreed that citizenship shall be the basis of rights and duties. The establishment of a southern coordinating council in southern Sudan was also agreed.

In signing the Political Charter, Dr Machar stated that “although the real causes of war have long been identified, yet successive national governments in the past deliberately evaded providing a realistic and acceptable solution to the conflict. Promises and agreements were made but hardly honoured. Thus the war continued for forty years, resulting in untold loss in human lives, and property, retardation of socio-economic development, massive displacement of people, famine, diseases and break down of social fabric and traditions in Southern Sudan”. Machar added that the signing of the political charter “is a clear demonstration to a commitment by both the current leadership of the Sudan and the South Sudan Independence Movement to start a new path to peace, stability, prosperity in the country”. The referendum issue was central to the process: “Elaborate legal and constitutional procedures ought to be worked out and agreed upon for the ascertainment through a referendum of views of the people of southern Sudan with respect to their political and constitutional status at the end of the interim period”. Commander Kerubino stated that the Political Charter would be “safeguarding the right of Southern Sudanese to participate in a full ruling of the country in guaranteeing the equitable share of wealth and resources of the country by its people and state.”
Interviewed after the signing, Machar was asked why he had chosen to sign a peace agreement with the present government of Sudan: “We started dialogue in 1986 with Sewar El Dahab (leader of the Transitional Government after the downfall of Numeiri) and we did not reach any solution. During Sadiq El Mahdi’s regime, we doubled our efforts, but no progress was achieved. And when the National Salvation Revolution came to power, we also further doubled our efforts. We started peace talks in 1989 in Nairobi, then under the auspices of former US president Mr Jimmy Carter and the Abuja 1 and 2 and several IGADD efforts and the Frankfurt talks. But Garang was always the obstacle. We tried to convince him but in vain...And then after IGADD, we decided to do it ourselves...we are convinced that this government is serious to reach a solution.”

These views were echoed by Kerubino who also stated: “We think this government is serious and committed to realise peace. And, after all, war was not our objective. We had reasons to go to the bush and start fighting and now we are here to challenge the government on the spot politically.”

On 31 July 1996 the government also signed an understanding with the Nuba Mountain Central Committee of the SPLA of Commander Mohammed Haroun Kafi. Negotiations with Sudanese rebel leaders continued for the rest of 1996 and into 1997.

The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

As a result of this search for a comprehensive peace, on 21 April 1997, a Peace Agreement was signed in Khartoum. It was signed by the Sudanese Vice-President, Zubeir Mohammed Salih and by Dr Riek Machar, representing the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), which was the largest of the rebel groups taking part in the peace process. Other signatories were Commander Kerubino Bol Kuyin, for the SPLA (Bahr al-Gazal Group), Theophilus Ochang Lotti, for the Equatoria Defence Force, Kawac Makwei, for the South Sudan Independents Group, Arok Thon Arok, for the SPLA/Bor Group, Samuel Aru Bol, for the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP), which was itself made up of seven political parties – the Southern Sudan Political Association, the People’s Progressive Party, the Sudan African Congress, the Sudan African People’s Congress, the Southern Sudan Federal Party, the Sudan African National Union and the Sudan National Party. Also present were the Sudanese President, General Omer al-Bashir, the Speaker of Parliament, Dr Hassan al-Turabi, and other senior government officials, civil servants and army representatives. The Agreement carries into effect the principles agreed in the preliminary rounds of discussions described above, and incorporated in the Peace Charters.

Sudanow (Khartoum), May 1996, p.15.
Firstly in respect of southern aspirations for self-determination, there is to be a free and fair – and internationally monitored – referendum in southern Sudan after four years, to determine whether the people of the south desire independence or federation.

Second, in the meantime the sources of law in Sudan are to be Islamic sharia and local custom, but each of the 26 States created by the Twelfth Constitutional Decree of 1995, which introduced a federal system, is to have the right to make such supplementary laws as it finds just or convenient. Southern Sudan would be exempt from Islamic law. This provision settles the dispute that may not have restarted the civil war in 1983, but which certainly embittered it, and which the Governments led by Sadiq al-Mahdi conspicuously failed to address in the late 1980s.

Third, the Agreement guarantees all the usual freedoms – of movement, assembly, organisation, speech, and press in accordance with the laws in force in the country, and in accordance with the relevant international treaties. The Sudanese Supreme Court is to be the custodian of the Constitution, which will include the Agreement as entrenched legislation, alterable only by a special process. Worth mentioning are the articles that spell out that there shall be no official discrimination for or against any religion. Though overwhelmingly an Islamic country, Sudan is to give an equality of civil and other rights to its five percent Christian minority, and to the rather larger minority of animists.

Fourth, the Agreement provides that Southerners shall be equitably represented in all constitutional, legislative and executive organs at the Federal level. It decrees the formation of a 25-Member Southern Coordination Council, which is to include a President, 13 Ministers and the 10 Southern Sudan Governors. One of the permanent grievances of Southerners since before independence in 1956 has been the monopolisation of office by Northerners. The present Government has tried to redress this historic imbalance. The making of a formal guarantee of affirmative action at the official level is a logical extension.

Fifth, and following from the above, there is to be a formal sharing of national resources between the different regions of Sudan, with priority being given to reconstruction in the south.

Sixth, while Arabic is to be the official language of Sudan, English is to be the second language. This again settles one of the Southern grievances – the cultural domination of the Arabic North over the more English-speaking South. Moreover, other, traditional, languages are to be encouraged and developed, especially in the media.
The significance of the 1997 Agreement was that it represented at that time the boldest and most sustained effort in Sudanese history to bring about a just and lasting settlement to the Sudanese civil war. The rebel leaders who took part in the negotiations deserve high praise for their statesmanship in coming to the negotiating table. So also does the Sudanese Government, for having broken a deadlock that had defeated every previous government – and for having defied predictions that it would fight the civil war to the bitter end. The Southern Coordination Council was also established in August 1997.

It was significant that so many years of negotiations were focused amongst Sudanese, within Sudan itself. The result of this internal peace dialogue were the 1996 Peace Charters, the April 1997 Peace Agreement and subsequent agreements such as that with Dr Lam Akol, leader of the SPLA-United. The SPLA’s intransigence amid calls to enter this process undermined the achievements made in 1996 and 1997. That the Government was still keen to include all parties to the conflict was demonstrated by its acceptance of the regional Inter-Government Authority on Development’s declaration of principles in Nairobi in July 1997.

A heavy price was paid by the Sudanese government in its search for “peace from within”. In February 1998, a transport plane carrying a senior peace delegation headed by the first Vice-President General Zubeir Mohammed Salih, the man responsible for negotiating the political charters and the 1997 Khartoum peace agreement, crashed near Nasir in southern Sudan. Vice-President Zubeir died along with 26 others, including the former rebel leader Arok Thon Arok.

In conclusion the following can be observed. The present Sudanese government declared within weeks of its coming to power that there could not be a military solution to the Sudanese conflict. It has also been the present Sudanese government that has sought to resolve the conflict with constitutional proposals and enacted legislation unprecedented in Sudan’s post-independence history – actions which addressed all previous southern Sudanese aspirations as articulated by southern Sudanese leaders. These policies constituted a distinct break with the policies of previous governments. In 1991 the government exempted southern Sudan from the Islamic sharia law introduced by President Nimeiri in 1983 and maintained by successive administrations. Khartoum also introduced a federal system in Sudan, another long-standing southern call, which saw the formation of 26 states, ten of which within southern Sudan, governed by southerners. The 1997 peace agreement saw the granting of special status to southern Sudan with the creation of a Coordinating Council, in effect a southern government within the Sudanese federal system. This was incorporated into the 1998 Constitution. All this certainly follows the “one country, two systems” formula advanced by the SPLA. And, unlike any government before
it, the present administration also accepted the holding of an internationally-
monitored referendum whereby the people of southern Sudan could choose
between unity or separation. This attitude must be compared to the inflexibility
of previous Sudanese governments. None offered anything like these attempts
to address the southern conflict, and the constitutional issues at its core. This
attitude must also be compared to the intransigence of the SPLA and what can
only but be described as the lack of negotiating will on its part. The SPLA has
failed to recognise and seize the unprecedented political and constitutional
opportunities for peace that exist. It has seemingly opted instead to pursue a
futile military solution.

The “peace from within” activities of the Sudanese government were also
gradually augmented with new constitutional reforms and the introduction of
multi-party politics in the country. It was these changes which unfolded in the
late 1990s which came to persuade key opposition leaders such as former prime
minister Sadiq al-Mahdi that genuine political changes had come to Sudan. It is
clear that for the SPLA their war in southern Sudan is, as stated by the Comboni
missionaries, “no longer a struggle for freedom of the Sudanese people and for
the defence of human rights”. There can also be no doubt that the international
community, and particularly the United States, has a vital role to play in
bringing pressure to bear upon the SPLA to embrace the peace process within
Sudan. Given that the IGAD process has for some time been blocked by SPLA
intransigence, it is little wonder that we have seen the emergence of the Libyan-
Egyptian initiative as an additional, and some would say an alternative path
towards peace.
A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY

A Background to Conflict

1820-1881 Turkish-Egyptian forces led by Mohammed Ali occupy northern Sudan and much of southern Sudan, including Bahr al-Ghazal. In 1881 Mohammed Ahmed declares himself to be al-Mahdi, the awaited guide, and leads his Ansar Islamic movement against Egyptian control of Sudan. The Mahdist conquest of Sudan begins.

1882 The British occupy Egypt.

1885 Mahdist forces capture Khartoum. British General Charles Gordon is killed in the fighting. Mohammed Ahmed dies later that year.

1885-1898 The Mahdist state is established first under al-Mahdi and then under Abdallah ibn Mohammed, known as the Khalifa. “The mahdist state was the first modern Sudanese national entity, governing vast and diverse regions from a central capital at Omdurman, with a centralized legal and political apparatus and its own currency. It was also an Islamic state fashioned to revive the concept and practice of the early Islamic community of Muhammad and his companions.” In 1896 Anglo-Egyptian forces led by Lord Kitchener begin the conquest of Sudan. In September 1898, the battle of Omdurman saw the resounding defeat of Mahdist forces. The Khalifa is killed in fighting the following year.


1899 The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in Sudan is established following the defeat of the Mahdist state. Britain and Egypt are legally equal rulers over Sudan, although Britain is the dominant partner.

In the following years, the British focus on development in northern Sudan, including building railways. A modern civil service is also established. There is little social or economic development of western or southern Sudan which are administered through British-supervised traditional authorities. Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi, hereditary head of the Islamic Ansar sect and Ali al-Mirghani, hereditary head of the Islamic Khatmiyya sect, are encouraged by the British authorities to reconfigure their conservative, Sunni Muslim movements into political organisations.
1922 The British administration introduces the ‘Passport and Permits Ordinance’ which controls movement between northern and southern Sudan. This resulted in the progressive exclusion of northern traders and the limitation of southerners travelling to the north.

1930 The British develop the “Southern Policy” reinforcing barriers between northern and southern Sudan.

1943-45 The first political parties are formed, including the Ashigga, identified with the Khatmiyya sect, and the Umma Party, based on the Mahdi family’s Ansar Islamic sect. The Ashigga Party favours union with Egypt while Umma advocates the complete independence of the Sudan.

1946 The administration’s “Southern Policy” is reversed. The colonial authorities acknowledges that southern Sudan was inextricably bound to the Arabicised northern Sudan. The new policy was to ensure that the southern Sudanese were equipped to stand up for themselves as social and economic equals of the northerners.

12 June 1947 The Juba Conference is convened by the British colonial administration. Southern and northern representatives met for the first time to discuss the future of southern Sudan in the framework of a united Sudan. It was agreed that a legislative council should be formed with members drawn from the north and south. It was also agreed that a plan of economic, administrative and educational development should be initiated in southern Sudan to enable the region to catch up with the north.

23 December 1948 The Legislative Assembly meets for the first time. There are 76 members representing the north, 13 southerners and six British members.

1951 A southern Sudanese political movement is formed. It is subsequently officially registered as the Southern Party.

12 February 1953 There is an Anglo-Egyptian agreement which outlines the end of Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan and the steps to self-rule.

December 1953 Parliamentary elections are won by the National Unionist Party (NUP), which had evolved out of the Ashigga Party, which gained 97 seats in the lower house. The Umma Party won 23 seats. The Southern Party wins sixteen out of twenty-two southern seats.

January 1954 NUP leader Ismail al-Azhari becomes prime minister. The Southern Party change its name to the Liberal Party.
October 1954  The Liberal Party, at a conference in Juba, passes a resolution calling for federal status with northern Sudan. The party calls on all southern Members of Parliament, regardless of party affiliation, to form one Southern Bloc.

August 1955  Following earlier unrest in Nzara and Juba, southern Sudanese soldiers belonging to the Equatorian Corps mutiny against central government in Torit in southern Sudan. 261 Northerners are killed. The Sudanese civil war commences.

1 January 1956  Sudan becomes independent. There has been no prior agreement on a permanent constitution. The Constituent Assembly instead adopts a “Transitional” Constitution, which replaces the governor-general as head-of-state with a five-member Supreme Council elected by a parliament made up of an elected House of Representatives and an indirectly-elected Senate. The Transitional Constitution granted executive power to a prime minister, nominated by the House of Representatives and confirmed in office by the Supreme Council.

February 1956  Ismail al-Azhari becomes the first prime minister of an independent Sudan. His government is formed from the National Unionist Party and Umma Party. A special commission was established to work towards a permanent constitution. The commission decides against federalism. Azhari alienates the Khatmiyya sect by supporting some secular government policies. As a result the National Unionist Party fragments and some Khatmiyya members defect from the NUP and form the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

June 1956  The al-Azhari government is brought down. It is replaced by a coalition government made up of the Umma Party and the People’s Democratic Party, with backing from the Ansar and Khatmiyya. Abdallah Khalil becomes prime minister. The government is faced with a number of problems including searching for a permanent constitution, addressing problems in southern Sudan, economic development and improving relations with Egypt.

February 1958  Elections result in an Umma Party-PDP coalition led once again by Abdallah Khalil. The NUP win nearly one-quarter of the seats. Electoral results in southern Sudan demonstrate continuing southern political dissatisfaction. Factionalism, corruption and vote fraud dominate parliamentary proceedings. The government is seemingly unable to address several social, political and economic problems. There are many anti-government demonstrations in Khartoum. Egypt is also critical of the government.
General Ibrahim Abboud, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army, seizes power in a military coup d'état. He dissolves all political parties and forms a 12-man Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Abboud also appoints a constitutional commission to draft a permanent constitution, and promises to resolve any problems with Egypt.

February 1962 Southern Sudanese leaders form the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU). Its founding president is Joseph Oduho. William Deng is appointed as secretary-general. There is continuing unrest in southern Sudan.

April 1963 SACDNU shortens its name to Sudan African National Union (SANU). It is head-quartered in Kampala, Uganda.

19 September 1963 The rebel military organisation is formed. Emilio Tafeng is appointed commander-in-chief. The movement would come to be known as Anya-Nya. Rebel military activity begins in Equatoria and extends to the Anwak and Gaajok Nuer of Nasir region.

11 January 1964 Southern rebels attack the military barracks in Wau.

October 1964 The Abboud regime is ousted following civil unrest and a general strike. A broad-based caretaker government is formed to serve under the 1956 transitional constitution. Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifah becomes prime minister.

December 1964 There is intensive fighting in western Bahr al-Ghazal.

16 - 29 March 1965 A round-table conference was held between northern and southern representatives to discuss constitutional links between north and south. Delegates from six northern parties attend with southerners. Monitors from African and Arab countries also attended. The representatives failed to reach any conclusive understanding but agreed to form a joint commission of 12 members to draw up the basis for a comprehensive understanding.

June 1965 A general election results in an Umma Party and NUP coalition. Umma politician Mohammed Mahgoub becomes prime minister. Parliamentary activity is dogged by factional disputes. Mahgoub is supported by the traditionalist wing of the Umma Party identified with Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi and challenged by a younger generation headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi. The government decides to pursue military means to end the southern rebellion. The war in southern Sudan escalates. The Islamic Charter Front also contests the elections, presenting itself as a modern, urban-based Islamic party.
26 June 1966  The joint commission set up following the March 1965 round-table conference recommends regional self-government as the most appropriate constitutional arrangement for the country. The war intensifies.

26 July 1966  Following a split in the Umma Party, the thirty-year old Parliamentarian Sadiq al-Mahdi replaces Mahgoub as prime minister of Sudan.


15 August 1967  Southern military and political leaders meet in Angundri, in eastern Equatoria. They announce the formation of the ‘Southern Sudan Provisional Government’ (SSPG), a provisional government to administer areas under Anya-Nya control. Two southern parties, William Deng’s SANU and the Southern Front, remain outside of this framework. The SSPG subsequently breaks down as a result of tensions between Equatorian and Dinka members.

April 1968  The newly formed Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the result of a merger between the National Unionist Party and the Popular Democratic Party wins the general election. Both parties are associated with the Khatmiyya sect. Mohammed Mahgoub continues as premier. A coalition government is formed between the DUP and Umma Party.

5 May 1968  William Deng, President of SANU, is assassinated by rebels.

March 1969  Following the collapse of the ‘Southern Sudan Provisional Government’, the ‘Nile Provisional Government’ is formed.

25 May 1969  The government of Mohammed Mahgoub is overthrown in a bloodless coup by Colonel Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiri. All existing political institutions and organisations are abolished. Nimeiri creates a one-party state under the Sudanese Socialist Union and introduces socialist policies.

9 June 1969  President Nimeiri issues a policy statement regarding the conflict in southern Sudan: “(T)he revolutionary government is confident and competent enough to face existing realities. It recognizes historical and cultural differences between the North and the South and firmly believes that unity of our country must be built on these objective realities. The Southern people have a right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a
united Sudan.” He announces a four-point programme. These were the continuation and widening of the amnesty for southern opponents granted by the previous regime, an intensive social, economic and cultural programme for southern Sudan, the appointment of a minister for southern affairs and the training of southerners to take up positions of responsibility. A prominent Dinka southern lawyer Abel Alier is made Minister of Supply and Internal Trade.


**October 1969** Colonel Joseph Lagu forms the Anya-Nya High Command Council. This unites rebel commanders throughout southern Sudan.

**March 1970** A Umma Party insurrection is crushed by the Sudanese military. Thousands of Ansar members are killed in the fighting. Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi dies in the uprising.

**July 1971** There is an unsuccessful coup attempt by the Sudanese communist party.

**July 1971** Joseph Lagu convenes a conference which brings together southern Sudanese military and political leaders. This conference sees the formation of the ‘Southern Sudan Liberation Movement’. Lagu emerges as the recognised leader of rebel forces in southern Sudan. Lagu issues a policy statement in which, among other things, he states: “(A)s far as the Southern Sudanese are concerned, it is well recorded in history that our attitude has always been to find a peaceful solution to the Southern cause. Therefore in conformity with this constant policy for a negotiated settlement that we have pursued during the reign of different and consecutive governments in Khartoum, we call upon General el-Nimeiri to meet the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement to determine conditions aimed at bringing a final end to war and atrocities in South Sudan.”


**16-17 February 1972** The Addis Ababa peace conference takes place. The government delegation is headed by Vice-President and Minister for Southern Affairs, Abel Alier. The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement delegates are led by Ezboni Mindiri. The General Secretary of the All-Africa Conference of Churches, Canon Burgess Carr, chaired the conference. This conference ends what proves to be the first phase of the Sudanese civil war with the provision for constituent local elections and an autonomous regional government in southern Sudan. Some 6,000 former Anya-Nya rebels were to be integrated into the Sudanese armed forces, and southern Sudanese refugees were to be resettled
with the assistance of the United Nations and various non-governmental organisations.

3 May 1972 The Addis Ababa agreement is ratified through a presidential decree by President Nimeiri as ‘The Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act 1972’. Abel Alier is appointed as President of the High Executive Regional Assembly. Samuel Aru Bol and Joseph Oduho are amongst those appointed to the southern executive. Joseph Lagu is appointed a major-general in the Sudanese army and commanding officer for the Southern Command in Juba.

November 1973 Elections to the Southern Assembly are held.

1974 The Chevron oil company begins operations in Sudan. It is active on the Red Sea and near Bentiu, Malakal and Muglad.

March 1975 Former Anya-Nya soldiers mutiny in Akobo. The mutiny is put down.

September 1975 An attempted military coup, in which both communists and religious groups participated, is suppressed.

February 1976 Former Anya-Nya soldiers mutiny in Wau. This is the start of what comes to be known as the Anya-Nya 2 movement, seeking to renew the fight for a separate southern Sudan.

July 1976 There is an unsuccessful attempted military coup d’etat by Umma Party, DUP and Islamist elements. A Defence agreement with Egypt is signed.

6-7 July 1977 President Nimeiri and Sadiq al-Mahdi agree a policy of national reconciliation and a general amnesty for the Sudanese opposition. Nine hundred political prisoners are released.

1978 Chevron discover large oil deposits near Heglig and Bentiu in south-central and southern Sudan.

February 1978 General elections are held in Sudan. Nimeiri appoints Joseph Lagu as the new President of the High Executive Council of southern Sudan. Joseph Oduho and Benjamin Bol are amongst newly and re-appointed ministers.

January 1980 Sudan is divided into five regions in addition to the south which has its autonomous status.
February 1980 New elections are held in Sudan. Abel Alier is re-elected President of the High Executive Council of southern Sudan. He is subsequently re-appointed as Sudanese Vice-President.

1981 Chevron discovers significant oil deposits north of Bentiu.

4 January 1982 Twenty-one leading politicians are arrested in Juba, and are charged with forming an illegal party – ‘The Council for Unity of Southern Sudan’. They include Clement Mboro, Samuel Aru Bol, Michael Wal and Martin Majer.

April 1982 Africa Now publishes a special report on the politics of southern Sudan. While acknowledging that there was pressure from northern politicians and political groups to divide southern Sudan, Africa Now confirms that there also southern pressure from people such as Joseph Lagu: “Lagu has been pushing the idea of division for over a year now, arguing that regionalism and a division into the three provinces would serve the interests of the smaller ethnic groups; it would also help to break what Lagu sees as the political hegemony of the largest single group in the South, the Dinka…In February last year, Lagu was complaining about ethnicity in the South, organising discussion groups to talk about division, and public demonstrations…Lagu himself…[published] a pamphlet entitled ‘Decentralisation – a necessity for the South’.”

“Southern Sudan Division Still an Election Issue”, Africa Now, April 1982, pp.53-54

April 1982 Elections to the Southern Regional Assembly are held. Of 115 seats, 29 of 36 of the Equatorian seats are “divisionist”, seeking a redivision of southern Sudan, while the other four provinces return unionists. Joseph James Tembura was elected as President of the High Executive Council of southern Sudan. Joseph Lagu was subsequently appointed Vice-President of Sudan.

May 1983 Southern Sudanese soldiers, commanded by Captain Kerubino Bol Kuanyn, mutiny at Bor in southern Sudan in response to the Nimeiri regime’s decision to revise some of the understandings and structures settled by the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. Similar uprisings take place in Ayod and Pibor.

16 May 1983 The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) is formed. Veteran southern politician Joseph Oduho becomes chairman. Colonel John Garang, a Dinka army officer, heads the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. A manifesto outlining its aims was published. Oduho is
subsequently deposed by Garang who then establishes himself as the leader of the SPLA/M. There are armed clashes with Anya Nya 2 rebels. Largely Nuer-based, the Anya-Nya militarily opposed the SPLA because of that organisation’s Dinka domination and commitment to Sudan’s unity.

23 May 1983     Nimeiri redivides southern Sudan into three smaller and separate regions, Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile, each with their own assembly. This move is partly in response to Equatorian concerns about Dinka domination.

8 September 1983 President Nimeiri announces the introduction of Islamic sharia law in Sudan

November 1983     The SPLA abduct eleven workers working on the Jongli Canal project in Upper Nile. The French company managing the project suspends its work.

4 February 1984     Chevron announces that it is suspending its oil exploration and production activities in southern Sudan following SPLA attacks on its installations. The SPLA admits responsibility for an attack on a Nile steamer, an attack which halts all river and rail transport to the south. One hundred and fifty passengers are reported to have been killed in the attack.

2 March 1984     Speaking on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary commemorating the end of the war within southern Sudan, General Nimeiri extended an offer of reconciliation. He assured southerners that “development projects would benefit all Sudanese without discrimination”. He appealed “to all those who carry weapons in southern Sudan to return to their units and villages”, promising them a “general amnesty”.

News Article by SUNA, 3 March 1984

3 March 1984     John Garang outlines what he sees as the SPLA’s objectives: “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has been founded to spearhead armed resistance against Nimeiri’s one-man system dictatorship and to organize the whole Sudanese people under the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), through revolutionary protracted armed struggle waged by the SPLA and political support…A united and Socialist Sudan can be achieved only through protracted revolutionary armed struggle.”


29 April 1984     The government declares a state of emergency throughout southern Sudan.
19 November 1984  Speaking during a visit to Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile region in southern Sudan, General Nimeiri called on “all brothers” in the south to engage in dialogue with him, an invitation repeated on subsequent occasions. The SPLA categorically reject these calls.

Broadcast by Radio Omdurman, 19 November 1984

December 1984  There is intensive SPLA activity in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile.

1985  Sudan receives five hundred million dollars in aid from the United States.

1 January 1985  In response to Nimeiri’s calls for negotiations, the SPLA states that it would cease fighting only “when Numayri’s system [had] all been dismantled and thrown into history’s dustbin”.

Broadcast by Radio SPLA, 1 January 1985

3 March 1985  The Nimeiri regime once again called upon the SPLA to enter into a dialogue. The rebels responded with a new wave of military attacks.

6 April 1985  The Nimeiri government is ousted in a military coup d’état led by Lieutenant General Abd al-Rahman Mohammed Swar al-Dahab. A 15-man Transitional Military Council is formed and headed by General Swar al-Dahab. A military communiqué stated that “the forces of the Sudanese people noticed the country’s worsening situation in the course of the past days and the political crisis that worsens continuously.” The armed forces had “unanimously decided” to take over power in order “to save the country and its independence”; and to “convey this power to the people after a precise transition”. All political structures are dissolved and hundreds of political detainees are released. The economy is extremely weak and Sudan has a nine billion dollar international debt. The SPLA initially declares a cease-fire but subsequently refuses offers to enter into peace negotiations and resumes fighting.

News Article by SUNA, 6 April 1985

12 April 1985  The TMC declares it will only be in office for 12 months and prepares the way for multi-party elections. John Garang is offered a position in government.
17 April 1985  The transitional government revokes Nimeiri’s division of southern Sudan into three regions. Khartoum also announces the validation of the articles of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement “as a general framework for regional rule in the South…”

Broadcast by Radio Omdurman, 17 April 1985

19 April 1985  The SPLA continues with its war, reiterating its commitment to fight until “the reactionary structure [in Khartoum was] completely removed and the edifice of Socialism [was] constructed on the ruins of the ancient regime”.

Broadcast by Radio SPLA, 19 April 1985

21 April 1985  The TMC continues efforts to re-establish and re-invigorate southern political structures. It issues a decree establishing a Transitional Higher Executive Council in southern Sudan. A southerner, Major-General James Loro, is appointed chairman.

22 April 1985  The TMC announces the new cabinet. Dr Gizuli Dafallah is appointed prime minister. Southern politician Samuel Aru Bol becomes deputy premier. The transitional Prime Minister stated that the TMC would be “devoting all its efforts to solving the problem of the South on a democratic basis”.

26 April 1985  The transitional government declares a unilateral cease-fire and general amnesty. The SPLA categorically rejects any contact with the new government, stating that the “revolution [would] continue until liberation”.

News Article by SUNA, 22 April 1985; Broadcast by Radio SPLA, 29 April 1985

10 May 1985  The National Islamic Front political party is formed by Islamists led by Dr Hassan al-Turabi. It is a successor to the Islamic Charter Front. The NIF is described as “an ideological movement that seeks comprehensive reform of Muslim society for the establishment of a just social order centred on faith. For the NIF, Islam provides a comprehensive belief system that organises an all-encompassing way of life. It delineates a vision of the past and the future, and prescribes all social organisation and norms of daily existence. The relevance of faith is not confined to the arena of individual morality, but is also integral to the conduct of socio-economic and political relationships. This holistic world view negates any separation between religion and politics.”

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York, July 1996, p.20
23 May 1985 The transitional government announces the establishment of seven ministries which were to assisted by the Transitional Higher Executive Council in southern Sudan.

26 May 1985 Speaking about the Transitional Military Council, John Garang states: “It is abundantly clear that the junta will neither hand over power to the people nor hold elections.”


27 May 1985 John Garang continues to reject any notion of peace negotiations with the government. Garang states that “there [was] nothing to negotiate about and, even worse, there [was] nobody to negotiate with…Today…I here ring the bell for round two of the popular uprising in the streets of our cities and SPLA’s revolutionary armed struggle in the bushes and sands of our great country…As of today I put all SPLA forces on maximum alert, [directing them to] shift to the tactics of classical guerilla warfare.” The war intensifies in June and July.

Broadcast by Radio SPLA, 27 May 1985

July 1985 The SPLA opens up a new front in southern Kordofan with an attack on a cattle camp for Baggara Arab nomads close to the north-south internal boundary. The SPLA kills sixty Baggara tribesmen and wounded 82 others. This leads to the arming of tribal militias by both the government and SPLA and a spiral of reprisals and counter-reprisals. The British human rights group African Rights states of the incident: “The war in the Nuba Mountains began in July 1985.”

August 1985 The SPLA kills William Abdullah Choul, the leader of the Anya-Nya 2 rebel movement.

February 1986 The International Monetary Fund in effect declares Sudan bankrupt following the government’s refusal to accept economic austerity measures.

9 March 1986 The SPLA states that it is willing to enter into a dialogue with the Khartoum government on four conditions. First, any talks have to be about Sudan’s problems, and not about the “so-called problem of the South, because we are a national movement”. Second, Nimeiri’s September laws must be cancelled. Third, a national conference must be held to form an interim government of national unity. The transitional government must agree
in advance to resign once any agreement was reached at such a conference. Fourth, that all military defence pacts and other agreements with foreign countries must be cancelled.

Broadcast by Radio SPLA, 9 March 1986

24 March 1986 The SPLA meets with the National Alliance for National Salvation, representing 14 political parties, including the Umma Party, and 22 trades unions. The resultant Koka Dam declaration floats the idea of a national constitutional conference preceded by the lifting of the state of emergency, the repeal of the September 1983 sharia laws, cease-fire and abrogation of Sudan’s military pacts.

26 March 1986 In his meeting with the National Alliance, John Garang states: “Brothers, as we have said many times before, we are not secessionists. And if anybody wants to separate even in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. We will maintain this opinion.”


6 April 1986 In a speech John Garang denies that his movement was a threat to Arabism or Islam in Sudan. He declares: “Arabism and Islam are part and parcel of Sudan’s reality. That reality is inevitable and it is therefore totally absurd to speak of a threat to Arabism and Islam. It is the SPLM/SPLA’s conviction that both Arabism and Islam, among others, are components inextricably woven into the fabric of Sudan’s unique and singular identity. They are integral parts of the sum total of our distinct cultural heritage.”

Broadcast by Radio SPLA, 6 April 1986

May 1986 The Transitional Military Council keeps its promise that it would stay in office for only one year and hands over to the civilian government elected following multi-party elections in April.

15 May 1986 Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes prime minister of Sudan. He heads a coalition government made up primarily of the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party led by Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the spiritual leader of the Khatmiyya, and four southern parties. DUP official al-Sherif Zein al-Abidin al-Hindi becomes deputy prime minister. The NIF win 51 parliamentary seats, including 23 of the 25 “graduates” seats, as well as a seat in Juba. The SPLA had called for a total boycott of the elections. Because of security considerations elections in 37 constituencies were postponed. A ministry of peace and constitutional affairs is created.
June 1986 Sadiq al-Mahdi defined his position on religious affairs: “The watchword of the free Sudanese people has always been Islam. Even non-Muslim Sudanese hold religious beliefs. All this gives religious affairs in Sudan a distinctive character. We, as Muslims whose duty it is to be interested in Muslim affairs, should also provide the non-Muslim with similar care. For this reason we shall form a Supreme Council for Religious Affairs which will supervise all religious affairs in Sudan.”

Al-Mahdi restates a commitment to abolish Nimeiri’s September laws and to replace them with “sound Islamic laws based on equity”. Al-Mahdi promises with regard to the southern question that the issues would be addressed at a future constitutional conference, with any problems being solved through dialogue. The newly-created ministry of peace and constitutional affairs was to establish contacts with the rebel movement.

31 July 1986 As part of an ongoing peace initiative Sadiq al-Mahdi meets with SPLA leader John Garang. The SPLA wishes to see the Koka Dam declaration elaborated upon and implemented. Sadiq al-Mahdi states that despite an Umma Party presence, the declaration does not hold given that the DUP and NIF have not been included in the process. The prime minister states that the meeting has revitalised the peace process.

16 August 1986 The SPLA shoots down a civilian Sudan Airways aircraft near Malakal, killing sixty passengers and crew. All peace contacts between the government and SPLA are frozen. The SPLA launches a new offensive.

2-5 December 1986 Sudanese church leaders meet with the SPLA in Addis Ababa. The church leaders called upon the rebels to resume dialogue with the government and urged the SPLA to conduct the war more humanely.

January 1987 The National Islamic Front publishes its national charter. This contains proposals concerning the future of southern Sudan. The charter accepts the rights of all citizens, regardless of religion, to hold public office, and called for freedom of conscience and equality before the law. The NIF also states that in a federal system non-Muslim regions would be allowed to opt out of the Islamic legal system. Central government would have a duty to promote balanced regional development.

May 1987 Sadiq al-Mahdi dissolves his coalition government, and forms another, barely changed, administration. Umma and the DUP agree a memorandum which fix the new government’s priorities as affirming the application of sharia law to Muslims and consolidating the Islamic banking
system. The coalition is criticised for not addressing the civil war, famine and worsening social and economic conditions.

August 1987  The DUP bring down the coalition government because Sadiq al-Mahdi had opposed the appointment of a DUP member to the Supreme Council.

14 October 1987  SPLA leader John Garang states that he is fighting for greater autonomy for all regions of Sudan and for an end to national Islamic laws: “We are fighting a cultural, political and economic war.” He states that he wants to put an end to the dominance of the central government by two religiously-based parties, which are in turn dominated by two families, one of them the family of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.

“Sudan’s Rebel Leader Signals Flexibility in Pursuit of Peace Talks”, The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 14 October 1987

December 1987  The government and SPLA meet for secret peace talks in London. There is no agreement.

January 1988  The government and 17 political parties sign a transitional charter outlining a commitment to multi-party democracy.

April 1988  The Sadiq al-Mahdi government is dissolved following continuing constitutional, economic and military crises. After several days without a government Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes prime minister of a coalition government again on 27 April.

May 1988  A new coalition government is formed by Sadiq al-Mahdi. Coalition members include the Umma, DUP, the National Islamic Front and some southern parties.


October 1988  Sadiq al-Mahdi introduces ‘Sudan’s Peace Initiative: A Working Paper for Peace’. This outlined the historical background to conflict and peace initiatives. It proposes an immediate conference to discuss a ceasefire, humanitarian aid and arrangements for a national constitutional conference. It also outlines transitional arrangements including amnesty and reconstruction.

October 1988  The United Nations Secretary-General launches appeal for US$ 73 million in relief aid for Sudan.
November 1988  The DUP led by Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani meets with the SPLA in Addis Ababa. They agree that there should be a ceasefire, the state of emergency should be lifted, a national constitutional conference should be held by the end of the year, that Islamic legal punishments in the September 1983 laws should be frozen and that a national preparatory committee be formed.

December 1988  The DUP leaves the coalition government in protest at Sadiq al-Mahdi’s failure to endorse its agreement with the SPLA.

1989  In the course of the year the SPLA shell Juba, killing dozens of civilians.

January 1989  The SPLA captured the strategic town of Nasir in Upper Nile region.

1 February 1989  Al-Mahdi announces the formation of a new government, without the DUP. The National Islamic Front is given seven portfolios within the new cabinet. The Umma Party hold eleven. NIF leader Dr al-Turabi becomes deputy prime minister and foreign minister. The rebels seize Torit in eastern Equatoria, as well as towns such as Liria, Farrago and Nimble.

20 February 1989  The Sudanese military high command deliver an open memorandum to Sadiq al-Mahdi. Signed by 150 senior officers headed by the Commander-in-Chief General Fathi Ahmed Ali, the memorandum demanded that al-Mahdi either brought the war to an end or provided the military with the support it needed in its war with the SPLA. It also called on the government to address the deepening economic recession.

12 March 1989  The coalition government is dissolved. The war intensifies with rebel activity in southern Kordofan.

25 March 1989  A new government is sworn in. The National Islamic Front refuses to serve in the cabinet. Sadiq al-Mahdi agrees to form a broad-based government which would enter into peace talks with the SPLA.

1 April 1989  The United Nations supervised-Operation Lifeline Sudan is launched to address the humanitarian crisis within southern Sudan. It is an agreement negotiated by the United Nations with the government of Sudan and the SPLA to allow humanitarian assistance to pass through “corridors of tranquillity” to civilians in affected areas.

30 June 1989  The Sadiq al-Mahdi administration is overthrown in a bloodless coup d’état by army officers. General Omer al-Bashir heads the
Revolutionary Command Council for the ‘Revolution of National Salvation’, made up of fifteen members from across Sudan. The new government sends a letter to SPLA leader John Garang inviting him to participate in the rescue of Sudan by negotiating a peaceful settlement. Garang refuses to receive the letter.

4 July 1989

The Sudanese government declares a month-long cease-fire.

8 July 1989

A new government is formed. Of the 21 cabinet ministers named, 16 are civilians.

25 July 1989

The government extends the cease-fire by another month.

14 August 1989

John Garang vigorously criticises the new government, claiming that it had a “distorted perception” of the civil war. He stated that the new government lacks “any new radical program” that could improve the chances of peace. He dismisses the government’s offer to hold a referendum on the Sharia law issue: “It is blasphemous to say that God’s laws should be judged by human beings.” He called for the establishment of an interim government of national unity free of sectarianism, the establishment of a national army made up of the regular army and SPLA, the convening of a national constitutional conference and the holding of free elections. Garang states that if this programme is not agreed to by the government he would be obliged to mount a general strike and uprising and remove the government from office and have the SPLA implement the programme.

Broadcast by Radio SPLA, 14-15 August 1989

18-22 August 1989

Peace talks between the government and SPLA, the first to take place between the rebels and a Sudanese government since the war began in June 1983, stall over the issue of sharia law when the government announces a national referendum on the issue. The SPLA also turn down the government offer of a cease-fire. The government nevertheless extends its cease-fire for another month.

9 September 1989

The government convenes ‘The National Dialogue Conference on the Issues of Peace’ in Khartoum. This meets until 10 October. It is chaired by RCC member Mohammed al-Amin Khalifa and Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese vice-president, and leader of the southern Sudanese rebels in the first phase of the civil war. The conference presents a peace plan based on the decentralisation of power and resources, and the protection of cultural diversity. A federal system is deemed to be “the best alternative for government in Sudan”. The government adopts this plan as a national programme for
negotiations with the SPLA. John Garang refuses any further negotiations in Khartoum.

30 September 1989    The government extends the cease-fire for another month.

21 October 1989    The government announces the extension of the cease-fire for another month. The cease-fire is broken by the SPLA on the same day with attacks in the Kurmuk area, near the Ethiopian border. The rebels subsequently occupy the town of Kurmuk.

21 October 1989    The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is formed in Egypt. It is made up of representatives of the Umma, DUP and nine other political parties and trade unions. The charter which is drawn up calls for “general political strike, civil disobedience and well protected popular insurrection”. Tasks for the period following the overthrow of the government are to include the formation of a transitional government, repeal of Islamist laws and guarantees of human rights.

30 November 1989    Talks facilitated by former United States President Jimmy Carter are held in Nairobi between a government delegation headed by Mohammed al-Amin Khalifa and an SPLA delegation led by Dr Lam Akol. It was agreed that a possible route to peace might be the formation of a broad-based national government, the holding of a constitutional conference and a national referendum to ratify the resulting constitution. The SPLA refused to accept Carter as a mediator.

December 1990    Former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen puts forward a peace proposal; which includes separation of government and rebel forces and declaring Juba city a demilitarised zone. The Sudanese government does not accept the initiative because it infringes both the sovereignty and security of the country.

January 1990    The SPLA shells Juba.

March 1990    At a meeting at the Namibian Independence celebration President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria meets Sudanese President Omer Hassan al-Bashir and suggests an initiative to host Sudanese peace negotiations. After a series of further contacts the Nigerian government sets an agenda and fixes a date for the commencement of talks in Abuja. This is the first time that the rebel movement agrees to enter direct talks with the Sudanese government without prior conditions.

March 1990    Operation Lifeline Sudan 2 is launched in Sudan.
December 1990    President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya calls a meeting between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and SPLA leader John Garang. Bashir responds by travelling to Kenya where he spends two days. Garang also travels to Nairobi but refuses to meet President Bashir.

5 January 1991   Sudanese President Omer Hassan al-Bashir passes a decree establishing a federal system of nine states in Sudan as part of an effort to end the civil war. These are in turn sub-divided into 66 provinces and 281 local government areas. These new states are to be responsible for local administration and some tax collection.

ª Sudan Decrees Federation to End Civil Warº , The Times (London), 6 February 1991

5 January 1991   SPLA leader John Garang rejects the federal system of government announced by President al-Bashir and calls on the army to overthrow the government. He states: “We reject al-Bashir’s federalism because it is based on sectarianism. It is intended to divert public attention from the issue of peace.”

ª Sudanese Rebels Call on Army to Revoltº , The Times (London), 5 January 1991

1 February 1991   A new legal code is introduced, amending sharia law and specifically exempting southern Sudanese states from the application of Islamic law.

April-May 1991   The Sudanese government convened a national conference to discuss Sudan’s political future.

21 May 1991      The Mengistu regime in Ethiopia is overthrown. The SPLA loses its main supporter. SPLA forces fight to defend the Mengistu government.

June 1991        The government officially proposed that President Babangida of Nigeria act as a mediator within the Sudanese conflict. The SPLA supports this call.

August 1991      The US offers to mediate in the Sudanese civil war. US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen meets with SPLA leader John Garang in America. It is reported that Garang and the SPLA are unhappy with a proposed American peace plan, which they consider amounts to a secession for the south. New Africa reports Garang’s views as follows: “Garang denies there are separatist feelings in his movement. He told journalists in London that the SPLA would not be tempted by what had happened in northern Somalia and Eritrea into secession.” They further quote
Garang on the issue: “We spent the first six months in 1983 arguing amongst ourselves whether to separate the south or liberate the whole of Sudan...We shed a lot of blood for it and in the end the unionists prevailed.”


**August 1991** The Sudan People’s Liberation Army fragments following growing criticism of John Garang. Three SPLA field commanders, Dr Riek Machar, Dr Lam Akol and Gordon Kong, based in Nasir, issue a statement calling for the removal of Garang from the leadership of the SPLA. They also accused Garang of being a “dictatorial” and “autocratic” leader who has “humiliated and degraded people and turned a popular struggle into wardrooms and a reign of terror”. They also issue a policy statement calling for an end to the war, immediate negotiations for the separation of the south, the implementation of democracy within the liberation movement and more emphasis on relief efforts. Machar, Akol and Kong call for “strict adherence to the respect of human rights and the rule of law”. Dr Machar and Dr Akol come to head a grouping known as SPLA-Nasir. Garang then renamed what remained of the SPLA as SPLA-Torit and then SPLA-Mainstream. Further dissatisfaction with Garang led to an additional fragmentation of what remained of his SPLA grouping when Garang’s deputy, William Nyoun, left and formed another faction called SPLA-Unity. Riek Machar’s SPLA-Nasir and Nyoun’s Unity groups then merged in March 1993 to form SPLA-United. SPLA-United then itself divided. Dr Machar came to head the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and Dr Akol continued as the chairman of SPLA-United.

**November 1991** There is fierce fighting between the different factions of the SPLA. Several thousand civilians are reported to have been killed. The SPLA shells Juba, killing seventy civilians.

**3 February 1992** The government announces austerity measures and economic reforms. These include devaluation of the currency, privatisation and cuts in commodity subsidies.

**13 February 1992** A 300-member Transitional National Assembly is appointed and met for the first time on 24 February. Mohammed al-Amin Khalifa serves as the first speaker.

**26 May-4 June 1992** The first Abuja peace talks are held between the government and the SPLA under the auspices of President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria. Both parties recognise that Sudan is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious country and agree to work towards a peaceful resolution of the Sudanese conflict. The two sides agree to meet again in Nigeria. Mohammed Al-Amin Khalifa, leader of the Sudanese delegation,
states: “It was the first serious meeting between the warring parties in the country.”

“Abuja: The Search for Peace Continues”, *Sudanow* (Khartoum), July 1992

**June 1992**  
The SPLA besiege Juba. They shell the city, killing 200 civilians. There are military attacks inside Juba itself.

**June 1992**  
Chevron ended its 17-year involvement in Sudan. It sells its upstream holding to a Sudanese company, Concord. Concord subsequently sells Chevron concessions to Arakis Energy of Canada.

**16 July 1992**  
Humanitarian shipments to Juba are suspended as the result of SPLA threats.

**12 August 1992**  
Oxfam, Christian Aid, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development and Norwegian Christian Aid report that an estimated 300,000 people in Juba were facing “imminent starvation” if corridors for relief aid were not agreed.

**17 August 1992**  
The SPLA stated that any UN relief workers flying into Juba did so at their own risk.

**24 August 1992**  
The United Nations halt aid airlifts into Juba after the SPLA fired on a relief airplane as it unloaded food. Aid flights recommence the following day.

**7 September 1992**  
The United Nations halt aid airlifts into Juba for the third time in two weeks because of SPLA attacks. An agreement is subsequently arrived at between the United Nations, the government and SPLA whereby humanitarian aid is to be flown into 20 locations in southern Sudan: Juba was not included.

**30 September 1992**  
The United Nations suspend relief operations in southern Sudan after three UN aid workers and a Norwegian journalist were killed by the SPLA.

**November 1992**  
Fighting between SPLA factions led by John Garang and William Nyoun is reported to have left at least 2,000 dead in the Kongor and Waat areas.

**23 February 1993**  
The Sudanese government and the SPLA issue a joint communiqué following a meeting in Entebbe, under the auspices of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. Both sides agree to proceed to Abuja Two conference.
“The Entebbe Declaration”, *Sudanow* (Khartoum), March 1993

**17 April 1993**  The *New York Times* reports that increased rebel factional fighting and an attack on a UN relief worker in Kongor has resulted in a suspension of humanitarian aid and the removal of UN workers from the area.

**26 April-17 May 1993**  The second Abuja peace talks are held in Nigeria. A wide range of constitutional, political and social issues are discussed. The peace-talks focus on several themes: power-sharing between central authority and federated states, the powers of a central authority, the use of referendums as a means of judging the wishes of people in southern Sudan. It is agreed that any future dispensation would involve a distinct separation of powers within Sudan. A number of interim measures are discussed, including security and military considerations, the resettlement and rehabilitation of those affected by the civil war and the status of the south during any future interim period. A considerable amount of common ground is covered and agreed, and the Nigerian hosts of the talks begin drafting the final communiqué. John Garang arrives in Abuja one day before the end of the talks and demands the redrafting of what had previously been agreed upon – to include that residual powers not specifically vested with central government should devolve to the states, a reversal of accepted federal models whereby those powers not vested with the states are reserved to the federal government. These demands effectively derail the negotiations. The Nigerian government issues a statement outlining the course of the talks, the agreements and disagreements, and calling upon the two sides to continue their dialogue. Nigeria also declares its willingness to continue its mediation efforts.

**April-May 1993**  The government meets in Nairobi with the SPLA-United faction. There is agreement for southern Sudan to be a separate entity within a united federal state. Political power and wealth are to be allocated between the federal state and southern institutions. National laws are to be “based on general principles common to the States” with states being able to enact their own “complementary” legislation.

**August 1993**  The Sudanese government holds a number of meetings with the SPLA-United faction at Fashoda in Upper Nile. Agreements not to obstruct movement on the Nile and to open land corridors and not to obstruct aid and development services in the Upper Nile area are arrived at.

**18 August 1993**  The United States government lists Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. Donald Petterson, the United States ambassador to Sudan at the time of Sudan’s listing, records that he was “surprised” that Sudan was put on the terrorism list. Petterson states that while he was aware of “collusion” between “some elements of the Sudanese Government” and various “terrorist”

17 September 1993 Former United States President Jimmy Carter asked to see what evidence there was for Sudan’s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism. Carter was told there was no evidence: “In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state he said they did not have any proof, but there were strong allegations.”

The Independent (London), 17 September 1993

September 1993 The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) forms a peace committee. Chaired by Kenya, it is made up of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir welcomes the initiative and expresses his hope that it will enhance similar Nigerian efforts to achieve peace in Sudan.

14 October 1993 The SPLA states that a separate state for Sudan may be the only chance for peace. SPLA spokesman Bius Subek states: “Nobody in southern Sudan wants to remain a part of the country… We want a separate Sudan now. No more confederacy. If we reach an agreement, then great. But Khartoum has indicated that it’s not willing to work with the south.”

A Sudan embassy spokesman, Safwat Siddig, denies that Khartoum government wants to impose Islamic law in the south. He states: “Nobody will harm them unless they violate the law in the north. The law is clear and just. They don’t have to become Islamic.”

“Sudan Rebels Believe Partition Only Hope”, The Tampa Tribune, 14 October 1993

16 October 1993 The Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation votes to disband itself and asks General Omer al-Bashir to assume the post of president.

19 October 1993 The government announces political reforms aimed at preparing for Presidential, legislative and local elections.

20-22 October 1993 Negotiations between the two factions of the SPLA, SPLA-United led by Riek Machar and John Garang’s SPLA-Mainstream, are arranged by Rep. Harry Johnston, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee and Edward Moose, US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, in Washington. An eight-point plan to end the civil war is
agreed, but neither side signs. Both claim to be the only legitimate representative of the Sudanese rebel movement.

2 November 1993 A cease-fire between the SPLA and SPLA-United broke down following attacks made SPLA-United forces.

February 1994 Sudan is re-divided into 26 states instead of nine. The executive and legislative power of the states is expanded as part of a policy of rolling devolution.

17-23 March 1994 The government and SPLA meet in Nairobi for the first time for peace talks under the auspices of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Both sides agree principles of neutral humanitarian assistance carried out by Operation Lifeline Sudan and corridors of tranquillity for ten weeks for child vaccination.

13 May 1994 The Sudanese government invites American and other Western experts to help Sudan with “technical know-how” on federalism and to help Sudan draft a power-sharing plan for consideration by the government and rebels. The Christian Science Monitor reported that: “Western nations may have a rare opportunity to help end a 12-year civil war in Sudan... Sudan’s top leadership has opened the door to Western help in peace negotiations and in examining the touchy issue of alleged government human rights abuses.” The American ambassador stated that the opening should be followed up: “There is a need for someone to help out on the negotiating process.” The paper also quoted John Prendergast, a prominent Sudan analyst within the United States, who called the offer “a very big opening. I think we should take them up on it immediately”.


14-16 May 1994 The government convenes the Juba Political Forum. This meeting is attended by several hundred southern Sudanese representatives, including the Vice-President George Kongor and several state governors. There are also 20 representatives from each of the ten southern states. The Juba Declaration’ affirms the unity of Sudan, endorses the process of federalisation and condemns the continuation of conflict.

17-20 May 1994 The second round of IGADD-sponsored peace talks take place in Nairobi. The government outlines a unitary federal state with sharia as a source of law with some exemptions for non-Muslims. The SPLA put forward self-determination and a complete rejection of sharia. There is no political agreement. The mediators issue a 'Declaration of Principles’ outlining
a secular state with guarantees of equality. If agreement cannot be reached on this then a referendum on southern self-determination is envisaged.

**19-29 July 1994** The third round of IGADD-sponsored talks are held in Nairobi. No progress is made on the issue of a secular state. The Khartoum government accepts the principle of a referendum on southern self-determination. The government declares a cease-fire effective 23 July.

**23 August 1994** Speaking in 1994, the then director-general of the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, and subsequently Sudanese ambassador to the United States, Mahdi Ibrahim, challenged American claims of Sudanese involvement in terrorism: “How can you prove a negative? We have always believed that in Western countries the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. In our case, it is not like that. Until today, no information has been provided about a terrorist harboured in our country.”


**6 September 1994** The fourth round of IGADD talks between the government and SPLA are held in Nairobi. No progress whatsoever is made and the meeting is adjourned.

**27 September 1994** President al-Bashir announces the formation of an 89-member Supreme Council for Peace in order to coordinate efforts to achieve peace. Lino Rol Deng is appointed chairman.

**11 October 1994** Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, the minister-of-state for political affairs, speaking during the Inter-Religious Dialogue conference in Khartoum, outlined the government’s position on the conflict in southern Sudan: “Such a problem has been with us for 40 years, and draws upon a long history of colonial policy aimed at creating a separate culture in southern Sudan, a culture of hatred and animosity against northern Sudan. This is not a problem that can be solved militarily. We are convinced that the solution to this problem must be a long-term one, must be expressed in the policies of the government, economic, political, and cultural policies…[W]e have introduced a federal system. The idea of federalism came from southern Sudan. But northern politicians had always been suspicious of federalism. I remember a demonstration in the streets of Khartoum shouting ‘federation is separation.’ They thought of federalism as separation. This is the first government to offer federalism to the whole of Sudan, because Sudan is so vast and diverse, language-wise and so forth. Now we have federalism, and in the south this includes economic development and cultural activities whose aim is to raze to the ground the psychological barriers that the colonialists established…which cut off the south from the north completely.”
“Sudanese Leaders Deal with the Issues”, Executive Intelligence Review, 1994 at www.aboutsudan.com

15 February 1995 The United States National Security Advisor, Antony Lake, addresses a Centre for Strategic Studies conference. He states that: “We will be working with other governments in the region to see how we can best contain the influence of the Sudanese Government until it changes its views and begins to behave in accordance with the norms of international behaviour that we think governments should follow”

3 March 1995 The London-based Africa Confidential newsletter reports that the Sudanese peace process is being undermined by foreign governments: “Important shifts in policy and strategy are emerging in response to the continuing war in Sudan. Western officials have made a subtle shift from supporting the Nairobi peace process as such to hinting that a new government in Khartoum is needed to implement it. Officials of various factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, who once spoke as if a peace agreement with the National Islamic Front were possible, now talk of the prior need for a new government…The United States has caught and fed this mood.”


18 March 1995 SPLA leader John Garang announces that he has decided, in cooperation with northern opposition parties, to take the war to northern Sudan, including Khartoum, via a new force, the “New Sudan Brigade”. He also states that he is awaiting a delegation from opposition parties to discuss the formation of a committee to act as a government in exile.

“Garang, Khalid Announce Formation of ‘New Sudan Brigade’ to Spread War to North”, Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 March 1995

22 March 1995 In testimony before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Edward Brynn, the deputy Assistant Secretary-of-State for African Affairs, states that: “We will maintain bilateral and international pressure on Khartoum. We have not and will not stop looking for ways in which to bring changes in Khartoum’s behaviour…The Sudanese government…must understand that those same policies and practices which we find threatening and objectionable will eventually cause its downfall.”

Brynn also comments on the Sudan’s northern opposition: “The political opposition is generally discredited in the eyes of many Sudanese, having been associated with past governments which…mismanaged the economy, prosecuted the civil war, allowed the humanitarian crisis to deepen, and show little respect for human rights.” Commenting on the SPLA and SSIM, Brynn states: “The southern rebels also have little to offer the Sudanese people…are
fractured and factioned, both internally and against each other. The SPLA and SSIM have poor human rights records—long standing inter-tribal conflicts make other commanders quick to switch sides and turn their weapons on each other. Forced conscription of boys by rebel militias has also been a problem—both the SPLA and SSIM regularly loot, harass and obstruct international relief efforts for needy southern Sudanese.”


27 March 1995

An initiative brokered by former American President Jimmy Carter results in the government declaring a two-month unilateral cease-fire. The SPLA and SSIM respond by also declaring cease-fires.

May-June 1995

In an interview for the US journal Foreign Affairs, Dr Hassan al-Turabi outlined his concepts of Islamic government and society:

“What would an Islamic Government mean?...The model is very clear; the scope of government is limited. Law is not the only agency of social control. Moral norms, individual conscience, all these are very important, and they are autonomous. Intellectual attitudes toward Islam are not going to be regulated or codified at all. The presumption is that people are free. The religious freedom not just of non-Muslims, but even of Muslims who have different views, is going to be guaranteed. I personally have views that run against all the orthodox schools of law on the status of women, on the court testimony of non-Muslims, on the law of apostasy. Some people say that I have been influenced by the West and that I border on apostasy myself...I don’t accept the condemnation of Salman Rushdie. If a Muslim wakes up in the morning and says he doesn’t believe any more, that’s his business. There has never been any question of inhibiting people’s freedom to express any understanding of Islam. The function of government is not total.”

Milton Viorst, ‘Sudan’s Islamic Experiment: Fundamentalism in Power’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, Volume 74, Number 3, p.53

27 May 1995

The Sudanese government extends its cease-fire for a further two months.

30 May 1995

The SSIM and the SPLA agree to accept federalism as the basis for peace negotiations with the government.

June 1995

The National Democratic Alliance convenes a conference on “fundamental issues”. The Asmara declaration states a general right of self-determination by way of referendum for the south, Nuba
mountains, Ingessena Hills, Abyei, while committing itself to working for reforms to encourage unity. The SPLM/SPLA joins northern opposition groups in the National Democratic Alliance. Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and spiritual head of the Khatmiyyah sect, becomes Chairman of the NDA: Mubarak al-Fadel al-Mahdi, a cousin of Sadiq al-Mahdi and senior Umma Party leader, becomes Secretary-General of the organisation. The conference also called for “opening up new fronts (in the East or West, or both) and preparing for a revolutionary insurrection in the North”. The Eritrean government confiscates the Sudanese embassy and turns it over to the NDA.

Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), 1 July 1995

26 June 1995 Egyptian terrorists attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during an Organisation of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It is alleged that three of the gunmen involved have fled into the Sudan.

July 1995 SPLA forces attack two villages in Ganyiel region in southern Sudan. The rebels murder 210 villagers, of whom 30 were men, 53 were women and 127 were children. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Sudan reported that:

“Eyewitnesses reported that some of the victims, mostly women, children and the elderly, were caught while trying to escape and killed with spears and pangas. M.N., a member of the World Food Programme relief committee at Panyajor, lost four of her five children (aged 8-15 years). The youngest child was thrown into the fire after being shot. D.K. witnessed three women with their babies being caught. Two of the women were shot and one was killed with a panga. Their babies were all killed with pangas. A total of 1,987 households were reported destroyed and looted and 3, 500 cattle were taken.”


July 1995 The chairman of the Supreme Council for Peace, Lino Rol Deng, defined the government’s concept of “peace from within”: “Peace from within is simply peace in society with a view to restoring a normal state of affairs in war-affected areas, and the removal of alienation between north and south in order to build confidence and consolidate people-to-people relations. Peace from within is the ending of war, the promotion of the concept of peace among all sections of society, and the rehabilitation of heath, educational and agricultural infrastructure in war-affected areas.”
Asking about peace talks in Abuja and Nairobi – “peace from the outside” – Deng said: “There is no such entity as ‘peace from the outside’, as the peace at issue is 100% Sudanese. All contacts are made with the aim of supporting peace from within and convincing rebel factions to join the initiative.”

“Interview with Lino Rol Deng, Chairman of the Supreme Council for Peace”, Sudanow (Khartoum), July 1995.

30 July 1995 The South Sudan Independence Movement reports that its forces have clashed with SPLA units in western Upper Nile.

22 August 1995 President al-Bashir announces presidential and parliamentary elections are to be held in 1996.

October 1995 The Eritrean head-of-state Issias Afeworki stated his regime’s hostility to Sudan: “We are out to see that this government is not there any more...We will give weapons to anyone committed to overthrowing them”.

The Economist (London), 14 October 1995

26 October 1995 The government reports that government forces have clashed with Ugandan-backed SPLA forces in the southern town of Fargouk.

10 January 1996 Southern rebel leader William Nyoun is assassinated by members of the Southern Sudan Independence Army.

12 February 1996 The electoral commission announces that there will be 49 presidential candidates in the forthcoming elections.

6-17 March 1996 Presidential and parliamentary elections are held in Sudan. President Bashir is elected in a contest with 40 other candidates. He secures 60 percent of the popular vote in a 70 percent turn out. It is also the first direct election for President ever to take office in Sudan. The parliamentary elections see the return of 275 members of Parliament. The elections are observed by various international bodies, including the Arab League and the Organisation of African Unity. Ambassador Kemoko Keita, leader of the OAU delegation, in his report states: “This election is a historic occasion, the first direct Presidential election in Sudan, and the first time the voters in the newly demarcated States have the opportunity to select their representatives to the new National Assembly”.

1 April 1996 Dr Hassan al-Turabi is elected as the Speaker of Parliament.
6 April 1996 Cairo radio reports that Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi has refused a request to join the Sudanese government.

10 April 1996 The government signs a Peace Charter with the South Sudan Independence Movement and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (Bahr al-Ghazal Group) led by Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, a former deputy commander of the SPLA. The charter provides for cease-fires, followed by elections and a referendum on the status of southern Sudan.

21 April 1996 A long interview with Mustafa Hamza, one of the three terrorists said to be in Sudan, was published in Al-Hayat newspaper. The only named suspect in the assassination attempt, Hamza was subsequently located and interviewed by the international media in Afghanistan. Hamza stated that the Egyptian group, ‘Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya’, was responsible for the murder attempt. He stated that most of the gunmen involved came from Pakistan, travelling on passports issued by an Arab country, and that one or two men had entered Ethiopia from Sudan, having received visas from the Ethiopian embassy in Khartoum. He said that only one of the gunmen had left through Sudan and that he was now in a third country. Hamza stated that Sheikh Omer Abdel Rahman was the movement’s spiritual leader. Al-Hayat reported that Hamza stated that there were “deep differences” between the ruling Islamic Front in the Sudan and his Group. He stated that the Sudanese model of Islam was too liberal for him and accused the Sudanese Government [of following a] distorted and deviated application of Islam”.

26 April 1996 The United Nations Security Council invokes measures contained in Resolutions 1054 and 1070 and imposes diplomatic sanctions on Sudan. These sanctions requested that all states reduce the number and level of staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts. States were also called upon to restrict the movement through their countries of members of the Sudanese government. International and regional organisations were also requested not to hold conferences in Sudan.

30 April 1996 The SPLA and SSIM sign a unification agreement to merge their organisations.

11 May 1996 Eritrean leader Afeworki states that his regime will support Sudanese rebels: “Eritrea will provide any type of support...The sky is the limit.” Sudanese rebels were allowed to establish several training camps in western Eritrea. The Eritrean government also admitted training some of the rebels themselves. The United States government was also directly involved in this training process.

30 May 1996 The SSIM reports that SPLA forces have attacked SSIM positions.

7 June 1996 Ethiopian involvement in attempts to destabilise Sudan was reported by *Africa Confidential*: “As in the days of Colonel Mengistu’s dictatorship, the Ethiopians are helping train the SPLA and sending it arms through Gambella. This time they are encouraged not by Russia, but by the USA.”

*Africa Confidential* (London), 7 June 1996

June 1996 There is fighting between the SPLA and SSIM in eastern Upper Nile.

2 July 1996 The SPLA is further split when a group of the Nuba Mountain SPLA breaks with John Garang.

31 July 1996 The government signs a political charter with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Nuba Mountains Central Committee led by Commander Mohammed Haroun Kafi.

14 August 1996 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir declares an amnesty for southern rebels. He states: “We are extending our hand to all who seek the national interests of the homeland”.

“Bashir Declares Amnesty to Southern Rebels”, News Article by PANA, 14 August 1996

16 August 1996 The Sudanese government responds to claims that Khartoum in any way supports terrorism: “Sudan has not, and will not, allow its territory to be used for any act of terror or to be used as a shelter for terrorists or by those who have eluded justice. Sudan, like many other states, suffers day after day with those innocent civilians who lose their lives or who are harmed as a result of terrorist acts perpetrated in many parts of the world. Killing women and children, terrorizing peaceful citizens, destroying property and taking innocent civilians hostage cannot be accepted under any divine law; nor can they be accepted by any human being who believes in justice and peace.”

Speech by the Sudanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, before the Security Council, 16 August 1996.

October 1996 The NDA holds a conference in Asmara, Eritrea. They call on regional institutions to overthrow the Sudanese government.
26 December 1996 The New York Times says of Dr Hassan al-Turabi in 1996: “He voices a tolerant version of political Islam – far less conservative than Saudi Arabia’s, far less militant than Iran’s”.

1997 Commenting on US policy toward Sudan in his book Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia, John Prendergast writes: “The Parallels to Central America in the 1980s are stark. The US provided covert aid to the Contras (and official aid to the regimes in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatamala) and because of domestic public pressure urged numerous reforms on the Contras (and the three central American governments), especially in the area of human rights and institutional reform (though the pressures were undercut by an administration in Washington not serious about human rights)”.


January 1997 Samuel Aru Bol, a former deputy prime minister and past president and secretary-general of the Sudan African National Union, welcomes the political charters signed between the government and the SSIM and other southern groups: “(T)he political leaders of South Sudan, except John Garang and a few others, want to negotiate with the government of the day to achieve a peaceful and just solution to the conflict. Southerners are not warmongers but peace-loving people.” He stated that the parties he represented within the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP): “represent the interest of these peace-loving people of South Sudan and will join in the subsequent peace talks stated in this political charter.”


January 1997 There are reports of military incursions into Sudan from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. There is considerable fighting in eastern Sudan.

16 January 1997 The Guardian reports that the Sudanese rebels have “tanks and mortars” and Eritrean backing.

17 January 1997 The Times of London reports that “[b]oth countries have denied any involvement with the SPLA, but Eritrean and Ethiopian officers have been seen commanding SPLA soldiers”, and quoted African diplomatic sources as saying there “is no way that the SPLA are not being supported by the Eritreans and Ethiopians”. The Times also reports that this aggression has the “enthusiastic backing of the United States”.
The Times (London), 17 January 1997

23 January 1997  Ethiopian involvement was also clear. The Guardian quote a senior SPLA officer as saying that “Ethiopia provides us with a corridor” and that Ethiopia accommodated the SPLA.

25 January 1997  The South Sudan Independence Movement attack the SPLA’s human rights record. In a statement released in Washington-DC they call upon the United States and its western allies to “encourage reconciliation of Southern rebel groups and abstain from endorsing the SPLM-SPLA as the ‘main resistance’ movement.” The SSIM also presented lists of southern Sudanese political leaders that had been murdered by the SPLA.

“SSIM Blasts Garang as ‘Bloody Dictator’”, Executive Intelligence Review, 14 February 1997 at www.aboutsudan.com

February 1997  The fighting in eastern Sudan stabilises.

21 February 1997  Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, the Secretary-General of the National Congress comments on the January incursions into Sudan by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces: “Anthony Lake, the national security adviser to the U.S. President, expounded the ‘Sudan policy’ of the U.S. government in a public lecture in March 1995. He explicitly pointed out that the U.S. government would harass the Sudan through some of its neighbors; Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda are the biggest recipients of U.S. and European aid in sub-Saharan Africa. No wonder, therefore, that they took it upon themselves to implement those vows made by Mr Lake…The invasion was carried out at this particular point in time to scuttle the internal peace process, which had started to bear fruit.”

“Foreign Invasion Designed to Wreck Sudan’s Internal Peace Initiative. Interview: Dr. Ghazi Attabani”, Executive Intelligence Review, 21 February 1997, at www.aboutsudan.com

30 March 1997  Following a meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, a communiqué issued by the leadership of the National Democratic Alliance states that it will only accept initiatives toward peace within the framework of IGAD. General Fathi Ahmed Ali, vice-president of the NDA, further states that the NDA had re-affirmed its goal of toppling the Sudanese government. SPLA representative at the meeting. Magnetise Haled, declares that:

“The NDA is not only an opposition force but an alternative to the present government…The NDA will make all material and spiritual means useful to make the popular uprising successful.”
The Asmara meeting also declares that the opposition would topple the Sudanese government “within several months”; condemns countries supporting the Sudanese government financially, militarily and politically; agrees to step up civil disobedience abroad; threatens to try the ruling government for violating the constitution, for torture, for exporting terrorism, for ethnic cleansing and for war crimes; and calls for diplomatic sanctions by other countries in order to isolate Sudan. They also state that they are hoping to step up military operations on the eastern, western and southern fronts.

Richard Engel and Simon Apiku, “Sudanese Rebels Find Unity in Asmara”, Middle East Times, 30 March 1997

April-May 1997 Commenting on the military offensive earlier in 1997, the BBC observes that: “It seemed that the northern and southern opposition movements – operating under the umbrella National Democratic Alliance – had launched a final campaign to bring down the Islamic government of President Omer Hassan al-Bashir by a strategy of direct military confrontation in the field and civilian uprisings in the main cities, particularly the capital, Khartoum.”


2 April 1997 Former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi states that the Sudanese opposition was working for the unity of Sudan but did not rule out secession for the south. He says: “Any alternative is better than war”. He also assures Egypt that a potentially independent south would respect the “international nature” of the Nile.

“Sudan’s Mahdi Does Not Rule Out Secession for South”, News Article by Reuters, 2 April 1997

21 April 1997 The government signs the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the South Sudan Independence Movement, led by Dr Riek Machar, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (Bahr al-Ghazal Group) represented by Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, the Equatoria Defence Force led by Dr Theophilus Ochang Loti, the South Sudan Independents Group, Arok Thon Arok’s SPLA-Bor group, and the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP) represented by Samuel Aru Bol (USAP was itself made up of seven political parties – the Southern Sudan Political Association, the People’s Progressive Party, the Sudan African Congress, the Sudan African People’s Congress, the Southern Sudan Federal Party, the Sudan African National Union and the Sudan National Party). The agreement provides for a free and fair, internationally-supervised, referendum in southern Sudan to determine whether the people of the south desire independence or federation. The south would continue to be exempt from sharia law.
The agreement also guarantees freedom of movement, assembly, organisation, speech and press, and provides for an equitable representation of southerners at all levels within Sudan. It further provides for the formation of a 25-member Southern Coordination Council, to include a president, 14 ministers and the ten southern state governors, to serve as a southern government until the referendum, which was to be held in four years time given a situation of peace. It is also agreed that there will be an equitable sharing of national resources between the different regions of Sudan, with priority given to the reconstruction of the south.

23 April 1997

NDA Chairman and DUP leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the chairman of the National Democratic Alliance, the umbrella group of northern and southern opposition groups, rejects the provision of a referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan entrenched in the Khartoum Peace Agreement. He states: “We shall take drastic measures to stop the separatists from splitting up our country.”

The SSIM’s spokesman for information, Paul Mabior, speaking in London, states that: “The Sudanese, both from the north and south, are fed up with war and have now decided to resolve their conflict through a referendum.”

“Sudan: Exiled Opposition Rejects This Week’s Peace Pact”, News Article by World News IPS, 23 April 1997

21 May 1997

The government of Sudan releases 80 political prisoners and states that they had been released to pave the way for cooperation between the government and the opposition. The Minister of Justice, Abdel Basit Sabdarat, states: “Sudan has no more political prisoners, all the detainees have been freed. The opposition should grip such an opportunity...The government is prepared to hold peaceful negotiations and dialogue.”

The Khartoum government also states that it is preparing to draft a permanent constitution and wishes to see as many politicians as possible participating in the process.

“Sudan Frees Prisoners and Calls for Peace”, Electronic Mail and Guardian, (Johannesburg), 21 May 1997

31 May 1997

The leader of the South Sudan Independence Movement, Dr Riek Machar, speaking at the end of the OAU Council of Ministers meeting, states that given the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 21 April signed between rebels and the government of Sudan, John Garang no longer had a reason to continue fighting. Machar states that the agreement was a breakthrough and realised the dreams of southern Sudanese who had been fighting since 1955 for their rights. He states that the Khartoum Agreement “is
the progressive way forward. The agreement is comprehensive enough to accommodate all views…whatever they are”.


**June 1997** In an interview with the Swiss newspaper *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* SPLA leader John Garang declares that: “We have shown that the myth of the NIF’s invincibility was a balloon, and we’ve now punctured it … We have intensified the war in the South…I wouldn’t want to predict how many days, weeks or months it will be until the regime falls. I’m no prophet. But it will be sooner rather than later, because the regime is no longer capable of reversing the situation.”

“`Our Goal Is to Topple the Khartoum Regime’: An Interview with John Garang, Head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army”, NZZ Background, *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, June 1997

**9 July 1997** SPLA leader John Garang states that his forces were escalating their activities and were circling Juba. Garang also rejects the offer of a face-to-face meeting with President Bashir.

“Sudan Rebel Leader Eyes Juba, Rejects Talks”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 9 July 1997

**9 July 1997** At the IGAD heads-of-state summit meeting, Sudanese President al-Bashir states that Sudan accepts the IGAD ‘Declaration of Principles’ as the basis for a negotiated end to the Sudanese conflict. The five leaders at the IGAD talks also issue a statement saying:

“The summit welcomed the acceptance by the government of Sudan of the declaration of principles as the basis for discussions and negotiations. The summit considered this development a major breakthrough in the peace initiative. This will enable the parties to the conflict to freely discuss and negotiate on all the points enshrined in the declaration of principles. The summit requests the chairman of the IGAD peace initiative to take the necessary measures aimed at a speedy resumption of the negotiations.”

“Bashir Accepts Framework for Peace Talks”, News Article by Reuters, 9 July 1997

**23 July 1997** The April Khartoum Peace Agreement passes into law as the 14th constitutional amendment.

**7 August 1997** The Southern Coordination Council is formed. Dr Riek Machar is appointed president of the Council.
“Sudanese President Appoints Head of Southern [Council]”, News Article by XINHUA, 7 August 1997

12 August 1997  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, speaking at a press conference following talks with President Nelson Mandela, calls for a cease-fire in the Sudanese civil war. He states: “We believe that the war should come to an end. In this respect we have requested for a ceasefire with the faction of Dr John Garang.”

“Bashir Calls for Ceasefire With Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 12 August 1997

16 August 1997  Responding to Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir’s call for a cease-fire Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, head of the National Democratic Alliance, rejects bilateral talks with the Sudanese government. He states: “The view of the NDA … is that bilateral negotiations with the regime will not achieve peace in Sudan.”

“Sudan Opposition Head Rejects Talks With Khartoum”, News Article by Reuters, 16 August 1997

18 August 1997  Africa Confidential Sudan specialist Gill Lusk states: “The opposition expects to overthrow the government by the end of the year or the first half of next year. Previously cautious Western officials agree. It’s a matter of time.”

Newsweek, 18 August 1997, p.18.

21 August 1997  The SPLA rejects Nelson Mandela’s offers to mediate directly between the Sudanese government and the rebels. A statement by SPLA spokesman John Luk declares that the SPLA is not seeking any other form of mediation. He states: “The SPLA remains committed to the IGAD peace process under President Daniel Arap Moi and will not seek another alternative forum.”

Former SPLA commander Riek Machar – who had signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese Government in April 1997 – states that during a visit to South Africa he and his group of 6 former rebel factions would continue to appeal to the SPLA to join the peace process.

“Why Sudan’s Rebels Snubbed Mandela”, Electronic Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 25 August 1997

22 August 1997  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, following his meeting with President Mandela, states: “We support the call of South African President Nelson Mandela for a ceasefire with the SPLA.”

“Sudanese and the National Cake”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 22 August 1997
29 August 1997 SPLA leader John Garang refuses to meet Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir or attend the joint talks hosted by President Mandela between Bashir and Ugandan President Museveni. Garang states: “Of course the war goes on…we are preparing ourselves to defend our gains as well as to extend them.”

“Rebel Leader Garang Says ‘War Goes On’”, News Article by Reuters, 29 August 1979

2 September 1997 President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, following a meeting with President Bashir, stated that his government wanted to join the search for peace in Sudan: “We have seen your efforts to try and establish peace and we commend you for them.”

17 September 1997 The federally-funded US Institute of Peace holds a meeting on “Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan”. John Prendergast of the National Security Council outlines Washington’s policy toward Sudan. He describes Sudan as “the principle threat to US national security interests on the Continent today”. He further states:

“The US Government strongly supports IGADD as the only viable interlocutor for peace talks on Sudan at this time. We support the IGADD declaration of principles as the basis for such talks. We do not view the April peace agreement signed between the government of Sudan and the splinter rebel southern factions as a viable alternative to peace in Sudan. We have actively countered the government of Sudan’s efforts to utilise other mediators and the April peace agreement as vehicles to divide international support for IGADD.”


20 September 1997 The government and Dr Lam Akol, the leader of the SPLA-United rebel faction sign the ‘Fashoda Peace Agreement’. The agreement is facilitated by the Reth of the Shilluk, and while agreeing some amendments to it, the SPLA-United becomes a further signatory to the April 1997 Sudan Peace Agreement.

25 September 1997 Commenting on the Clinton Administration’s US$20 million grant in military aid to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda former United States President Jimmy Carter states that it was “a tacit demonstration of support for the overthrow of the Khartoum government”. He also believed that this behaviour by Washington had a negative effect on the SPLA’s interest in negotiating a political settlement: “I think Garang now feels he doesn’t need to negotiate because he anticipates a victory brought about by increasing support
from his immediate neighbors, and also from the United States and indirectly from other countries.”


October 1997 President al-Bashir announces the creation of a 377-member commission to draft a new constitution.

7 October 1997 Commenting on the Clinton Administration’s Sudan policy, former American President Carter observes “If the United States would be reasonably objective in Sudan, I think that we at the Carter Center and the Africans who live in the area could bring peace to Sudan. But the United States government has a policy of trying to overthrow the government in Sudan. So whenever there’s a peace initiative, unfortunately our government puts up whatever obstruction it can.”


November 1997 American journalist Bill Berkeley, in an in-depth study of the war in southern Sudan, published in The New York Times Magazine, states: “Across the south in its heyday the SPLA behaved like an occupying army. Civilians remain the main military targets. All factions [of the SPLA] seek to destroy communities presumed to be supporting their opponents. In far-flung scorched-earth sweeps, minimally trained, totally illiterate, heavily armed fighters torch villages, steal the livestock and food, plant land mines, conscript the young men and boys and rape the women and girls. Garang’s explicit strategy was to render south Sudan ungovernable, and in that he succeeded. The south today is not only ungovernable but virtually uninhabitable.”

Garang states that: “Of course, we are not trying to achieve a military victory, We cannot win this war.” Berkeley observes of the SPLA that it is “at once a genuine liberation movement and a loose confederation of ethnically based criminal gangs” and that “[I]ts character was shaped by its principal backer, the former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, and by Mengistu’s backer, the Soviet Union”. Berkeley also observes that “few doubt that the Clinton Administration has had a hand in Garang’s revival”.


1-7 November 1997 The fifth round of Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace talks between the government and SPLA are held in Nairobi. It is the first meeting since the signing of the Khartoum Peace Agreement, and the government’s offer of an internationally supervised
referendum on southern self-determination. In discussions about a referendum, the SPLA present a map showing the areas it demands should exercise self-determination. These areas include not only the Nuba mountains and Ingessana Hills, but several other areas in Darfur, Kordofan, White Nile and Blue Nile. The government’s offer was to have been for southern Sudan according to the 1956 boundaries. The talks stall on this issue.

2 November 1997 The European Union reiterates its support for peace talks aimed at settling the Sudanese civil war. It states that it hoped the present round of peace talks will stop the killing and let international aid flow.

3 November 1997 President Clinton signed executive order 13067, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703 et seq) and the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641 c), which imposed comprehensive trade and economic sanctions against Sudan. The order declared “that the policies of Sudan constitute an extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”.


29 November 1997 SPLA leader John Garang, in a visit to Cairo to brief Egyptian officials on the peace talks in Kenya, states that: “We are prepared as a matter of principle to talk with the government of the day in Khartoum.” He also states that he is committed to preserving the unity of Sudan.

“SPLA Committed to Sudan Unity”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 29 November 1997

6 December 1997 The Sudanese foreign minister, Ali Osman Taha, accuses SPLA leader John Garang of not being interested in a peaceful solution to the conflict. He states that the last round of peace talks had achieved little, and that the government would continue to implement the peace accord it had signed in April with other rebel groups.

“Sudan Says Garang Not Interested in Peace”, News Article by BBC News, 6 December 1997

12 December 1997 John Garang, commenting on the November round of peace talks in Nairobi, states that: “We intended not to reach an agreement with the NIF. This is what we did and we succeeded in it because we did not reach an agreement.”

Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC, 15 December 1997

9 January 1998 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi stated that he saw change in the government’s position: “There is a new political atmosphere
about national dialogue. I recognize that the language of the Sudanese government has changed.”


19-20 January 1998 The first meeting of the Joint IGAD Partners Forum at ministerial level is held in Rome. In its Final Declaration the Forum declares regarding Sudan:

“Participants welcomed the resumption of the negotiating process between the Government of Sudan and the Southern Parties which took place in Nairobi in October-November 1997, under Kenyan chairmanship. They strongly appealed to the Parties concerned to fully engage in the next stage of the reconciliation process promoted by IGAD in order to bring to an end soon the Sudanese conflict...[Participants] declared their readiness to support with all possible means the ‘shuttle diplomacy’ under the auspices of the Kenyan chairmanship in preparation of the next session of the peace talks to be held in Nairobi in April 1998...”


28-29 January 1998 Several thousand SPLA insurgents, led by Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, attack Wau. There is fierce fighting in the north-eastern and southern part of Wau. After 48-hours of fighting the rebels retreat.

31 January 1998 The Sudanese foreign minister calls on the SPLA to offer concessions and states that the government was ready to offer guarantees to build confidence between the two sides to reach a settlement.

3 February 1998 A Sudanese army spokesman stated that Eritrea had shelled border areas in eastern Sudan. Areas around Kassala were shelled twice in three days.


10 February 1998 The Sudanese government states that heavy artillery shelling from inside Ethiopia had accompanied rebel attacks in the al-Kadaref province of Sudan, near the Sudanese-Ethiopian border.

12 February 1998 The First Vice-President, Lieutenant-General al-Zubeir Mohammed Salih and a number of other officials die when their airplane crashes on landing at Nasir in Upper Nile. SPLA spokesman Justin Yaac
claimed that SPLA forces had shot down the plane as it was passing through “an area we control”.

‘Sudan rebels say they downed vice-president’s plane’, News Article by Reuters, 12 February 1998

13 February 1998 As more information emerges about the crash which resulted in the death of the first vice-president and other officials, which was the result of poor visibility during landing, the SPLA withdraw its claim to have shot his plane down. SPLA spokesman John Luk stated that they had no forces in the area in southern Sudan where the crash occurred.

‘Sudan rebels withdraw plane crash claim’, News Article by Reuters, 13 February 1998

19 February 1998 NDA chairman, and DUP leader, Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, in meetings with the Egyptian government, states that peace can only be achieved in Sudan through talks with the Sudanese government and opposition groups.

“Peace Will Not be Achieved in Sudan Except Through Talks”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 19 February 1998

22 February 1998 Interviewed in Khartoum, the president of the Southern Coordinating Council, Dr Riek Machar, discussed the evolution of the peace process in the light of the return to Khartoum of several northern opposition leaders: “[T]here are new alliances taking place in the country. The final result would be that the attempt for reconciliation with the northern political parties will be accelerated, whatever their stand will be. Pluralism, freedom of speech, freedom of political organisation are coming. The moves towards peace have been consolidated. Definitely, they will have to come to terms with the government. In it, the loser will be John Garang, because the talk of the overthrow of the government, will not be there with the northern political parties, if they get the guarantees; politically, they will operate. They will have no reason to continue holding arms and fighting the government. Garang will be faced with the choice, to come to peace. After all, he has no reason to continue the war, because if he is fighting for the federal system, this is under implementation; if he is fighting for self-rule in the South, there is a special status for the South during the interim period. If he is fighting for the right to self-determination, it shall be exercised through a referendum. He has no political agenda.”

“Why Southern Leaders Want to End the War. Interview: Dr Riek Machar”, Executive Intelligence Review, 13 March 1998, at www.aboutsudan.com

5 March 1998 The Sudanese government accuses Eritrean forces of cross-border shelling of the villages of Awad, Gulsah and Hudrah, in Kasha
state. The six hours of artillery fire cause casualties and destroy schools and wells.

9 March 1998 The new government for southern Sudan is announced. The government is to be headed by Dr Riek Machar and is made up of 14 ministers and the ten state governors in the south. The government will be based in Juba, the capital of the south.

12 March 1998 The Speaker of the Sudanese Parliament, Dr Hassan al-Turabi, confirms that the new draft constitution provides for the formation and functioning of political parties.

13 March 1998 The Sudanese government states that it is ready to sign a cease-fire agreement with rebel forces in southern Sudan. The foreign minister, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, offers a cease-fire to ensure a “proper atmosphere of peace” for the April negotiations in Nairobi. The minister calls on the international community to press the rebels to agree to the cease-fire, which would guarantee humanitarian aid delivery to affected areas in southern Sudan.

16 March 1998 The heads-of-state summit meeting of IGAD, held in Djibouti, express their support for the peace negotiations on southern Sudan being held under the IGAD umbrella. The Summit urges the parties to the conflict to declare a cease-fire as a measure of good-will and in order to create a conducive environment for the April peace negotiations. The Summit also warns of the negative impact on the peace process of external intervention.

18 March 1998 The opposition NDA holds a conference in Asmara, Eritrea. SPLA leader John Garang fails to attend. SPLA spokesman Pagan Amum denies that Garang’s failure to attend is to avoid confrontation with other NDA members over his switch to demanding “confederalism” for the South rather than self-determination. Amum also declares that the IGAD peace-talks would be unnecessary if SPLA military forces topple the regime soon. He states:

“[T]here would be no need for going to the Nairobi negotiations [IGAD] which is to be held in April between the SPLA and the GOS if we reach Khartoum before the time set for these talks … The build-up of the military wings for the political parties and groups within the Alliance is complete and thus, I can say that we are the last stages in the way to topple the Sudanese regime, and among other issues that we will be discussing tomorrow is the development of the military actions and increasing coordination and the executing of the plans to topple the regime and to reach Khartoum … we will also discuss the post-Khartoum issues, such as the government, the coordination of the transitional
period and the constitution … IGAD is another topic. We will try to reach Khartoum before then, if we could not, then we will participate in the talks.”

“The NDA Begins its Conference with the Absence of Sadiq and Garang”, Al-Hayat, 18 March 1998

27 March 1998  Bishop Gabriel Roric Jur, Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, calls on the IGAD countries to pressure the SPLA into accepting a cease-fire. He states: “IGAD, government and the rebel SPLA should work to realize a cease-fire so as to provide a climate which is conducive to making a success of the talks in the next round.” Following talks with Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir the Catholic Archbishop of Sudan, Gabriel Zubeir Wako, expresses his desire for the church to participate in the IGAD peace negotiations. President Bashir agrees to the request.

Three of the opposition parties, – the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Communist Party – express their desire to participate in the IGAD peace process.

“Politics-Sudan: Catholic Church to Join Peace Talks”, News Article by IPS, 30 March 1998

28 March 1998  President al-Bashir restates the Khartoum government’s commitment to the IGAD peace process. Speaking to an IGAD delegation, he added that his government “is serious about reaching peace”.

News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 March 1998

31 March 1998  The SPLA rejects the new Sudanese constitution.

News Article by BBC, 31 March, 1998

3 April 1998  Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail calls on the international community to put pressure on the SPLA to agree a cease-fire. He states: “I want the international community to convince the rebels of the SPLA to accept the cease-fire arrangement so that humanitarian aid reaches the poor in rebel-controlled areas.” Ismail also states that the government was “ready for talks with the rebels.”

The visiting Italian foreign minister also comments: “This is a good step and we want the SPLA to positively respond to the call for a ceasefire.” He states that the SPLA was laying “obstacles before the forthcoming negotiations by persistently rejecting a ceasefire.”

“Italian Official in Sudan to Push for Ceasefire”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 April 1998
April 1998

The Bahr al-Ghazal region is wracked by famine as a result of the attack on Wau and its consequences. This attack, and the fighting that followed it, led to a drastic deterioration in the security and food distribution situation in that region. The government had also restricted flights into some contested areas of southern Sudan. Rebel responsibility in large part for the famine situation was reported on by CNN in early April 1998 under headlines such as “aid agencies blame Sudanese rebel who switched sides”: “Observers say much of the recent chaos has resulted from the actions of one man, Kerubino Kwanying Bol, a founding member of the rebel movement…He aided rebel forces in sieges of three government-held towns, which sent people fleeing into the countryside.” *Newsweek* magazine also reported that: “Aid workers blame much of the south’s recent anguish on one man: the mercurial Dinka warlord Kerubino Kuanyin Bol.”

“1 million people face famine in Sudan, Ethiopia”, News Article by CNN, April 10, 1998, web posted at 6:04 p.m. EDT (22:04 GMT); *Newsweek*, 18 May 1998

16 April 1998

Sudanese Vice-President George Kongor restates the government’s support for all efforts to convince the SPLA to join the peace process.

News Article by SUNA, 18 April 1998

18 April 1998

Cabinet Affairs Minister Mohammed al-Amin Khalifa affirms the government’s readiness to participate in the forthcoming IGAD peace talks. He calls on the SPLA to keep to the items of the IGAD-sponsored peace initiative, and adds that the Khartoum Peace Agreement has guaranteed the right of self-determination in the south.

News Article by SUNA, 18 April 1998

22 April 1998

First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha restates his government’s offer of a cease-fire to advance the IGAD peace initiative. He states that the success or failure of the forthcoming peace talks was in the hands of the SPLA.

News Article by SUNA, 22 April 1998.

24 April 1998

BBC journalist Barbara Plett, reporting from Sudan, states: “What was I to make of signs that Sudan is liberalising. Was this the beginning of glasnost in Africa’s largest state? The IMF seems to think so…This year it congratulated Khartoum for carrying out economic reforms and took it off the blacklist…And political debate is open and fierce. The growing number of private newspapers freely criticise the government…We have more political freedoms that almost any other country in Africa, one university
professor told me. The change in atmosphere from previous visits is truly remarkable…”


26 April 1998 The Sudanese Foreign Minister states “Sudan’s keenness to participate wholeheartedly in the coming round of peace talks in Nairobi on the grounds that war has proved to be an improper means for solving conflicts.”

News Article by Reuters, 26 April 1998.

27 April 1998 The IGAD Peace talks are postponed by the Kenyan host from 4 May to 30 April. A Sudanese army spokesman states: “Intensive troop concentrations have been monitored on Sudan’s southern borders, poised for an offensive in the coming days.”

“Peace Talks Between Sudanese Government, SPLA Postponed”, News Article by XINHUA, 27 April 1998

1-20 May 1998 Voting takes place in a referendum on the new constitution.

1 May 1998 The European Union calls for an immediate ceasefire in Sudan. It states: “We urge all sides in the dispute to adopt a positive attitude and come to an agreement at the next session of the peace talks in Nairobi on May 2-5. In order to enhance the chances of success of the talks and to end the suffering of the Sudanese people we call on all parties to effect an immediate ceasefire.”

News Article by Agence France Press, 1 May 1998

1 May 1998 The British foreign affairs commentator Jonathan Steele attacks US intervention in Sudan. Writing in The Guardian he states: “Welcome to the 1980s. Long live Ronald Reagan. Remember the scenario – a rebel group being trained and armed by the CIA to topple a sovereign government, cross-border incursions from secluded camps, and the whole destabilisation exercise backed by international sanctions and a massive propaganda campaign. It sounds like Nicaragua or Angola circa 1984. In fact it’s Sudan 1998 … Sudan’s human rights record is far from brilliant, but this has never been a reason for US destabilisation elsewhere. The Sudanese government is no more severe on opposition parties than are the neighbouring governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda which Washington supports. Sudan respects women’s rights far more fully than Saudi Arabia or the Islamic governments of Iran or Afghanistan.”
He further comments that “The conflict in southern Sudan is not a simple case of a largely Arab north against a largely Christian south, since there are numerous ethnic divisions among southerners. The government in Khartoum has agreed not to impose sharia law in the southern federal regions set up under the new constitution. It has offered a referendum on secession. Desultory peace talks have been held with the rebels of the SPLA under international auspices, although the last round was sabotaged by [US Secretary of State] Mrs Albright’s sabre-rattling on the border which emboldened the rebels…The only hope of preventing famines in the future has to be peace. Unless the United States takes a neutral position, drops the double standards and stops arming one side against the other, the chances of compromise are nil.”


4 May 1998 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir offers amnesty to southern rebels on the eve of peace talks with the SPLA. Bashir urges rebels to participate in national reconciliation and to “return to the homeland, the doors of which will always remain open”.

News Article by Associated Press, 4 May 1998

4 May 1998 The Democratic Unionist Party states that peace talks are no solution to the Sudanese conflict: “The real solution to the Sudanese issue lies in blockading the regime, politically and economically, until it falls.”

“Sudan Opposition Group Says Peace Talks No Solution”, News Article by Reuters, 4 May 1998

4-6 May 1998 The sixth round of IGAD-sponsored peace talks are held in Nairobi. The government of Sudan and the SPLA agree to hold an internationally-supervised referendum on self-determination for the south. These talks falter, however, on the SPLA’s continuing insistence on redrawing the boundaries of what constituted southern Sudan and on the issue of state and religion.

The Kenyan foreign minister, Bonaya Godana, states that the government had offered a cease-fire to enable the delivery of relief food to starving people in southern Sudan, but the rebels insisted it was not necessary.

News Article by Associated Press, May 06, 1998; “Referendum Agreed at Sudan Peace Talks”, News Article by BBC News, 7 May 1998; “Communiqué by the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee Meeting on The South Sudan Conflict Held From 4th to 6th May 1998, Nairobi, Kenya”, IGAD, Nairobi, Kenya

7 May 1998 The SPLA declare the Nairobi peace talks to have been a failure. They play down the significance of the agreement on a
referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan, claiming it did not address the fundamental issues of the war.


7 May 1998 The Sudanese Foreign Minister states that the government was fully committed to a referendum on self-determination in south Sudan and would accept the south becoming a sovereign state: He declares: “If the south wants to secede and live as a sovereign state then let us live as good neighbours.”

Dr Riek Machar, President of the Southern Coordinating Council, who had been present during the recent round of peace talks, states that: “The government is saying ‘yes’ to self-determination, ‘yes’ to international observers and ‘yes’ the referendum should be about unity or secession. The solution to the war has been reached...Let us go and work out the remaining interim arrangements.”

“Focus-Sudan Says Happy for South to Secede”, News Article by Reuters, 7 May 1998

9 May 1998 A leader of the National Democratic Alliance opposition, former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, criticises the offer made by the government of Sudan of a referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan: “secession by the south in current conditions will damage the north and the south, and will mean the continuation of hostilities.”

“Nairobi Peace Plan for Sudan will Aggravate Civil War’: Former PM”, News Article by Reuters, 9 May 1998

10 May 1998 The proposed Sudanese constitution is attacked by conservative Islamist groups in Sudan. The Muslim Brothers group denounce the proposed constitution for including a number of clauses that compromise Islamic laws such as having placed Islamic laws on an equal footing with customary laws and for having permitted non-Muslims to hold top political posts in the country. The group rejected clauses which state that any citizen, whether a Muslim or not, has the right to contest presidential elections: “The head of state must be Moslem, because there is no room in Islam for infidels to rule over Moslems.” These objections are over-ruled by the constitution’s drafters.


20 May 1998 The rebel SPLA launches an offensive that seizes government garrisons in Wadega, Guffa, Abaldugu, Melkan, Sama’a and Nila. SPLA commander Majak d’Agoot states: “We’ve really hit them on a sensitive
spot. We have captured areas we have not held before. We are in a maximum state of alert and are preparing for other advances.”

“Sudan Civil War Enters New Phase as Rebels Capture Key Garrisons”, News Article by The Daily Telegraph (London), 20 May 1998

26 May 1998 BBC journalist Martin Dawes, reporting from famine-affected areas of southern Sudan, states that the SPLA had rejected a government offer of cease-fire. He declares: “For the fighters the threat of mass starvation is not sufficient reason to stop.”

29 May 1998 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir renews an offer of amnesty for all armed rebels in southern Sudan. He states that given the 1997 Peace Agreement there was no need for continued conflict.

“Bashir for Pardoning Rebels in the South”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 29 May 1998

31 May 1998 The Speaker of the Sudanese Parliament, Dr Hassan al-Turabi, meeting with a visiting American congressman, stated that: “The real humanitarian aid for the people affected by the war in south Sudan is to bolster efforts for ending the war and achieving peace.”

June 1998 The new constitution is adopted.

June 1998 Commenting on the new Sudanese constitution, the Speaker of the Sudanese Parliament, Dr Hassan al-Turabi,

“Of course, Sudan has a rich experience in constitutional practice. We have tried everything – democracy, dictatorship, Parliamentary and Presidential systems, centralised and decentralised systems. You name it, we have tried it. Let me...compare our new Constitution to those in other African and Arab countries...Under our Constitution, the law may regulate the manner of preaching and debate – the avoidance of public disorder must always be an important concern: [England has] similar restrictions. Fanaticism must be discouraged whenever it tends to a breach of the peace. But the law cannot suppress religious opinion...It is even permissible to criticise Islam – so long as such expressions of opinion remain peaceable...In parenthesis, though let me say that we Sudanese are not by nature fanatical about our religious views. We hold our religious views very strongly at time. But this is by no means the same thing. I can therefore say that our laws on religious liberty are more liberal in every respect than those in every other Islamic country – more so even than in those countries that describe themselves as secular. Indeed, in some respects we even compare well with England. We have no religious test whatever for any office. The President may be a Muslim. He may be a Christian. He may believe in one of the native religions that exist in the south. Under the [British] Act of
Settlement, the Queen must be a communicant of the Church of England. If she converts to Catholicism – let alone Islam – she forfeits her Crown. She is also Head of the English Church, for [Britain] is not a state in which religion and politics are separate. We have nothing similar to this.”


6 June 1998 Dr Riek Machar, head of the Southern Coordinating Council expressed his wish to meet with SPLA leader John Garang in order to help with forthcoming negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the rebels.

News Article by ArabicNews.com, 6 June 1998

8 June 1998 Rebels kill three members of a UN-led relief team and wound four others in an attack in the Nuba mountains. The Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies condemn the murders of the World Food Programme and Sudanese Red Crescent workers.

“Three Relief Workers Killed in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 June 1998

9 June 1998 SPLA leader John Garang says that he rejected an offer to make peace with the Sudanese government. Garang had met with his former deputy Riek Machar in the northern Ugandan town of Gulu. Garang pressed his former comrade to rejoin the rebels: Machar said that was “out of the question, particularly as the Khartoum peace agreement has fulfilled all the demands of south Sudan”.


10 June 1998 The Nuer-Dinka Loki Accord is signed in an attempt to settle conflict between the two tribes.

15 June 1998 The Sudanese government calls on the United Nations to press the SPLA to end the war in the south. First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha says that “the removal of the reasons of the war represent the comprehensive solution to the suffering of women and children”.

News Article by Reuters, 15 June 1998

Dr Riek Machar, head of the Southern Coordination Council, expresses his hope to hold a discussion meeting with SPLA leader
John Garang in order to pave the way for forthcoming IGAD negotiations in Addis Ababa in August. Machar also appeals to the United Nations to put pressure on Garang to join the peace process and complains that the SPLA is yet again recruiting child soldiers in the Bahr al-Ghazal area.


15 June 1998 US Congressman Tony Hall reveals that the Sudanese government had agreed to his suggestion official monitors to observe any cease fire.


11 July 1998 Dr Riek Machar, the President of the Southern Coordination Council, outlined the role of the Council: “It is the government for the South. It is entrusted with the resolution of the government apparatus of the ten states. It does planning, social, economic planning. It is also responsible for maintenance and security. It is responsible for the development of the South. It is responsible for the rehabilitation of schools, roads, health services. It is a government. It is also supported by an Advisory Council, which shall be announced soon. The Advisory Council’s work would be to improve on the legislation process in the ten states of the South and coordinate that process... Maintenance of peace also means that we must continue the negotiations with the remaining faction that has not joined the peace process... It is only through negotiations that we can resolve the conflict in Sudan.”


15 July 1998 The Sudanese government declared a cease-fire to assist with humanitarian assistance to famine-affected areas of southern Sudan. Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states: “We hope the position of the rebel movement will develop into an overall ceasefire and declaration of its commitment to negotiation as the sole means for resolving the south Sudan problem.” Ali al-Haj Mohammed, a government peace negotiator, stated that: “We have been asking for a ceasefire but the stumbling block has been the SPLA. We would like the ceasefire to give us time to negotiate security arrangements and power sharing. These are issues of peace we would like to discuss with the SPLA... to stop the war.”

15 July 1998

The SPLA leader states that the Sudanese government must be removed by military or political means.

“SPLA Leader Garang Says Khartoum’s Government ‘Must be Removed’”, News Article by DPA, 15 August 1998

21 July 1998

The Roman Catholic Bishop of the starvation-affected diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar Mazzolari, stated that the SPLA were stealing 65 percent of the food aid going into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. Agence France Presse also reported that: “Much of the relief food going to more than a million famine victims in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan is ending up in the hands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), relief workers said.”

“Aid for Sudan Ending Up With SPLA: Relief Workers”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 July, 1998

22 July 1998

The President of the Southern Coordination Council, Dr Riek Machar, urges John Garang and the SPLA to present in writing his differences with the Sudanese government position regarding peace negotiations: “[W]e, as a government negotiating party, have made clear our position with regards to those issues while Garang has not pronounced his attitude until now.”

“Khartoum Tells Rebels to be Clear on Controversial Issues”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 July 1998

30 July 1998

The Sudanese Ambassador to the United Nations, Fatih Erwa, outlines how his government is seeking to address Sudan’s humanitarian crisis: “(T)his problem is a political problem. And the government is seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations. The government has offered cease-fire to allow the humanitarian assistance to go to the south before this late agreement, and this was even last May the government offered and the rebels refused to do that. Now, when this has come through an initiative from the Kenyan president, the rebels accepted it, Sudan, the Sudanese government accepted it willingly, and we’re ready to extend it any time. Over and above, we are offering now a permanent cease-fire until we finish the peace talks…and we offered that there should be a self-determination from the south. If the southerners, they want independence, they can go an independent state, if they want one united Sudan, it’s their own will and free will to do that. This was our government’s policy, and we are ready even today for a permanent cease-fire until we finish the peace negotiations.”

4 August 1998  In a letter to the Sudanese President, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted the government’s measures to address the ongoing famine in southern Sudan: “The decision taken by your Government to expand aircraft clearance for Operation Lifeline Sudan to increase its access to people in dire need is commendable. I was also encouraged by the agreement reached on the three-month cease-fire in Bahr al Ghazal. I was particularly gratified by the declaration of your Government this morning to extend it unilaterally to cover all of southern Sudan.”

4-6 August 1998  The seventh round of IGAD peace talks are held in Nairobi. In a statement at the beginning of the talks the Khartoum government declares a unilateral and comprehensive cease-fire. The issue of self-determination is returned to at these talks. It is suggested by the SPLA that the question of self-determination for the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills should not be an obstacle to southern self-determination. The SPLA did insist on the inclusion of Abyei within what they considered southern Sudan for purposes of any referendum. On other issues, the government offers a federal system while the SPLA insisted on a “confederal” system.

Communique by the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee Meeting on South Sudan Conflict Held From 4th – 6th August 1998 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia”, IGAD, Addis Ababa, 7 August 1998

7 August 1998  Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the IGAD peace talks have collapsed because of the “stubbornness” of the rebel movement and “its premeditated determination to lead the talks into an impasse”. The SPLA was insisting upon a new definition of southern Sudan. He declares: “The SPLA have retreated from the boundary of southern Sudan, based on the map of 1956 as agreed upon, by adding the areas of Abyei, Jebel Nuba and the Blue Nile.”

However, Dr Ismail reiterates that the Sudanese government is still committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict.

“Sudanese Minister Says Peace Talks With Rebels Have Collapsed”, News Article by Associated Press, 7 August 1998; “Sudan Seeks Peaceful End to War After Talks Fail”, News Article by Reuters, 8 August 1998

7 August 1998  Terrorist bombs devastated United States embassy buildings in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds of people, some of them American, were killed in the explosion in Nairobi and dozens in the blast in Dar-es-Salaam. Thousands more were injured. The American government linked Osama bin-Laden, the Saudi-born millionaire funder of Islamic extremism with these attacks. The Sudanese government immediately and repeatedly condemned the embassy bombings. The Sudanese Foreign Minister, Dr Mustafa
Osman Ismail, stated, for example, that: “These criminal acts of violence do not lead to any goal.”

’Sudan Condemns Bombings of U.S. Embassies’, News Article by Reuters on 8 August 1998 at 08:54:19; ‘Sudan Condemns Bombings of U.S. Embassies’, News Article by Reuters on 8 August 1998 at 08:54:19

10 August 1998  The Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that: “We must pool our efforts to eradicate all the causes of terrorism.” He further says: “the solidarity and cooperation of all the nations in the region and the international community to stand up to international terrorism.” Sudan offered to help in tracking down the terrorists involved. The foreign minister stated that: “Sudan supports Kenya in its efforts to reach the people who committed the incident and is prepared to cooperate fully with it in this regard.” The government of Sudan also immediately granted United States requests for access to Sudanese airspace to evacuate American diplomatic staff and citizens from Kenya, and to provide emergency assistance to those affected in the bombing. When the United States requested further humanitarian overflight authorisations they too were granted.

’Sudan Offers Nairobi Help to Track Down the “Guilty Men”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 August 1998; ‘Sudan Offers to Help Find Kenya Bombings’, News Article by Reuters, 11 August 1998

17 August 1998  The National Democratic Alliance reiterates that it would continue its “struggle against the Khartoum government in order to overthrow it” and insisted on “the necessity of maintaining military confrontation with the ruling regime.” The NDA also called on the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to southern Sudan.

“Sudan Opposition Vows to Keep Fighting, Appeals for Famine Aid”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 August 1998

20 August 1998  The United States government launched a missile attack on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, alleging that it was making chemical weapons as part of Osama bin-Laden’s infrastructure of international terrorism. Seventeen Cruise missiles hit the factory. The al-Shifa plant was badly damaged. Several workers were injured in the attack. Two food processing factories were also damaged in the strike.


20 August 1998  The United States government made several, widely-reported, claims about the al-Shifa factory. In the news briefing given by United States Defence Secretary, William Cohen he stated that the al-Shifa factory “produced the precursor chemicals that would allow the production of... VX
nerve agent”. Secretary Cohen also stated that Osama bin-Laden “has had some financial interest in contributing to…this particular facility”. The American government also claimed that no commercial medicines or drugs were made at the factory, The New York Times, for example, reported: “statements by a senior intelligence official hours after the attack that the plant in Khartoum…produced no commercial products.”


20 August 1998

Within hours of the attack, Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir said that Sudan would bring an official complaint at the American action before the United Nations Security Council and that the Sudanese government would also ask the United Nations to establish “a commission to verify the nature of the activity of the plant”. President Bashir flatly denied American claims that the al-Shifa plant was being used to make chemical weapons. He accused President Clinton of lying: “Putting out lies is not new for the United States and its president. A person of such immorality will not hesitate to tell any lie.” President Bashir also stated that Sudan was critical of the United States government, and not of American companies or citizens: “We have no animosity towards the American people and non-government agencies.”


21 August 1998

In a formal letter to the United Nations Security Council, Bishop Gabriel Roric Jur, the Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, condemned the American attack on the factory. The Sudanese government stated that the factory was privately owned and had been financed by several Sudanese investors and the Bank of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), also known as Comesa. The factory produced more than half of Sudan’s need for medicines. The Sudanese government stated: “The allegations in U.S. statements that Osama bin-Laden owned this factory and that it produced chemical weapons and poisonous gases for terrorist purposes are allegations devoid of truth and the U.S. government has no evidence for this.” Sudan requested the convening of the Security Council to discuss the matter, and also requested a technical fact-finding mission to verify American claims.

‘Letter of H.E. Bishop Gabriel Roric, State Minister at the Ministry of External Affairs to the President of the United Nations Security Council on the flagrant American aggression against the Sudan’, Ministry of External Affairs, Khartoum. See, also, ‘Sudan Formally Asks for UN Meeting, Probe of Plant’, News Article by Reuters on 22 August 1998 at 05:44 pm EST; ‘Khartoum Seeks
30 August 1998 American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory fall by the wayside one by one. The United States government made five claims about the al-Shifa factory in its attempts to justify its Cruise missile attack on the plant. These were as follows: the al-Shifa plant was making precursors to the VX nerve gas, namely a compound known as Empta; that Osama bin-Laden either owned or had a financial link to the al-Shifa factory; that the al-Shifa factory did not produce any medicines or drugs; that the al-Shifa factory was a high security facility guarded by the Sudanese military; and that there were weapons of mass destruction technology links between Sudan and Iraq. An examination and assessment of the evidence released by the United States found it to be confused, inconclusive and contradictory. After just over one week of sifting through American government claims, The Observer newspaper speaks of: “a catalogue of US misinformation, glaring omissions and intelligence errors about the function of the plant.”


3 September 1998 The summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, meeting in Durban, South Africa, and representing well over one hundred countries, condemns the American attack on the al-Shifa factory, passing the following resolution: “The Heads of State or Government…expressed their deep concern over the air attack carried out by the United States Government against the El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in the Sudan on 20 August 1998, and considered this as a serious violation of the principles of international law and the UN Charter and contrary to the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes as well as a serious threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan and the regional stability and international peace and security. They further considered this attack as a unilateral and unwarranted act. The Heads of State or Government condemned this act of aggression and the continuing threats made by the United States Government against the Sudan and urged the US Government to refrain from such unilateral acts. They further expressed support to the Sudan in its legitimate demands for full compensation for economic and material losses resulting from the attack.”

Final Document, XII NAM Summit, Durban, 29 August - 3 September 1998

6 September 1998 The Washington Post, in an editorial entitled ‘Intelligence Lapse?’, called American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory into question: “the possibility of an intelligence failure in the choice of targets in Sudan is so awful to contemplate…but enough questions have been raised, and the administration’s story has been often enough revised, to warrant further inquiry…How could the CIA not have known more about the factory –
not have known what so many ordinary citizens apparently knew? Some officials reportedly pointed to a search of the factory’s Internet site that listed no products for sale. We can only hope that, if the administration could speak more openly, it could make a more persuasive case. At a minimum, there is room here for congressional intelligence committees to inquire further.”

21 September 1998 The New York Times, and The Times of London, after investigations in the wake of the American attack on the al-Shifa factory, report that the Central Intelligence Agency had previously secretly had to withdraw over one hundred of its reports alleging Sudanese involvement in terrorism. The CIA had realised that the reports in question had been fabricated: “In late 1995 the CIA realized that a foreign agent who had warned repeatedly of startling terrorist threats to U.S. diplomats, spies and their children in Khartoum was fabricating information. They withdrew his reports, but the climate of fear and mistrust created by the reports bolstered the case for withdrawing personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, officials said...The embassy remained closed, even though, as a senior intelligence official put it, “the threat wasn’t there” as of 1996.” An editorial stated that: “the Central Intelligence Agency...recently concluded that reports that had appeared to document a clear link between the Sudanese Government and terrorist activities were fabricated and unreliable...The United States is entitled to use military force to protect itself against terrorism. But the case for every such action must be rigorously established. In the case of the Sudan, Washington has conspicuously failed to prove its case.” In London, The Times concluded that this: “is no great surprise to those who have watched similar CIA operations in Africa where ‘American intelligence’ is often seen as an oxymoron.”

22 September 1998 The Sudanese government accuse Uganda of having attacked Sudan. Sudanese media reported that fifty Ugandan soldiers had been killed in the fighting. Mansour Khalid, political advisor to SPLA leader John Garang, states that: “There is no Ugandan interference in the battles in the south.”

22 September 1998 The European Commission calls upon both the Sudanese government and the rebel SPLA to extend the cease-fire that is set to expire on October 15.

"European Commission Calls for Extension of Sudan Ceasefire", News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 September 1998
24 September 1998  A Sudanese army spokesman announces that Sudanese forces have killed more than 70 Ugandan soldiers and destroyed 75 tanks, three armoured vehicles and several lorries in battles in southern Sudan. The Ugandan government denied the claims, stating “we do not have any presence there.”

“Sudan Says it Kills 70 and Destroys 75 Tanks, Ugandans Deny Intervention”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 24 September 1998

27 September 1998  The Sudanese government reported that rebel forces and their Ugandan allies had suffered 1,100 casualties in fighting over the weekend. Government forces had also destroyed several armoured vehicles and trucks in the fighting in eastern Equatoria. The government has announced a general mobilisation to deal with Ugandan-Eritrean aggression.

“1,100 Ugandan, SPLA casualties in south Sudan: Khartoum”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 September 1998

30 September 1998  The Sudanese government agrees in principle to extend its cease-fire in parts of the south to enable relief operations to proceed.


1 October 1998  The Sudanese army claims to have killed 500 “invading” Ugandan soldiers in south-eastern East Equatoria state. Seventeen tanks and five armoured vehicles were also destroyed: “The armed forces are now controlling the situation in East Equatoria after they have destroyed the two regiments with which Uganda has spearheaded the offensive in Sudan.”

“Sudanese Army Claims to Kill 500 Ugandan Troops in Southeast”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 1 October 1998

1 October 1998  SPLA rebels attack the southern garrison town of Torit, one of a series of towns that the SPLA has said it must capture to encircle the southern capital. Aid workers report the presence of Ugandan troops in the area.

“Sudan Rebels Shelling Government Town of Torit”, News Article by Reuters, 1 October 1998

9 October 1998  The Sudanese government states that government forces have lifted the rebel siege on military garrisons in southern Sudan and forced back invading Ugandan and Eritrean troops assisting the rebel SPLA.

“Sudanese Army Lifts Siege of Southern Garrisons”, News Article by DPA, 9 October 1998; SPLA Confirms Withdrawal from Laria”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 9 October 1998
7 October 1998 The Sudanese government announces that it has complained to the United Nations Security Council about Ugandan and Eritrean military incursions into southern Sudan in September.

“Sudan Presents Complaint to UN Security Council Against Eritrea and Uganda”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 7 October 1998

10 October 1998 A Sudanese army spokesman states that southern rebels were benefiting from the current cease-fire in order to regroup and resupply, but that it would honour any government decision on extending it.

“Sudanese Army Says Ceasefire Benefits Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 10 October 1998

11 October 1998 The Sudanese government states that it wants a “comprehensive full cease-fire” with the southern rebels and calls “on those working with humanitarian groups to exercise pressure on the rebels…to halt the shedding of blood and end the suffering of civilians in the south”.

“Government Seeks Full Cease-Fire With Southern Rebels”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 October 1998

11 October 1998 SPLA leader John Garang tells a UN delegation investigating famine and relief operations in Sudan that: “The SPLA has decided to continue the war…It is up to the international community to provide humanitarian aid.”


12 October 1998 The Sudanese government extends the cease-fire in the Bahr al-Ghazal area to enable humanitarian relief operations to take place, although the Khartoum government states it would have preferred a lasting solution to the conflict.

“Sudan, Rebels to Extend Cease-Fire”, News Article by Associated Press, 12 October 1998

16 October 1998 The Sudanese government states that it is inviting prominent opposition figures abroad, including SPLA leader John Garang, to return safely to Sudan to discuss a proposed bill allowing the establishment of political organisations.


19 October 1998 The NDA rejects the government’s call to discuss forthcoming legislation legalising multi-party politics in Sudan.
22 October 1998  The Sudanese President in an address to the Sudanese Parliament states that his government seeks to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement and national reconciliation. He states that the proposed multi-party legislation is moving towards achieving those aims.

23 October 1998  The Secretary-General of the Democratic Unionist Party, al-Sherif Zein al-Abidin al-Hindi returns to Sudan and announces that large groups of the Sudanese opposition living abroad are on their way back to Sudan to participate in discussions on the draft law on multi-partyism in the Sudanese Parliament. He also says that the law could help achieve stability in Sudan as well as the peaceful and civil transmission of authority.

28 October 1998  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi rejects an invitation from the Sudanese government to discuss a draft law regulating multi-partyism, and allowing the establishment of political parties. He also states that the Umma Party rejected the Sudanese constitution ratified this summer.

14 November 1998  There are armed clashes between southern Sudanese rebels in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. Gunmen loyal to Kerubino Bol Kuanyn are said to have killed one of John Garang’s bodyguards in a shoot-out outside Garang’s residence in Nairobi. These clashes had followed several incidents in previous weeks. Kerubino’s deputy, Amon Wantok, states that the Garang movement has been harassing Kerubino: “This was a carefully planned scheme by Garang to harass and intimidate Kerubino.” Wantok also said that southern Sudanese are unhappy and wish to limit Garang’s excesses: “Garang does not want this war to end because he benefits from it.”
to parts of Sudan hardest hit by war and famine. The agreements laid down the first-ever rules for aid convoys crossing front lines and set out a framework under which aid deliveries could be sent to southern areas by train for the first time since 1995.

“Sudan, rebels agree to improve safety of aid workers”, New Article by CNN, 19 November 1998

24 November 1998 The Sudanese parliament approves a bill providing for the return of a multi-party system to Sudan. The act will pass into law and become effective on January 1, 1999. Earlier in the month parliament also passed a bill forming a constitutional court as part of the government’s declared plan to restore democracy to the country.

“Sudan Parliament Ratifies Multi-Party Bill”, News Article by Reuters, 24 November 1998

24 November 1998 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir calls on the United Nations to stop the United States and other countries from “obstructing” the Sudanese peace process by their interference.

“Sudan Asks UN to Stop US, Others Halting Peace”, News Article by Reuters, 24 November 1998

26 November 1998 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi states that he opposes the multi-party legislation just ratified by the Sudanese parliament and opposes discussing the law with the Sudanese government. However, he does confirm the existence of communications between the Sudanese government and the opposition abroad and his approval of mediation and peace initiatives.


1 December 1998 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail calls on the United Nations to put “pressure, directly or through agencies, on the rebel movement to accept a comprehensive ceasefire for facilitating relief operations and for pushing the IGAD initiative forward”.

“Sudan Slams UN Envoy for Meeting With Opposition”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 1 December 1998

14 December 1998 Organisation of African Unity Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim urges both sides in the Sudanese civil war to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.

“OAU Urges Sudanese Warring Parties to Seek Peace”, News Article by PANA, 14 December 1998
30 December 1998   Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir issues a decree liberalising the press laws, in line with the new Sudanese constitution’s provisions allowing multi-partyism.

“Sudan to Liberalise Press Laws, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 28 December 1998

1 January 1999   President Omer al-Bashir expresses Sudan’s wish for dialogue with both his domestic opposition as well as the United States and Britain. He states: “We will not close the door to dialogue with the United States and Britain despite the hostility shown by these two nations”. Bashir also said that his government would continue to improve Sudan regional relationships, and noted that some neighbouring states that had until recently shown animosity to Sudan “have now begun to change this attitude.”

“Sudanese Leader Says He Wants Dialogue”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 31 December 1998

14 January 1999   In an official SPLM/SPLA paper, “Notes on the Peace Process in the Sudan”, Deng Alor Kuol argues that the passing of the Islamic constitution by the NIF government makes any option of Sudanese unity “redundant and academic within the context of the NIF Government” and that IGAD mediation “should be geared towards a final divorce between SPLM/SPLA New Sudan and the NIF Sudan”.


15 January 1999   In an interview published in an American magazine, Mahdi Ibrahim Mohammed, the Sudanese Ambassador to the USA, addresses the background of the Sudanese civil war, and the attempt of the Bashir government to negotiate a peaceful settlement. He states:

“It is important that the war in the south be perceived in its historical context. This war started when the British were there, and continued for four decades. There have only been ten years of peace in southern Sudan, from 1972 to 1982. So this war started well before this government in place came to power. It is not the responsibility of this government. Since this government assumed power [in 1989], it has taken very seriously the task of bringing the war to an end. The initial thrust of the government was to try to do that through negotiations. But unfortunately, at the time John Garang felt that he was supported by the then communist President of Ethiopia, Haile Miriam Mengistu, and his only way of addressing the issue with the government of Sudan was to use force. Because of that, he undermined all the serious attempts to negotiate faithfully and seriously with the government of Sudan. It is because of that, that the last ten years have witnessed a terrible suffering of the people of the south, and the people of the whole country…The government continued with its efforts. After lengthy
deliberations and wide discussion, the government established a federal system, which is already implemented. There are now 26 states with elected parliaments and elected governors. This is a major devolution of power...We then went beyond the expectation of any sitting government in Africa to accept an internationally monitored referendum, to give the people of the south the right to decide what their choices are. The referendum allows the southerners to choose even secession, separation, if they want it.”

Regarding the role of the United States in relation to Sudan, he states:

“The [US] administration is supporting John Garang, who does not intend any real peace for the country. He fought the Numiery government, the Swaredahab transitional government, the elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and now the Beshir government. He has never compromised in negotiation with the government ... The United States is crucial to peace. That requires a new vision. The policy of the administration was designed to overthrow the government of Sudan, rather than to help the two parties reach an amicable agreement. I think it is high time for a change in the US government’s policy toward Sudan, and toward Africa generally. We know very well that fighting between Africans has destroyed the African continent. The divide and rule policy of the colonial powers should never be pursued by the US administration. There is no way for Africa, and Sudan particularly, to establish peace and development in the absence of negotiated settlement. We think the time is ripe for that, and we hope the United States will come forward without bias to any party, to help this war come to an end.”

On the subject of conditions in the southern states the Ambassador declares:

“We are also establishing a fund from the central government to help the southern states engage in a balanced development. We give them funds to expand the levels of development in these states of the south particularly. We give them funds to expand the levels of development in these states of the south particularly. There are some states in western and eastern Sudan which are also poor and even less developed than the south, but they have been stable. But this fund is created purposely to address the imbalance in our development in the south because of the four decades of war, which hindered any programmes of development. It is amazing that still John Garang is pursuing a policy that closes the south and puts it under extreme emergency conditions. Not only are schools and hospitals not being built, but those facilities and projects that existed were destroyed by the rebels. All the projects that were going on in the south when John Garang started the rebellion in 1983 were targeted. We are extremely conscious of the need to generate funds in order to provide the south with the necessary funds for its development.”

26 January 1999  The Sudanese government again extends its ceasefire in the southern Bahr al-Ghazal region. Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the two previous partial cease-fires “led to nowhere in the peace process. Yet we now agreeing to a third partial ceasefire, but it will be the last one”. Dr Ismail also adds: “We have always been demanding a comprehensive ceasefire which will not only help in handling the humanitarian situation bit in confidence-building to allow the two parties to lay down arms and sit down for negotiating a lasting peace in south Sudan.”

“Sudanese Government Agrees to Ceasefire Extension”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 27 January 1999

11 February 1999  Sudanese opposition groups attend a four-day conference in Kampala. They vow to intensify the struggle to topple the Khartoum government.

“Sudanese Vow to Topple Khartoum”, News Article by Africa News Service, 11 February 1999

22 February 1999  Sudanese President Omer Hassan al-Bashir declares that he is willing to let the south secede if that would end Sudan’s civil war. He states: “the option of separation with peace is better than that of unity with the continuation of the war.”

He also states that the Sudanese government is ready to “open up all avenues” and is seeking to “bridge the gap” with the rebel SPLA.

“Sudan Offers South Secession”, News Article by BBC, 22 February 1999

9 March 1999  Sudanese Minister of State in the National Development Institution Makwakj Tang Youk, who is also spokesman for the United Democratic Salvation Front, states that the UDSF has signed a cease-fire with rebels in all parts of the south, to come into force in April to coincide with the Nairobi negotiations in that month. He states that the agreement allows for the return of refugees to their homes and the free movement of people between government and rebel held areas in the south.

“Sudan Agrees With Rebels on Cease Fire”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 9 March 1999

9 March 1999  The SPLA issues a press release denying that “there are peace talks going on between the SPLM/SPLA and members of the Government of Sudan especially those Southern Sudanese elements affiliated to the break away group known as the United Democratic Salvation Front and who have signed peace agreement with Khartoum and are part and parcel of the regime”. It claims that “grassroots” talks are going on between local leaders
from the Nuer and Dinka communities under the “protection and security” of the SPLM/SPLA. It claims that “Khartoum and its Southern Sudan agents would like to hijack such occasions to legitimise and give an impetus to its dying policy of peace from within”.

“Press Release: There Are No Peace Talks Between the SPLM/SPLA and UDSF”, Dr Samson L. Kwaje, SPLA Spokesman, Nairobi, 5 March 1999

10 March 1999 Leaders of southern Sudan’s main two rival tribes signed a peace agreement this week to end their conflict. Members of the United Democratic Salvation Front said that Dinka and Nuer tribesmen came to an agreement on March 7 during a nine-day conference – the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Peace Conference. Farang Garkout, a Nuer member of parliament in Khartoum, who attended the conference, told Reuters that the 700 attendants resolved to end all acts of hostility between the two tribes and declare an immediate cease-fire. He also stated that they had agreed to call for the extension of the current ceasefire in Southern Sudan’s Bahr al-Ghazal region between the government and the SPLA.

UDSF leader Riek Machar said: “It has been difficult to convince the SPLA to sign a comprehensive ceasefire, this time there will be an effect because the call for cease-fire is coming from the grassroots.” Machar also stated that President Omer al-Bashir promised to form a committee to study the new agreement and make use of it in the coming round of peace talks in Nairobi in April.


10 March 1999 Libyan leader Colonel Kadafi states that he plans to speed up his mediation between the Sudanese opposition and the government by inviting the National Democratic Alliance to Libya to explain their stand on how to settle the conflict peacefully and to ask the Sudanese government for its reaction. Kadafi also stated that in January he had met John Garang of the SPLA and Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail in Libya.

“Kadafi Plans to Speed Up Mediation Between Khartoum and Opposition”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 March 1999

11 March 1999 A faction of the opposition Umma Party decides to register as a party under the new law aimed at restoring a multi-party system in Sudan. A provisional 11-member leadership is formed until it holds a national Congress in September. The Al-Ra‘i Al-Akher daily names Al Nur Jaden as party President, Ali Osman Yahia as Deputy President and Al-Tayeb Rahim as Secretary-General.
11 March 1999 At a lecture in Cairo University’s Faculty of Law Colonel Kadhafi claims that the problem of southern Sudan is a “virus” planted by neo-colonialist forces to destabilise both Sudan and Egypt. He urges national reconciliation, and states that in his earlier meeting with SPLA leader John Garang the latter stated that he was prepared to meet unconditionally with the Sudanese government.

17 March 1999 It is announced that a new round of peace talks between the Sudanese government and the SPLA will be held in Nairobi on 25 April. SPLA spokesman Osama Yasser also states that SPLA members met Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Bishop Gabriel Roric Jur in a recent visit to Nairobi.

23 March 1999 Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali Nimeiri states that Sudan will seek to gain the admittance of Egypt into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD, in view of the “common interests” of Sudan and Egypt.

23 March 1999 SPLA leader John Garang states that the best hope for peace in Sudan is the creation of two separate confederal states.

27 March 1999 The London-based Saudi newspaper Ashram Al-Awash reports that Egypt is mediating between the Sudanese government and opposition. Egyptian officials are keeping their initiative secret, the paper claims, in order to “make it successful and prevent the intervention of regional or international parties”. It is stated that Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa met Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, head of the National Democratic Alliance, former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, and an SPLA representative. The previous week Moussa had met Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail during an Organisation of African Unity meeting in Ethiopia.
27 March 1999  The “Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant” is signed after a peace and reconciliation conference that started on 27 February at Wunlit, Tonj county in Bahr el Ghazal, under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). The covenant and its resolutions are signed by more than 300 Dinka and Nuer chiefs, community leaders, local administrators, church leaders and women’s and youth representatives. It proclaims an end to Dinka-Nuer conflict on the West Bank of the Nile, and includes clauses dealing with inter-tribal abductions, forced marriages, border issues, policing, grazing and fishing disputes, forced marriages. A peace council of 137 members, including one from the NSCC, is formed to implement the resolutions. An appeal is made to the SPLM/A and the Southern Sudan Democratic Front led by Dr. Riek Machar, to endorse, embrace and assist in the implementation of the covenant and its resolutions.

“Dinka, Nuer Endorse Proposals to End Conflict”, News Article by ANS, 27 March 1999

31 March 1999  Sudan’s national assembly speaker Dr Hassan al-Turabi states that Sudanese opponents abroad, including former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, will be welcome back home to practise politics. Turabi was quoted in Wednesday’s Akhbar al-Youm daily as saying: “I do not see any reason that makes the opponent remain abroad after the constitution has been passed … It is their right to return to Khartoum and participate in politics … I have no problem with Sadek el-Mahdi … The Sudanese do not need guarantees for returning home … If I was in their position I would immediately climb a plane to take me to Khartoum … Believe me, if they return, they will be warmly welcome and I will greet them at the airport and visit them at home.”

Commenting on a mechanism for dialogue formed by the National Congress and chaired by first Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, Turabi also states that it was in fact a group set up by the leadership bureau of the National Congress to draw up a plan for contacting the opposition. “The group is entrusted to prepare a contact plan rather than make contacts”, he added.

“Sudanese Opponents Free to Return Home: Turabi”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 31 March 1999

31 March 1999  Deputy Secretary-General of the National Congress, Osman Abdul Qader Abdullatif, denies reports of reaching a national reconciliation and political dialogue with the opposition. He states that “the preparatory committee which was assigned in the leading office of the conference has not yet drawn its conception of the national reconciliation, its programme or the political forces with whom the dialogue will be initiated, in line with the volume of its massive bases”.

“Sudanese Opponents Free to Return Home: Turabi”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 31 March 1999
April 1999  The 1610 kilometre oil pipeline linking the Heglig oil-fields with Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast is completed.

5 April 1999  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir declares a cease-fire in southern Sudan, to take effect on April 15: “In order to emphasize our unchanged position in favour of peace, we hereby declare a comprehensive cease-fire all over the south Sudanese states for safeguarding the lives and property of the citizens as well as those of the humanitarian workers of the UN agencies and international organisations…We hereby declare our willingness to go into arrangements for the comprehensive ceasefire in all fighting zones in south Sudan and we appeal to the rebel movement to display its sincerity for achieving peace by accepting this call and immediately responding to it.”

8 April 1999  The SPLA agrees to a limited cease-fire in the Bahr al-Ghazal region, but fails to agree to a comprehensive cease-fire called for by Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir. The SPLA claims that “Al-Bashir’s declaration of a meaningless ‘comprehensive ceasefire’ is actually a ploy intended to kill the humanitarian ceasefire. There is therefore no situation of a comprehensive ceasefire for the SPLA to respond to”.

10 April 1999  The Sudanese government suspends all IGAD talks with the SPLA in protest at the SPLA killing of relief workers in southern Sudan.

10 April 1999  The Sudanese government states that it is willing to accept Egypt as a “neutral mediator” in its attempts to resolve its conflict with opposition forces.

13 April 1999  SPLA representative Peter Adwok rejects the idea of Egyptian involvement in the peace process. He states: “We cannot allow this. Egypt is party to the conflict. It is part of the Arab expansion ploy to Arabise..."
and colonise Africa … the way forward … will depend on the military situation in the country.”

“Sudan: Peace Talks Under Threat”, News Article by ANS, 13 April 1999

13 April 1999 SPLA and other opposition forces claim a major victory over government forces by capturing the garrison of Dar el Umda on the Khartoum-Port Sudan road.

“Sudanese Rebels Claim Capture of Khartoum-Port Sudan Road”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 13 April 1999

16 April 1999 Libyan leader Moamer Kadafi hosts talks between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and Eritrean President Issias Afeworki in attempt to ease tension between the two countries.

“Gadhafi Meets with Sudanese, Eritrean Presidents”, News Article by Associated Press, 16 April 1999

16 April 1999 Dr Riek Machar, President of the Southern Coordinating Council, describes the rebel SPLA’s proposals for a “confederacy” as “impractical” because it would result in two states. He further calls on the SPLA to concentrate on practical issues and to engage effectively with the Khartoum peace agreement. He also points to the positive political development in Sudan, including the Khartoum peace agreement, the political association act and the new constitution and argues that the rebels have no excuse for not negotiating a peace. The rebels, he says, now have the possibility of gaining power through elections and of achieving self-determination via a referendum.

“Sudan: Official Says Rebel Demand for Confederacy ‘Impractical’”, News Article by SUNA, 16 April 1999

19 April 1999 The Sudanese government pulls out of scheduled peace talks in Nairobi under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) because of the SPLA’s violation of the cease-fire and its murder in March of four Sudanese working with the Red Cross. Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states: “The Sudanese government’s participation in the upcoming negotiations with the rebel movement will be determined on the... repatriation of the four Sudanese victims and agreement for conducting an inquiry into the incident.”

South Coordinination Council President Riek Machar states that both sides had agreed to postpone talks for two weeks for “more consultations for bringing their viewpoints closer, to ensure a successful round to reach a lasting solution to the south Sudan problem” and that an IGAD committee chaired by Kenyan
President Daniel arap Moi would make contacts with the government and SPLA for “narrowing the gap” between the two sides.


21 April 1999 The SPLA claims that Red Cross workers held by them were killed in crossfire when Sudanese government forces attempted to rescue them in what it calls “a callous act of recklessness”. It argues that the exhuming and repatriation of bodies for a reburial is “culturally offensive and against Islamic traditions and values”. It also further denies that the IGAD meeting was postponed to allow further negotiations between the government and the SPLA.

The SPLA claims that the Sudanese government is “not interested in the [IGAD] Talks and would prefer a military solution instead”. The SPLA also reiterates its “commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Sudan conflict and to the IGAD mediation process” and “condemns in the strongest possible terms the Government of Sudan’s intransigence and its belief in a military solution to what is essentially a political problem needing a political solution.”

“Press Release: SPLM Reaction to Khartoum Indefinite Postponement of Talks”, Dr Samson L. Kwaje, SPLA Spokesman, Nairobi, 20 April 1999

25 April 1999 Sudan extends a partial cease-fire in famine-stricken Bahr el Ghazal region. The Foreign Ministry states: “Sudan hereby declares a ceasefire in Bahr el Ghazal until the next round of peace talks in Nairobi to allow humanitarian relief aid to flow to the area.”

“Sudan Extends Ceasefire in Bahr el Ghazal”, News Article by Reuters, 25 April 1999

26 April 1999 Augustino Aremo, Secretary of the southern Sudan department in the National Congress, criticises the proposals of former Vice-President Abel Alier that John Garang join with President al-Bashir to form a supreme authority to run Sudan for a two-year interim period ahead of a proposed referendum on self-determination for the South and that Garang administer the South during the same period. Aremo states that this would endanger SPLA opponents: “What will happen to the people inside the country who have had differences with the SPLA when the South is handed to the rebels”.

“Sudan Politician Criticises Peace Proposals”, News Article by Reuters, 26 April 1999

27 April 1999 Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa denied on Monday that Egypt was trying to undermine the Sudanese government: “Egypt
is not working against Sudan. On the contrary Egypt is working with Sudan, in a positive way, to find solutions to Sudan’s problems. The presence of Sudanese nationals in Egypt is a historic issue and it will continue in the future because we are one people.”

Sudan’s President Omer Al-Bashir on Saturday said that: “Egypt’s hosting of the Sudanese opposition and occupation of Halaib triangle will remain an obstacle for normalisation of relations between the two countries.” He urged Egypt to expel Sudanese opposition leaders from its soil.


29 April 1999 A Sudanese government official states that peace talks with the SPLA in Nairobi will probably resume on May 10. Dr Hassan al-Turabi, Speaker of Sudan’s parliament, denounces Abel Alier’s memorandum as “an early entrance into secession”.

“Sudan Peace Talks to Resume Soon, Mediator Spurned”, by Alfred Taban, News Article by Reuters, 29 April 1999

7 May 1999 An SPLA spokesman says that they have received a letter from the Kenyan government stating that “the talks have been postponed indefinitely until a compromise date is reached”. The SPLA also accuses the Sudanese government of breaching the cease-fire.

“Sudan Peace Talks Postponed Indefinitely – Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 7 May 1999

9 May 1999 Southern Coordination Council President Riek Machar states that the Kenyan government in fact postponed the peace talks at the request of the SPLA, which said that it was not ready. Abdalla Deng Nhial, head of the peace committee in the Sudanese National Assembly, states: “The objective of the surprise postponement is to disrupt the dialogue process.”

“Sudan Reports New Delay in Talks With Rebels”, News Article by Reuters on 9 May 1999

10 May 1999 Sadiq al-Mahdi, the main leader of Sudan’s northern opposition, makes a statement in Cairo following a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. Referring to his meeting the previous week in Geneva with Dr al-Turabi, he states: “There were steps on the path to a political settlement of the outstanding problems which Sudan faces.” Mahdi also states that opposition leaders will be meeting in Cairo soon to “exchange views on various aspects of the Sudanese question”.

“Opposition Leader Reports Progress in Resolving Sudan Conflict”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 May 1999
13 May 1999 Sadiq al-Mahdi states that the opposition will continue its armed struggle despite the start of a dialogue with the Sudan government. He also states the Umma Party would not strike a reconciliation agreement with the government without the other factions of the NDA.

“Sudanese Opposition Vows to Continue Armed Struggle Despite Dialogue”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 13 May 1999

15 May 1999 Mohammed Hakern, spokesman of the Democratic Unionist Party, states that: “The DUP is opposed to any reconciliation with the illegitimate regime in Khartoum which seized power in a coup.”

“Sudanese Opposition Leaders Divided Over Reconciliation With Government”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 15 May 1999

17 May 1999 Mohammed Al-Hassan al-Amin, political department secretary for the ruling National Congress states that: “The National Congress will embark in the next few days on contacts... with opposition leaders [in preparation for] a national dialogue conference.” Amin states that the proposed conference would be in lieu of a constitutional conference called for by the opposition but which the NC rejects because “it contradicts the constitution”.

“Government Seeks Contacts to Establish National Dialogue”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 May 1999

17 May 1999 Former Sudanese military leader Jaafar Nimeiri, in exile in Cairo, states that he will return to Sudan in June.

“Sudanese President to Contact Opposition”, News Article by Reuters, 18 May 1999

2 June 1999 SPLA leader John Garang, in a meeting with Dinka leader Kerubino Bol Kuanyin in the south-eastern Bahr al-Jabul region, calls on Riek Machar to abandon his alliance with the Sudanese government and return to the rebel ranks. The SPLA also announces that it had allegedly killed 300 Sudanese soldiers the previous Thursday in the biggest battle in a year, in the southern Blue Nile province.

“SPLA Leader Garang Calls on Machar to Return to Rebel Ranks”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 June 1999

2 June 1999 Top officials defect from the United Democratic Salvation Front led by Riek Machar and its armed wing, the Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF). A splinter group calling itself the UDSF Collective Leadership is headed by Weles Wal Bung, the deputy secretary of the Southern
Coordination Council. The group calls for the dismissal of Machar from both the USDF and SSDF.

“Spilt in Ranks Behind Khartoum’s Chief for South Sudan, Machar”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 June 1999

4 June 1999

The SPLA claims that, together with allied groups, it had killed 3,000 government troops on three fronts since the beginning of the year.

“Sudanese Rebels Say They Killed 3,000 Government Troops”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 4 June 1999

9 June 1999

The Sudanese army reports that it has rebuffed attempts by opposition groups and the SPLA to infiltrate the eastern and southern sections of the country. The National Democratic Alliance states that its troops had killed 40 Sudanese soldiers in battles in Tigan, near the Eritrean border. The attacks are an attempt to cut off oil pipelines and the highway linking Khartoum with the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

“Sudan Army Spokesman Reports Fighting in Eastern Border Region”, News Article by Associated Press, 9 June 1999

10 June 1999

Informal talks between Sudanese opposition groups start on Thursday in Asmara. John Garang dismisses the possibility of real negotiations with Khartoum and calls for renewed military attacks. He states: “The Khartoum regime is not serious in its desire for dialogue and does not want to reach real solutions … efforts must be redoubled towards a popular uprising in parallel with the armed struggle in order to step up regional and international pressure on the regime to lead it to accept an equitable peaceful solution.” Garang also emphasised “the need for formal recognition by Khartoum of the NDA” as a “logical preparatory measure” for dialogue. Garang also attacks Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi for meeting with Dr Hassan al-Turabi stating that: “Any partial compromise with the NIF is just adding to the disaster. The NIF cannot be reformed, it must be removed.” Mahdi defends his meeting stating: “Any initiative from genuine parties should be welcomed if it is to help in achieving the objectives of our people and stopping the bloodshed of our sons and daughters.”

“Sudan Opposition Talks Open Amid Scepticism”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 June 1999; “Sudan Opposition Divided Over Talks With Khartoum”, News Article by Reuters, 10 June 1999

10 June 1999

Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states the Sudanese government’s support for holding a national reconciliation conference with the Sudanese opposition. Following a meeting
with Arab League Secretary-General Esmat Abdel Meguid, Ismail states: “A dialogue is in progress between the government and opposition to minimise the differences, but we haven’t yet arrived at an agreement. We hope that all these contacts will lead to a general conference of all the Sudanese prices inside and outside [the country] to resolve Sudan’s problems.”

Ismail also expresses his hopes that a new security agreement between Egypt and Sudan would be signed in the future to “ease the path to political and economic cooperation”. He states that a security agreement with Eritrea, normalising diplomatic relations severed in 1994, was also on the cards.


13 June 1999 Communist Party official Tigani al-Tayeb demands a restoration of democracy in Sudan before dialogue can start. “For a dialogue to be fruitful, it’s necessary to return to democracy and freedom of expression … to stop the arrests, cancel the state of emergency and hold free elections. A change in the political climate is imperative.”

“Sudanese Opposition Says Democracy Must Come Before Dialogue With Khartoum”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 13 June 1999

14 June 1999 Talks in Asmara between Sudanese opposition groups are extended after five straight days of discussion. Yassir Arman, an SPLA spokesman, denies reports of policy rifts between opposition participants.

“Sudan Opposition Groups Extend Talks in Asmara”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 14 June 1999

14 June 1999 The Governor of the eastern Sudanese state of Kassala states that rebel attacks and land-mine planting near the Sudan-Eritrea border have been intensifying despite the peace deal signed between the Eritrean and Sudanese presidents last month.

Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail concludes two days of meetings in Qatar with his Eritrean counterpart Haile Woldensae, and agrees to form joint security, political and military committees.

“Sudan Says Opposition Escalating Situation in Eastern Sudan”, News Article by Associated Press, 14 June 1999

15 June 1999 At the end of the opposition meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, Sudanese opposition leaders state that they will be meeting Egyptian and Libyan leaders next month to assist in reaching a settlement.
16 June 1999  Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha states that the government is prepared to relinquish power if that will bring peace. He states: “The government is ready to step down if the chair of power is the only problem our country faces … We are confessing loudly that our experience is a human attempt that could be right or wrong … We are ready to discard anything that proves to be wrong.”

16 June 1999 The National Democratic Alliance issues a statement following the Asmara meeting calling for an intensification of the armed struggle whilst continuing contacts with the Sudan government. Mohammed al-Amin, head of the political department of the National Congress, condemns the statement.

19 June 1999 It is reported that peace talks between the Sudanese government and the SPLA will be held in Nairobi on 19 July. President of the Southern Coordination Council Riek Machar states that the talks could “achieve major progress so long as the rebel movement delegation remains committed to the political settlement option”.

21 June 1999 General Mohammed Osman Yassin, spokesman of the Sudanese Army, denies opposition claims that their forces had taken over the Dinder national park in the Blue Nile region last Thursday. President of the Southern Coordination Council Riek Machar warns against the escalation of military operations in south Sudan by the SPLA before the scheduled peace negotiations in Nairobi on 19 July.

21 June 1999 Libyan leader Colonel Kadafi is awarded an honorary doctorate in law by the University of Khartoum for his efforts to promote the unity of Libya and Sudan. Kadafi vows to reconcile the Sudanese government and the opposition forces. He states: “I am calling for an inclusive conference for all Sudanese where they can resolve their differences instead of
warring and feuding.” He announces his opposition to the idea of the separation of southern Sudan, and urges SPLA leader John Garang to give up the idea, which he describes as “a seed from the devil planted by imperialists”.


23 June 1999 Sadiq al-Mahdi, Umma Party leader, in an interview with the Saudi-owned news magazine al-Wasat states that although he is “keen on a peaceful solution”, he also believes that “the regime that imposed the armed struggle upon us needs to be removed the same way – namely, by military means and through mobilisation for an uprising.”

“Sudan’s Mahdi: ‘Why I’m Keen on a Peaceful Solution”, News Article by Mideast Mirror, 23 June 1999

29 June 1999 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi declares: “The opposition … can’t simply talk war, war, it must also talk about the principles of a political solution.” He states that the IGAD talks were “defective” could not lead to a comprehensive peace since they excluded parties other than the SPLA and did not deal with the constitution. Whilst criticising the Sudanese government he says that internal and external pressures had forced Khartoum to “think in terms of change”.

“Sudan Ripe for Change, Opposition Leader Says”, News Article by Reuters, 29 June 1999

30 June 1999 In a speech celebrating a decade in power, Sudanese President Omer al Bashir urged opposition groups to return from exile and share in the country’s development. He reverses the government’s previous refusal to summon a national conference on the country’s future and constitution – as demanded by the National Democratic Alliance – and states: “I affirm our agreement to the holding of a comprehensive conference for national dialogue.” He further states that he would shortly set up an advisory council drawn from registered political parties to help shape a reconciliation policy. He also adds that the government “open[s] the door wide to amnesty” to the rebel movement.


1 July 1999 Mohammed al-Hassan al-Amin, secretary of the National Congress party’s political department, states that: “At the start of arrangement to hold a comprehensive conference for dialogue between the sons of Sudan, the National Congress set up two committees for contact with the opposition outside and inside [the country].”
1 July 1999  Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the government will discuss a cease-fire with rebels at the 19 July peace talks in Nairobi.

2 July 1999  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi gives a special statement on the Sudan issue to ArabicNews.com. He summarises his criticism of the NIF government while accepting that “the regime has attempted to reform itself during the last two years.” He reiterates his threefold criticism of the IGAD peace process: its restriction to “only … two parties to the conflict”; its exclusion of the constitution; its exclusion of “other equally concerned neighbours.” He reaffirms the “solidarity” of the NDA, which he states was adequately addressed at its 10 June meeting, expresses support for both the IGAD and the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiatives and calls for a “search for a mechanism to coordinate the mediation efforts”. He argues that the “process of political dialogue will become really viable if and when three aspects are realised”. Those aspects are, he states: “A comprehensive declaration of principles … A mechanism to coordinate the mediation efforts as a form of GAAAD-plus … A comprehensive negotiating mechanism.”

He re-states his view that “the political situation in Sudan is pregnant with change”.

5 July 1999  Faruq Abu Issa, spokesman for the National Democratic Alliance reveals that Kamel Tayeb, a representative of the Sudanese parliamentary speaker Hassan al-Turabi, “has been holding meetings since Sunday with various factions of the opposition, in particular with former prime minister Sadek al-Mahdi…His task is to persuade the opposition to start a dialogue with Mr. Turabi…But if the dialogue is to be fruitful, there has to be a return to democracy, the reestablishment of freedom of expression, an end to arrests, the lifting of the state of emergency and the holding of free elections…Mr. Turabi apparently accepts these principles. But it is essential for the government to issue a statement to that end if we are to embark on our dialogue with Khartoum.”

10 July 1999  SPLA leader John Garang claims that the Sudanese government wanted to destroy the unity of opposition groups. In a speech read out by a representative at the opening session of the two-day meeting of the National Democratic Alliance in Egypt. He states: “The regime’s keenness to
talk to several mediators at several fora proves...a desperate attempt to break up our lines.”

“Sudan Opposition Says Government Seeks to Shatter Unity”, News Article by Reuters, 10 July 1999

10 July 1999  Ali al-Haj Mohammed, a Sudanese government negotiator, expresses pessimism over the next round of peace negotiations with the SPLA in Nairobi. He states that it was “a negative indication” that the government had not yet received an agenda from IGAD. He also criticises the setting by IGAD of just two days for the talks. “A time limit is not conducive to resolving any problem”, he says. He adds that he has no reason to be optimistic that the Nairobi talks would bring “any positive results”.

“Khartoum Sceptical About Next Round of Sudan Peace Talks”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 July 1999

11 July 1999  Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister Yousef Wali meets with National Democratic Alliance members to discuss the future of Sudan. NDA member Mohammed Hakim reveals that Egypt is trying to set up talks between Sudanese opposition groups and the Sudanese government. NDA officials state that they will explore the idea of talks and propose the enlargement of the Kenyan IGAD talks to include the NDA and other forces. NDA leadership council member Omer Deng says: “If we can enlarge the [Kenya talks] to accommodate the NDA and all the forces we would have a better chance to reach a peaceful solution and regional stability.”

Umma Party spokesman Hassan Ahmed al-Hassan states: “The opposition sees a change in the Khartoum regime’s policy. It has given a margin of freedom in the press and political life … [it] has improved relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea, and is trying to normalise ties with Egypt, the Gulf states and even the United States.” However, SPLA leader John Garang, in a speech read on his behalf to the Egyptian-NDA talks, states that the Sudanese government is trying to “divide our ranks”.


19 July 1999  As peace talks begin in Nairobi under the aegis of IGAD, the SPLA announces the renewal of a humanitarian cease-fire in south-western Sudan. Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ismail states that he is going to Nairobi with “an open mind and heart and would exert every possible effort for achieving progress in the negotiations”. Deputy speaker of the Sudanese parliament, Abdulaziz Shiddou, warns against “American conspiracies to undermine the negotiations”.

“South Sudan Rebels Extend Humanitarian Truce, Talks Start”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 19 July 1999

23 July 1999 At the end of the IGAD peace talks the Sudanese government and the opposition agree to set up a special secretariat, based in Nairobi and headed by Kenyan diplomat Daniel Mboya, to help negotiate peace. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman states that the secretariat “will shorten intervals between rounds of talks between the two parties and will persuade the negotiators to put forward practical proposals”. He also states that Khartoum is ready for a total cease-fire “to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations” but declined a cease-fire limited only to the South which would “intensify the fighting in other areas”. Samson Kwaje, spokesman of the SPLA, states that a total cease-fire should come only after both sides had settled outstanding political issues and states that “no substantive progress towards the resolution of the core contentious issues has been made”. He reiterates SPLA demands regarding the abolition of Sharia, the establishment of a local administration in the south for a two year period prior to an independence referendum and a boundary on the south drawn further north.

Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail accuses the SPLA of retreating from agreements made at previous rounds of talks stating that: “This changing of positions tactically does not help us build a bond”. He also states that Khartoum “has other options to pursue in the event of the failure of the permanent secretariat”.

Dr Hassan al-Turabi states that he will pursue talks with former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and raises the prospect of “decisive” meetings with other prominent northerners, including Democratic Unionist Party chief Osman al-Mirghani. However, he warns that: “Meetings with the opposition are likely but cannot be declared because if announced, they could be foiled by other parties”.


24 July 1999 In an official press conference following his return from the IGAD peace conference Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that conference had revealed the “great contradictions in the stances of the rebellion movement”. He argues that the SPLA “speaks about the unified Sudan, while at the same time it calls for a confederacy involving two states with each has its own army, foreign relations and currency. The confederacy as proposed by the movement means separation and two states and never means unity”.

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The government restates its commitment to the following principles:

“Humanitarian assistance to all war affected areas throughout the southern Sudan”;

“the right of self-determination”;

that Sudanese society “is pluralistic, multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural”;

that Sudan “is a democratic state, where the power is exercised by the Sudanese through their elected institutions”;

“Citizenship is the base for filling of public offices and the enjoyment of all rights and duties – not religion or race”.

“Religious freedoms are part of the fundamental rights”

The government also specifically renews its call for a comprehensive cease-fire: It states: “The Government of Sudan maintain its constant position calling for the comprehensive, unlimited, and permanent cease-fire in the southern Sudan to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy areas and to create conducive atmosphere for peace talks under the IGAD umbrella... [It] reiterates its support for national, regional and international appeals calling for an immediate comprehensive cease-fire.”


28 July 1999 The Canadian government announces its support for the setting up of a permanent Talks Secretariat and pledges $300,000 for its maintenance.


31 July 1999 The Sudanese government is accused of having used chemical weapons in an attack near Lainya in southern Sudan.

“Sudan ‘Chemical’ Attack on Rebels”, News Article by BBC Online News, 31 July 1999
2 August 1999 Norwegian People’s Aid went so far as to issue a press release on 2 August headed ‘Confirmed Chemical Bombing in Southern Sudan’.

‘Confirmed Chemical Bombing in Southern Sudan’, Press Release by Norwegian People’s Aid on 2 August, 1999, carried on ReliefWeb at http://www.reliefweb.int

4 August 1999 The Sudanese government categorically denied any such use of chemical weapons. The Sudanese Foreign Minister, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, stated on 5 August, 1999 that the Sudanese government was “ready to receive any impartial and credible quarter to investigate this matter…Sudan does not possess chemical weapons…the allegations made by the Norwegian People’s Aid…are mere lies”. The Sudanese army spokesman, General Mohammed Osman, said the allegations were a smear against the Khartoum government.


5 August 1999 Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that Sudan is ready for an impartial investigation into allegations that it used chemical or biological weapons against the two southern towns of Lainya and Kaaya.

“Sudan Declares Unilateral Cease-Fire”, News Article by Yahoo News, 5 August 1999

5 August 1999 The Sudanese government declares a unilateral 70-day cease-fire in the south “to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid”. It calls upon the SPLA to announce its own cease-fire “to end the people’s suffering and go forward in the march towards a peaceful solution to the conflict”.

SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje states that the SPLA had already declared a cease-fire in the Bahr al Ghazal province and in the western and Upper Nile province and that the government’s cease-fire “is just a trick so that they can go and finish us in the east…We are not interested in a comprehensive ceasefire. We are interested in a humanitarian ceasefire”.

“Khartoum Decrees a 70-day Ceasefire in Sudan’s South”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 5 August; “Kwaje Said the Rebels Had Already Declared a Ceasefire in Bahr el Ghazal”, News Article by Reuters, 5 August
6 August 1999  SPLA leader John Garang once again rejects the Sudanese government’s proposal for a comprehensive cease-fire.

“Sudan Rebel Leader Rejects Government Truce Offer”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 August 1999

6 August 1999  The Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomes the Sudanese government’s declaration of a comprehensive ceasefire. He states: “A ceasefire is essential…I call upon the SPLM to consider extending the scope of its ceasefire and this contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for humanitarian operations in the Sudan.”


6 August 1999  SPLA leader John Garang accuses the Sudanese government’s declaration of a ceasefire as a ploy to buy time to deploy newly trained army recruits and that government planes had in fact bombed the southern towns of Yei and Lainya. Independent confirmation of his latter claim could not be made by the media.


7 August 1999  Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that: “The Sudan [government] will go on implementing its decision of a comprehensive ceasefire irrespective of a declaration by the rebel movement rejecting this ceasefire.”

“Sudan Government to Observe Ceasefire Despite SPLA Rejection”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 August 1999

7 August 1999  Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail affirms Sudan’s acceptance of the Libyan reconciliation initiative and its five items. He states that the Sudanese government, unlike the rebels, is placing
no pre-conditions before negotiations, that no political detainees are held in Sudanese prisons, that the state of emergency only remains in areas of military conflict, that the issue of amendments to the constitution are negotiable and that the government is ready to join dialogue on different issues.


7 August 1999 Nhail Deng, personal representative of SPLA leader John Garang, expresses SPLA support for the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He says: “In the alliance [i.e. National Democratic Alliance], we have agreed during our last meeting in the Libyan capital on the Libyan initiative to achieve to achieve the national reconciliation in Sudan…In the alliance and in the people’s movement, we will do what is necessary so the efforts exerted for finding peace and reconciliation in Sudan become fruitful, yet we hope that the Sudanese government takes specific measures to qualify the adequate atmosphere for the beginning of discussion and negotiation with it.”

“Garang Views Importance of Establishing Trust Through Specific Steps by Khartoum”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 7 August 1999

10 August 1999 Umma Party spokesman Hassan Ahmed al-Hassan states that Egypt and Libya have set up a joint committee to build international support for a peace conference and a further committee to work out the organisational details. The latter will meet, he states, after the 6-9 September summit of the Organization of African Unity.

12 August 1999 The Arab League states that it supports the Sudanese government’s decision to declare a unilateral cease-fire and asks the United Nations and other organisations to back Sudan’s move “as well as Egypt’s and Libya’s efforts to achieve reconciliation in Sudan”.

“Arab League Supports Sudan’s Cease-Fire Decision”, News Article by Reuters, 19 August 1999

17 August 1999 The Co-Chairs of the Sudan Committee of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), the Governments of Italy and Norway, welcome the declaration of a comprehensive cease-fire by the Sudanese government and “call[s] upon the SPLM/A to consider extending the scope of the current humanitarian ceasefire”.

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19 August 1999 The European Union welcomes the Sudanese government’s cease-fire and calls upon both the government and the SPLA “to enter a mutual agreement on a permanent comprehensive humanitarian cease-fire”.


21 August 1999 Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail states that the Sudanese government expresses its “utmost willingness” to enter peace talks with the opposition and will shortly name five delegates for a preparatory committee. A visiting Egyptian-Libyan delegation has been informed, Ismail states, “that we have begun preparing the atmosphere for the success of the initiative by declaring a ceasefire and adopting a formal media line in support of the reconciliation process”.

Ismail also states that: “The government intends to return all seized properties [from the rebels], even if no agreement is reached with the opposition.”

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24 August 1999 The Sudanese government accepts a Libyan-Egyptian plan to end the war, under which the parties would call a permanent cease-fire, attend a national peace conference and stop mounting media campaigns against each other.


25 August 1999 Musa Dirar, a member of the Sudanese ruling National Congress party, urges President al-Bashir to allow the South to secede in order to end the civil war. He states: “The setting up of a new state in the south, to live with the north in the context of good neighbourliness, is better for the north and the south after the failure of politicians to stop the war which has entered its 44th year.” He calls for an immediate referendum on unity or secession for the south, as offered in the Khartoum agreement of April 1997.
26 August 1999  Mubarak al-Fadel al-Mahdi, Secretary-General of the National Democratic Alliance states that the NDA has agreed to the Egyptian-Libyan plan to end the civil war. But Yassir Arman, spokesman for the SPLA, states that this is not the case and that the NDA could not hold talks until conditions improve. Arman says: “[The NDA] does not enter into negotiations in the shadow of the ban on its parties and unions … Khartoum did not take any confidence-building steps and also did not prepare the atmosphere for negotiations.”

30 August 1999  The SPLA/SPLM rejects the Libyan-Egyptian peace proposals. It reiterates its conditions to be met by Khartoum before a peace conference can be organised, and states that “the IGAD peace initiative is the only viable peace process that should continue. There is therefore no need for parallel initiatives that will allow the notorious NIF regime off the hook”.

31 August 1999  An Egyptian foreign ministry spokesman states that SPLA leader John Garang had, in fact, in private welcomed the Libyan-Egyptian peace plan. The Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Yousef Wali also reiterates Egypt’s support for the unity of Sudan.

1 September 1999 SPLA leader John Garang accuses the Sudanese government of showing no serious interest in ending the war. He insists that the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative should be integrated into the IGAD peace process, claims he knows nothing about the scheduled talks between the NDA and the Khartoum government in Cairo on 13 September. He also threatens to attack Sudanese oil installations.
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“Rebel Leader Says Khartoum Not Serious About Peace”, News Article by Reuters, 1 September 1999

September 1999 The first shipment of Sudanese oil leaves Port Sudan.

1 September 1999 Following talks with SPLA leader John Garang Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa announces that the 13 September talks scheduled in Cairo with the NDA and Sudanese government to organise a peace conference have been postponed to give opposition groups more time to coordinate.

“Postponement of Meeting to Organise Sudanese Peace Talks”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 1 September 1999

2 September 1999 Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail emphasised that Sudan agrees to attend any discussions regarding a preparatory committee for a peace conference, and the government has no objection to dealing with any topics. He also states that the realisation of a national reconciliation would expand the government’s achievements.

“Sudanese-Egyptian Ties Improving, Sudanese Official”, News Article by XINHUA, 2 September 1999

4 September 1999 Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, the Sudanese Culture and Information Minister, reiterates the government’s commitment to peace initiatives. He says: “We are prepared to participate in the preparatory meeting of the national dialogue conference at any time and place requested by the other side.” He also points out that the rebel movement tends to use media propaganda in order to escape serious talks, and that the SPLA disagreements with and contradictions of other opposition groups is explained by the fact that its leader John Garang is really implementing the agenda of other powers.

“Dr. Salah Eddin Holds Rebel Movement Responsible for Postponement of Dialogue Meeting”, SUNA News Digest, 4 September 1999; “Sudan Says Committed to Libyan-Egyptian Initiative”, News Article by Reuters, 5 September 1999

6 September 1999 National Democratic Alliance Secretary-General Mubarak al-Fadel al-Mahdi states that at its October meeting the NDA will propose a date and venue for a national dialogue conference, agree on principles of dialogue, define an agenda and name its delegates.
13 September 1999 A two-day meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo drafts a resolution calling on “Arab states to support Sudan against any threat to its stability and security and stressed the danger of foreign interference”.

“A Arabs Discuss Iraq Crisis, Sudan Reconciliation”, News Article by Reuters, 13 September 1999

13 September 1999 The Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Bishop Gabriel Roric Jur, defends Sudan’s human rights record – “among the best in Africa” – and stresses the “drastic changes and profound transformation in the spheres of social, economic, political and democratic process”. He refutes various propaganda charges regarding “slavery” and the use of chemical weapons. And further emphasises the “Sudanese keenness to resolve the on-going war in the country through peaceful dialogue among brothers”. He states: “Sudan is always putting [the] peace issue as first priority in the national policy. The Sudanese Government, showed good will and created [a] conducive atmosphere for peaceful dialogue with the opposition groups and declared a cease-fire. This was done, in anticipation that the other side would respond positively. Instead the SPLA rejected the comprehensive cease-fire in the country, and chose to select certain areas, thus exposing people, mainly the civilians, to the danger of war effects in the areas of conflicts.”

“Sudan at the Threshold of Prosperity”, by Gabriel Rorich Jur, Middle East Review, 13 September 1999

13 September 1999 SPLA leader John Garang decides not to come to Egypt on 2 October as scheduled to participate in the meeting of the National Democratic Alliance. He contacts both the head of the NDA and of Democratic Unionist Party to propose delaying the meeting until the middle of the coming month.

“Garang Calls for Delaying Sudanese Opposition Meeting in Cairo”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 13 September 1999

14 September 1999 Osama El-Baz, political advisor to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, states that Egypt wants to maintain the unity of Sudan.

“El-Baz: Sudan is the Strategic Depth of Egypt”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 14 September 1999
14 September 1999   Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa and Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail meet in Cairo to discuss the next move to coordinate the Egyptian-Libyan and IGAD peace initiatives.

“Egyptian, Sudanese Foreign Ministers Meet Again to Coordinate Initiatives”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 14 September 1999

15 September 1999   Southern rebel leader Kerubino Bol Kuanyin is killed by SPLA gunmen.

15 September 1999   Leaders of eleven United States-based humanitarian organisations working in Sudan urge Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to focus US policy towards Sudan on the achievement of a just peace. The organisations include CARE, Oxfam, Lutheran World Relief, Save the Children, World Vision and the US Committee for Refugees.


18 September 1999   The Presidency of the European Union issues a statement which “welcomes the latest round of negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Movement which were held in Addis Ababa from 4 to 7 August 1999 in the framework of IGAD, and the agreement of the parties to convene a fourth round of negotiations within six months in Nairobi. The European Union nevertheless notes with regret that the Government of Sudan and the SPLM were not able at this stage to reach an agreement on major questions of contention”.


5 October 1999   Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa asks the different Sudanese opposition groups to create an adequate atmosphere for peace initiatives.

“Moussa Asks Sudanese Opposition to Support Egyptian Initiative for National Rapport”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 5 October 1999

6 October 1999   Former US President Jimmy Carter states: “If the United States would be reasonably objective in Sudan I think we at the Carter Centre and the Africans who live in that area could bring peace in Sudan. But the United States government has a policy of trying to overthrow the
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government in Sudan. So whenever there’s a peace initiative, unfortunately our government puts up whatever obstruction it can.”

“CARE Seeks Political Fix in Sudan”, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6 October 1999

8 October 1999 Members of the Sudanese Parliament urged the government to continue the peace process in spite of a rebel attack on an oil pipeline, and appealed to opposition groups to return to Sudan. The Assembly also set up a parliamentary committee under the chairmanship of the head of parliament to assist peace initiatives.

“Members of the Sudanese Parliament Demand National Rapport”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 8 October 1999

9 October 1999 Sudanese Presidential Advisor for Peace Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, states that Sudan has agreed to proposals made by Kenyan envoy Daniel Mboya, for a new round of IGAD peace talks with the SPLA in Nairobi later in October.

“Government Ready for Talks With SPLA Late October: Official”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 8 October 1999

9 October 1999 Egypt expels National Democratic Alliance joint military command spokesman Abdul Rahman following his admission of responsibility for bombing the Sudanese oil pipeline. Egypt is a participant in the Arab anti-terrorist treaty which forbids signatories to shelter terrorists. Rahman subsequently moves to Asmara in Eritrea.

“Cairo Makes Khartoum Happy”, The Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), 9 October 1999

12 October 1999 Sudan extends for a further three months its ceasefire due to expire in three days time. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states: “In order to create a conducive atmosphere for achieving peace and in response to appeals by brothers and friends, the government declares an extension of the comprehensive ceasefire in all military operations zones for three months as of Friday midnight, October 15.” He also expresses his hope that the SPLA will “respond to reason and declare, on its part, a similar ceasefire so that the two sides will be able to take arrangements for separation of forces and monitoring the ceasefire so that it will develop from a temporary to a permanent one”.

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12 October 1999 Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail reiterates Sudan’s keenness to carry out serious dialogue with the American administration in order to solve the problems hampering the normalisation of relations and to enhance the role that the US could play in achieving peace in the Sudan. He also reveals that a meeting had been held between the American envoy to Sudan, Harry Johnston and the Sudan Permanent Representative to the United Nations, for an exchange of views.

“Sudan/US”, SUNA News Digest, 12 October 1999

12 October 1999 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail accuses the opposition of working to abort the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative by putting forward reservations and procrastinating in implementing the articles that ensure its continuation. Whilst the government was serious to maintain the initiative, he asserted, the opposition simply intensified its military and media campaigns. He also calls on the opposition to return to Khartoum, and pledges all necessary guarantees including the right to return abroad if it does not reach agreement with the government.

“Sudan/Opposition/Accusation”, SUNA News Digest, 12 October 1999

12 October 1999 Arab League Assistant Secretary-General for Arab Affairs Ahmad Bin Hali states that the League strongly backs Sudanese national reconciliation attempts as well as the national unity of the country and opposes foreign attempts to undermine its regional security. He also criticises rebel attacks on Sudanese pipelines, which could only result in destroying the national potential and economic gains which would ultimately benefit all of Sudan’s people.

“Arab League for National Reconciliation in Sudan”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 12 October 1999

12 October 1999 In a meeting between the Italian Ambassador Lamberto Dini and Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail in Khartoum, the Ambassador conveys the text of an EU decision to open “a page of useful and fruitful dialogue with Khartoum”.

“European Union is Open to Useful Dialogue With Sudan”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 12 October 1999
13 October 1999  Allegations that the Sudanese government had used chemical weapons in southern Sudan are repeated by Baroness Cox, President of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, in the British House of Lords on 13 October, 1999. Cox specifically claimed that the after effects were identical to symptoms associated with poisoning by compounds such as Lewisite.

House of Lords Official Report, 13 October 1999, col. 444

13 October 1999  The SPLA announces it will extend its cease-fire in the regions of Bahr al Ghazal, central Upper Nile and western Upper Nile to facilitate foreign relief efforts. An SPLA spokesman says, however: “It is not a comprehensive ceasefire which is part and parcel of the overall political solution to the war in Sudan...A comprehensive ceasefire, in our view, will be the result of progress in the peace talks and not vice-versa.”


14 October 1999  Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomes the extension of the cease-fire by both the Sudanese government and the SPLA and “urges the parties to the conflict to redouble their efforts to secure a comprehensive and lasting peace, in the context of the forthcoming IGAD discussions”.

“Secretary-General Welcomes Three-Month Extension of Sudan Ceasefire”, UN Secretary-General, 14 October 1999, http://www.reliefnet.int

15 October 1999  The National Democratic Alliance announces that it will be meeting in Cairo on Saturday 23 October. Communist Party deputy leader Tigani al-Tayeb states that the meeting will discuss “one question only” – its position on the Egyptian-Libyan invitation to attend a preparatory meeting regarding a peace conference. He says: “We will discuss Khartoum’s response to the Egyptian-Libyan initiative ... and decide whether or not the time is right to take part in the preparatory meeting.” The meeting will be attended by delegates from the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Sudanese Communist Party and the SPLA. However, a spokesman for the SPLA could not confirm whether SPLA leader John Garang would attend the conference himself or send a representative.

“Sudanese Opposition Leaders to Discuss Initiatives to End Civil War”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 15 October 1999
16 October 1999  Former Sudanese prime minister and leader of the opposition Umma Party, Sadiq al-Mahdi, meets in Rome with foreign ministers from the IGAD partner countries. Hassan Ahmed al-Hassan, official spokesman for the Umma Party, states that al-Mahdi had been invited to the meeting to discuss his previous messages to them on the peace process.

Al-Hassan reveals that these messages assert that an agreement between the SPLA and the Sudanese government was only a partial step to a full resolution of the Sudanese problem. He says: “Any dialogue must include all the dispute’s parties and expand the range of IGAD in its content and form to include, besides Egypt and Libya, other African and Arab states.”

“El-Mahdi Asserts Necessity of Coordination Between Egyptian-Libyan and IGAD Initiatives”, News Article by ArabicNews.com; Umma Party Letter to IPF at http://umma.org/up_letter_to_ipf.htm,

17 October 1999  Libyan leader Colonel Kadhafi, in a letter to Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, calls on the Sudanese government to step up its efforts in the peace process. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail also announces that he plans to travel to Cairo in the near future for talks on the peace initiative with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa.

“Libyan Leader Kadhafi Calls on Sudan to Step Up Peace Efforts”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 October 1999

19 October 1999  Rebel factions at the NDA meeting in Cairo disagree immediately on the best approach to peace talks. Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, President of the National Democratic Alliance, and head of the Democratic Unionist Party, says that the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative was the best “comprehensive political solution … the only initiative that contains all the parties [to the conflict] in Sudan”. Deng Alor, spokesman for absent SPLA leader John Garang, says that: “The SPLM/A believes that there should be one and only one mediation forum, and that is IGAD.” Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, says that failure to combine the Libyan-Egyptian initiatives might lead to an “internationalisation” of Sudan’s conflict.

“Sudan’s Opposition Divided on Approach to Peace”, New Article by Reuters on 19 October 1999

20 October 1999  NDA spokesman Faruq Abu Issa accuses the Sudanese government of “dilly-dallying and manoeuvring to gain more time”.
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“Sudanese Opposition Leaders Meet Again in Cairo”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 20 October 1999

21 October 1999  The SPLA shell the town of Bentiu.

21 October 1999  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi states that the recent change that took place in Sudan during the NIF conference could help in reaching a political solution to the Sudanese crisis. He states that the Umma Party: “Will do all it can to rally the friendly national, regional and international will in order to reach a comprehensive political solution.”


22 October 1999  At the end of its three-day meeting in Cairo the NDA states that it will meet again in Kampala on 15 November to name a delegation that will participate in a preparatory meeting with Sudanese government representatives to decide on a framework for eventual peace talks. By then, it states, it hopes that the two different peace initiatives would be combined. He also complains that the IGAD initiative only provided for a dialogue between the Sudanese government and the SPLA and excluded northern opposition groups also represented by the umbrella NDA. NDA spokesman Faruq Abu Isa also states that the SPLA delegation – which did not include its leader John Garang – opposed going straight into preparatory talks with the Khartoum government.


22 October 1999  US Secretary-of-State Madeleine Albright states that she will be meeting SPLA leader John Garang “as an important support for what we think needs to be done … to have the people of the south to be taken seriously in Khartoum”. Albright also strongly dismisses the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative, stating that all peace efforts should be under the umbrella of the IGAD process. She says: “We believe the IGAD process is the best way to go forward and do not support other processes that some are suggesting, the Egyptians or the Libyans.”

She further commits US funding to cover “more than half the expenses” for the IGAD secretariat’s first six months of operation.
23 October 1999  Sudanese government spokesman and Information Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that the NDA communiqué issued after its Cairo conference reveals that the NDA is in a state of “paralysis and conflict” and that those in the NDA supporting national reconciliation “seem incapable of standing up against the opposing group” which had succeeded in blocking the immediate formation of an NDA team for the preparatory meeting for a peace conference.

“NDA Statement Reflected Conflict Within Opposition Ranks: Government”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 23 October 1999

23 October 1999  US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright meets SPLA leader in Nairobi along with IGAD envoys. She praises John Garang as “a very dynamic leader who has a goal that is difficult to fulfil because he is not recognised in the international system” and announces the extension to 5 years of the Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation programme, giving southern rebels an additional 6 million dollars. She attacks the Sudanese government for attempting to fool the world about the severity of the conflict and its intentions toward the south.

Albright states: “The people in the government of Khartoum have to realise that their charm offensive is not charming. In fact, it is offensive…They have to deal with the huge portions of their population that don’t want to live under Sharia law.” Albright also opposes any rival peace initiatives to IGAD, and urges the latter to “speedy progress” as “there is not a lot of time”.

Albright further expresses disquiet about the recently completed Sudanese pipeline. She says: “I am concerned because it becomes another resource over which to fight...Part of the problem is that there seem to be some countries that believe if a central government that is dictatorial has access to more money that money will filter to the benefit of the people. That doesn’t happen.” She states that she plans to speak to the Canadian, Malaysian and Chinese governments to express displeasure with the fact that they allowed companies to invest in Sudan.

SPLA leader John Garang pledges his support for the peace process, but a senior aide states that the SPLA has little confidence that it would lead to a lasting settlement. He says: “There is no agreement because the positions of the warring parties are incompatible...Khartoum has not taken the decision to
search for a political solution. It uses the peace talks to buy time while carrying out its military program.”


24 October 1999 Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa opens talks with Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail on the two peace initiatives. Moussa tries to downplay the significance of Albright’s remarks. He says: “I don’t believe that Mrs Albright’s statements were an objection to the Egyptian-Libyan initiative. I think instead they were a show of support for the IGAD plan that doesn’t rule out our efforts...[the initiative] does not cancel out the IGAD plan... [it] proposes a total solution to the Sudanese problem while the IGAD plan is only limited to the south.”

“Egypt, Sudan Foreign Ministers in Talks on Rival Peace Plans”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 October 1999

24 October 1999 Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail emphasises that the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative “does not aim to eclipse the IGAD initiative but tries to supplement IGAD... by looking to solve the problem comprehensively...[it] is not an alternative to IGAD. We hope that the US will be more positive towards this...Our priority is for everyone to use both the proposals and all our efforts will be directed to that...We hope we don’t reach a point where one group or individual delays or holds up reaching a complete solution.”

“Sudan Backs Combination of Arab and African Peace Drives”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 October 1999

24 October 1999 Libyan leader Colonel Kadhafi denounces US Secretary of State Albright’s statement regarding the Sudanese peace initiatives. He says: “This is an unacceptable interference in African affairs...It is not up to Albright to accept or refuse initiatives toward peace. This matter does not concern the United States but the African continent, which can resolve its problems by itself.”

“Libya Denounces Albright’s ‘Interference’ in Sudan Peace-Talk Proposals”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 October 1999

24 October 1999 Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa has talks with Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi on both economic ties and the conflicts
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Eritrea issues a statement regarding the IGAD initiative. It attacks what it labels “disinformation”, denies that IGAD represents an “African initiative” and the Egyptian-Libyan initiative an “Arabic” one, and rejects views that there is a “fundamental rift within the NDA.” It defends the IGAD process and states that: “To digress from this approach by undermining the role of IGAD or putting blame on it will have no meaning other than wasting time on marginal issues and confounding the peace initiative … we believe that any interested party that wishes to strengthen and reinforce the IGAD initiative must bolster the efforts of IGAD rather than looking for alternative endeavours that will only dilute the peace process”.

“IGAD’s Initiative Remains as Valid as Ever”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asmara, Eritrea, 25 October 1999

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail accuses the USA of pursuing a policy that prolongs the Sudanese war. He says: “Your [i.e. the US] policy will not lead to peace. It will lead to the continuation of war, the suffering of the people, the loss of lives in the south … This war, this problem, will not be settled by fighting. It has to be settled by political means. The government of Sudan is ready for that.”

Ismail also states that the Egyptian-Libyan initiative was not intended to replace the IGAD process but to “coordinate” with it. “IGAD is for the problem of the south, while the Egyptian-Libyan initiative offers a comprehensive settlement for the whole problem of Sudan.”

Ismail also replies to US allegations of violations of religious freedom in Sudan, pointing to the many southern Christians holding senior posts in the Sudanese government – a higher proportion than Muslims in American government. Whilst acknowledging that Sudan’s human rights record was not perfect, he denied the existence of slavery and says that Sudan was working with UNICEF and other relief groups to stop “abductions” of civilians by warring factions. He also states that Sudan would welcome any objective investigation into slavery allegations by either the UN, the European Union or the Organisation of African Unity.

26 October 1999  The Sudanese National Congress mandates Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail to meet opposition leaders seeking reconciliation with Khartoum. New committees are to be formed to conduct reconciliation talks. Information Minister Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani is to take part in preparatory meetings with the opposition for a proposed national dialogue conference. A committee has also been formed under first Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha for contacts with opponents abroad and another under Higher Education Minister Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omer for contacts with opponents inside the country.

“Sudanese FM Mandated to Meet Opponents in Cairo: Official”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 26 October 1999

28 October 1999  Following talks in Cairo with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa announces that Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir will visit Egypt soon. He states that he feels “optimistic” about ties between the two nations and the normalisation of relations. Ismail also reiterates Sudan’s view that the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative did not aim at replacing that of IGAD and that the Sudanese government believed it was important to coordinate the two.

“Sudan President to Visit Egypt Soon, Moussa”, News Article by Reuters, 28 October 1999; “Egypt’s Mubarak Meets Sudanese Foreign Minister”, News Article by DPA, 28 October 1999

28 October 1999  Members of the Sudanese parliamentary majority announce their attention to lobby both the Khartoum government, and to send a parliamentary delegation to meet opposition leaders abroad, in order to achieve “national reconciliation”. Sudan had lost “the best of its youth”, they declared, and called for guns to be used to defend the nation and not for Sudanese to shoot each other.

“Sudanese Deputies Press for Reconciliation With Opposition”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 October 1999

28 October 1999  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, during a visit to Cairo, states that the Egyptian-Libyan peace plan is “the only comprehensive framework designed to help end the civil strife in Sudan…What is important about the initiative is that it has placed the future of rule in Sudan on the agenda of discussion”.

“Sudanese Opposition Leader Praises Egyptian-Libyan Peace Plan”, News Article by XINHUA, 28 October 1999
28 October 1999

SPLA leader John Garang phones Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi to stress his commitment to the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“The Sudanese SPLA Leader Tells Qadhafi of Support for Egyptian-Libyan Initiative”, News Article by Voice of Africa (Tripoli), 28 October 1999

November 1999

The American publication Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, commenting on US support for the rebel SPLA and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s discussions with SPLA leader John Garang, reports:

“There are growing indications that Washington is now backing the establishment of an independent state in the south of Sudan. US support for the opposition in south Sudan, efforts to isolate the government in Khartoum and diplomatic initiatives to legitimise the south’s secession have all been reinvigorated in recent months…Last month, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with southern Sudanese rebel commander John Garang in Nairobi and pledged to increase ‘humanitarian aid’ to his Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)…The increase in humanitarian aid is clearly designed to allow the SPLA to spend more of its meager funds on military equipment. This will help make up for a considerable shortfall in support for the SPLA coming in from neighboring countries. Support for the group by Ethiopia and Eritrea has tapered off somewhat since the outbreak of war between the two countries, while Uganda the most pro-SPLA country in the region, is deeply embroiled in the Congo conflict and has fewer resources to spare.

According to unconfirmed reports obtained by Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Albright and Garang discussed SPLA plans to capture the southern capital of Juba in advance of negotiations with the Sudanese government…In perhaps the most important [US] policy shift, Albright announced that future peace negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLA must be exclusively within the framework of talks sponsored by IGAD. This is considered to be a major concession to the SPLA because the IGAD initiative treats the problem as an ethno-sectarian conflict between the north and the south of Sudan – a framework that inherently legitimises the prospect of secession…Due in part to US encouragement, the SPLA is now unwilling to consider alternative negotiating frameworks. It has refused even to name a representative to the opposition delegation that will carry out the negotiations with Khartoum in accordance with the Egyptian-Libyan [peace] initiative.

Although US officials have been unenthusiastic about the Egyptian-Libyan initiative from the very beginning, Albright had not explicitly rejected it until her trip to Africa last month…Egyptian officials are reportedly fuming over this rebuff – prompting one Arabic newspaper [Al-Sharq al-Awat, 29 October 1999] to speak of an ‘undeclared crisis’ in Egyptian-American relations. During
his recent visit to Cairo, the US special envoy for Sudan, Harry Johnston, was
denied a meeting with [Egyptian President] Mubarak.”

“US Steps Up Support for South Sudanese Resistance”, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. 1(11),
November 1999

4 November 1999 A new rebel organisation, the Upper Nile Provisional
Military Command Council is established in Waat, central Upper Nile, by the
South Sudan Defense Force, the SPLA, and the South Sudan Unity Army, to
“[unify] all the military forces in central, eastern and western Upper Nile”.

“A New Military Command Structure for Greater Upper Nile Region”, Waat, Sudan, 31 January
2000 at http://members.tripod.com/SudanInfonet/UMCC.htm

17 November 1999 Arab League Secretary-General Esmat Abdel-Meguid sends messages to Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Djiboutan
President and current IGAD President Ismail Omer Guelleh, Organisation of
African Unity chief Salem Ahmed Salem, and Arab League assistant Secretary-
General Ahmad Bin Hali, calling on them to support the peace efforts in Sudan.
He reiterates the necessity of preserving Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity
and rejects foreign interference in its internal affairs.

“Arab League Urges African Support for Peace Efforts on Sudan”, News Article by XINHUA, 17
November 1999

17 November 1999 Hundred of people flee to Uganda from Southern
Sudan to escape factional in-fighting between members of the SPLA. UN High
Commission for Refugees UNHCR spokeswoman Tomoko Nini reports that
250 refugees have arrived at the Kakoma refugee camp in Kenya. This follows a
similar influx of 500 refugees in May, also fleeing similar SPLA in-fighting.

“Hundreds Flee Rebel Infighting in South Sudan”, News Article by Reuters, 17 November 1999

18 November 1999 It is announced that President Omer al-Bashir will
meet former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi to discuss ways of setting up
“reconciliation efforts”.

“Sudan President to Meet Opposition Leader – Newspaper”, News Article by Associated Press, 18
November 1999

19 November 1999 SPLA leader John Garang attempts to persuade
Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi from meeting Sudanese President Omer al-
Bashir. NDA spokesman Yassir Arman states that: “A meeting [with Bashir]
will put a split in the NDA. It’s not the end, but it [would be] the beginning of
the end of Umma being a part of the NDA.”
20 November 1999    Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi has failed to show up at their planned meeting in Addis Ababa. He states: “I have agreed to meet Sadiq el-Mahdi but he has not come for the meeting…No arrangement has yet been made for another appointment.”

Bashir also states that his two-day state visit to Ethiopia was successful and that Sudanese-Ethiopian relations “have now fully returned to normal”.

22 November 1999    During a visit to Saudi Arabia Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha says there are no plans to hold peace talks in Saudi Arabia, although the Sudanese government was in favour of holding peace talks in an Arab country after proper preparations. He says: “Until now, we have not presented the Saudi government with an official request to host a meeting and dialogue concerning Sudan …There are unofficial contacts with the Saudi government, but not from official sides.” Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan had earlier revealed that Saudi Arabia had been approached by one Sudanese party to host peace talks in the holy city of Mecca, and he had stated that the kingdom would “not prevent anyone from coming to the holy places to perform their religious obligations and resolve their disputes”.

22 November 1999    Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir issues decree scrapping laws against opposition groups. He orders the release of any remaining political detainees in Sudan, the return of confiscated properties to opposition leaders, and the lifting of travel bans and of freezes on their bank accounts.

23 November 1999    In an official commentary issued by Steven Wondu, the SPLM-SPLA Representative for the United States and Canada, the SPLA declares that the Sudanese Government “would not go for a just negotiated settlement”. It accuses Khartoum of planning to invade other African countries by creating “a bridgehead for a future thrust into central and eastern Africa”, and of covertly creating “weapons of mass destruction”. It further argues that the IGAD peace process would only make progress if “a significant disturbance
of the military balance” occurs – that is to say, if the SPLA makes significant military advances.

Steven Wondu, “Commentary: Sudan War – Not IGAD’s Fault”, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 23 November, 1999

23 November 1999 Osamal Baz, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s political advisor, says that there is little the USA can do to upset the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative: He states: “Nobody can halt it because it is going in line with the general interests...No American blessing is requested, no American approval is requested, no American intervention is requested...if the US is still opposing [the peace initiative]...this will not be of any importance to us.” He further states that US ability to influence events “is far less than ours...The countries concerned with this matter are the Sudan, Egypt and Libya…and then the neighbouring African countries”.


25 November 1999 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir leaves for Djibouti to attend the IGAD conference, scheduled to discuss joint economic projects as well as the situations in Sudan and Somalia. He also meets there with former Prime Minister and Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi.


26 November 1999 Following Sudanese President Bashir’s meeting with Umma leader Sadiq al-Mahdi the Sudanese government signs a three-page “declaration of principles for a comprehensive political solution” with the Umma Party which include the establishment of “a democratic pluralist government and federal, presidential system”, “a fair division of power and wealth”, “respect for international human-rights convention” and further talks on extending democracy. It declares that “citizenship is the base for rights and obligations” and affirms “the rejection of any privilege which would be granted to a community for religious, ethnic or cultural reasons”. Sudanese foreign relations are to be based on “the principles of international cooperation and the safeguarding of security and international peace”. Djibouti President Ismail Omer Guelleh welcomes the agreement. He says: “We are pleased that they have met and have spoken at this forum...For what has happened here today we congratulate the people of Sudan.”

Yassir Arman, SPLA spokesman, states that he “regretted” al-Mahdi’s peace moves which were, he alleged, made without any consultation with the NDA.
He says: “The Umma Party must decide in which ship it wants to sail its journey, with the government or with the NDA.”

Faruq Abu Issa of the National Democratic Alliance also condemns the agreement. He says: “As the NDA we were not consulted on this agreement. We had absolutely no knowledge of it at all, so we are not party to it”. He criticises the “obscure terms” in the accord, declaring that “It just talks about citizenship and this is not enough … What is in this agreement will not stop the war, it will escalate it.”


27 November 1999  Sudanese Culture and Information Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani declares the agreement with the Umma Party to be “a very important step towards the achievement of national accord in Sudan…What was good was not only the signing of these principles, but also the good spirit that reigned and the good will on both sides”. He also emphasised that the agreement supports other existing peace initiatives and does not come at their expense.


28 November 1999  In spite of the NDA’s attack on the government’s peace accord with the Umma Party, Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir urges NDA Chairman and Democratic Unionist Party leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani to meet with him for further peace talks.

“Bashir Urges Further Opposition Meetings as NDA Denounces Peace Deal”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 November 1999

29 November 1999  Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa states that the Sudan government-Umma Party peace accord is unacceptable in its present form. He says: “There are some points which do not conform to what has been discussed on more than one occasion between us and Sadiq al-Mahdi, and with the Foreign Minister of Sudan … It requires explanation and cannot be accepted as it is.”

“Egypt Says Bashir-Mahdi Deal on Sudan Unacceptable”, News Article by Reuters, 29 November 1999

29 November 1999  Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail announce that he will be travelling to Germany and France to discuss
US President Clinton states his intention to sign a bill permitting the administration to give food assistance directly to anti-government rebels in Sudan. The plan is designed by its advocates in the State Department and the National Security Council to strengthen the military operations of the rebel SPLA and to isolate the Sudanese government.

John Prendergast, of the National Security Council, states: “This is so forces can eat more easily and resupply forces in food-deficit areas...[It is hoped that the food will allow the rebels] to stay in position or expand positions in places where it is difficult to maintain a logistical line.” White House spokesman Joe Lockhart also states: “We’ve worked very hard to try to end the fighting [in Sudan]. We believe that the Sudanese government should be isolated because of their support of terrorism, because of their efforts to destabilise the region.”

The plan is criticised, however, by both humanitarian groups and other members of the administration for contravening the long-held principle of neutrality in food assistance during conflicts. Julia Taft, Assistant Secretary of State for refugees and humanitarian assistance, states: “This is a departure from the way we should be using food aid.” Oxfam America’s Peggy Connolly also states that Oxfam opposes turning food aid into a political weapon: “Food should be used to feed people. We would support promoting negotiation rather than backing one side in an extremely complex conflict.”

And a spokesman for the World Food Programme expresses concern that American plans will disrupt the existing non-partisan aid programme – Operation Lifeline Sudan, set up by UNICEF and 35 other NGOs.

US State Department spokesman James Rubin criticises the peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the opposition Umma Party in Djibouti. He claims that is merely indicative of Sudan’s intransigence as it: “[D]id not address the main concern that we’ve all had [concerning] Sudan’s crackdown on human rights, its deliberate policies of
The Search for Peace in the Sudan: 1989-2001

depression, and its refusal to approach peace seriously … If the Sudanese
government were serious about pursuing a peace agreement, they would try to
engage through the work of our special envoy and several others who have
made themselves available to help.”

“Washington Criticises Sudan Government, Debates Food Aid to Rebels”, by Matthew Lee, News
Article by Agence France Presse, 29 November 1999

30 November 1999 The SPLA issues an official statement
comprehensively rejecting the Djibouti agreement. The Statement says:

“As far as the SPLM/SPLA is concerned, this is a bilateral agreement between
the Umma Party and the NIF. Neither the SPLM/SPLA nor the National
Democratic Alliance NDA were consulted. The SPLM/SPLA therefore
associates itself from this agreement and has nothing to do with it…As for the…agreement itself, there is nothing substantive or new in it that can possibly
contribute to a just and peaceful resolution of the Sudan conflict Its so-called
principles are not different from those contained in the April 1997 so-called
Khartoum Peace Agreement signed between the NIF and its Southern Sudanese
allies…[which] has not brought peace to the country and has in fact collapsed
due to its inadequacies and lack of seriousness to resolve the country…The so-
called Djibouti ‘Call of the Nation’ is another gimmick similar to [this] and it
will surely suffer the same fate…By their action the Leadership of the Umma
Party has literally dismissed themselves from the NDA and joined the NIF
regime. In this regard the SPLM/SPLA calls upon the Umma Party and its
cadres to reconsider their position and continue with the NDA instead of going
on board the sinking ship of the NIF regime…[T]he SPLM/SPLA would like to
serve notice and state in unambiguous terms that the Movement will not be a
party to any so-called ‘national conference’ or ‘national reconciliation
conference’, which is being called for by the NIF/Umma alliance as stated in the
Djibouti agreement. However, we advocate reconciliation processes among the
Sudanese people, but not reconciliation with the NIF Government, which
continues to terrorise and destroy the country. The SPLM/SPLA totally rejects
and dismisses the Djibouti so-called ‘Call of the Nation’ as an ill-conceived
public relations stunt, a non-starter, and worse still a futile attempt by the NIF to
use the Umma Party to mobilise for war.”

“SPLM/SPLA Position on the Bashir-Sadiq Agreement”, Dr Samson L. Kwaje, SPLA Spokesman,
Nairobi; “Sudan’s SPLA Says Bashir-Mahdi Deal a ‘Gimmick’”, News Article by Reuters, 30
November 1999

2 December 1999 Eight US-based humanitarian organisations working
in Sudan send a letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressing
strong opposition to the US government’s plans for overt aid to Sudanese
rebels. Such a step, they state, “could damage the reputations of American non-

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governmental agencies which act as implementing partners in the distribution of humanitarian assistance and could restrict their access to populations in dire need…[Such backing is a] most unwelcome departure from the policies and practices of successive administrations”.

The aid agencies state that: “Food aid [to rebel forces] will put not only humanitarian aid workers at risk but also jeopardise vulnerable people in need.” The Washington-based organisation CARE also specifically states that such a move “would set a terrible precedent” and the London-based Amnesty International declares that: “Giving food aid directly to the rebels would be fuelling the war rather than putting pressure on both sides to end it. It would be an escalation.”

A UN official is also quoted as stating that during Albright’s meetings with SPLA leader John Garang she “made a deal with Garang about more help in return for SPLA improving their human rights record, but Albright did not put pressure on Garang to conclude a peace”. Aid organisation critics are also quoted as stating that: “It is insane to think that Garang [leader of the rebel SPLA] is the saviour of the south. Garang will either sell the food, give it to some of his friends, or deny it to people he doesn’t like”.


2 December 1999 It is reported that Sudanese opposition factions are trying to resolve their differences. NDA spokesman Faruq Abu Issa states that the DUP and Umma parties had met in Cairo to smooth over their differences in preparation for the forthcoming NDA conference in Kampala. DUP Secretary-General Abdel Rahman Sheila states this his party was concerned with both the unity of Sudan and of the NDA, and of the “strategic relationship” with the Umma Party. The unity of the NDA in general and the DUP-Umma relationship in particular “are a factor of stability in Sudan”, he explains. And the Kampala conference will discuss all questions relating to a comprehensive peaceful solution “in the context of the unity of the alliance”.

Ibrahim al-Amin, an Umma Party member of the NDA joint committee states that well-wishing mediators – whom he did not identify – “have removed most of the misunderstandings that accompanied the signing of the [Djibouti] agreement … The situation has now changed completely, and those who bet on the disintegration of the unity of the opposition will lose the bet and their wishes will fail”.

“Sudan Opposition Factions Try to Resolve Disagreements”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 December 1999
Contradictory statements regarding the Djibouti accord are made by opposition spokesmen. Umma Party foreign relations officer, Najeib Abdel-Wahab, states that the Democratic Unionist Party was looking more favourably on the Djibouti accord following a meeting with Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi. “The NDA’s two major parties, Umma and DUP, are now with the Djibouti process”, he says. Umma Party Ibrahim al-Amin, a member of the NDA joint committee, also states that the two parties “have reached common ground for overcoming their disagreements over the Djibouti accord”.

However, DUP spokesman Abdel Rahman Sheila, states: “The Djibouti deal involves Umma and Bashir. We are not involved.” But NDA Spokesman Faruq Abu Issa states that the DUP and Umma had smoothed over their differences in preparation for the forthcoming meeting in Kampala.

A local SPLA military commander in the south of Sudan states that each group in the NDA worked towards its own objectives: “We were enemies before. We are allies now, and we may be enemies tomorrow”, he says.

Nine political prisoners are released in compliance with the 30 November decision by the Peace and Reconciliation Committee. The Committee also announces the return of confiscated property and assets of leading opponents, including Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi and Democratic Unionist Party leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani. Presidential political and legal advisor Abdul Basit Sabdrat also announces that other political prisoners would be pardoned in coming weeks. The Sudanese National Council also announces its backing for and welcome of the Djibouti agreement. Several parliamentary members call on the government to accelerate the steps in order to reach a comprehensive solution.

Lieutenant-General Abdul Rahman, spokesman for the National Democratic Alliance’s united military leadership, claims responsibility for the blowing up of an oil pipeline in eastern Sudan. He says: “[A] special unit from the national coalition of al-Baija conference blasted the incoming oil pipeline in Dahnet area to the west of Swaken city. This operation is made to assure once again the determination of the NDA to eliminate the regime of the Islamic front by peaceful or warlike means, rather than reconciliation, bargaining or partitioning the authority with it.”
The NDA unanimously rejects the 25 November agreement between the Sudanese government and the Umma Party as “a flagrant violation” of NDA charters. They further suspend NDA Secretary-General Mubarak al-Fadel al-Mahdi who signed the document on Umma’s behalf.


2 December 1999 The Heads of State and Government of IGAD issue a statement setting out their agreement on a number of issues. Regarding the Sudanese peace process they report:

“The Heads of state and Government expressed their appreciation to H. E. President Arap Moi for the lead role he continues to play for peace in the Sudan. They reiterated that the Declaration of Principles continue to provide an effective and just basis for resolving the crisis in the Sudan, particularly for national reconciliation which would pave the way for bringing to an end the conflict in the South.

“The Heads of State and Government expressed the preparedness of IGAD to co-operate with all those with keen interest to contribute to national reconciliation in Sudan based on the principles expounded in the DOP and already accepted by the two parties in the IGAD process. The IGAD initiative is an African initiative and should remain so.”

“Declaration of the 7th IGAD Summit of Heads of States and Government”, Djibouti, 26 November 1999

3 December 1999 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that the Sudanese government would be bound by the outcome of a forthcoming referendum on the right of south Sudan to self-determination. He reiterates the government’s commitment to achieving a federal system in which the rights of people of all cultures would be recognised and a fair allocation of power and resources arrived at. He attacks American foreign policy toward Sudan and its attempt to incite neighbouring countries to attack it.

“Agenda” television programme, MBC Channel, at 19.00gmt, 3 December 1999

3 December 1999 Egyptian presidential advisor Osama al-Baz affirms that the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative stems from Egypt’s concern for the interests of Sudan and its territorial integrity, and calls upon all Sudanese leaders and parties to pool their efforts in the peace initiative. He emphasises that the initiative will continue in spite of American opposition because it reflects the wishes and interests of the Sudanese people and neighbouring countries. “The
US opposition...does not concern us much and will not change our stance at all”, he says.

“Egyptian-Libyan Initiative On-Going Despite US Opposition”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 3 December 1999

3 December 1999 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, states that the National Democratic Alliance no longer represents all the Sudanese opposition, and that the alliance was nothing but a temporary formula to fulfil the needs of national work in a certain stage. Developments may lead to a restructuring of the whole opposition and the establishment of an alternative formula for an alliance. Such an alliance may take the form of a wide front that includes all supporters of democracy and peace.

He also states that the ruling system in Sudan is not weak and the opposition not that strong. The opposition’s structure is fragile and not a persuasive alternative accepted by a lot of people in Sudan.

“El-Sadek El-Mahdi: The Sudanese System is Not Weak, and the Opposition is Not Strong”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 4 December 1999

6 December 1999 Commenting on the Clinton Administration’s stated intention to provide the SPLA with food aid, The New York Times states: “This is likely to prolong the war” and “ally Washington with a brutal and predatory guerilla army. One of the tragedies of Sudan’s war is that John Garang’s S.P.L.A. has squandered a sympathetic cause. Though its members claim to be ‘Christians’ resisting Islamization, they have behaved like an occupying army, killing, raping and pillaging.” The New York Times also described Garang as one of “Sudan’s pre-eminent war criminals” and stated that any such food aid would “enlist America in the conflict’s most pernicious tactic – the use of food as a weapon of war”. The paper reports that “[t]he plan is designed by its advocates in the State Department and the National Security Council to strengthen the military operations of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army”. The American humanitarian aid agency CARE states: “It would set a terrible precedent.”


6 December 1999 Internal Sudanese leaders of the National Democratic Alliance – Abdel Rahman Nugdallah of the Umma Party, Ali Ahmed of the Democratic Unionist Party and Joseph Akol of the Union of Sudanese African Parties – leave Khartoum to travel to Kampala, in Uganda, to discuss a peace agreement with the government. The NDA announces that government and alliance leaders had held a “cordial” three-hour meeting under the aegis of the official Peace and Reconciliation Committee.
The SPLA announces that it has formed a new force comprising the SPLA and commanders of two former pro-government militias in Southern Sudan. The new force, entitled the Upper Nile Provisional Military Command Council, issues a statement that it would use all means necessary to resist the “genocidal war” waged by the government on southern Sudan “with the clear intention of ethnic cleansing and to depopulate the areas of the oil fields”.

“Sudanese Internal Opposition Leaders Head for Peace Parley”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 December 1999

6 December 1999 Sidahmed al-Hussein, Democratic Unionist Party leader, states that the Djibouti accord will close the door in the face of any efforts toward dialogue and reconciliation between the Sudanese government and the opposition parties. He claims that the agreement is part of a “divide and rule” policy by the government to fragment the NDA and emphatically rejects it. He further states that the DUP “are going ahead with our opposition to the regime with all means until its downfall”.

“The DUP Rejects”, Al Hayat, 6 December 1999

6 December 1999 The Sudanese Organizations Abroad group sends a Memorandum to Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, President of the National Democratic Alliance, and to all members of the NDA Leadership Council, calling on the NDA to “reject reconciliation with the existing ruling regime”. It denounces the “anti-democratic, uncivilised, and irrevocably rejected policies, practices, and very existence of the NIF pariah rule in our beloved Homeland”. It calls for a coordination “on a daily base” of the “struggles of Sudanese Masses in Diaspora” and the establishment of an “All-Sudanese Conference Abroad towards a stronger movement to support the NDA struggles”.

“Memorandum from The Sudanese Organisations Abroad”, 6 December 1999

6 December 1999 Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi announces he will lead talks at the State House in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, in order to establish better relations between the two countries. The talks are organised by the Carter Centre, of Atlanta, Georgia, and former President Jimmy Carter is also expected to attend. The Carter Centre had been holding exploratory talks on regional issues for several months previously.

“Kenya, Sudan, Uganda to Hold Talks”, News Article by Associated Press, 6 December 1999; “Uganda and Sudan Try to Improve Relations”, News Article by Reuters, 7 December 1999
7 December 1999

Two Roman Catholic priests and 18 others accused of planting bombs in Khartoum are pardoned by Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir as part of the national reconciliation process.

“Sudanese President Orders Release of Alleged Insurgents”, News Article by Associated Press, 7 December 1999

7 December 1999

Former Nigerian military ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida, arrives in Uganda as an emissary from Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to deliver a message to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. It is also believed that he intends to meet Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi.

“Obasanjo Sends General Babangida to Uganda”, New Vision (Kampala), 7 December 1999

7 December 1999

NDA leaders meet in Ugandan capital Kampala, primarily to discuss what Abdon Agaw, of the Union of Sudan African Parties, calls the “cracks” in the NDA. “The Mahdi-Khartoum deal is an urgent issue that is going to be hot for the conference as it hinges on the unity of the movement”, he says.

“Sudanese Opposition Chiefs to Meet in Kampala”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 December 1999

8 December 1999

Former American President Jimmy Carter commenting on American attempts to destabilise Sudan states: “The people in Sudan want to resolve the conflict. The biggest obstacle is US government policy. The US is committed to overthrowing the government in Khartoum. Any sort of peace effort is aborted, basically by policies of the United States...Instead of working for peace in Sudan, the US government has basically promoted a continuation of the war.”

In a further comment, the Boston Globe states that: “To the peril of regional stability, the Clinton Administration has used northern Uganda as a military training ground for southern Sudanese rebels fighting the Muslim government of Khartoum.”


8 December 1999

John Garang, SPLA leader, at the Kampala meeting of the National Democratic Alliance, rejects the Djibouti accord and the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He states that the IGAD Declaration of Principles is the only valid solution to the Sudanese problem.

9 December 1999 SPLA leader John Garang states that proposed US food aid for his forces will boost its capacity in the war against the Sudanese government. He says: “We will be able to concentrate more men in bigger units...Concentration is one of the principles of war. If you concentrate your manpower or your firepower, you get better results.”

The SPLA’s ability to concentrate its forces, he adds, had heretofore been limited by its reliance on local civilian populations for food. Garang also states that the new peace deal between Uganda and Sudan would have no impact on the SPLA’s military operations or supply lines. He states that the SPLA will continue to control Sudan’s borders with several neighbouring nations and would be able to move people and equipment across those frontiers. “Governments have no control over the movement of people”, he adds.

“Interview – Sudan Rebel Says US Food Aid Will Help”, News Article by Reuters, 9 December 1999

9 December 1999 In an interview on Egyptian Television US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright states with regard to the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative that: “We believe that it is important for there to be a comprehensive agreement on Sudan. We also understand that Egypt has vital interests as far as Sudan is concerned. It’s just that we think that it is important to try to have a comprehensive settlement for Sudan and that the Egyptian-Libyan negotiations should be a part of that.”


12 December 1999 Sudanese Presidential decrees dissolve parliament and reduce Dr Hassan al-Turabi to an administrative position within the National Congress, impose a state of emergency and suspend articles of the Constitution which relate to election of governors of the country’s 26 states. The action is widely seen as a positive move to compromising with opposition groups over the issue of separation of state and religion in Sudan.

18 December 1999 In meetings with a visiting South African delegation, the Sudanese Foreign Minister reiterated with regard to the Sudanese conflict that “there was no military solution to the problem”. The government also stated that peace depends on the IGAD and Libyan-Egyptian initiatives.

Sudan Monthly Report (Nairobi), 15 December 1999

19 December 1999 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi meets in Kampala with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to discuss the Sudanese peace process.
21 December 1999 Libyan President Moamer Kadhafi chairs an African mini-summit in Tripoli with President Laurent Kabila of the Congo, President Issias Afeworki of Eritrea, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Omer al-Bashir of Sudan.

"Kadhafi Holds Mini African Peace Summit in Tripoli", News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 December 1999

22 December 1999 The Sudanese Government signs a peace treaty with the TANA (Blue Nile Citizens Front) forces at the Presidential Palace. The agreement is signed by Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, Advisor to the President for Peace Affairs and rebel leader Chief Obeid Mohammed Abu-Shutal. Vice-President Ali Osman Taha describes the peace agreement as a step forward to realising peace and stability in the country and proof of the government’s enthusiasm to achieve peace. He also renews his call to opposition members abroad to return to Sudan to join the peace and rehabilitation process.

Chief Abu-Shutal states that the Blue Nile citizens are keen to uphold the efforts to achieve peace, accord, stability and development in the country.

The 12-point agreement includes provisions on: democratic rule in Sudan; the preservation of the unity of the Sudanese people; a fair distribution of national resources; the development of the less developed parts of the country; a commitment to federal government and local autonomy; an ending of tribal and ethnic conflicts; the establishment of effective structures to ensure the implementation of the agreement; the guarantee of representation of Blue Nile citizens in various federal posts; the verification of the good use agricultural lands in the region; the granting of priority to Blue Nile citizens in the allocation of land plots; the improvement of basic services, especially health and education, in the area; the establishment of a specialised organisation to ensure the development of the Blue Nile area; a general amnesty for all those carrying arms who returned to the homeland.

News Article by SUNA News Digest, 22 December 1999

22 December 1999 Sadiq al-Mahdi, President of the Umma Party, sends an open letter to SPLA leader John Garang. He points out that in the Umma Party’s “discussions with important players in the international community left [them] in no doubt that the SPLM/A is regarded along with the government as responsible for Human Rights abuses, and perpetuation of the war...The SPLA’s record on Human Rights, in the eyes of many neutral observers has
blunted if not altogether arrested the opposition campaign against the Human Rights record of the NIF regime”.

He criticises the SPLA’s tactics during peace negotiations, especially its attempt to bypass previous NDA agreements and “divide central power between SPLM/A and the NIF regime”, to exclude NDA participation in IGAD, for “the vehemence of [its] negative reaction to [the] Djibouti [Agreement]”, and for its “scathing, unfair and distorted attack on a party [Umma] which represents majority opinion in the Sudan”.

He further criticises the SPLA’s attitude to various peace negotiation. “We insisted on an IGAD update”, Al-Mahdi writes, “to broaden it to involve uncatered for aspects. You were not equally enthusiastic for this revision. We encouraged the Joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative as a necessary means to rectify the IGAD drawbacks and to compliment it. Initially you have welcomed the joint initiative and then had second thoughts about it, The IGAD revision, which you suggested as a substitute, was so unfair that our rejection of it should have caused no surprise.”

Al-Mahdi also states that, as a result of these prevarications, “towards the end of 1998 we became increasingly anxious about the possibility of international resolutions being implemented over the heads of the Sudanese people, and the creeping Balkanisation of the Sudan. You may not have similar anxieties”.

Al-Mahdi further comments on the “change in political language in Khartoum”, its “acceptance of citizenship as the basis of constitutional rights, the endorsement of some Asmara 1995 resolutions, particularly the principle of self-determination for the South, and the acceptance of a National constitution commission charged with drafting a constitution guaranteeing political plurality...allowing a greater margin of freedom within the country...changing its regional address toward good neighbourliness...changing its international agenda”.

It was these changes, al-Mahdi observes, that persuaded him of the need and opportunity “to move very fast indeed in the search for a Comprehensive Political Agreement”, to “free [themselves] from the NDA deadwood”, and to recognise “that it is possible to clinch a peace agreement, a program for Democratic Transformation”. He outlines a number of possible political directions and for “a national All Party Conference to discuss and resolve all national conflicts and usher into a Comprehensive Political Agreement”.

Sadiq al-Mahdi, Umma Party President, “Letter to Dr. John Garang, Chairman SPLA and Commander in Chief, SPLA”, 22 December, 1999
22 December 1999  
In comments to reporters in Cairo Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states: “Now we have a completely new reality. There is no (Islamic) Front. There are Sudanese political forces, some of them were inside the front, others were not”.

He asserts that his recent moves were not tactical, but “fixed policies”. Bashir reaffirms his commitment to the unity of Sudan, to Egyptian-Sudanese ties, and to the success of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Africa: President ‘Rules Out’ Reconciliation With Turabi Praises Egypt”, News Article by MENA, 22 December 1999

23 December 1999  
A joint communique is issued by the Egyptian and Sudanese governments at the end of President Bashir’s visit. The statement declares that Presidents Mubarak and Bashir discussed “the latest developments in Sudan and the stages taken by its legitimate leadership to correct the situation, maintain unity and achieve stability and security for its people”. Egypt’s Foreign Minister Amr Moussa stated that the talks included “dialogue between the different Sudanese parties including the people of the south and the northern opposition”.

The statement also calls upon African members of IGAD to co-ordinate with the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. President al-Bashir expresses full readiness to take any necessary steps to create a suitable atmosphere for peace talks.

Moussa also states that he had found support for President Bashir among Gulf leaders during a recent four-day tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates and that “Egypt sees al-Bashir as the head of the Sudanese state and as a representative of his country … There’s now an openness in Sudan’s government. It is prepared to listen and negotiate and reach a vision for a new Sudan that accepts all opposition factions”. Full diplomatic relations are restored between Egypt and Sudan and the Egyptian Ambassador is set to return to Khartoum (from which he had been withdrawn since 1995) “immediately”.

President Bashir’s also states that former Speaker Dr Hassan al-Turabi’s ideal of an Islamic family of nations was over. “How can a country that cannot realise its national unity and security of its territories … go beyond its borders in search of (Islamic) unity of nations?”

Sudan analyst Hassan Abu Taleb declares that “Turabi took a position that put an end to reconciliation measures. Distancing Turabi helps a lot”.

“Egypt and Sudan Agree to Normalise Relations”, News Article by DPA, 23 December 1999;  
“Egypt, Sudan Urge Joint Peace Efforts for Realizing Peace in Sudan”, News Article by XINHUA,
25 December 1999  Former Sudanese Prime Minister and Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi meets Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. He states that the time was ripe for a reconciliation meeting between the Sudanese government and its opponents. He also states that the recent actions taken by the Sudanese President Omer Al-Bashir, dissolving parliament and declaring a three-month state of emergency, created a suitable atmosphere to convene such a meeting. Mahdi added that Egypt and Libya should co-ordinate with the IGAD peace efforts.

Mahdi declares that: “There are now circumstances and developments which could favour an agreement on a comprehensive political solution...(We) discussed ways of activating a comprehensive political solution and the steps needed to organise a conference that includes all factions to the Sudanese dispute.”

Mahdi calls for the US government to back the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative, “and to avoid totally any projects that could lead to partial or bilateral solutions only”. He points out that US policy towards Sudan is opposed by many parties, including European countries, international relief agencies, and the UN: “We hope that the US will consider all these views and take the right decisions.”

26 December 1999  Sudanese Culture and Information Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani underlines the importance of Egyptian-Sudanese unity in the settlement of Sudan’s problems. He reiterates Sudan’s willingness to hold a peace conference with all opposition parties on the basis of a commitment to democratic government and equal rights for all.

27 December 1999  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that all political parties, whether pro- or anti-government, were from now on free to practice political activities in the country. He declares: “From now on, there is no more discrimination between associated and non-associated parties...
political forces can now organise themselves and start practising political activities in the manner they wish...We want a constructive opposition which shares the concerns and interests of the country, rather than a destructive opposition...to welcome all Sudanese people around national and fundamental questions.”

“Sudanese President Pledges Political Freedoms”, News Article by AFP, 27 December 1999

28 December 1999 Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, President of the National Democratic Alliance, holds talks in Cairo with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa on the joint Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He states that he hopes that the opposition and government could find “common ground” as soon as possible. He also suggests that the NDA wants to move directly into a national reconciliation conference as proposed by the Egyptian-Libyan initiative rather than going through a preparatory meeting with government officials to discuss the agenda and logistics of the conference.

Al-Mirghani also welcomes the complete restoration of Egyptian-Sudanese diplomatic relations. He further explains that the NDA did not meet with Sudanese President al-Bashir during the latter’s recent visit to Cairo because “the NDA doesn’t deal with Khartoum, except through the Egyptian-Libyan initiative”.

“Egyptian FM Meets Sudanese Opposition Leader”, News Article by AFP, 28 December 1999

30 December 1999 Sudanese President al-Bashir states that the National Salvation Revolution is still working to present a new civilisational Islamic model and that the government is trying to bring together the highest possible number of political forces to form the base of this programme. He refers to the Peace and Conciliation Committee, stating that it is possible to form a broad-based national front via the endeavoured national comprehensive dialogue conference which would be held either in Cairo, Libya or Khartoum. He expresses the hope that such a front would mark the beginning for re-structuring the state’s institutions.

“Revolution Will Never Relinquish Civilisational Project: President Al-Bashir”, News Article by SUNA, 30 December 1999

31 December 1999 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir in a New Year’s and Independence Day address to the nation promises that political pluralism, reconciliation with the opposition and the end of the civil war will be the government’s New Year’s resolutions. He states:

“[W]e want this year to be a year of reconciliation and peace and a year of agreement, mutual compromise and an end to war and fighting by a free
Sudanese will which would put the country’s unity, security, stability and welfare above all considerations: A country that gives equality to the people without discrimination because of race, sex, creed, social status or economic capacity; a country that upholds justice on the basis of equality of citizenship on which all constitutional rights and duties are based, equality before the law and participation in all public affairs; a country which is guided by peace, reconciliation, consultation and democracy, the peaceful transfer of power and the guarantee of basic freedoms and all human rights laid down by divine faiths and enshrined in international conventions to which Sudan is a party and committed; a country in which there is no bias nor discrimination except in favour of a weak group which we want to support or a less developed region that we want to develop … In our efforts to establish this ideal country, we, hereby, renew our commitment to all peace initiatives and reconciliation efforts which we had accepted, the IGAD initiative and the Egyptian-Libyan initiative…These are sincere efforts and have been coordinated with all friends of the countries of the regions and their leaders in order to reach a political solution …

In order to prepare the atmosphere leading to important development...with the aim of achieving peace and reconciliation, we would continue the measures we started for reconciliation, compromise and confidence building. In this regard, we would implement the following measures:

- Formulate a special programme to establish peace and intensify the social support programme in southern states and all areas affected by the war.

- Strengthen the implementation of the peace agreement in order to achieve unity based on mutual consent and not on coercion and fighting.

President Bashir also stated that the government would re-enact the Political Association Law under the name of the Political Parties and Organisations’ Law, and continue the dialogue with all political forces to unify views on the contents of the law, so as to achieve the largest possible consensus which would be an expression of national unity and political reconciliation.”

“Sudanese Government to Boost Democracy in the New Year”, News Article by DPA, 31 December 1999; “Sudan: President Bashir’s Independence Day Address to Nation”, News Article by Sudan Television, 1 January 2000

2 January 2000

The Sudan government announces that it plans to hold talks with opposition parties. The Ministry of Justice renews its call to all opposition political forces to present proposals to amend some articles of the constitution and lay out a law on parties which meets the demands of all.
Adam Mussa Madibu, a prominent member of the Umma Party, dismisses the governmental re-organisation initiated by President al-Bashir and states that the opposition “rejects participation in the expected new government” calling instead for a national conference to “resolve all of Sudan’s problems”. Sidahmed al-Hussein, a leader of the opposition Democratic Unionist Party, states that the government is still dictatorial and should be toppled.


3 January 2000

At a press conference in Canada Sudanese Minister of Culture and Information Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani reviews recent progress in Sudan, including the constitution of 1998 which “provides for a pluralistic region system, in which all basic freedoms are guaranteed. There is freedom of expression, freedom of association, rule of law and the system of checks and balances in government and parliament … [and] guarantees [of] cultural and religious rights of the different minorities”. He emphasises that “Sincere efforts are now underway to achieve national reconciliation with opposition elements in coordination with some neighbouring countries… the government since it came to power in 1989 has made peace its top priority”.

“Interviews: Canadian Press Conference Call With Dr. Ghazi Salahu-Din; Sudan Minister of Culture and Information and Other Four Top Officials…”, Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Ottawa, Canada, 13 January 2000

4 January 2000

During a visit of the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa and Libyan Foreign Minister Omar al-Muntaser to Khartoum, al-Muntaser declares that the NDA’s “reservations” over the “Libya-Egypt peace initiative” were due to “foreign” influence.


5 January 2000

Save the Children President Charles F. MacCormack adds its voice to those of other relief agencies criticising the Clinton administration’s policy on Sudan as one-sided in its hostility toward the Khartoum government and insufficiently committed to promoting peace in Sudan.

The Washington Post reveals that the aid groups are arguing that Washington’s focus “has blinded it to possible openings to Khartoum, as well as to the manifest faults of the SPLA. They say that the US view has led to decisions like the August 1998 bombing of a Khartoum pharmaceutical plant on what is now widely questioned evidence that it was involved in chemical weapons manufacture. And it has given outsize influence to those who see the long ethnic and territorial war in Sudan, Africa’s largest country in area, as primarily a religious battle between the Islamic north and the Christian south”.


12 January 2000

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army issues an ultimatum to the 39 humanitarian aid agencies active within SPLA-controlled areas of southern Sudan. The SPLA demanded that all these NGOs sign an SPLA-drafted ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ strictly controlling their activities and dictating their relationship with the SPLA’s ‘humanitarian’ wing, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), or leave southern Sudan by 1 March.

The SPLA Memorandum included, amongst other contentious items, demands that SPLA permission had to be sought before any NGO interaction with local communities; SPLA control over the distribution of humanitarian assistance; a requirement to work “in accordance with SRRA objectives” rather than solely humanitarian principles; SPLA control of whom NGOs could employ as local Sudanese staff; the payment of “security fees” and a swath of additional taxes and charges, including charges for the landing of aircraft carrying humanitarian aid and for NGO movement within SPLA-held areas; that the SPLA would be entitled to use NGO transport on certain occasions; and that aid agencies submit their budgets to the SPLA for approval. The SPLA also stipulated that any NGO “assets and supplies” would have to be left to them should there be any “interruption” in the NGO’s work, which the SPLA reserves the right to order. In previous attempts to negotiate aspects of this memorandum with the NGOs, the SPLA had specifically refused a provision that would have discouraged the diversion of aid for military purposes.

The SPLA stated that those NGOs that failed to sign the document by 1 March would cease to be the security responsibility of the SPLA. Those NGOs were also told that their organisations and staff would be considered a “military security problem” and would be “dealt with accordingly”.


17 January 2000

The fifth round of IGAD peace negotiations start in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi.

“Sudan Peace Talks Start in Earnest”. News Article by Reuters, 18 January 2000

19 January 2000

The Arab League’s Assistant Secretary-General for Arab affairs, Ahmad Bin Hali, states after a meeting with the Eritrean Ambassador to Egypt in Cairo, that he has informed Eritrea of the League’s desire to preserve Sudan’s territorial integrity and of the importance of
continuous efforts to achieve peace and national reconciliation in Sudan. He further states that the League believes that the IGAD and Libyan-Egyptian initiatives should be integrated in order to achieve reconciliation in Sudan.

Bin Hali further states that the question of Sudan and its latest developments will be debated during the next meeting of the Arab foreign ministers council of 12 March, with the objective of uniting Arab stances towards the Sudanese question and to assert the Arab stand in backing Sudan against foreign conspiratorial schemes against it.

“Arab League Wants to Maintain Sudan’s Security and Unity”, News Article by ArabicNews, 19 January 2000

19 January 2000 In a goodwill gesture aimed at national reconciliation the Sudanese government announces that it will return to opposition members properties which had earlier been confiscated.

“Sudan to Return Confiscated Properties of Opponents”, News Article by XINHUA, 19 January 2000

20 January 2000 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi states that the United States government is moving in a “positive direction” after “trying to limit” the peace process between Khartoum and the southern rebels. He states that the US “has now come to accept the development of the IGAD and coordination between IGAD and the Egyptian-Libyan initiative”.


20 January 2000 Opposition leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and also Chairman of the National Democratic Alliance, states that he hopes to return from exile in Saudi Arabia to Sudan “very soon”. Following the ousting of Islamist leader Dr Hassan al-Turabi from the Khartoum government the DUP had expressed growing hopes about possible reconciliation with Khartoum.

“Opposition Leader Hopes to Return to Sudan Soon”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 20 January 2000

22 January 2000 The land route between Sudan and Eritrea is officially opened by representatives of the Sudanese and Eritrean governments as part of the improving relations between the two countries.

“Khartoum Says Sudan-Eritrea Land Route Opened”, News Article by Reuters, 22 January 2000

24 January 2000 Following a reported reconciliation between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and followers of the ousted Hassan al-
Turabi, Democratic Unionist Party representative Mohammed Hakern states that the party reserves the right to continue using “military action and a popular rising to overthrow the regime”.

“Opposition Renews Threats to Overthrow Sudan Government”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 January 2000

27 January 2000 The IGAD peace talks between the Sudanese government and the SPLA in Nairobi are reported as deadlocked. SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje states: “There was no breakthrough on the issue (of the separation of religion and the state).” Kwaje states that the SPLA had agreed to exclude two areas of the north – the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile – from the proposed self-determination referendum, but that the war would continue until these areas were also granted greater freedoms.

However, Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, leader of the Sudanese government’s negotiating team, states that the talks were “very dynamic…the most dynamic meeting because the delegations discussed issues in detail”. He added that the SPLA, unlike in the past, were showing flexibility on the subject of the state and religion. The two sides agreed to another round of talks on 21 February.

Mohammed Khaled, “‘Dynamic’ Talks on South Sudan”, Al-Ahran, 27 January-2 February, 2000; “Sudan Peace Talks Adjourned for One Month”, News Article by Reuters, 20 January 2000

31 January 2000 Dr Riek Machar, the former rebel leader who in 1997 had, together with six rebel factions, signed a peace agreement with the Sudan government, becoming the president of the Southern Coordination Council, tenders his resignation to President Omer al-Bashir. Machar accuses the Sudanese government of not honouring the terms of its agreement with the former rebels. He also states that he has resigned from his post as Chairman of the United Democratic Salvation Front party.

“Machar Quits in Setback for Sudan Peace Process”, News Article by DPA, 5 February 2000

31 January 2000 Following the setting up earlier, in November 1999, by the South Sudan Defense Force, the SPLA, and the South Sudan Unity Army, of the Upper Nile Provisional Military Command Council in Waat, central Upper Nile, the South Sudan Liberation Movement is formed. It states that it “was formed and begins its existence in Upper Nile Region to politically mobilise the people, who have been neutralised and removed from the war of liberation since 1991, and commit them to participate effectively in the war of liberation alongside their compatriots in other parts of South Sudan … The SSLM shall pursue two methods of struggle to achieve the right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination: The peaceful resolution of the conflict through a negotiated settlement through the IGAD peace process, and through the armed struggle.”

The Search for Peace in the Sudan: 1989-2001
The Search for Peace in the Sudan: 1989-2001

“Press Announcement: South Sudan Liberation Movement”, Dr Wal Duany, Chairman, Interim Executive Committee, South Sudan Liberation Movement, Waat, Sudan, 31 January 2000

4 February 2000 Norwegian Minister of International Development and Human Rights, Mrs Hilde Frajford, a member of the IGAD peace initiative, states that both sides appear to be prepared to negotiate seriously. She says: “There’s war fatigue on both sides. There’s definitely an understanding that a military solution cannot be found by either side.”

“Norwegian Official Says Sudan Serious About Peace Negotiations”, News Article by Associated Press, 4 February 2000

7 February 2000 The SPLA issues the text of SPLA leader John Garang’s letter of 21 January in reply to Sadiq al-Mahdi’s letter of 22 December. Garang claims that “all evidence points to that your so-called Comprehensive Political Settlement is a euphemism for reconciliation with the NIF regime, and from the position in which you are today ... would be tantamount to surrender”.

“Dr John Garang’s Letter to Mr. Sadiq al-Mahdi”, at Sudanese@list.msu.edu, 7 February 2000

14 February 2000 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir emphasises the depth of the bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan, that consultations on all matters are proceeding, and that disputes between the two states have ended for good.

“El-Bashir Emphases Depth of Relations Between Cairo and Khartoum”, News Article by ArabicNews, 14 February 2000

14 February 2000 The SPLA, in an apparent change of policy, announces that it was ready to consider cooperation with the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. Mansour Khalid, an advisor to SPLA leader John Garang, states: “The position of John Garang is clearly in favour of the Egyptian-Libyan initiative on condition that there is coordination with that of the IGAD.”

However, Khalid, who is also responsible for foreign relations for the umbrella group NDA, also added that: “We are not talking about a national reconciliation conference, but about dialogue between the opposition and the government because there are no other parties”.

“Sudanese Rebel SPLA Warms to Egypt-Libya Peace Initiative”, News Article by Agence France Press, 14 February 2000

14 February 2000 The Sudanese government issues a Press Release via its Embassy in Canada “warmly welcom[ing]” Canada diplomatic presence in
The Sudanese government also expresses its appreciation of Canadian support for the Committee of for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children and emphasised its support for the visit in December 1999 of Canadian envoy John Harker to assess allegations of human rights abuses in Sudan. It reiterated that: “Mr. Harker accomplished his mission in the Sudan without hindrance. He met whomever he wanted to meet and visited every location he wanted to visit.”


16 February 2000 Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy dismisses charges that he was being soft on Sudan after he stated on the previous Monday that he would not impose sanctions on either Sudan or Talisman Energy, the Canadian oil firm involved in Sudan. Axworthy states:

“Frankly I think some [people] have taken their eye off what the real objective is, which is to bring an end to the conflict and an end to the human rights abuses…That’s what we’re interested in doing, not punishing one person or another … it’s much more important to maintain a presence in Sudan rather than pull people out…When we go to the Security Council we’ll have an opportunity to get further into the peace process and we may want to provide support for enhancing that process and supporting the solution to the conflict…The question isn’t Talisman’s role – the question is how do you get peace in a conflict which has gone on for decades in Sudan, how do you get proper attention paid to human rights abuses?”

“Beleaguered Axworthy Vows to Push for Sudan Peace”, News Article by Reuters, 16 February 2000

16 February 2000 Sudanese first Vice-President Ali Osman Taha states that the question of separating religion from the state can be debated without provoking the division of Sudan. He says: “We know the issue of separating religion from the state will not be a reason for dividing us…We can discuss this question and reach a solution.” He also states that Sudan is heading toward a democratic multiparty system and political freedoms – a process which was not due to “foreign pressures” but were rather “a part of a devolution” of the current government. He affirms that: “The government’s drive for peace and national reconciliation is not a manoeuvre.”

Opposition spokesmen for the Democratic Unionist Party, the National Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (NARD) and the Union of the Sudanese African
Parties all welcome his remarks as “a new pragmatic and realistic attitude”. DUP official Taj al-Sirr Mohammed Salih states that the remarks help build confidence between the opposition and the government while paving the way for a peace conference. He says: “It is a boost to the camp that believes that there is room to all citizens in a Sudan that is free of a single party’s hegemony and fanaticism … Every person has his own party and belief but we should get together as Sudanese to agree on the country’s supreme interests, through dialogue, rather than coercion.”

NARD Chairman Ghazi Suleiman said the statement is in line with the policies of the European Union and the IGAD Partners Forum. He adds: “It heralds the achievement of peace in Sudan in the coming months.”


18 February 2000 The Sudanese government decides to amend its controversial political associations law to allow for political parties to be registered more easily. A meeting of the peace-and-reconciliation ministerial committee chaired by President Omer al-Bashir approves amendments making it easier to set up new political parties. The old law is to be rescinded, except for two articles calling for abstention from violence in politics and stipulating that a party’s finances be from domestic resources and subject to audit.

“Sudan to Amend Law on Creating Political Parties”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 18 February 2000

18 February 2000 SPLA/M spokesman Dr Samson Kwaje states that “the issue of separation of religion and state has been the main point of deadlock [in peace negotiations], but we will try to resolve it when the political committee talks [of IGAD] resume on Monday”.

“Deadlocked Sudan Peace Talks to Resume Monday”, News Article by Agence France Press, 18 February 2000

18 February 2000 US Department of State Deputy Spokesman James B. Foley comments on the SPLA’s ultimatum to expel relief organisations in areas under its control that do not sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with it. He states:

“The US Special Envoy for Sudan Harry Johnston, along with the UN Special Envoy for Humanitarian Issues in Sudan Ambassador Tom Vraalsen, met with the SPLM leadership in Nairobi, Kenya, on February 17 to offer direct US and other donor assistance to facilitate resolution of the outstanding points of the disagreement, to request a suspension of the deadline while negotiations are
ongoing, and to request that no NGO be expelled. They also met with NGOs and urged them to be flexible in the event that negotiations resume.

The United States Government is willing to work with other donors, the NGOs, and the SPLM to facilitate achievement of an agreement acceptable to all parties. The United States believes that a quick resolution of the MOU issue is desirable, but one that is negotiated in good faith by all parties. Any expulsion of NGOs, or confiscation of assets, would seriously jeopardise humanitarian operations, exacerbating further the human suffering in southern Sudan.


19 February 2000

It is announced that Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail is to visit Egypt to discuss the results of Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir’s tour of the Gulf states and of Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa’s talks with Sudanese opposition leaders.

“Sudan Minister to Visit Egypt, Discuss Civil War”, News Article by Reuters, 19 February 2000

20 February 2000

Former Sudanese opposition figure Gamar Hassan al-Tahir resigns from the opposition and returns home. He states that many others in the opposition were calling for a reconsideration of its positions and decisions, specially those that were hampering the peace progress. Many splits and disagreements were emerging in opposition ranks, he argues. He concludes his statement by calling on the Khartoum government to speed up its efforts to normalise Sudanese relations with neighbouring countries and to encourage the opposition to return home.

“Defector From Opposition Side Explains Reasons Behind is Return to the Homeland”, News Article by SUNA, 20 February 2000

21 February 2000

The IGAD peace negotiations resume in Nairobi. In a statement the rebel SPLA declare that alleged daily bombardment of many areas of the rebel-held south did not create “a conducive atmosphere for the talks” SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje also states that the talks will focus on two issues – separation of religion and state and the right of self-determination for the south.

“Focus – Sudan Peace Talks Resume Amidst Mistrust”, News Article by Reuters, 21 February 2000

21 February 2000

Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi states that contacts are being conducted by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to hold a four-day meeting in Cairo of Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, NDA leader Muhammad Osman al-Mirghani, SPLA leader John Garang, and the Umma Party leader. He declares that the anticipated meeting would be held with the
participation of Egypt and Libya to prepare for a dialogue conference, improve the atmosphere, and help the expanded forthcoming conference which will discuss all the outstanding issues to attain its goal. He further states that the Sudanese government is seeking a comprehensive solution to the crisis and describes Garang and the SPLA position toward the Egyptian-Libyan dialogue as vague. He urges Garang to take a clear-cut, frank position and declare that he would support peace.

Mahdi also says that Garang had been accused of using the war as a profitable industry and that Garang had returned from his visit to the USA in July of last year more determined to reject the Egyptian-Libyan initiative and willing to kill it due to temptations and promises made to him in Washington.

“Umma Party Leader Says Egypt to Host Meeting of Parties to Sudanese ‘Crisis’”, Al-Arabal-Yawm (Amman), 21 February 2000, p. 1

21 February 2000 In a response to Sudanese first Vice-President Ali Osman Taha’s statement that the government was willing to discuss the issue of the separation of religion from the state, Sudanese Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi brands the idea as “atheism”.

“Turabi Insists Islam, Sudan State Bonded, Before Peace Talks”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 February 2000

22 February 2000 Sudanese Vice-President General George Kongor affirms the government’s keenness to set up basic infrastructures and to provide stability and peace in the southern states. He also calls for accelerating the implementation of the emergency plan for the south, and the provision of the necessary financing.

“Vice President Affirms Government Keenness to Set Up Infrastructural Projects in the south”, News Article by SUNA, 22 February 2000

23 February 2000 Sudanese Minister of State for Justice Amin Benani Nio announces that the 1998 Political Associations Law has “officially been cancelled and will be substituted by the Political Parties and Associations Law” which is “characterised by flexibility” and “gives the political forces more freedom for practising their political activities”. The new law, he adds:

“[I]s fully in line with the requirements of the reconciliation and the Egyptian-Libyan [peace] bid…This step as well as previous and following ones underscores the government’s willingness to pave the way for dialogue.”

“Sudan to Ease Restrictions on Political Parties With New Law”, News Article by Agence France Press, 23 February 2000
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23 February 2000  Tom Vraalsen, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan sends an official letter to concerned NGOs and governments regarding his meeting with SPLA leader John Garang about the SPLA’s attempt to impose their Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) upon humanitarian organisations. He writes:

“Much to our disappointment, the meeting with the SPLM leadership did not result in a lifting of the deadline or a revision of any aspects of the MOU...It is therefore my duty to inform you that the deadline imposed by the SRRA for NGOs to sign the 19th August version of the MOU remains in force. We have been notified by the SRRA that personnel of NGOs that do not sign must evacuate the SPLM-held areas by the 29th of February. I regret very much this turn of events...The United Nations will undertake the evacuation of NGO personnel from locations in the field and will support NGOs who wish to establish programmes in areas outside of SPLM territory. OLS will continue to support the membership of expelled NGOs in the OLS Consortium and advocate the right of the people of southern Sudan to receive humanitarian assistance”.


23 February 2000  All the NGOs in the OLS consortium, including those who did sign the Memorandum, declared in a joint statement to the SRRA that “the decision to sign or not sign is made under duress, with grave implications for continuing humanitarian support to the people of south Sudan”.


26 February 2000  Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail holds talks with Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak to further the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative. Ismail declares: “[President al-Bashir] affirmed to President Mubarak the position of the Sudanese government in support of holding the conference...The Sudanese government has no pre-conditions on the time or the place or the subjects that will be discussed”.

Ismail further states that Egypt was trying to dispel the reservations of SPLA leader John Garang on the Egyptian-Libyan initiative: “Egypt is making efforts with Garang and I think Egypt has succeeded in dissipating Garang’s doubts”.

“Sudan Says Ready for Peace Conference”, News Article by Reuters, 26 February 2000

28 February 2000  Disagreement over what constitutes southern Sudan derails the latest round of IGAD peace talks. Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, the peace adviser to Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, states:
The parties jointly affirmed the right of self-determination of the people of south Sudan, as of the borders of 1 January 1956. However, the SPLM/A contended that the right of self-determination shall be extended to include also Abyei are in the northern state of Western Kordofan and two northern states of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile. The government of Sudan had flatly rejected the contention as being totally irrelevant once it had been established by the parties that those territories are not part of southern Sudan.°

The SPLA issues a press statement accusing Dr Nafie of “wrecking the talks”, asserting vehemently that “the territory and people of Abyei are part and parcel of Bahr El Ghazal Region of Southern Sudan”, and stating that “The positions of the two parties in regards to constitutional separation of state and religion have remained irreconcilable”.


29 February 2000 The European Commission issues a statement on humanitarian assistance to southern Sudan which states that: “The European Commission condemns the explicit threat made by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to the safety of humanitarian agencies who do not sign the Memorandum of Understanding between NGOs and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) before March 1st. Such a threat is completely unacceptable and the Commission calls for this ultimatum to be lifted. The Commission considers the ability of humanitarian agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance in a neutral, independent and secure framework as being of utmost importance...However, the forced evacuation of non-signatory NGOs under threat to their lives from SPLA areas is considered as a serious breach of international humanitarian law which jeopardises the delivery of assistance in line with internationally recognised principles. The responsibility for this situation must rest with the SPLA.”

“European Commission Statement on Southern Sudan”, 29 February 2000

1 March 2000 Eleven international humanitarian aid agencies felt themselves unable to remain active in southern Sudan under the conditions demanded of them by the SPLA. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) confirmed that 149 staff members of non-governmental organisations working under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan had been evacuated from areas of southern Sudan controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The eleven non-governmental organisations in question, groups such as CARE, Oxfam, Medecins sans Frontieres, Medecins du Monde, Save the Children, World
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Vision International, Healthnet, Veterinaires sans Frontieres (Belgium and Germany), and the Carter Center, handled about 75 percent of the humanitarian aid entering southern Sudan. The withdrawal of these NGOs directly affects US$ 40 million worth of aid programs. The expelled aid agencies stated that one million southern Sudanese were at risk as a result of the SPLA’s decision to expel the NGOs.


1 March 2000    Commenting on the SPLA’s expulsion of humanitarian NGOs from southern Sudan, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that it: “[R]epresents the temporary loss of a significant proportion of the humanitarian resources provided by OLS NGOs. This has created a void in the OLS consortium’s ability to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to the people of southern Sudan, already made vulnerable by decades of war and deprivation...Emergency response, health, nutrition, household food security, and water and sanitation programmes will be hardest hit.”


1 March 2000    Umma Party President Sadiq al-Mahdi, in a long public letter to SPLA leader John Garang, responds to Garang’s recent communications and statements about the Umma Party and its negotiations with the government of Sudan.

Al-Mahdi accuses Garang of “attempt[ing] to demonise the Umma Party” and of having “provided...an agenda of false accusations and disinformation, which are easily and authentically refutable”. He also points to the “great embarrassment” caused by the SPLA’s repeated brutal human rights abuses, condemned by many external observers and UN resolutions, and to Garang’s “disregard and despis[ing] [of] the voters and peoples’ will” – evidence that makes a joke of his professions to seek a “New Sudan”. Al-Mahdi further points to Garang’s refusal to accommodate himself to the “new realities” emerging in Sudan and in changes of political agenda by the Sudanese government – and instead of targeting the Umma a Party more than the Sudanese government itself. He further argues that Garang is “treating the IGAD encounters as a public relations forum to declare [his] war aims and is taking a hypocritical position over issues of religion in Sudanese politics. Whilst publicly declaring for a total separation of church and state Garang in actuality speaks of the New Sudan Council of Churches as “the spiritual wing of [his] movement”.

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Al-Mahdi concludes by appealing to Garang to accommodate himself to a “Comprehensive Political Agreement to end the war, make Peace, build Democracy” – at a time when: “The opportunity for this win-win position for the cause of our peoples is so huge”.

Sadiq Al Mahdi, “Letter to Dr. John Garang, Chairman SPLM, Commander-in-Chief SPLA”, 1 March 2000

2 March 2000 The Sudanese government warns the opposition that it will organise general elections without opposition participation if the opposition does not respond soon to government reconciliation initiatives. Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail accuses the opposition of “procrastination and evasion”, and states that: “The government will not remain patient forever and will only await the outcome of a forthcoming meeting of the opposition in Asmara”.

He further states that if the NDA fails to respond to the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative “the government will not wait any longer and will go ahead in conducting free and fair elections...[the government] prefers reaching agreement through a dialogue forum [with the opposition] so that all parties will participate in the peace process...The ball is now in the court of the opposition”.


2 March 2000 Sudanese Justice Minister Ali Mohammed Osman Yassin states that: “The Egyptian support for Sudan has reflected on improving its relations with the neighbour countries and the Arab ones, and Egypt seeks to reform Sudan’s relations with the USA.”

“Sudanese Justice Minister: Egyptian Support Contributed to Improving Our Relations With Neighbours”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 2 March 2000

3 March 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail warns the Sudanese opposition against deception towards the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He states that the Sudanese government has responded to all requests proposed by the opposition in the hope of convening a pan-Sudanese conference for a comprehensive dialogue.

“Khartoum Calls on Opposition to Define its Position Toward National Reconciliation”, News Article by ArabicNews.Com, 3 March 2000

4 March 2000 Sudanese opposition Democratic Unionist Party leaders at a meeting at Al Masoudiyah near Khartoum rule out any cooperation
with the current Sudanese government. DUP deputy Secretary-General Sidahmed al-Hussein states that: “We will never reconcile with the NIF government which has ruined the country”, whilst senior DUP member Ali Mahmoud Hassanain declares that; “We will not be satisfied with amendments to laws the government has enacted … We will never recognise the NIF laws and constitution”.

“Sudanese Opposition Rules Out Any Deals With Islamist Regime”, News Article by Agence France Press, 4 March 2000

**7 March 2000**

Officials of the Sudanese opposition umbrella group, the National Democratic Alliance, arrive in Asmara to attend a leadership meeting. SPLA leader John Garang is expected to attend.

“Sudanese Opposition Leaders in Asmara for Leadership Council Meeting”, News Article by Agence France Press, 7 March 2000

**8 March 2000**

Mohammed al-Hassan Abdalla Yassin, a leader of the opposition Democratic Unionist Party returns to Khartoum in “response to the call for accord” made by the government. He is greeted at Khartoum Airport by Justice Minister Ali Mohammed Osman Yassin and presidential adviser Abdel Basit Sabdrat.

“Former Members of Sudan Presidency Returns Home”, News Article by Reuters, 8 March 2000

**8 March 2000**

Mansour Khalid, political adviser to SPLA leader John Garang, states that he has officially informed IGAD’s envoy ambassador Mboya of demands to add Democratic National Alliance to the IGAD negotiation team. Khalid also states that Sudanese government proposal for changing laws do not achieve an adequate atmosphere to start any talks with the government.

“Garang’s Advisor: We Demand Joining the National Assembly to the Negotiation Team”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 8 March 2000

**10 March 2000**

The opposition umbrella group the National Democratic Alliance holds a meeting of representatives in Asmara, Eritrea. Discussions centre largely on the peace overtures made by the Sudanese government and the significance of the split between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi.

Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, reiterates his view that the time is right for national reconciliation talks between the government and opposition forces and to embrace the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.
SPLA leader John Garang rejects calls for negotiations via the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and calls for a thorough shake-up of the opposition alliance, as its current organisation was paralysing its decision-making structure. Garang further claims that political trends in the Sudanese government will not lead to more democracy as many believed but would fuel conflict as “as each faction tries to prove it is more committed to an Islamic state.”

Garang states that the “NDA must…intensify the struggle in all its forms and at all levels” and claims that the Sudanese government is “more belligerent and intransigent”, and that “unless military pressure is stepped up and sustained by the NDA, Khartoum will not accept the inevitability of political change in the direction of justice”. Garang further argues that “the option of a negotiated peaceful settlement should … be seen in its proper context, and not in isolation from the other forms of struggle” specifically “Intifada [Popular Uprising]” and “the armed struggle”. He calls for the NDA to pledge “financial resources to support the forces of [armed uprising]”. He also states that “if some of us cave in to pressure from Khartoum to be co-opted into the regime, then they must be dismissed from the NDA”.


11 March 2000 A committee of the Sudanese cabinet approves the new Bill replacing the old Political Associations law, and allowing opposition parties to operate in Sudan. Information Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that: “The new law is aimed at allowing all political parties to practise their political activities in public and peacefully.”


14 March 2000 At the NDA meeting at Asmara Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi “[called] on the NDA to take note of the changes in Khartoum and move towards reconciling with the regime so they can work within the process for democracy”. Other NDA members were reportedly angry, with one stating that: “They will fight. People were angry. They were cocking their guns to fire at Sadiq al-Mahdi”.

Pagan Amum, one of the SPLA commanders states: “There is divergence. Two trends have cropped up. One side, led by Umma [Party], is arguing that the recent developments in Sudan are an opportunity to reconcile with factions within the NIF…The rest of the NDA sees the crisis within the NIF as a challenge to step up the struggle to oust the NIF.”
SPLA leader John Garang states that he believes that the NDA will agree to his proposed organisational shake-up. He reaffirms his view that: “It is time to increase he pressure on [the Sudanese government]…It is a totalitarian system and it can only be removed through pressure … The NIF is undemocratic by nature. It cannot possibly reform or be removed.”

Garang also argues that the IGAD and Egyptian-Libyan peace negotiations should be “coordinate[d]…amalgamated so we only have one track for negotiations”.


15 March 2000 Egypt’s new Ambassador in Khartoum, Mohammed Asim Ibrahim, states that Egypt objects to the call for self-determination of southern Sudan, which could lead to Sudan’s disintegration. “Sudan is our shield, and we are not involved in any internal conflicts in Sudan”, he added.

“Egypt to Keep Policy of Supporting Unity of Sudan”, News Article by XINHUA, 15 March 2000

16 March 2000 Following the introduction of a motion at the NDA Asmara meeting to suspend its membership the Umma Party resigns from the organisation. Omar Nour al-Diem, the Umma Party’s Secretary-General states: “The Umma Party quit because we thought these people were not serious…The others are against Umma because Umma is for political settlement. The NDA is doing nothing, they are unaware of the changes in the region and they are not for negotiations…Umma suspended its membership because it feels now is the time to go inside and cooperate with the government in Khartoum.”

An NDA spokesman states that: “We can now vigorously pursue forcing fundamental changes in our country and use all means at our disposal, including negotiated settlements, armed struggle, popular uprising and diplomatic pressure. We are now more energetic and less compromising for divisions in power.”

“Sudan’s Influential Umma Party Quits Opposition’, News Article by Agence France Press, 16 March 2000

16 March 2000 The NDA’s founding Secretary-General, Mubarak al-Mahdi resigns his position and issues a press release in which he attacks:

“The [pursuit] of personal ambition and party agenda on part of some members in contradiction to the NDA collective interest and the national interest … The
inaptitude of the NDA chairman and his strife to monopolise the political and executive work of the NDA in violation of his mandate … the complete paralysis of the NDA work … The failure of the leadership council to agree on a political settlement to the conflict in the Sudan and the failure of the NDA leadership council to address the new political development and employ them in the struggle to achieve the national goals … The failure of the NDA to honour its commitment toward the joint Libyan-Egyptian initiative … The refusal to convene the second NDA congress by the chairman for the last four years to avoid accountability and restructuring of the NDA.”


17 March 2000 Sudanese Culture and Information Minister Dr Ghazi Salehedin Atabani describes the departure of the Umma Party from the NDA as an “important development which is hoped to push forward the national dialogue endeavours rather than hindering them”. He also predicts that the SPLA “planned to subjugate the [other NDA] factions to its will and use them for its purposes, a matter which made it inevitable for those who wanted to retain their credibility to break away from the National Alliance”.


17 March 2000 SPLA and other opposition forces seize the eastern town of Hamoshkorib, near the Eritrean border

20 March 2000 SPLA leader John Garang states that: “The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the political wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army will immediately begin political activities in the public sphere in Khartoum, whether the government agrees or not.” He describes the move as “a new method of political action, following the example set by the Palestinian movement Hamas and Sin Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army … We are a patriotic Sudanese movement, that is why we have the right to have political activity in our capital, like Hamas and Sinn Fein”.

“Sudanese Rebel Group to Enter Khartoum Politics”, News Article by Agence France Press, 20 March 2000

20 March 2000 Sudanese Interior Minister General Abdel-Rahim Hussein states that the government welcomes the Umma Party’s departure from the NDA. “We consider it a positive move”, he says, but denies that any secret agreement between the government and the Umma Party had been made. Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail states that: “The ceasefire declaration by the Umma Party is a positive step that comes in line with the principles and attitudes that ultimately lead to a peaceful solution to the Sudan problems.”
SPLA leader John Garang accuses the Umma Party of betraying rebel military positions to the Government of Sudan.

Al-Mahdi also responds to SPLA leader John Garang’ s claims that the Umma Party was cooperating with Sudanese government military attacks upon the opposition. He declares:

“This is a very unfortunate statement, but it falls within Garang’s characteristic attitudes of crying wolf, wolf and sustaining a position of negativism and intransigence…His accusations are calculated to fan flames to keep tempers high in order to find continuous support for his intransigence. His irresponsible statement could fan fuels and between troops lead to loss of innocent blood…Garang’s statement to fan fires between ourselves and (NDA-EX) parties is a poorly conceived piece of misinformation.”

Al-Mahdi further protests Garang’s public statement that he would finance NDA internal efforts to foment an uprising within Sudan. He sees it as a “direct incrimination for them given freely to the [Sudanese] security authorities…again his unfounded statement could lead to blood shed between combatants. If so, who benefits from that?” Al-Mahdi concludes with a further plea for renewed peace efforts: “The situation in Sudan is ripe for change, I appeal to our IGAD neighbours, our joint initiative neighbours to move to create new realities beneficial to the peoples of Sudan.”

21 March 2000  Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail responds to SPLA leader John Garang’s statement that the SPLA intended to operate politically within Sudan, stating that Garang could not enjoy this right of political freedom whilst still fighting. He declares: “Garang cannot pursue violence and peaceful means at the same time… [Garang] has to choose between war which he is now pursuing and peace which we are pursuing as a way for the stability of Sudan.”


22 March 2000  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi visits Libya to discuss the peace process with the Libyan government.

“Kaddafi Hosts Sudanese Opposition Party Chairman”, News Article by Pan Arab News Agency, 22 March 2000

23 March 2000  The Umma Party states that it does not seek a bilateral or partial solution with the Sudanese government but only a collective discussion conference through the Egyptian-Libyan initiative convened with the participation of all effective political forces in Sudan, including the southern rebels.

“Umma Party Leadership Heads to Khartoum”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 23 March 2000

23 March 2000  The European Commission approves the 2000 Global Plan for Sudan, which earmarks 11 million Euros for humanitarian aid in Sudan over the next nine months. However, it makes clear that the projects destined for rebel-held areas “can only be carried out once the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance as required by international humanitarian principles are fulfilled”, that is, the withdrawal of the SPLA’s expulsion of NGOs which refused to sign its ‘Memorandum of Understanding’. The Commission reaffirms its earlier demands that “the SPLM/SRRA to resume negotiations with the objective of creating conditions that will allow NGOs to carry out humanitarian operations unhindered and in accordance with international humanitarian law”.


23 March 2000  Cairo-based Umma Party spokesman Hassan Ahmed al-Hassan states that: “The Umma Party will not seek a bilateral or partial solution with the [Sudanese] government.” He also states that Party might form a “democratic front for peace” with non-government groups and southern
parties, which “will seek a comprehensive political settlement and will be pen for all parties”.

Hassan adds that Umma Party militia forces have announced a unilateral cease-fire, and that some Umma politicians – but not party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi – would return to Khartoum in the next few weeks to resume political work.


25 March 2000

Mubarak al Fadel al-Mahdi, the former Secretary-General of the NDA, states that certain elements within NDA “are obviously and clearly against any peaceful settlement for the conflict in the country”. Another senior aide to al-Mahdi says that “Colonel John Garang believes in the bullet and his SPLA is carrying the gun”.

The PANA also reports rumours that Garang and the SPLA “is preparing, with the help of Uganda, for an offensive in southern Sudan”.

25 March 2000

It is reported that Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi is having discussions with other rebel leaders including ex-communist Al Haji Warraq, a member of the dissident faction of the Sudanese Communist Party, and Nuer leader Riek Machar, and Bona Malwal, a Dinka leader who has been living in exile in Great Britain since 1989.

26 March 2000

A five-member team from IGAD, led by Ambassador Daniel Mboya, Kenyan President Arap Moi’s special envoy to Sudan, arrive in Khartoum to continue peace talks. “The visit comes within the context of the resumption of the peace talks between the government and the rebel SPLA which are expected to start in early April in Nairobi”, a spokesman states.

27 March 2000

Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi confers with Libyan leader Colonel Kadhafi regarding the Sudanese peace process. He predicts an imminent political solution to Sudan’s problems, which can come not from southern self-determination but a political solution that takes into account cultural diversity. Al-Mahdi states that: “Those who want or talk about self-determination are actually venting their dissatisfaction with the current political situation... Sudan is one single entity from North to South...Today more than ever we believe in a political settlement to the crisis...Sudan is a microcosm of Africa where all the Arab-African diversity of the continent can be found...A political solution to the Sudanese crisis should take into account
the cultural diversity of the country, where people with different beliefs, religions, customs and cultures, live together…To my mind, there should be peaceful co-existence among the cultures and religions of Sudan in order for the crisis to be solved…The political solution projected is actually one that recognises cultural diversity in Sudan, removes all causes of civil war and introduces democratic changes in the country.”

Al-Mahdi also hints that the Sudanese government and most leaders in the Sudanese opposition were now favourable to such a political solution, which could be negotiated within the framework of the joint Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative – which “initiative is the only one open to us”.


28 March 2000 The Council of the Arab League, meeting in Cairo, issues a resolution on Sudan. The League’s Council:

Voices its objection to any attempt to break up Sudan;

Denounces any attempt to encourage separatist trends by extending material and military aid to the rebels or by imposing no-fly zones;

Denounces the US imposition of economic sanctions upon Sudan or on companies investing in the development of Sudan’s national resources;

Expresses its appreciation of the Sudanese government’s successful efforts to resolve its foreign relations;

Commends the progress made in Sudanese-European dialogue;

Commends the normalising of Sudan’s relations with international financial organisations;

Calls upon countries and international organisations to cease circulating false accusations against Sudan and other Arab countries;

Calls upon other countries to refrain from attempting to internationalise the Sudanese issue by referring it to the UN Security Council;

Calls upon Arab countries to extend more aid and support to Sudan;

Reiterates its support for the peace process in Sudan;

Calls for regional efforts to realise peace in Sudan to be given a chance;
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Supports the efforts of the Sudanese government to achieve national accord;

Supports the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative;

“Arab League Reiterates Its Support to Sudan”, News Article by SUNA, 29 March 2000

29 March 2000  NDA and Democratic Unionist Party spokesman Mohammed al-Moetasern declares its support for the joint Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and co-ordination between it and the IGAD initiative.


29 March 2000  The Sudanese government delegation, led by Presidential adviser for peace affairs Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, leaves for a new round of IGAD peace talks in Nairobi scheduled for 3-7 April.


29 March 2000  The Umma Party is given back its Omdurman head offices (originally confiscated in the 1989 coup d’etat) by Sudanese government officials in a public ceremony. Siddiq al-Mahdi (son of Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi) states that his party would “immediately resume political activities”, and that a number of other senior Umma Party officials would return to Sudan in the coming week.


30 March 2000  The New Sudan Council of Churches announces that the previously postponed Nilotic People-to-People Conference has been re-scheduled for 8-14 May, a peace initiative approved of by the SPLA.

Dr Harun L. Runn, Executive Secretary, New Sudan Council of Churches, “Postponement of Nilotic People to People Conference”, email announcement posted to Sudanese@list.msu.edu, 30 March 2000

2 April 2000  In the SPLA’s opening statement at the IGAD peace negotiations in Nairobi Colonel Nhial Deng, leader of the SPLA/SPLM delegation states that: “We…doubt the commitment of the government of Sudan to the peace process and the seriousness of its commitment to resolve the conflict.”

He further accuses the Sudanese government of attempting to “rewrite history and distort facts” with regard to the SPLA’s demand that Abyei territory be
defined as part of the south. He also accuses the Government of lying by allegedly claiming that a breakthrough had taken place over the issue of religion and the state, protests at alleged government “routine bombing of civilian targets all over Southern Sudan”, and calls upon the “international community particularly the United Nations Security Council to declare the New Sudan a No-fly zone for [Government] aircraft”.

Colonel Nhial Deng Nhial, Chairman of SPLM/SPLA Delegation, “SPLM/SPLA Opening Statement – Third Political Committee Meeting on Peace in the Sudan”, posted to Sudan-L@listserv.cc.emory.edu, 3 April 2000

2 April 2000 Following lengthy talks with Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir in Cairo, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi expresses his hope that peace negotiations would go ahead and reach an acceptable conclusion. Al-Bashir expresses his confidence in President Moi’s leadership of the IGAD peace initiate and both Presidents agreed that other parallel initiatives or forms of external interference in the peace process were unhelpful.

“Kenya Hopes to Push Forward Peace Negotiations in Sudan”, News Article by XINHUA, 3 April 2000

2 April 2000 The IGAD peace negotiations continue in Nairobi. However, the SPLA intensifies fighting in eastern areas of Sudan, including its own attack on the strategic Kassala Airport. The SPLA claims to have destroyed ammunition and fuel depots and an Antonov bomber used for troop movements, and to have seized smaller garrison towns in the area. The SPLA also claims that government forces “are getting ready to attack our position”.

“Sudan Government, Rebels in New Round of Talks”, News Article by Reuters, 3 April 2000

2 April 2000 Sudanese President al-Bashir meets in Cairo with former Sudanese head-of-state Ahmed al-Mirgani, currently with the opposition, and states that the meeting “concentrated on uniting the Sudanese people and ending internal disagreements”. The meeting was initiated by al-Mirghani, who issues a statement describing the meeting as cordial and fruitful. Al-Mirghani further calls upon the opposition to halt military action and calls for a peaceful dialogue to end the conflict.

“Egypt, Libya Meet to Discuss Sudan’s Civil War”, News Article by Associated Press, 4 April 2000; “President Al-Bashir Meets Ahmed Al-Mirghani in Cairo”, News Article by SUNA, 4 April 2000; “Sudan’s al-Bashir Calls for Peaceful Solution”, News Article by Reuters, 4 April 2000

2 April 2000 During a joint summit in Cairo of 14 European Union members and 52 African countries, the leaders of Egypt, Libya and Sudan meet to discuss ways of ending Sudan’s civil war. Kenyan Foreign
Minister Boyane Godana rebuffed Egyptian and Libyan attempts to meet with him and IGAD officials.

“Egypt, Libya Meet to Discuss Sudan’s civil War”, News Article by Associated Press, 4 April 2000

4 April 2000 

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail affirms that Sudan will push forward all efforts that would contribute to achieving rapport and a peaceful solution, whether they are by the Umma Party or any other faction. He also states that he does not exclude the possibility of forming a transitional government with the Umma Party in order push forward efforts for a peaceful exchange of power.


4 April 2000 

The Umma Party announces that a high level delegation, including Mubarak al-Fadel al-Mahdi (the party’s number two) and Abdel Rassul Nur (a member of its political bureau) and Secretary-General Omar Nur al-Diem, will be flying to Khartoum, this week.

“High-Level Sudanese Opposition Delegation Bound for Khartoum”, News Article by Agence France Press, 4 April 2000

5 April 2000 

Following his talks with the Egyptian and Libyan leaders Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir declares that: “We agreed to accelerate the reconciliation process and stated our commitment to the Egyptian-Libyan initiative and our will to settle all Sudan’s problem’s through this initiative…We were agreed completely on the need to complete efforts at reconciliation in Sudan.”

“Sudan Raises Hope of Increased Reconciliation Efforts”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 5 April 2000

6 April 2000 

Thousands of Umma Party supporters welcome returning party leaders and members – headed by Umma Party Secretary General Omar Nour al-Diem – at Khartoum Airport. Presidential Adviser Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, and several members of the ruling National Congress Party, headed by Dr Ali al-Haj Mohammed, deputy Secretary-General of the party, formally welcome them.

Umma Party Secretary-General al-Diem states that “we have come to bring peace and achieve democracy”, whilst Professor Omer declares that the government was serious about achieving national accord in Sudan.

“Umma Party Members Return to Sudan from Exile”, News Article by Reuters, 6 April 2000
7 April 2000
Sudanese delegation leader Dr Nafie Ali Nafie announces that the current round of IGAD peace negotiations in Nairobi have ended with no agreement on the two key issues discussed. He states that the SPLA had insisted on making Sudan a confederation of the northern and southern sections – a position unacceptable to the government because it amounted to the breaking up of the country. He states: “They wanted us to discuss coordination between two separate entities.”

“No Agreement at a New Round of Sudan Peace Talks”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 April 2000

7 April 2000
In a press conference in Cairo Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, criticised the NDA coordination committee, denounces the NDA attacks in east Sudan, and claims that the SPLA is working to “freeze” the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.


7 April 2000
The NDA alleges that 162 government troops were killed when they launched an attack on opposition forces south of the eastern town of Kassala, and that two captives, including a captain, had been taken.


8 April 2000
The Director of the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, Osman Jaafar, states that some 160,000 persons have been displaced in the ongoing war in Kassala state in eastern Sudan.

“160,000 Persons Displaced by Civil War in Eastern Sudan”, News Article by DPA, 8 April 2001

9 April 2000
Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi in a speech in Cairo denounces SPLA leader John Garang’s call for Security Council intervention in Sudan. He further criticises the NDA for failing to recognise the internal, regional and international changes which have taken place with regard to Sudan. He notes that the international community has changed its previously hostile attitude toward Sudan and that the problem is now Garang and the SPLA and its “hidden agenda”.

“Sadiq Al-Mahdi/Garang’s Movement”, News Article by SUNA, 9 April 2000

9 April 2000
Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi issues a press release following his meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. He reaffirms the importance of a general conference on the future of Sudan, and states that the Umma party will play a significant role in the Egyptian-Libyan peace process by making contacts with all the involved parties. He further
states that he believes that the US government is reviewing its Sudan policy in the light of the latest developments

“Mahdi Asserts Importance of Egyptian-Libyan Efforts to Settle Situation in Sudan”, News Article by SUNA, 9 April 2000

**10 April 2000**

The Sudanese Cabinet approves a draft bill to combat terrorist activities, which stipulates that those convicted of terrorist crimes will be punished by death, amputation or life imprisonment.

“Sudanese Government Approves New Law to Combat Terrorism”, News Article by Associated Press, 10 April 2000

**11 April 2000**

The NDA states that it is committed to both the Egyptian-Libyan and IGAD peace initiatives – and launches a vitriolic attack on the government of Sudan, which it claims does not take peace initiatives seriously. It further states:

“The National Islamic Front regime…is insincere in recognising…multiparty democracy…refuses to dismantle the religious state, seeks to fan the flames of the war and objects to a just peace…[is] still beating the drums of war under the Jihad (holy war) banner and sending students and civil servants to the military operations zones…[and has not abandoned laws under which] practices of arrest, summons, torture and closure of newspapers are still going on.”

“Khartoum Still War-Mongering and Insincere Towards Peace: Opposition”, News Article by Agence France Press, 11 April 2000

**12 April 2000**

The Sudanese government re-confiscates the property of a number of opposition figures, Mansour Khalid (adviser to SPLA leader John Garang), Abdel Rahama Said (a northern military commander), and Nemat Medani Abbashar (wife of NDA supporter Farouq Abu Issa) because of their “backing the attacks on the land and … supporting the rebel movement in an attack on the innocent in the east”.


**14 April 2000**

The Umma Party announces that it has started measures in Sudan to establish a new political bureau composed of 50 elected members to lead the party’s work in the coming period.

“Sudanese Opposition Party to Elect Its Political Bureau Members”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 13 April 2000
13 April 2000
Southern Sudanese politicians postpone a conference, organised by Joseph Okelo of the Union of Sudanese African Parties, originally scheduled for April 24 in Geneva, to discuss whether the south should secede. The postponement is reportedly made in order to allow more time to attract broader participation by politicians both in Sudan and abroad. Okelo states that, although he was not personally in favour of secession, northerners must demonstrate before any referendum that they really want to share the same nation with the southerners.

“South Sudanese Postpone Conference on Self-Determination”, News Article by Agence France Press, 13 April 2000

18 April 2000
Dr Riek Machar, head of the UDSF, expresses his support for the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He states that the Sudanese problem will only be settled when all parties gather at the conference table to negotiate a peaceful settlement, and hopes that a merging of the Egyptian-Libyan and IGAD peace initiatives will help the peace process.

“Marchar Expresses his Support for Egyptian-Libyan Initiative”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 18 April 2000

18 April 2000
Malawi President Bakili Muluzi leaves for a three-day official visit to Sudan aimed “to encourage the government there to continue with the democratisation and peace process”.

“Muluzi Heads for Sudan for Peace Talks”, News Article by Agence France Press, 18 April 2000

19 April 2000
Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the foreign ministers of Sudan, Egypt and Libya will meet in Khartoum in late April or early May to discuss the “acceleration of the reconciliation process in line with the joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative”.

Ismail further states that political dialogue was continuing both with other countries and with Sudanese political forces that “have shown willingness to accept a political solution to the Sudanese problem”. He adds, however, that there would be no dialogue with opposition forces involved in the month-long occupation of the eastern town of Hamoshkorib until the “Hamoshkorib question is resolved”.

“Sudan, Libya and Egypt to Discuss Peace Plans in Late April or May”, News Article by Agence France Press, 19 April 2000

19 April 2000
The Sudanese President ordered his air force to halt air raids within southern Sudan.
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20 April 2000  The SPLA “warns international companies and investors not to invest in Southern Sudan and other marginalised areas while the war is still on. By doing so they shall be legitimate military targets. The SPLA has the capability to strike at these targets (including personnel and assets) at any time”.


21 April 2000  Various newspapers report an escalation of the civil war by rebel forces, and increased fighting in eastern regions.


21 April 2000  Sudanese Foreign Minister denies reports that Britain has offered to mediate in the civil war and invited the Sudanese Government to meet with the SPLA in London. He states: “It is true that relations with Britain have improved but still, we have not received such an invitation.”

But he adds that the Sudanese government did “not harbour any reservations towards a constructive dialogue with Britain for reaching peace in Sudan”.

“Sudan Denies Receiving British Mediation Offer”, News Article by Agence France Press, 21 April 2000

22 April 2000  Sudanese first Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha states that presidential and parliamentary elections will be held before the end of the year.

“Sudan Official Says Elections by End of Year”, News Article by Reuters, 22 April 2000

24 April 2000  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi rejects the Sudanese Government’s announced elections, calling on the government not to rush into elections until a full national agreement is concluded and a conference of all Sudanese political parties is convened. Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, head of the NDA and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, also declares that holding elections ahead of a full political settlement would hinder national reconciliation and deepen the Sudanese crisis.

“Sudanese Opposition Rejects President’ Bashir’s Call on Holding Elections”, News Article by KUNA, 24 April 2000

24 April 2000  Following a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani praises the role played by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi in the
Sudanese peace process. He states that the next step in the initiative should be a conference that gathers all the Sudanese people. He confirms his own forthcoming return to Sudan.

“Sudanese Opposition Member Meets With Moussa”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 24 April 2000

25 April 2000 The Sudanese Communist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party reject the Sudanese government’s plans to hold elections. Ali Mahmoud Hassanain of the DUP states that the government is “seeking to only obstruct the process of peaceful solution to Sudan’s problems…We reject the convening of any elections before holding of the national dialogue conference”.


25 April 2000 Abdel Moneim al-Zain al-Nahas, head of the Sudanese election commission, states that foreign observers – including representatives of the non-partisan Carter Centre, headed by former US President Jimmy Carter – will be invited to monitor the fairness of the forthcoming elections.

“Sudan to Invite Foreign Observers to October Polls”, News Article by Reuters, 25 April 2000

26 April 2000 IGAD Executive Director Atalla Hamad Beshir states that he is “strongly opposed to raising the problem [of Sudan]” at the UN Security Council, declaring that such calls were only used as pressure on the warring parties.


26 April 2000 Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, in a joint press conference with Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail, expresses optimism over the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He states: “A settlement cannot be reached overnight but I can say the initiative is progressing forward satisfactorily….We are not dealing with the northern (political opposition) parties only, and the southerners should be involved in the reconciliation.” He also declares that there “is no conflict” between the Egyptian-Libyan and IGAD initiatives.

“Egyptian Foreign Minister Optimistic on Resolving Sudanese Problem”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 27 April 2000

26 April 2000 Sudanese Foreign Affairs Ministry Under-Secretary Awadel-Kerim Fadlulla meets with European Union ambassadors and
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representatives. He calls on the West to pressure south Sudanese rebels into accepting a comprehensive cease-fire to end the civil war. He argues that Sudan had “boosted efforts for peace and stability” by halting air raids in the south, had freed political detainees, guaranteed freedom of expression, lifted the ban on anti-government political parties, and arranged for a “free and fair” election.

“Sudan Calls for Western Pressure on Southern Rebels to Accept Ceasefire”, News Article by Agence France Press, 27 April 2000

27 April 2000   Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail urges SPLA leader John Garang to join the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and to “stop vetoing” it within the NDA. He states that: “The peace process is invisible and will be ineffective if it is partitioned, the Egyptian-Sudanese initiative dealing with the entire Sudanese issue, whilst IGAD deals only with the south Sudan issue.”

Ismail also states that Garang’s position will be dealt with at the next meeting of Egyptian and Libyan diplomats in Khartoum in May. He further observes that: “Diplomatic, political and economic ties with the various countries, particularly with the European Union, have been enhanced … relations with the EU nations will be restored to normal before the end of this year.”

“Sudan Urges Garang to Accept Peace Initiative”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 27 April 2000

28 April 2000   Steven Wondu, the SPLA/SPLM representative in the USA, in response to recent statements by Umma Party leader Sadiq al Mahdi, re-issues on the internet a 1998 paper, “New Sudan: Too Good!”, originally delivered at the Sudan Studies Association at the University of Pennsylvania. In it Wondu concludes that: “The NIF cannot be reformed. Sudan can only find peace on the tombstone of their government. The eastern African region will only experience stability after a change of government in Khartoum. The international community will only have respite from terrorism after the regime in Khartoum is uprooted.”

Steve Wondu, “Excuse Me, Sayed el Sadiq el Mahdi!”, posted on “Sudan-L@listserv.cc.emory.edu”, 28 April 2000

29 April 2000   The Sudanese Foreign Ministry confirms that the humanitarian cease-fire that expired on 15 April will be renewed for another three months, a renewal which it states “stems from [the government’s] desire to realise peace and to deliver food to all persons in need in Bahr al-Ghazal region”.

“Government Renews Cease-Fire for Another Three Months”, News Article by Associated Press, 29 April 2000
**30 April 2000**

Taisier Mohammed Ahmed, President of the Sudanese National Alliance/Sudanese Alliance Forces (SNF/SAF) Foreign Affairs Secretariat, in an interview published on the internet, denies that opposition forces have ever committed atrocities. He also demands that the government of Sudan be diplomatically isolated and subjected to international economic sanctions, and that “diplomatic and material support” should be given to the NDA.

Mark Francois, “D. Taisier Mohamed Ahmed Answers a Canadian Activist”, posted to Sudanese@list.msu.edu, 30 April 2000

**30 April 2000**

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir returns from a visit to the Nigerian capital of Abuja and publicly welcomes the Nigerian offer to resume a mediating role in the resolution of the Sudanese civil war. He further states that the Sudanese government was determined to restore peace “no matter where this would be found”.

“Nigeria to Resume Mediation in Sudanese Conflict”, News Article by XINHUA, 30 April 2000

**May 2000**

Veteran southern politician Bona Malwal, publisher of Sudan Democratic Gazette and NDA executive member, publishes a damning criticism of SPLA leader John Garang. With regard to the search for peace in Sudan, Malwal stated:

“I have noticed and revealed the duplicity with which you have participated in the peace process. Many Southerners have spoken for some time about the need to arrive at a Southern concensus over the question of Self-Determination. They recognise the need to fill the vacuum created by your vague goals for the war of liberation. After seventeen years of this bloody war in which two million of our people have perished, the Northern Sudanese political establishment as a whole has said that they would negotiate a political agreement with you to work out the modalities for a referendum on Self-Determination for the South. Yet, you have personally dodged this issue – as seen in the way you have briefed your delegations to the various rounds of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) peace talks….Perhaps your own tactics make you blind to this, but there is indeed increasing support among the Southern Sudanese people for pursuing peace, if peace is pursued honestly, diligently and in good faith by the other side. How many more millions of Southern Sudanese do you want to die to satisfy your ego?

Let me note here two ploys that you have used to circumvent the peace process. Firstly, you are using the cause of the peoples of the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessina Hills as an excuse for failing to negotiate in good faith for the interests of the South. You tell everyone that the Nuba and the Ingessina
peoples have fought side by side with the South, which is true, and that negotiating for Self-Determination of the South will alienate them. Which is absolutely false!…Your real agenda is to pursue the unity of the South and North by fighting for an illusive, unattainable ‘New Sudan’. Do you think that fighting to make you the leader of your ‘New Sudan’ has been worth the lives of the two million of our people who have died so far?…Now that the North is crying our for peace based on the right of Self-Determination, it is time for the South to embark on serious negotiations in good faith with the North. You will not be able to escape the charge already made repeatedly that you are a warlord who has no interest in ending this tragic conflict.

With regard to famine conditions in parts of southern Sudan, Malwal claimed: “In 1998, you deliberately ignored the deadly famine in Bahr El Ghazal which resulted in the death by starvation of hundreds of thousands. You knew that there was food shortage in the province that year because the rains had failed the previous season. Your own people compiled the data on that famine. When you encouraged late Kerubino Kuanyin Bol to attack Wau Town in January 1998 and you failed to back up that attack, which eventually collapsed, the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime suspended all relief flights to Bahr El Ghazal in retaliation.”

Malwal also touched on some of the intra-ethnic conflict that the SPLA has been party to in Equatoria: “Even where the SPLA is totally in charge, as in Chukadom in Eastern Equatoria, you have allowed the situation between the Didinga people and the SPLA to develop into one of atrocities. You have abetted this Chukudum situation by your failure to act and allowed it to degenerate into an intra-tribal conflict between the Dinka, as represented by those who act as your agents there, and their hosts, the Didinga community. Examples of this type of administrative incompetence – indeed of using our tribes against each other to allow you the freedom to manipulate and to take advantage of these terrible situations amongst our people – abound.”

2 May 2000 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomes the Sudanese government’s declaration of a humanitarian cease-fire until 15 July of this year. He also invites the SPLA/M to similarly extend a cease-fire to create “an enabling environment for humanitarian operations”.

“Sudan: Secretary-General Welcomes Humanitarian Ceasefire”, Horn of Africa: IRIN News Briefs, 2 May 2000

8 May 2000 The New Sudanese Council of Churches holds its People to People East Bank Nilotics Reconciliation Conference, to assist the peace process amongst four other ethnic groups of the East Bank in addition to the Nuer and Dinka of the region.
8 May 2000 In the course of his dispute with National Congress Party Secretary-General Hassan al-Turabi, President al-Bashir announces that he is “freezing” the secretariat of the Party. Information Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that the move is “directed primarily to correct the relationship between two opposing poles … There is a personal element, but basically it is the prerogatives of the two posts, the relationship between the two, the symbolism – who is leader of the party”. Atabani also states that al-Bashir had partly taken his latest measures in his capacity as President of the republic because developments in the party were “threatening the stability of the whole country” and that the moves will not affect the timing of the forthcoming elections.

“Interview: Sudan Elections to Go Ahead”, News Article by Reuters, 8 May 2000

8 May 2000 The SPLA states that it will extend its cease-fire in the Bahr al-Ghazal province for another three months to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. However, it also states that it is suspending negotiations with the Sudanese government – scheduled to begin on May 17 – because of the latter’s alleged bombing of civilians. SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje declares: “Our conscience no longer allows us to ignore the treatment being meted out daily to our people by the very same regime that pretends to be engaging in a dialogue for peace.”

Sudanese Army spokesman General Osman Yassin dismisses the SPLA claims of aerial bombardment as an “unfounded allegation … a lie made as an excuse to escape from participation in the forthcoming round of [IGAD peace] talks”.


8 May 2000 Sheikh Hamid bin Rashid Al-Nuaimi of the United Arab Emirates meets with Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi. He calls on “all the parties of Sudan to reject division, to seek reconciliation, and to impose security and stability in the interests of Sudan and of the Arab nation”.

“UAE Calls for Sudanese Reconciliation”, News Article by Agence France Press, 8 May 2000

9 May 2000 Following talks in Cairo with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, SPLA leader John Garang states his belief that the current clash between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and Islamist leader and NIF Secretary General Hassan al-Tarabi could lead to the unification of Sudan. Garang says: “There is a crisis within the NIF party and regime, a clash between Turabi and Bashir…It is good news for the Sudanese people that there
is conflict within the NIF, in such an organisation which is totalitarian … once there is a split, or crack, it does not stop. I think you have seen the beginning of the end of the NIF regime. We will use it [i.e. the Bashir-Turabi split] in the NDA in order to achieve fundamental change in the country so that we can achieve a new Sudan and so that our country remains united…We are in favour of a new Sudan, a united Sudan that is based on a new political dispensation. A Sudan that accepts all its citizens, whether they are Moslems or Christians, whether they are of Arab or African origin. A Sudan that belongs to all of us.”

Garang also declares his commitment to both the Egyptian-Libyan and IGAD peace initiatives: “We have called for the Libyan-Egyptian initiative and the IGAD initiative, which we also support, to be merged together so that there is only one track for negotiations…If we prefer one initiative over another this will split Sudan into north and south.”

“Sudan Rebel Upset on Government Crisis”, News Article by Reuters, 9 May 2000; “Sudan Rebel Discusses Crisis With Mubarak”, News Article by Reuters, 10 May 2000

9 May 2000

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the Sudanese government negotiation team is still planning to head to Nairobi for the 17 May IGAD peace negotiations in spite of the SPLA statement that they will be boycotting the talks. Ismail states: “The [Sudanese] government is committed to participation in the round of peace on the date set by IGAD…We will make our decision [on attendance] in the light of what we receive from IGAD Committee Secretary General Daniel Mboya rather than the rebel statement.”

“Khartoum Committed to Peace Talks Despite Rebel Boycott”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 9 May 2000

11 May 2000

Sudan and Tunisia agree to restore international relations and exchange diplomatic representation. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that this is the last step in re-establishing diplomatic ties with all the Arab countries.

“Khartoum Restores Relations With Tunisia”, Sudan: IRIN News Briefs, 11 May, pp. 2-3

13 May 2000

Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa states that Egypt is planning talks with Sudan and Libya to discuss all aspects of the Sudanese civil war. Regarding the possibility of the integration of the Egyptian-Libyan and IGAD peace initiatives, he states:

“There is an invitation to the secretary-general of IGAD to visit Cairo and Tripoli…The ball is in IGAD’s camp. We have expressed our desire for coordination and we are waiting for IGAD to make the next move…We are
waiting for IGAD’s next step after we have expressed our interest in integration between the two initiatives.”

“Egypt Says Three-Way Talks to be Held on Sudan War”, News Article by Reuters, 13 May 2000;
“Egypt and Libya Try Again for Reconciliation in Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 13 May 2000

14 May 2000  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir expresses dissatisfaction with the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and calls for direct meetings with the opposition who he urges to be “more concerned” about peace. Al-Bashir states:

“The government is prepared to reach an agreement with all its opponents... [and] is prepared to call on all factions to develop [the Djibouti agreement with the Umma Party] into a comprehensive accord which would lead towards a national unity government”.

“Bashir Urges Sudanese Opposition to be More Concerned for Peace”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 15 May 2000

8-15 May 2000  The East Bank Nilotic Peace Conference is held at Liliir, in the Bor area of the Upper Nile, under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches – inspired by the success of the previous West Bank Dinka Nuer Conference in Wunlit in March 1999. 129 representatives of Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachpo, Murle and Nuer groups from the region sign a public covenant pledging an end to “all traditional hostilities”, establishing an “amnesty...for all offences against our people and property prior to the conference”, a return of all abducted women and children, “freedom of movement across...common borders” amongst others.


17 May 2000  Mustafa al-Fequi, Under-Secretary at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, states that SPLA leader John Garang has made it clear in current discussions in Cairo, that he preferred to resolve Sudan’s civil war without dividing the country. Al-Fequi states: “Garang has said … that a north-south split in Sudan is not his first choice...He said the primary choice for people in the south is a new Sudan that runs on a constitution that affirms equality according to the rights of citizenship”.

“Egypt Says Secession Not Sudan Rebel’s First Choice”, News Article by Reuters, 17 May 2000

18 May 2000  Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, Chairman of the National Democratic Alliance states that he has received a message from
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Sudanese President al-Bashir declaring his willingness to unify all Sudanese parties and proposing a inclusive conference. Mirghani expresses his appreciation of this “goodwill” message, welcomes its contents, and states that it will be given full consideration and presented to the NDA leadership.

“The Sudanese Opposition Gives Cautious Welcome to Bashir Peace Call”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 18 May 2000

18 May 2001 In an interview with the Cairo-based newspaper Al-Ahram SPLA leader John Garang describes what his view of a “negotiated settlement” with the government of Sudan means. He states: “We do not mean joining with the regime or reaching a power-sharing agreement with the ruling clique. What we want is for the NIF to negotiate itself out of power, just like the apartheid regime of South Africa did. We are not seeking reconciliation with the regime in Khartoum. They have reached a political dead end and we want them to negotiate the terms of their surrender of power”.

“The NIF Must Take the Back Seat”, Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 482, 18-24 May 2000

21 May 2000 Sudanese President al-Bashir orders the release of all female prisoners held in the country. Over 75% of women in Sudan’s prisons are thought to be mainly from the South, and generally convicted for making or selling alcohol, which is banned under sharia law.

“The Sudan’s Bashir Orders All Female Prisoners Freed”, News Article by Reuters, 21 May 2000

26 May 2000 Anthony J. Kozlowski, President of the American Refugee Committee, returns from a week-long fact-finding trip to Sudan. He states that there “have been human rights violations on both sides of the conflict – by Sudanese government forces... as well as by the southern rebels”. However, he states that the Sudanese government expresses its willingness to negotiate a general cease-fire and address the issue of increased autonomy for the South. He declares: “Our concern is for the people and how to stop the fighting, and we feel one of the best ways to do that is for the US government to engage with Khartoum, irrespective of what kinds of things the government is accused of.”


28 May 2000 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir expresses optimism over prospects for national reconciliation, after receiving a message from NDA chairman Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani. He states that the message is “a good sign of an approaching national reconciliation ... [and] contained positive elements for pushing forward current efforts for reaching a peaceful settlement”. An Egyptian-Libyan delegation also arrives to brief the
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Sudanese government on proposal made by the NDA for the planned reconciliation conference.

“Bashir Sees Hope for Reconciliation in Message from Opposition Leader”, News Article by Agence France Press, 28 May 2000

28 May 2000

SPLA leader John Garang visits President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. He states that Mbeki is very receptive to South Africa playing a key role in a further bid to end the Sudanese conflict via the establishment of a partnership between African countries and IGAD. Garang visualises an African based structure and partnership forum similar to IGAD.

“Mbeki Receptive to a Role in Sudan Peace”, Business Day (Johannesburg), 28 May 2000

31 May 2000

A joint Sudanese-Egyptian technical committee ends two days of meetings in Khartoum, and announces agreement on economic, trade, industrial, agricultural, cultural and consular cooperation, and security against terrorism issues. Visa requirements between the two nations are also declared to be coming to an end.

Assistant Foreign Minister Mustafa al-Fequi also reports on his mediation activities between the Sudanese government and the opposition NDA. He states that Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail responded to NDA proposals “in a manner that I wished the opposition leaders were here to listen to”. He also stated that he “[believed] that if [the two sides] sit down together at the negotiating table, the two sides will certainly reach agreement”.

“Sudano-Egyptian Cooperation, Sudanese Reconciliation”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 31 May 2000

4 June 2000

Exile opposition figure Ambrose A. Beny responds to SPLA views expressed in the Sudanese Democratic Gazette. He questions the “rut...military and/or political” in the SPLA’s thinking, and comments on the “kleptomania and hedonism the SPLM/A seems to have unleashed in Southern Sudan and the other marginalised areas of Sudan”.


5 June 2000

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir promises that presidential and parliamentary elections set for October will be free and fair. He states: “The next elections would be a model, free and fair, to choose the strong and trusted”.

“Sudan’s Bashir Promises Free Elections in October”, News Article by Reuters, 5 June 2000
5 June 2000  The Finnish national chemical weapons testing laboratories stated with regard to tests conducted on samples were collected on 17 August 1999 near the town Lainya in South Sudan, and presented as evidence of government involvement in chemical weapons use: “Analysis of the gloves, control soil sample and one water sample, revealed no relevant chemicals. Analysis of all soil samples and one water sample revealed the presence of 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT). In addition to TNT, one soil sample contained the following degradation products of TNT: 1,8-dinitronaphtalene, 1-nitronaphthalene and 1,5-dinitronaphthalene.” There was no evidence of any chemical weapons, but there was evidence that a conventional bomb had gone off. The VERIFIN report stated: “The health hazards described in literature for TNT and its degradation products, match quite well with the symptoms described by the victims” — symptoms consistent with the use of standard explosives.


5 June 2000  The British government’s chemical and biological defence agency at Porton Down rigorously tested seventeen samples of water, soil and shrapnel provided by British journalist Damien Lewis for the spectrum of known chemical agents. Lewis had claimed these samples proved the Sudanese government’s use of chemical weapons in southern Sudan. In the British government’s response, the Minister of State for Defence Procurement stated that “very careful analysis of all the available evidence” led the government to “conclude that there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations that chemical weapons were used in these incidents in the Sudan.” The minister stated that “samples of water, soil, and shrapnel collected from three sites in the Sudan were analysed for the presence of known chemical agents, ie the classical nerve agents, mustard, and other recognised agents, for their environmental degradation products, and for riot-control agents. They were also screened for the presence of arsenic. No intact CW agents, their associated environmental degradation products, or riot-control agents were identified in any of the samples.” More of Lewis’s samples were independently tested in the United States. The minister also stated with regard to these and other samples that “a separate set of samples taken from the sites of the alleged CW attacks in the Sudan was tested independently in the US. The results of these tests also indicated no evidence of exposure to CW agents. I understand that Mr Lewis also passed samples to the Finnish institute responsible for chemical weapons verification (“VERIFIN”) and I am advised that this analysis likewise found evidence of TNT but none for CW agents.” The British government remarked on “the consistency of results from these three independent sets of analysis”.

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Letter from Baroness Symons, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, to Baroness Cox Regarding the testing of Damien Lewis’s samples at the Chemical and Biological Defence Agency, Porton Down, Reference D/MIN(DP)/ECS/13/3/3, 5 June 2000

9 June 2000  Former first Vice-President Major-General Omer Muhammad al-Tayeb returns to Sudan and is greeted by presidential adviser for political affairs Abdel Basit Sabdrat, the Governor of the Nile Region, other government ministers and senior state officials. Al-Tayeb publicly commends al-Bashir’s initiatives and states that he will take part in the country’s peace process and consensus.

News Article on Sudan TV (Omdurman), 8 June 2000

10 June 2000  Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa holds talks with Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi. He states that: “The Egyptian-Libyan contacts have produced promising results and all the parties are ready to make a serious step towards a comprehensive political solution.”

“Egypt’s Moussa Meets Sudanese Opposition Leader”, News Article by Reuters, 10 June 2000

11 June 2000  Umma Party Leader Sadiq al-Mahdi meets US special envoy to Sudan Harry Johnston. He presents him with an Umma Party report on the issue of a comprehensive political settlement. The report states that the US had previously given “contradictory signals” over Sudan and requested that Washington should be clear in order to help reach a political solution.

“Sudan Opposition Leader Holds Talks With Envoy”, News Article by Reuters, 11 June 2000

17 June 2000  The SPLA launched a major new offensive in the area of Gogrial in southern Sudan. In so doing the SPLA broke the humanitarian cease-fire that had been in place for a year. The Sudanese government stated that rebel forces had shelled Gogrial town for twelve hours.


17 June 2000  The Sudanese government accuses the rebel SPLA of violating a cease-fire in the southern Bahr el-Ghazal region.

“Khartoum Accuses Rebels of Violating Southern Ceasefire”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 June 2000

18 June 2000  Following pressure from both US envoy to Sudan Harry Johnston and Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, the SPLA states that it is willing to return to the IGAD peace negotiations. “We feel our conditions for
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suspension have been met…[the SPLA is] willing to come back any time they
[i.e. IGAD] fix a date.”

“Rebels Say They’re Ready to Resume Peace Talks”, News Article by Associated Press, 18 June
IGAD”, Dr Samson L. Kwaje, SPLA Spokesman, Nairobi, 19 June 2000

20 June 2000 South Africa and Algeria, in the capacities as
chairmen of the 114-member Non-Aligned Movement and the 22-member Arab
Group of states respectively called on the Security Council to withdraw the
sanctions. The Organisation of African Unity, representing 53 countries, has
also urged the Security Council to rescind the sanctions in question. In a letter
to the President of the Security Council, OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed
Salim stated that the lifting of the sanctions was an urgent matter: “The lifting
of sanctions imposed on Sudan is not only urgently called for, but would also
positively contribute to efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability
in the region.” The Egyptian government had earlier stated that having seen “a
number of positive and encouraging indications from the part of the Sudanese
government” aimed at improving Sudan’s relations with Egypt, it supported the
rescinding of the sanctions. The Ethiopian government had also stated “it is the
conviction of the Ethiopian Government that the concerns that gave rise to the
sanctions…no longer apply…Ethiopia is, therefore, of the view that it is now
time for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the Sudan”.

‘OAU Urges Security Council to Lift Sudan Sanctions’, News Article by Reuters, 20 June 2000:
Letter from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the United Nations Security
Council, 8 June 2000; Letter from the Ethiopian Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President

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only urgently called for, but would also positively contribute to efforts aimed at
promoting peace, security and stability in the area.”

“Sudan’s Bashir Grants General Amnesty to Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 21 June 2000

21 June 2000 The Umma Party rules out any links with the Islamist
grouping lead by Dr Hassan al-Turabi.
21 June 2000

Egyptian Ambassador to Sudan Mohammed Asem Ibrahim states that Egypt is strongly opposed to the idea of separating southern Sudan.

“Egypt Strongly Opposed to Separation of South Sudan: Diplomat”, News Article by Associated Press, 21 June 2000

21 June 2000

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir grants an “unconditional general amnesty” to any Sudanese, civilian or military, who committed an act of rebellion between 30 June 1989 and 20 June 2000. Anyone wishing to benefit from it “shall return to Sudan willingly, declare his commitment to the constitutions and laws, and abandon violence”. He states: “Sudan is now open to all its sons without exception and from now the door of freedom which has opened will not close … Dialogue is what resolves our problems, military action does not settle issues.”


21 June 2000

The Sudanese Army states that it has repelled a series of rebel attacks violating the partial cease-fire in the south in the Gogrial, Kwangina and Awiel areas of the Bahr al-Ghazal region. Army spokesman General Mohammed Osman Yassin states that he believes SPLA leader John Garang had refused to meet US envoy Harry Johnston in Nairobi and decided instead to travel to southern Sudan to supervise the attacks.


21 June 2000

The Umma Party welcomes the Sudanese Government’s offer of general amnesty. Party spokesman Hassan Ahmed al-Hassan states: “We believe it is a positive step, because any decision in the direction of efforts for a peaceful global settlement is welcome … This decision largely helps create a propitious atmosphere for a diplomatic settlement and demonstrates good intentions … The decree is all the more important because it comes at a time when the Sudanese regime is seeking a comprehensive political settlement and has undertaken measures in this direction”. However, he also calls upon the government to “accelerate the adoption of additional measures the opposition considers necessary.”

Democratic Unionist Party spokesman Ali Ahmed al-Sayyed states: “It is a step towards setting the stage for dialogue” but warns that “the government has
previously taken many decisions that have not been implemented” and fears that “the decree may be retracted at any time by another decision or obstructed by another official within the government itself”. He insists on a cancellation of all laws restricting freedoms “as a guarantee for implementing this decree”.

The SPLA, however, rejects the offer of amnesty. Yassir Arman, its spokesman in Asmara, states:

“We reject General Bashir’s decision, because we believe it is he who needs to be pardoned and because we want a true democracy and complete peace … [Bashir should be] brought before an international court of justice like the Serbian leaders of the former Yugoslavia for the crimes he has committed … [as should] all members of the regime or everyone who has participated at undermining the political and economic life of the country and who practised corruption.”


21 June 2000 The SPLA claims that they have killed over 412 government troops in three days of fighting starting with an ambush near the oil fields, and over 2,000 during May and June. It also renews its warnings to western oil firms. SPLA Yassir Arman states: “The SPLA warned the oil companies against prospecting in these regions and repeated that it considers the oil fields to be legitimate targets…Oil production under the Islamist regime will prolong the war and threaten internal, regional and international security, because it serves the interests of extremist forces which have exploited the oil.”

The SPLA also states that it has launched a “systematic campaign” to close down a major oilfield north of Bentiu.

“Sudanese Rebels Claim to Have Killed 412 Government Troops”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 June 2000; “Sudan Rebels Say They Kill 430 Troops in Oil Battle”, News Article by Reuters, 22 June 2000

22 June 2000 The Sudanese government strongly criticises the SPLA’s violation of the cease-fire in Bahr al-Ghazal. It states that this is proof of the rebel movement’s disregard for world opinion.

22 June 2000 Umma Party spokesman Hassan Ahmed al-Hassan states that Party militiamen now felt safe to return home to Khartoum. 200 soldiers are reported to have returned to Gadarif state in eastern Sudan from Ethiopian bases.
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23 June 2000

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that foreign interference is delaying peace talks between the government and southern rebels. He argues that “IGAD partners tried to use their position to delay the peace process in Sudan... As for the delay in negotiations with the SPLA, it is because of regional and international interventions that they do not want peace in Sudan”. Al-Bashir argues that “every round of negotiations between the government and the [SPLA] is preceded by an announcement or a decision from Washington that encourages” SPLA leader John Garang to be stubborn and oppose reconciliation. Garang was being used “as a curtain for their war against the government”.

He further “[calls] on Egypt and Libya who lead reconciliation efforts between the government and the opposition to set a date for a national dialogue”.

24 June 2000

NDA spokesman Mahgoub al-Tigani states that: “The NDA is never committed to sit with Bashir and follow-up his desires and programmes. NDA is fully committed to overthrow Bashir, prosecute him and his regime, and punish him and all NIF criminals.”

24 June 2000

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir complains that the West is trying to push Khartoum to abandon Islamic law as a prelude to peace, and criticises the recent Oslo meeting of IGAD Partners Forum for ignoring the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He states:

“The outcome of the Oslo meeting was not a surprise to us because we aware of the special agenda that motivates IGAD partners ... From the outset [IGAD] has put forward only two options – acceptance of a united secular Sudan or granting the south the right to self-determination ... How come the United States, Britain and other IPF members be allowed a role in resolving Sudanese issues while Egypt, Libya and other Arab states be denied such a role?”

25 June 2000

The SPLA claims that it has captured the garrison town of Gogrial in the Bahr al Ghazal region and incorporated it into the “family” of “self-determined... New Sudan”. It claims that it did not initiate the
attack but only responded to “unprovoked…looting and acts of atrocities” of government troops on the civilian population. It reiterates the SPLA “commitment to the maintenance of the recent humanitarian cease-fire…but will decisively act on self-defense as well as in defense of the civil population”. The SPLA further claims that the Sudanese government is “sponsoring slave and cattle raids as well as disruption of agricultural production…to drive the civil population from their land and from the areas of the oil wells. This amounts to genocide…”


27 June 2000
Former Sudan Parliamentary Speaker, Dr Hassan al-Turabi, announces that he is forming a new political party, to be called the Popular National Congress.

28 June 2000
The US Government calls upon both the government and rebels to respect the cease-fire in the Bahr al Ghazal region. The US State Department declares: “The US is concerned that another crisis of similar proportions [to that of 1998] could emerge if the current fighting spreads and if access is denied for humanitarian organisations to deliver emergency assistance…We strongly urge the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan to cease all attacks in Bahr el Ghazal province and honour their humanitarian commitments.”

28 June 2000
The French Ambassador to the United Nations, Jean-David Levitte, President of the United Nations Security Council, states that France recognised positive developments within Sudan: “There are evolutions for the better in Khartoum, and France is not the only member of the Council to consider that these positive evolutions should be registered.”

1‘U.S. Delays UN Vote on Sudan Until After November Poll’, News Article by Reuters on 28 June 2000.

28 June 2000
Over 200 former Umma party soldiers returning to Sudan are formally met in Khartoum by Umma party Secretary-General Omar Nour al-Diem.

“Sudan Rebel Fighters Return to Khartoum in Peace”, News Article by Reuters, 28 June 2000
28 June 2000  
Forty-eight Sudanese military men who were imprisoned for crimes against the state have been freed under the general amnesty granted by President Omer al-Bashir.


29 June 2000  
The Umma Party presents a paper to the Sudanese justice ministry with proposals for clearly-worded articles in the constitution safeguarding freedom of political and press activities. A party spokesman also states that they hoped the proposed amendments would pave the way for a national reconciliation conference.

“The Sudan Opposition Party Calls for Freedom Guarantees”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 29 June 2000

29 June 2000  
Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that the government has accepted the Egyptian-Libyan peace and reconciliation initiative for “national reconstruction by all Sudanese, northerners and southerners, proponents and opponents”.

Al-Bashir further declares: “We have exerted all efforts for creating an atmosphere conducive to a national dialogue conference which we have proposed to discuss peace, rule, democracy, development and foreign relations and we were hoping that conference be held last October or March…In order to push the joint [Egyptian-Libyan] initiative forward I call for a national forum to be held in Khartoum in a month’s time with the participation of representatives of all political forces and national personalities…For our part we will offer everything that enables the forum to fulfil its mission, in an atmosphere of freedom and independence…We will work for reaching a just solution that meets the aspirations of the people of south Sudan to guarantee then fair participation in power and fair share of wealth…we will muster all national resources and petroleum proceeds as well as international contributions for the development programme of the south…We should all sit together in an earnest endeavour to stop fighting and save lives of our people in the North and South.”

Regarding foreign policy al-Bashir also states: “We will continue developing our ties with all our neighbours, without exception, on the basis of the African and Arab fraternity, removing causes of dispute and resolving problems through mutual respect and non-interference in other’s affairs.”

30 June 2000
The opposition National Democratic Alliance accepts President al-Bashir’s proposals for a national forum, but only with a string of conditions. NDA spokesman Ali Ahmed al-Sayyed declared the plan a “positive step”, but fell short of NDA demands for more political freedoms, a halt to the civil war and the calling off of presidential and legislative elections scheduled for October. He states: “The NDA accepts a preliminary meeting with the government to agree on a transitional period, an interim government, cessation of fighting and on the agenda, participants venue and date of the national dialogue.”

Al-Sayyed also claims that the forum plan was originally an NDA idea, but adds that the NDA would not agree to Khartoum as a preliminary meeting as the opposition “is not confident of the government”.


30 June 2000
The European Union issues a statement expressing its “grave concerns regarding the offensive launched by the SPLM/A in the region of Bahr al-Ghazal”. The statement also “calls for the Humanitarian cease-fire commitments given to be respected…and calls upon the Sudanese Government and the SPLA/M to resume rapidly the peace negotiations under the auspices of IGAD”.

“Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Civil War in Sudan”, European Union, Brussels, 30 June 2000

1 July 2000
Ethiopian President Negasso Jihada states that Ethiopia has a strong desire to see a peaceful settlement of disputes between the Sudanese government and the SPLA. A peaceful resolution of the Sudanese civil war would help bring about lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. He expresses Ethiopia’s commitment to the IGAD peace process.

“Ethiopia Keen to Peaceful Settlement of Civil War in Sudan”, News Article by XINHUA, 1 July 2000

4 July 2000
Egyptian and Libyan government officials criticise the Ethiopian President’s statement regarding the IGAD peace process. They state that “despite of having six years passed since the start of IGAD, yet it did not achieve any progress”. They state that the joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative emphasises a solution which includes all the opposition parties and the government.

“Egypt and Libya Criticise Ethiopian President’s Remarks on Sudan”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 6 July 2000
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6 July 2000
At a two-day NDA meeting in Cairo NDA head Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani states his agreement to a meeting within a month between the Sudanese government and NDA members, “whether it is held inside or outside Sudan”, and states that the Egyptian-Libyan initiative forms a basis for realising peace. However, Umma Party Secretary-General Omar Nour al-Diem accuses the NDA of “conspiring” against the Umma Party “just because the Umma Party favours a peaceful settlement and rejects a military option sponsored by the SPLM”.

“Sudanese Opposition Welcomes President’s Call for Reconciliation Meeting”, News Article by XINHUA, 5 July 2000; “Umma Party to Participate in Preparations for Sudan Peace Conference”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 5 July 2000

7 July 2000
The Roman Catholic Bishop of the Sudanese diocese of Rumbek, Caesar Mazzolari, states that thousands were fleeing the southern Sudanese town of Wau for fear of an imminent attack by SPLA forces.

“Thousands Flee Sudanese Town Fearing Rebel Attack: Cleric”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 July 2000

7 July 2000
A group of Sudanese rebels from the opposition Democratic Unionist Party return from bases in Ethiopia and surrender their weapons under the terms of President al-Bashir’s amnesty offer.

“Sudanese Rebels Return from Ethiopia, Surrender Weapons”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 July 2000

7 July 2000
US Department of State Spokesman Richard Boucher states that “The Sudanese National Democratic Alliance Leadership Committee (NDA) is meeting in Cairo…to continue efforts to advance the search for a just and comprehensive peace in Sudan. The NDA has launched an effort to coordinate the peace initiative of [IGAD] and the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative. The US believes that the Peace Initiative of [IGAD] offers the best hope for ending the violence in Sudan and supports coordinating the two efforts. Peace cannot be achieved if the two initiatives work separately or at odds with each other. The war in Sudan has gone on too long and the violence and killing must stop.”


8 July 2000
Organisation of African Unity Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim states that the OAU remains committed to a peaceful solution in Sudan “based on respect for the unity and territorial integrity of the country on the principles of tolerance and accommodation”. He further declares:
“The OAU, which has consistently supported the efforts made through IGAD peace process, will continue to extend that support... We also encourage the co-ordination of efforts deployed by IGAD countries on one hand, and Egypt and Libya on the other, aimed at promoting an early and peaceful solution to the conflict.”

“OAU Wants Peaceful Solution in Sudan”, News Article by Panafrian News Association, 8 July 2000

9 July 2000

Umma Party Foreign Relations Secretary Mubarak al-Fadel al-Mahdi states that the Umma Party would take part in “a national government” if the Khartoum government “accepts the Umma Party’s views on issues of peace, development and peaceful democratic transformation”.

“Sudan’s Opposition Umma Party Willing to Share Power”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 9 July 2000

10 July 2000


10 July 2000

Mutref Siddeiq, advisor on peace matters to President al-Bashir, states that IGAD representative Daniel Mboya, will arrive in Sudan shortly to discuss the timetable and agenda for talks between the government and the SPLA. Siddeiq also accuses the SPLA of abandoning its cease-fire in the southern Bahr al-Ghazal region, He states that: “This escalation is aimed at dragging the government into violating the ceasefire to give the rebel movement an excuse for postponing the negotiations.”

“Drive for New Peace Talks Between Sudan, Rebels”, News Article by Agence France Press, 10 July 2000

15 July 2000

The Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail says that the Sudanese government has not yet decided on renewing a temporary partial cease-fire with rebel forces due to participate at the end of the week. He states:

“We would be a laughing stock if we declare a renewal of the temporary partial cease-fire in Bahr al-Ghazal region while the rebel movement everyday announces new victories in the region ... The rebel SPLA has occupied a string of towns, including Gogriel, and has destroyed a railroad bridge cutting off delivery of food aid by railway to Wau town in Bahr al-Ghazal with a view to
making the town hungry prior to occupying it. We have demanded the UN, which is in charge of the humanitarian operations, to live up to its responsibility and determine which party has violated the ceasefire and adopt a clear-cut resolution."

“The Sudanese government unsure whether to extend ceasefire with rebels: FM”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 15 July 2000

15 July 2000 The Sudanese government issues a statement in which it restates that it had declared an end to aerial bombardment on 19 April except for self-defence; that on 27 April it had extended the humanitarian ceasefire in Bahr al-Ghazal for another three months and that on 3 May it had agreed the use of the railway line between Kosti and Wau to facilitate aid to the civilian population in western Bahr al-Ghazal. In spite of these agreements the SPLA had deliberately broken the cease-fire and attacked several towns within Bahr al-Ghazal. While, the Khartoum government reaffirmed its commitment to the humanitarian cease-fire and called for a comprehensive cease-fire an permanent peace it stated that it would “not stop and see the rebel movement attacking the towns and cities of Bahr el Ghazal one after another without due counter response”.

15 July 2000 The Indian Ocean Newsletter reveals that only strong pressure by the Egyptian government upon the NDA at its Cairo meeting manoeuvred it into agreeing to a preliminary meeting with the Sudanese government.

“Sudan: Cairo squeezing the Opposition”, The Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), 15 July 2000

16 July 2000 At a meeting with the IGAD delegation in Khartoum the Sudanese government urges IGAD to “take a stern position” toward the SPLA and “pressure it to abide by the ceasefire” in the Bahr el-Ghazal region, stating that “what is currently going on in the [the region] will cause a grave humanitarian catastrophe”. It declares that “participation of Sudan in the next round of talks…will be linked to the provision of real and essential guarantees from the IGAD secretariat and the international community of non-violation or contravention by the rebel movement of the ceasefire in southern Sudan”.


17 July 2000 The Egyptian government expresses concern over the reported massing of rebel troops at Sudan’s borders. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa states that: “Egypt will not accept any outside meddling in Sudan’s affairs that might harm the safety of its territory and destabilise the peace process …the military situation should not endanger Sudan’s territory and
wealth... We are very clear that we are against any intervention in Sudan’s internal affairs.”

“Egypt Concerned Over Troop Build Up at Sudan’s Borders”, News Article by Associated Press, 17 July 2000

18 July 2000 Sudanese Presidential peace advisor Mutref Siddeiq states that Sudan “will not boycott the next round of peace talks as the rebel movement did last April...despite repeated violations of the ceasefire [in the southern Bahr el-Ghazal region] by the rebel moment”. However, he does reaffirm Sudan’s call for “a denunciation by IGAD and the international community of the disrespect by the rebel movement for the declared ceasefire”.


19 July 2000 A group of pro-Government and former opposition parties in Sudan, including the Democratic Unionist Party, Umma Party, Alliance of the Peoples Working Forces, Nile Valley Congress, United Democratic Salvation Front, Sudanese National Front, Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Umma Party, Nile Valley Party, Sudanese National Party and the National Congress, issue a statement condemning the SPLA massing of troops on Sudan’s borders, and its military provocation in southern and eastern Sudan. It further declares that the SPLA is not honest and serious about peace negotiations and calls for all political parties and organisations in and outside Sudan to respond to the call for peace.

“Pro-Government Parties Condemn Rebel Attacks in East, South”, News Article by SUNA, 18 July 2000

21 July 2000 The Co-Chairs of the Sudan Committee of the IGAD Partners Forum express their concern over “the recent military development in Southern Sudan”. It declares the “capture of Gogrial...a clear violation of the SPLA’s unilateral cease fire” and calls upon both the Sudanese government and the SPLA to renew their cease-fires.

“Press Release: Statement by the Co-Chairs of the Sudan Committee of the IGAD Partners Forum”, 21 July 2000

23 July 2000 Sudanese Peace Advisory Administration Secretary-General Mohammed al-Atta states that Ugandan and Eritrean support for the SPLA in its current military operations in the Bahr al-Ghazal and Blue Nile regions in Sudan is “as clear as sunlight”. He reiterates that the Sudanese government will not pull out of the peace process and will participate in a meeting in Nairobi on 31 July to pave the way for the forthcoming round of peace negotiations.
23 July 2000 Sudanese women are set to have a greater say in peace negotiations following the creation of a Women’s Desk at the IGAD Secretariat for Sudan.

23 July 2000 Both the ruling National Congress party and opposition parties unite to mobilise their supporters against the rebel SPLA offensives in the east, south and Nuba Mountain region.

President Omer al-Bashir also states that Sudanese air space has been closed to foreign planes flying relief to country with effect from 22 July. He claims that UN sponsored relief operations are flying in weapons to the rebels. He also states that the government will now reconsider its agreement with the UN and the SPLA for Operation Lifeline Sudan.

23 July 2000 At a conference in Kampala leaders of a number of civil society groups opposed to the current Sudanese government resolve to push for a referendum on separation of Sudan into two states: “Self-determination is a basic right for all people. We shall continue pressuring for the people of Sudan to be allowed to see and exercise the right of self determination.”

One participant, Dengtiel A. Kur, Chairman of the South Sudan Law Society, calls for more pressure on the Sudanese government, including civil uprising.

26 July 2000 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail meets Vatican representative Jean-Louis Taran to discuss the peace process. A joint statement declares: “The Sudanese minister explained the latest political developments which are to lead the country to a multi-party and federal statement and are to put an end to the conflict which has been tearing apart southern Sudan for many years…The meeting was also an occasion to review the situation of the Catholic Church in the country and the ways to better the living conditions of the Catholic community and thus to permit it to participate more actively in the development of Sudanese society.”
27 July 2000  The National Democratic Alliance announces that it will not take part in the conference scheduled by the Sudanese government for August 7-14, designed to prepare for a wider national dialogue conference. NDA spokesman Ali Mahmoud Hassanain states: “We are not concerned with the meeting which is only aimed at rallying the government supporters and the NDA has nothing to do with it.” The Umma Party, however, states that it is willing to participate with “reservations” about timing and preparations. The conference will be chaired by former head-of-state Field Marshal Abd al-Rahman Swar al-Dahab, well respected in Sudan for organising free elections in 1986.

5 August 2000  Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustapha Osman Ismail states that: “The government strongly opposes the secession of the southern part of the country and is determined to keep Sudan a united state based on a federal system and a just distribution of wealth [and] by consensus of all parties.” He also states that secession would only lead to the rise of “mini-states”, would not end conflict and would be “unacceptable” to Sudan’s neighbours and the OAU. He further states the continued struggle of the SPLA “is based on personal ambitions not related to the demands of the other southern groups”.

11 August 2000  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan urges both the Sudanese government and the rebels to reinstate their cease-fires, and for the
The Sudanese government proposes the date of September 3 instead of August 21 for IGAD peace negotiations with the SPLA in Nairobi. The Sudanese government also states that it is presently in contact with other leaders and individual members of the SPLA so that negotiations “will not become a monopoly of [SPLA leader] Garang”. It also states that “the government will expand its political activities in south Sudanese provinces and villages held by the rebels” to rally support from civilians there.

“Khartoum Proposes September 3 for Talks with SPLA”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 August 2000

17 August 2000

General Abdel Rahman, Chairman of the Comprehensive Political Settlement Committee of the National Democratic Alliance, writes to Ambassador Daniel Mboya, Special Envoy, IGAD Peace Process for Sudan and to the Italian government with a Memorandum to the IGAD Secretariat. The Memorandum argues that the Sudanese conflict is not merely a north-south one and that: “Therefore the inclusion of the NDA in IGAD becomes necessary for the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement.” It re-affirms its support for the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and for the “coordination and merger of the [IGAD and Egyptian-Libyan] initiatives”. It concludes that:

“Lasting peace, if at all possible, requires a comprehensive political settlement through negotiations between the NDA and Government of Sudan. This is the best means to speed up the peace process and ensure the unity of the country.”

General Abdel Rahman Saed, Chairman Comprehensive Political Settlement Committee, National Democratic Alliance, “Letter to Ambassador Daniel Mboya, Special Envoy, IGAD Peace Process for Sudan and Memorandum to Political Settlement Committee (IGAD)”, 18 August 2000

18 August 2000

Responding to American criticism with regard to aerial bombing, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the US “openly sides with the rebel movement and offers it political and military assistance”. Regarding the accusations of bombing civilian targets he states: “The American administration repeats allegations by the rebel movement without bothering to verify them.” Bombing civilian targets “is not part of the government policy”, he adds, but accuses the SPLA of using humanitarian relief sites as “shields of protection”. He states: “It is legitimate to target the military bases of the rebel movement...[relief sites] have become venues of planning for attacking and occupying more [government held] towns.”

27 August 2000
Dr Ismail also refutes allegations that the Sudanese government targets relief workers in south Sudan. He states: “Not a single relief worker has ever been killed or wounded by the government while the rebel movement’s record is full of murdering, abducting and beating operations of the relief workers.”

“Khartoum Accuses Washington of Fanning War in Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 27 August 2000

27 August 2000 Ahmed Ibrahim Tahir, Presidential advisor for peace accuses the US of militarily and politically backing the rebels in the south and thus prolonging the war. He states: “America stands with the rebel movement and declares its military and political support.”


29 August 2000 The Sudanese Foreign Ministry accuses the US government of prolonging the Sudanese civil war. It states: “The US administration is one of the main reasons for the continuation of the war and the humanitarian situation in southern Sudan by encouraging the rebel movement to reject peace initiatives.”

It further claims that the US turns a blind eye to SPLA cease-fire violations, and that American condemnation of alleged Sudanese bombing of civilian targets was “unjustified and not supported by evidence”. It states: “It is not the policy of the Sudan government to strike civilian targets, but at the same time it reaffirms its right to hit military targets of the rebel movement which, regrettfully, is using positions and aid centres as a sort of protection.” It further blames the SPLA for instigating the fighting that prompted the 1998 famine in the Bahr al-Ghazal region and accuses it of doing the same thing again – using the declared cease-fire to launch an attack on Gogrial.

“Sudan Accuses US of Prolonging Civil War”, News Article by Reuters, 29 August 2000

1 September 2000 US envoy to Sudan Harry Johnston proposes that the Sudanese government immediately gives the southerner Sudanese the right to self-determination and offers to meet with southern and northern opposition groups to discuss these ideas during the forthcoming National Democratic Alliance meeting in Asmara.

The opposition Umma Party spokesman Hassan Ahmed al-Hassan rejects the proposals: “We are against such ideas because we want to first give a chance to a solution guaranteeing Sudan’s unity...We favour a peace accord giving the southerners the right to self-determination after a four-year transitional period in which the northerners and southerners try to rebuild trust between themselves.”
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“Sudanese Opposition Group Says It Opposes US Self-Determination Proposal”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 1 September 2000

2 September 2000 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the US could play a role in the peace process, but should distance itself from the rebel movement. He states:

“Everyone agrees that the American role in the installation of peace in Sudan is important. This role will be best if the US adopts a neutral position, and we in Sudan hope for such a position...For the past year, there’s been improvement in the American position, although the US has and continues to show favour toward the rebel movement...We are currently working to improve the American position some more so that it becomes neutral.”

“Sudan Calls for US Role in Country’s Peace Process”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 September 2000

2 September 2000 The foreign ministers of Egypt and Sudan meet in Cairo to sign eight cooperation agreements. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the meeting was the “crowning” of the process of normalisation between the two countries. The meeting discusses the rescheduling of approximately 70 million dollars of Sudanese debt to Egypt as well as measures to make travel between the two countries easier. Other matters are passed onto specialist technical committees for resolution.

“Egypt, Sudan FMs Meet, Crowning Normalisation of Ties”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 September 2000

3 September 2000 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir reiterates his willingness to normalise relations with the US, but not at the expense of Islamic law. He states: “We are prepared for serious dialogue for normalisation of relations with America...[but not] at the expense of the Sharia.” He reaffirms that: “Peace will be our topmost concern in the coming period. We will pursue a peace of dignity and honour to the people of Sudan and for this end we will continue dialogue with the country for unification of all Sudanese people.”

“Beshir Rules Out Sacrificing Islamic Law for Relations with US”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 3 September 2000

18 September 2000 The Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa declared Egypt’s support for Sudan’s candidacy for a seat on the United Nations Security Council: “There is an African and an Arab decision in Sudan’s favour concerning this issue.”

19 September 2000  
IGAD peace talks between the Sudanese government and the rebels are due to start again in Nairobi. However, SPLA leader John Garang states that: “Any peace talks are due to fail as long as [the Khartoum government] insist that sharia, the Islamic law, will remain the supreme law of the land.”

“Sudan Peace Talks Resume, Little Progress Seen”, News Article by Reuters, 19 September 2000

19 September 2000  
Sudanese Minister of Information Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, welcomes the fact that SPLA leader John Garang has expressed readiness to take steps towards a peaceful solution. This indicated “a new language”, he states, and hopes that it expresses a “true desire for peace”.

“Sudan: Government Says Rebel Leader’s Offer ‘Encouraging’”, News Article by IRIN, 19 September 2000

20 September 2000  
The Sudanese government delegation leaves for the latest IGAD peace talks in Nairobi. The Presidential peace advisor states that his delegation “is fully mandated to sign any agreement to be reached with the rebel movement”. However, he adds that: “The rebel movement is still unwilling to reach peace but this will not dissuade us from our peace efforts.”

“Government Delegation Leaves for Peace Talks in Nairobi”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 20 September 2000

21 September 2000  
The Sudanese government extends its cease-fire in the south by two weeks. Sudanese Information Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states: “The ceasefire has been declared to create an atmosphere conducive to reaching peace and stopping the bloodshed among the Sudanese people...for the success of the peace talks.”

“Sudan Government Extends Ceasefire for Two Weeks”, News Article by Reuters, 21 September 2001; “Government Declares Ceasefire in South Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 September 2000

25 September 2000  
During a seminar in Egypt Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi accuses SPLA leader John Garang of using the National Democratic Alliance to pursue aims that can only be achieved by military force. He cites Garang’s repeated calls for military victory and also accuses him of working in conjunction with the US government to “kill the Egyptian-Libyan initiative”. He further argues that the US government is working to eliminate Islam from Sudanese politics, to detach Sudan politically from North Africa, and to replace existing oil firms in Sudan with American ones.

“Sudan: Bashir to Meet Mirdhani as Garang Urges Arabs to Lend Him an Ear”, News Article by Mideast Mirror, 25 September 2000
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25 September 2000  In an interview with the magazine Mideast Mirror SPLA leader John Garang claims that he is a “guarantor” of “a new unified Sudan”, and accuses the Sudanese government of having a “hidden agenda to divide the country and undermine the cohesion of the Sudanese people...The NIF is seeking the south’s secession”. He further claims that he has always “called for harmonisation and coordination between the [IGAD and Egyptian-Libyan peace] initiatives”.

“Sudan: Bashir to Meet Mirghani as Garang Urges Arabs to Lend Him an Ear”, Mideast Mirror, 25 September 2000

26 September 2000  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir meets Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, leader of the opposition Democratic Unionist Party and head of the National Democratic Alliance, during his visit to the Eritrean capital of Asmara, in order to discuss moves to promote a political settlement in Sudan. This is the first time the government has ever had direct talks with the NDA. Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the meeting is in keeping with “the government’s priority of achieving entente and peace” in Sudan and expresses his hope that it will lead to “uniting ranks…and pushing the entire process forward”.

An NDA official states: “We have to agree on a general framework which will result in a forum for negotiation in which the two parties will commit themselves to negotiate in one forum which will be the result if the coordination and merger of the IGAD peace initiative and the joint Egyptian-Peace initiative.”

President Bashir declares that “the exploratory meeting we had was successful...We agreed that dialogue and not military means is the way of resolving problems”. A joint statement is issued which declares: “The two sides have expressed their determination to bring about a quick end to the war and the creation of suitable conditions for voluntary unity between the north and the south...The two sides have expressed their conviction that peace and stability of Sudan could only be achieved by a peaceful settlement and not by military means.”


28 September 2000  Salah Jalal, an Umma Party official, states that “the party welcomes the meeting and that it is in line with the instructions of the
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Umma party and its efforts for a comprehensive political settlement which emphasise the necessity of the serious work for the national agenda to end the war and to achieve democratic change through a political agreement.

“Sudanese Opposition Welcomes Merghany Bashir Meeting”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 28 September 2000

29 September 2000 At the end of its three-day annual conference Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party issues a closing statement backing fair and unrestricted political freedoms. It states that it will observe “lasting free and responsible democratic activity” without “political isolation and restrictions, except under the law to prevent political violence”. It declares its support for “political relaxation” as pledged by Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and its commitment to removing laws restraining freedom and guaranteeing “opportunities to all willing political parties for pursuing constructive political activities”. It also expresses its support for self-determination for southern Sudan and “optional unity based on the recognition of religious and ethnic diversity”.

The Party also notes “with satisfaction” previous contact by the government with opposition groups, including the Democratic Unionist Party, the Umma Party and the NDA.

“Sudan’s Ruling Party Backs Political Freedoms, Southern Self-Determination”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 29 September 2000

29 September 2000 The Sudanese government claims that SPLA forces attacked government forces in the southern Bahr al-Ghazal region and were repulsed. It also claims that SPLA is massing troops in the Eastern Equatoria state bordering Uganda and Kenya, with their potential military targets the towns of Torit, Mugiri and Kiyala.

“Sudan Accuses Rebels of Attacking Forces in South”, News Article by Reuters, 29 September 2000

30 September 2000 The United States vigorously campaigns against Sudan’s candidacy for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Washington is promoting a rival African group nation, Mauritius, for the seat for which the Organisation of African Unity had nominated Sudan. The Sudanese ambassador to the United Nations stated: “A superpower promoting a small country to contest another country against the will of the region is unprecedented. The permanent members should not get involved in such things.”

“U.S. Campaign Disrupts Sudan Bid”, News Article by Associated Press, 30 September 2000
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30 September 2000 Democratic Unionist Party leader and NDA head Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani leaves Asmara to travel to Cairo for meetings with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. It is reported that the talks will focus on preliminary meetings between the Sudanese government and other parties to discuss a date for holding a national dialogue.

“Merghani Starts Talks in Cairo About a Sudanese National Reconciliation”, News Article by KUNA, 30 September 2000

2 October 2000 At the close of the IGAD negotiations in Nairobi the Sudanese government issues an official statement. It defends its compromise proposals regarding religious freedom in Sudan. Whilst the SPLA continues to insist on full “secularism”, the Khartoum government proposes an implementation of Sharia “that at the national level …shall not affect the rights of non-Muslims…[and] at state level…shall apply only to states that co-opt for it”. The government also agrees with proposals from the IGAD national envoys regarding “a federal arrangement formula that gives the south full autonomy and guarantees fair wealth-sharing throughout the country”.

The Sudanese government also “reiterates its full commitment to the IGAD peace process being a viable framework for resolving the conflict of south Sudan”.

Although minimal progress is made at the talks a Sudanese government spokesman states that the gap between the government and the SPLA was “narrowing”. He further states that the Sudanese government is trying to come up “with a formula where the diverse cultures and … ethnic groups and…religious communities in the Sudan coexist” in order to “strike a balance between the right of each group and religion”.


5 October 2000 At a ceremony of welcome for visiting Eritrean President Issias Afeworki, organised by the opposition Umma Party, Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir affirms the necessity of giving further impetus to all Sudanese political forces drawing up a joint programme aimed at realising peace and national accord.

“President Al-Bashir Affirms Necessity of Giving Impetus to Peace Realisation Efforts in the Country”, News Article by SUNA, 7 October 2000
10 October 2000  Sudanese President al-Bashir reaffirms the government’s commitment to convening a preparatory dialogue forum for national reconciliation to be initiated on 16 October.


16 October 2000  The preparatory meeting for the Sudanese national reconciliation conference starts with more than 650 political figures attending.

“Preparatory Meeting Kicks Off in Sudan”, News Article by KUNA, 16 October 2001

16 October 2000  The Sudanese government declares a further temporary ceasefire for the period 16-27 October to enable UNICEF and government immunisation programmes to be enacted. It calls upon rebel forces to reciprocate and observe the ceasefire.


17 October 2000  Referring to tests conducted in the wake of allegations that the Sudanese government had used chemical weapons, a Spokesman for the United Nations Secretary-General stated that this medical team had: “gathered medical samples (blood and urine) from 13 of the 35 people who had reported symptoms. The samples were sent for analysis to the Centre for Disease Control (CDC), an independent laboratory in Atlanta.” The United Nations further stated that: “The results…as reported to the United Nations, indicated no evidence of exposure to chemicals.”

“Note for the Spokesman of the Secretary-General on Sudan”, Note delivered by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, Mr Philippe Borel, to the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, 17 October 1999.

19 October 2000  The Preparatory Forum for National Reconciliation issues a statement recommending a comprehensive cease-fire prior to the National Dialogue Conference to be arranged for the government and the opposition National Democratic Alliance by Egypt and Libya as part of their peace initiative. It also calls for the implementation of previously negotiated peace agreements reached with south Sudanese and Nuba mountain factions, recommends that power in Sudan be “peacefully devolved” under a democratic multiparty system, and that an office of prime minister, responsible to president and parliament, be created.

“Sudanese Pro-Government Forum Calls for Ceasefire, Recommends Premiership”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 19 October 2000
19 October 2000
Sudanese first Vice-President Ali Osman Taha affirms the government’s commitment to the recommendations and resolutions agreed in the Preparatory Forum for National Accord.

“First Vice-President Stresses Government’s Commitment to Recommendations of the Preparatory Forum for National Accord”, News Article by SUNA, 19 October 2001

19 October 2000
The Sudanese Presidential Advisor on Peace Affairs, Ahmed Ibrahim Tahir, meets with the European Union Ambassador. He stresses Sudan’s willingness to reach peace, and the stubbornness and apparent unwillingness of SPLA leader John Garang. He also welcomes any EU contributions to helping the peace process.

“Presidential Adviser Renews Government Desire and Seriousness to Reach Peace in Sudan”, News Article by SUNA, 19 October 2000

31 October 2000
The British government reiterated its findings when, referring to allegations of Sudanese use of chemical weapons, they once again stated that “there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations that chemical weapons were used in Sudan.


4 November 2000
Three days of talks between an Eritrean delegation and the Sudanese government end in Khartoum. Sudanese Information Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that Eritrean proposals will be “incorporated into other bids for peace and reconciliation in Sudan”.

“Eritrean Delegation Winds Up Talks in Khartoum”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 4 November 2000

6 November 2001
The Sudanese government announces that arrangements have been made with the SPLA and the United Nations regarding relief operations in southern Sudan.

“Sudan, UN, Rebels Work Out Arrangements for Relief Supplies to South”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 November 2000

6 November 2000
Mohammed Hakern, spokesman for the opposition Democratic Unionist Party, states that the Khartoum government must put its peace proposals in writing if the Eritrean mediation attempt is to succeed.

“Sudan Opposition Demands Peace Deal in Writing”, News Article by Reuters, 6 November 2000

8 November 2000
It is reported that opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi is planning to return from exile to Sudan. A letter from al-Mahdi to Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir containing proposals for a
“comprehensive political settlement through dialogue, far from fighting…within the context of a Sudanese solution and a national dialogue” has reportedly been delivered.

“Sudan Opposition Leader to Return Home This Month”, News Article by Reuters, 8 November 2000

**8 November 2000** The opposition National Democratic Alliance claims to have captured the northern Sudanese town of Kassala.

“Sudan Rebels Say Capture Eastern Town of Kassala”, News Article by Reuters, 8 November 2000

**9 November 2000** Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail accuses Uganda of procrastinating over the implementation of the agreement reached in September to normalise relations between the two countries.

“Sudan: Minister Accuses Uganda of Delaying Reconciliation”, News Article by IRIN, 9 November 2000

**14 November 2000** A three day seminar under IGAD auspices takes part in Nairobi to discuss the fair distribution of future oil revenues.

“Warring Sudanese Sides to Discuss Sharing Nation’s Wealth”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 November 2000

**15 November 2000** Opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi announces that he plans to return from exile to Sudan. He states that: “We think we are creating a dynamic that will make political plurality in Sudan a reality…This is what we are hoping other parties will do…We should advance to occupy the margin of freedom that exists.”

“Sudan Former Premier to End Exile, Returns Home Nov, 23”, News Article by Associated Press, 15 November 2000

**17 November 2000** Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that an agreement is near with the Umma Party that pushes forward the process of reconciliation. He reaffirms the government’s commitment to the pursuit of peace through dialogue.

“Sudan for Boosting National Reconciliation Efforts”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 17 November 2000

**17-19 November 2000** A three-day ministerial meeting takes place in Nairobi between the governments of Sudan and Uganda, under the auspices of The Carter Centre, with the participation of the governments of Canada, Egypt
and Libya and UNICEF representatives. The meeting concludes with a commitment to implement the Nairobi Agreement of 8 December 1999 and sets up various diplomatic mechanisms to oversee the process.


21 November 2000  Organisation of African Unity Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim states that the OAU will co-operate with IGAD. He also states that: “The OAU supports the IGAD member States’ effort seeking a peaceful settlement of the civil war in Sudan and welcomes the joint effort of Egypt and Libya to reconcile the Sudanese.”

“Salim Says OAU Supports Regional Peace Efforts”, News Article by PANA, 21 November 2000

21 November 2000  The eighth IGAD summit starts in Khartoum. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa states that the Egyptian government “seriously and persistently works for dialogue and historic reconciliation between the Sudanese parties”. He adds that the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative “cannot achieve its goals overnight” and that it might take some time to reach peace and reconciliation in Sudan.

“IGAD’s Ministerial Meetings Underway to prepare for Summit”, News Article by KUNA, 21 November 2000; “Participants Arrive for Regional Summit”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 November 2000

23 November 2000  Opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi attacks the NDA as living in “illusion”, and states that SPLA leader John Garang had no strategic thinking and had succeeded only in creating an army but not a political movement.

“Al Saddiq Last Interview Before Leaving Cairo”, posted on Sudanese@list.msu.edu, 24 November 2000

23 November 2000  Opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi returns to Sudan, accompanied by about 90 other Party officials. He states: “National duty dictates upon all the political leaderships to return home and continue dialogue for achieving a comprehensive solution to the conflict in the country.”

“Mahdi Returns to Sudan from Self-Imposed Exile”, News Article by Reuters, 23 November 2000; “Former Premier Returns As Hero”, News Article by PANA, 24 November 2000

23 November 2000  The Sudanese businessmen’s federation enters into an agreement with its Egyptian counterpart to form a joint council to foster trade
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exchanges and private investment between the two countries. The formation of a joint agro-industrial company is also announced.

“Sudanese, Egyptian Businesses Form Joint Council”, News Article by PANA, 23 November 2000

23 November 2000 A new IGAD summit starts to review a new plan to solve the Sudanese civil war. Eritrean President Issias Afeworki expresses his country’s willingness to assist “in finding a solution for the conflict in southern Sudan”. A draft resolution, proposed by Kenya, urging both parties in the civil war to speed up efforts to resolve the conflict “in a peaceful manner that guarantees the unity of the country”, is to be discussed.


26 November 2000 Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa has discussions with Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and Chairman of the National Democratic Alliance regarding the peace process. Al-Mirghani welcomes Egypt’s efforts to bring closer the viewpoints of the different opposition factions and the work of the Egyptian-Libyan initiative to achieve peace and reconciliation in Sudan.

“Egyptian Foreign Minister Discusses Sudanese Accord with NDA Leader Al-Mirghani”, News Article by MENA, 27 November 2000

27 November 2000 Ibrahim Radwan, a leading member of the opposition Democratic Unionist Party, returns to Sudan. He calls upon other opposition figures to return to Sudan and engage in a national dialogue.

“Sudan: Another Opposition Leader Returns Home From Exile”, News Article by Republic of Sudan Radio (Omdurman), 27 November 2000 at 1300gmt

28 November 2000 The Sudanese government reports that Eritrean troops and rebel forces have gathered in large numbers on the Eritrean side of the border with Sudan near the Sudanese border town of Qulsa in the central part of Kassala state. A high military alert is declared in these areas.


30 November 2000 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that he is ready to share power with opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi. He states that al-Mahdi’s return to Sudan “practically proved that the door is open to all opponents to come back home as there is no need for them to stay abroad and to carry arms”.

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1 December 2000 A Sudanese Army spokesman warns against plans, including bomb attacks, by the SPLA to destabilise the internal security of Sudan.

“Sudan: Army Spokesman Accuses Rebels of Plotting to Destabilise Country”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 11 December 2000 at 1900gmt; “Sudan: Rebels, Communists Accused of Planning Bomb Attacks in Three Cities”, News Article by Akbar al-Yawm (Khartoum), 10 December 2000

7 December 2000 European Union representative Catherine Boivineau, director of African affairs at the French foreign ministry, states that Sudan has made progress on promoting political and press freedoms since the EU and Sudan renewed dialogue a year ago. She states:

“We feel that some progress has been made on the issues which we have been discussing with the Sudanese government…[The EU] welcomed the new law on political association that encouraged some opponents to return home, a matter which testifies that there has been progress…The renewed dialogue with the Sudanese authorities was useful and frank…After a year we felt that the dialogue was very positive and that it was worthwhile continuing for another year to deepen the discussion and exchange views on those areas where we were not quite satisfied, particularly the peace process, which we feel is very slow.”

“EU Says Sudan Makes Progress on Individual Liberties”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 December 2000

13 December 2000 British Ambassador to Sudan, Richard Makepeace, states that Britain is continuing its dialogue with the US administration with a view to narrowing the difference between Khartoum and Washington and to convincing it of the real and positive changes that had taken place in Sudan. He also states that SPLA leader John Garang will shortly visit London for discussions about the peace process.

“Sudan: Britain Keen to Play Role in Peace Initiative, British Ambassador Says”, News Article by Al-Ra'y al-Amm (Khartoum), 13 December 2000

14 December 2000 The Sudanese Army states that it has recaptured parts of the Nuba Mountains from rebels, freeing 9,000 civilians it claims were being used as human shields by SPLA forces.

“Sudanese Army Says It Recaptures Parts of Nuba Mountains from Rebels”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 14 December 2000

15 December 2000 The NDA issues a press statement claiming to have carried out a series of attacks behind government lines near the town of Kassala.
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“Press Statement”, National Democratic Alliance, Unified Military Command, 15 December 2000 on Sudan-k@listserv.cc.emory.edu

**15 December 2000**
Libyan Minister for African Unity Ali Abdesselam Triki meets Ugandan Foreign Minister Eriya Kategaua in Tripoli to discuss bilateral relations and Libyan efforts to improve Ugandan-Sudanese relations. It is announced that a second four-nation meeting between Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Uganda, to follow up the normalisation of relations frozen since the first meeting in 1995, will take place.


**16 December 2000**
Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir meets a number of chairmen and leaders of political parties from the alliance of national parties and briefs them on the negotiations.

“Sudan: President Bashir Discusses Political Development With Party Leaders”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 16 December 2000

**18 December 2000**
Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir affirms the ties between Sudan and Egypt, stressing their common strategic interests. He also states that the natural resources of both countries could lead to a great degree of potential unity and integration between the two countries.

“Sudan: Ties With Egypt No Longer Strained, Bashir Says”, Sudan TV (Omdurman), 18 December 2000

**18 December 2000**
Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir sends a congratulatory message to US President-elect George W. Bush. He declares Sudan’s “keen desire to co-operate with the new US administration and work with it for the peace and stability of Sudan and the Region”. He further states: “We are looking forward to a new era when the Khartoum relationship would be based on close understanding and co-operation that would promote the interests of Sudan, the US and the other countries of the region.”

“Bashir Seeks Good Relations With the United States”, News Article by PANA, 18 December 2000

**18 December 2000**
The New Sudan Council of Churches reports on the third of the People-to-People Peace Process conferences that started under its auspices with the Wunlit conference in March 1999. The third conference, the Wulu People to People’s Conference, which took place 23-25 November, brought together the chiefs of the Bahr al-Ghazal, upper Nile and the Nuba mountains and the local administration in the area. The conference reviewed the
success of the “people to people” peace process to date and discussed the means of implementing and extending the previous agreements regarding abductees, border and natural resource disputes.

Makur Kot Dhuor, “Traditional Chiefs Call for Wider Tribal Conference”, News Article by African Church Information Service (Nairobi), 18 December 2000

18 December 2000  Brigadier Bushra Al-Fadil, long-standing supporter of the opposition NDA, returns to Khartoum after resigning from the opposition group. He states that Sudan is at a turning-point and emphasises the importance of negotiation with the government. He stresses that the Sudan of today is different from that of the 1990s and that the current government is committed to the honest pursuit of peace and to increasing freedom.

“Opposition Figure Bushra Al-Fadil Returns to the Homeland”, News Article by SUNA, 18 December 2000

19 December 2000  The Sudanese government accuses Uganda of sending arms to the rebel SPLA and of carrying out US policy by helping to oppose Sudan’s candidacy for the African seat on the UN Security Council. Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that Uganda is allowing non-registered NGOs to move weaponry and ammunition to the SPLA rebels, and helping them recruit child soldiers from Sudanese refugee camps in Uganda. He states: “Bilateral relations will improve only if the Ugandan government positively responds to this call [to cease assisting the SPLA].”

Ismail states he would still take part in a meeting next January in Libya with his Libyan, Egyptian and Ugandan counterparts to discuss the prospects of normalising Sudanese-Ugandan ties under an initiative sponsored by the US-based Carter Centre. Ismail further expresses his hopes that the new US administration would assume an “even handed” policy toward Sudan.

“Sudan Accuses Uganda of Shipping Arms to Rebels”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 19 December 2000

20 December 2000  The rebel National Democratic Alliance claims to have seized the garrison town of Karkoun in east Sudan. The Khartoum government claims that the attacks were successfully repulsed.


22 December 2000  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states the Sudanese constitution allows competition for power from anybody, and that he would accept defeat with the same spirit as victory. He again affirms that talks were continuing with the Umma Party on a national programme and agreement on power-sharing.
23 December 2000 The Sudanese General Electoral Commission announces that vote counting for the presidential and legislative elections had started. It reports an average 63 percent voter turnout in Khartoum State.

“Sudan Vote-Count Begins Amid Reports of Low Turnout”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 23 December 2000

23 December 2000 The Organisation of African Unity delegation monitoring the Sudanese election commends the efforts made by the Election commission in organising the polling and preparing an atmosphere conducive to elections and in enabling all presidential candidates to present their election manifestos through the media.

“Sudan: OAU Election Observers Praise Polling Exercise”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 23 December 2000

27 December 2000 Umma Party leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi welcomes the election of George W. Bush to the US Presidency and refers to the grave faults of the outgoing Clinton administration. President Clinton had supported radicalism and escalation of military activity by rebel Sudanese forces, he declares, and calls upon the new administration to reconsider such policies and to support a comprehensive political settlement.


28 December 2000 Ethiopia and Sudan agree to construct a joint railway line connecting the tow countries as another step towards improving relations between the two countries.

“Ethiopia, Sudan to Build Joint Railway”, News Article by Reuters, 28 December 2000

29 December 2000 Abdel-Moneim al-Zain Nahas, head of the General Election Authority, declares that General Omer al-Bashir has been re-elected President of Sudan, winning 86.5 percent of the vote. He also states that there was a turnout during the ten day polling period of over eight million out of 12 million eligible voters and that the elections were “fair and free and the candidates were given free access to the national media and to the voters”.

Opposition Presidential candidate Samuel Hussein Mansour declares that “the election was fair despite some irregularities by some immoral persons”. However, the opposition party, Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress argues that the elections were “cooked and prearranged”.

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President Omer al-Bashir renews pledges to end the civil war “through negotiation and dialogue” and states: “Our doors will be wide open to peace”.


29 December 2000 The Organisation of African Unity election monitoring team reports that the Sudanese elections were conducted “in a conductive atmosphere and in a democratic manner...[despite] boycotts by some major political parties”. They declare:

“[The election] allowed the Sudanese people, including those outside the country, to freely exercise their democratic rights...Having witnessed the various aspects of the electoral process, including administrative arrangements, campaign and polling activities, and having held discussions with all five presidential candidates as well as other parties, including those which boycotted the elections, the team wishes to commend the general elections authority for the arrangements.”

The OAU team also declared that “it was encouraging...that the leaders from all sides expressed their readiness and commitment to embark, after the elections, on a dialogue. This will hopefully bring about national reconciliation.”

“OAU Monitoring Team Says Sudanese Elections Encouraging”, News Article by PANA, 29 December 2000

29 December 2000 Sudan ratifies the constitutive act of the African Union

“Sudan, SADR, Ratify African Union Act”, News Article by PANA, 29 December 2000

30 December 2000 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir declares that his victory “proved to the world that [the Sudanese people] are for democracy, peace and political security”. He also promises that his new government will be broad-based and include a role for all parties, except that of Dr Hassan al-Turabi.


30 December 2000 Sudanese Army spokesman General Mohammed Osman Yassin refutes claims by the SPLA that it had seized control of an army garrison in eastern Sudan following two days of battles.
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“Sudanese Army in Control of Theatre of Operations – Army Spokesman”, News Article by KUNA, 30 December 2000

**30 December 2000** President Mubarak of Egypt telephones Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir to congratulate him on winning the Presidential elections.

“Egypt’s President Mubarak Congratulates President Bashir on Re-Election”, News Article by SUNA, 30 December 2000

**31 December 2000** Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika arrives in Sudan for a three-day official visit. The visit will include talks on bilateral relations, Arab and African issues and, according to some reports, an Algerian initiative to end the civil war.

“Algeria’s Bouteflika to Pay Rare Visit to Sudan”, News Article by Reuters, 29 December 2000; “Bouteflika Arrives Khartoum”, News Article by PANA, 31 December 2000

**31 December 2000** Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail clarifies Foreign Ministry rules regarding foreign diplomatic meetings with Sudanese opposition groups. He declares: “Sudan encourages diplomatic missions to meet opposition parties from right across the political spectrum. The circular sent out to diplomatic missions called upon them not to meet organisations that practise violence and terrorism.”

“Sudan Says Envoys Can Meet Non-Violent Opposition”, News Article by Reuters, 31 December 2000

**31 December 2000** Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir pledges to use his second term to advance peace in Sudan. He states: “Sudan is our homeland. It is the homeland for all of us. We are going to make the end of the war and the realisation of peace our first and utmost priority.”

President Bashir also appeals to the incoming US administration of President-elect George W. Bush “to take a neutral and positive position toward the realisation of peace in Sudan”.

“Sudan’s President Urges United States to Take a ‘Neutral and Positive’ Stand Toward Peace”, News Article by Associated Press, 31 December 2000

**1 January 2001** At the end of his visit to Sudan Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika expresses his optimism as to the advent of a promising era of friendship and co-operation between the two countries. An Algerian-Sudanese Commission is established to put into practice positive means of co-operation in various specific areas. Bouteflika also expresses Algeria’s
willingness to assist the peace process in Sudan. He states that he would “join hands with President al-Bashir for solving all issues that need contribution and coordination with efforts exerted by other parties for achieving national reconciliation”.

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir further makes a further call for peace in southern Sudan. In relation to President Bouteflika’s offer to mediate in the Sudanese civil war, President Bashir observes that a man “who managed to end the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, can settle other issues”.

Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Balkhadim states that although there is no specific Algerian initiative “there are efforts by President Bouteflika to bring viewpoints closer, making use of his relations with the government and the opposition”.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa states that the government hopes for an end to the Sudanese civil war during the new presidential term of Omer al-Bashir. He welcomes the re-election of Bashir and states Egypt hopes for the best of relations with Sudan and the continuation of the Egyptian-Libyan initiative for peace.

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states at a press conference that he is looking forward to a positive chapter in relations with the new American administration of George W. Bush, and that the errors of the past will be overcome.

As part of the state visit to Sudan by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika a joint meeting between him and Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir takes place in Khartoum. Peace initiatives and the security and stability of the Horn of Africa region are discussed. President Bouteflika states that he is “filled with optimism as to the advent of a promising era of co-ordination and co-operation between Sudan and Algeria”. Bouteflika also states that he is against any north-south division of Sudan and will defend “defend the unity of Sudan”. 
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“Sudanese, Algerian Delegations Discuss Bilateral Ties, To Issue Communique”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 2 January 2001; “Algeria/Sudan: Bouteflika Optimistic About the Future of the Relations Between the Two Countries”, News Article by Algerie Presse Service, 2 January 2000; “Sudan Welcomes Algerian Offer to Help Resolve Civil War”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 1 January 2001

3 January 2001

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the Sudanese air force is avoiding targeting civilians but will not allow rebels to hide behind “human shields”.

“Sudan Vows Not to Be Deterred by ‘Human Shields’ in War on Rebels”, News Article by Agence France Press, 3 January 2001

3 January 2001

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir extends the state of emergency for a further year.

“Sudan Extends State of Emergency for Another Year”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 3 January 2001

3 January 2001

A Sudanese diplomatic source states that foreign ministers of the IGAD peace negotiations will hold an important meeting next Tuesday in Khartoum to conduct an overall evaluation of the activities of the organisation, in the light of the recommendations made during the last IGAD conference in November 2000.

“IGAD Conference Due in Khartoum Next Tuesday”, News Article by KUNA, 3 January 2000

4 January 2001

Sudanese officials visit Libyan President Moamer Kadhafi, to discuss general African issues. A letter from Sudanese President al-Bashir expresses his thanks for Libya’s role in achieving reconciliation between Sudan and both Eritrea and Uganda, and in the process of national reconciliation within Sudan itself.


4 January 2001

Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the opposition Umma Party, alleges that US President Bill Clinton is planning to move 6,000 southern rebels to wage war in the north before he leaves office on 20 January. He claims that the US government was pressuring neighbouring Ethiopia and Eritrea to help in moving rebel forces to Sudan’s north-eastern border. He states:

“The Clinton administration’s strategy toward Sudan is based on three aims: separation of religion from politics in the state, seizing back control of the oil fields in Sudan from the Asian countries who are investing in oil production in Sudan and distancing Sudan from the Arab world and north Africa.”
5-13 January 2001 An American fact-finding mission to Sudan reported that Sadiq al-Mahdi: “claimed that the United States has been an obstacle to peace in Sudan and also to unity among the opposition. The United States’ policy has been a problem. He said that Sudan is like a pregnant woman that is about to deliver and needs a midwife to help the delivery. They all believe that the United States could act as a midwife. They all accept this. But, the United States, instead of helping deliver the baby, killed it...Part of the problem, he claims, has been that the United States by criticizing Islamic government in Khartoum and portraying this war as a religious war, has turned a political war into a religious war and other Christian communities in the Western world have joined this crusade.”


5 January 2001 Islamist leader Dr Hassan al-Turabi attacks President Bashir’s extension of the state of emergency. He argues that it is “expected to cripple all political forces which wish to conduct their activities from within [Sudan]”.

“Sudan’s Turabi Slams Extension of Emergency Law”, News Article by Reuters, 5 January, 2001

7 January 2001 Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa announces that he is about to visit Sudan again for two days in order to revitalise the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative

“Egypt’s Moussa to Push Peace Plan in Sudan”, News Article by Reuters, 7 January 2001

8 January 2001 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that during his new term of office he will see through “the regime’s programme covering the establishment of peace, freeing territories, reconciliation, development and improvement of society on the principles of religion and sharia”. He states: “The door is open to every patriot to join us in this process, (but) there is no agreement unless it is based on the principles of salvation. We call on all for reconciliation so we can build a new Sudan.”

“Sudan’s President Vows to Liberate Land, Impose Islamic Law”, News Article by Agence France Press, 8 January 2001

8 January 2001 The Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa visits Sudan for talks on bilateral relations and the peace process. He states that the time is right for a peace conference between the government and the opposition.
President Bashir defends his extension of the state of emergency, stating that it did not impede freedom of speech or political organisation. He declares: “The reality is that we have not violated any of the constitution’s articles that deal with freedoms and we haven’t obstructed any article from it...We haven’t violated the freedom of organisation nor the freedom of expression nor the freedom of religion. All these freedoms and others haven’t been touched.”

He further declares that the state of emergency will be cancelled once the constitution has been amended: “The National Council will discuss a procedure for constitutional amendment...After the National Council finishes placing these amendments, the reasons for working with the emergency law would be over.”

10 January 2001

It is reported that government forces have inflicted heavy losses on rebels in southern Sudan, sparking factional fighting amongst the rebels themselves.

11 January 2001

The British Ambassador in Sudan visits Sudanese Minister of Manpower Alison Manani Magaya to review bilateral relations. He welcomes government measures to solve the south Sudan problem and bring about peace and promises Britain’s continued support for the peace process.

13 January 2001

Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa states that the IGAD peace process is not sufficient to bring about an end to war in Sudan, but must be coordinated with the joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative. He states: “Everyone should know that the Sudanese problem will not be solved via the IGAD initiative alone, or IGAD’s partners in European and world capitals...The joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative for a comprehensive resolution is still correct...The Egyptian role in the issue is important and there can be no solution to [the conflict] without the Egyptian role.”
15 January 2001  
Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, Secretary-General of the ruling Sudanese party, the National Congress, discusses the progress of bilateral relations with the British ambassador in Sudan. He also affirms that the realisation of peace and stability in Sudan would be the most important priority of the government.


15 January 2001  
The Sudanese government claims to have killed many rebels in repulsing attacks around Aweil in the Bahr al-Ghazal region of south Sudan.


17 January 2001  
Mohammed Haroun Kafi, a government minister and a former SPLA commander in the Nuba mountains, states that over 30,000 civilians have fled from rebel-held areas in the Nuba mountains to seek sanctuary in government-held territory. He claims that: “These people have been under check by the rebel movement, not allowing them to move outside and at the same time [the rebels] could not provide them with any services.” The SPLA denies the claims.


17 January 2001  
Ambassador Awad al-Kerim Fadlallah, chairman of the Sudanese delegation in the Sudanese-European dialogue, calls on European Union governments – especially in those countries being visited by SPLA leader John Garang in January – to exercise political and diplomatic pressure on him to bring him to the negotiating table.

“Sudan Wants EU to Pressurise Rebel Leader Garang into Resuming Talks”, News Article by SUNA, 17 January 2001

19 January 2001  
At their annual meeting, the Roman Catholic Comboni missionaries in southern Sudan publicly condemned the civil war as “immoral and a tragic farce”. They stated that “the number of victims is escalating, especially among women and children. Spiritual, human and cultural values are getting lost. Corruption, tribalism and fratricidal hatred are fostered. Degradation, underdevelopment and anarchy increase”. The Comboni missionaries also pointedly stated that: “[t]he word ‘liberation’ is abused” and that the civil war was “not any longer a struggle for freedom of the Sudanese people and for the defence of human rights”.

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20 January 2001 In a meeting in Tripoli between Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, Libyan African Unity Minister Ali Triki and Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, the ministers state that “the Egyptian-Libyan joint initiative is the most correct and suitable way to achieve a national consensus in Sudan”.

“Egypt, Libya Press for Peace in the Sudan”, News Article by Reuters, 20 January 2001

24 January 2001 Extensive meetings take place in both Khartoum and Asmara, Eritrea, as part of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. SPLA leader John Garang arrives in Asmara, whilst NDA leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani holds talks with the IGAD ambassadors (Italy, Germany, France and Denmark) accredited to Eritrea. Al-Mirghani also meets with the US ambassador in Asmara to discuss ways of co-ordinating the IGAD and Egyptian-Libyan peace initiatives.


25 January 2001 During a visit to southern Sudan, President Omer al-Bashir states that: “Peace is the most important item in my second term of office and my first visit [since re-election] outside Khartoum is Juba to reaffirm the importance of peace.”

“Sudan’s Bashir Visits Town in War-Torn South”, News Article by Reuters, 25 January 2001

27 January 2001 SPLM spokesman Commander Yassir Arman issues an official press release claiming that the SPLA have attacked three oil wells in the Western Upper Nile areas. The SPLA renews its warning “to oil companies operating in the production areas that these areas are legitimate military targets”. The government states that no oil wells were destroyed and that only a minor “hit and run” raid had occurred in an outlying area well outside the oil production area.

The SPLA issues a further press release repeating its claims to have destroyed oil wells and to have routed government forces. It further states that it has “ordered its forces…to continue the current military operations in the area until all oil wells are brought to a halt”. It further threatens both the “installations or personnel” of the oil companies as “legitimate military targets for our gallant forces until the exploitation of oil is stopped”.

27 January 2001  Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Bishop Gabriel Roric Jur, in a Radio France International interview, states that there will be a referendum over the status of the south. Whatever its outcome, he argues, a referendum would improve relations between north and south.


28 January 2001  Sudanese Minister of Culture and Information Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that dialogue with all the political forces in Sudan will continue and that the government is committed to the Libyan-Egyptian initiative.

“Sudan: Government Keen to Continue Talks With Opponents, Minister Says”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 28 January 2001

30 January 2001  The National Democratic Alliance claims that its forces have captured and destroyed the government garrison of Malawia in the east of Sudan. The Sudanese government denies the claims, asserting that its forces had repelled a rebel attack on the road near the Malawia garrison and on a small police station south of Kassala.


31 January 2001  A third English-language newspaper, The Nile Courier, is set up in Khartoum. It states that it is encouraged “by the present tendency towards democratisation, liberalisation and national reconciliation…The Nile courier is an attempt to strengthen this tendency. As such, its main interest is to promote democracy, human rights, national unity and political freedom”.

“Sudan Gets Third English Language Newspaper”, News Article by PANA, 31 January 2001


4 February 2001
Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, Sudanese Culture and Information Minister, states that successful contacts had been made with the Democratic Unionist Party, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Alliance of National Parties regarding national reconciliation and power sharing. Discussions with the Umma Party were still taking place.

“Dr Salah-Eddin Describes National Congress Contacts With Other Political Parties as Successful”, News Article by SUNA, 4 February 2001

4 February 2001
An Ethiopian Army representative visits Sudan to discuss cooperation between the Ethiopian and Sudanese armies.

“Ethiopian Army Chief Arrives in Khartoum to Discuss Cooperation”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 4 February 2001

5 February 2001
The Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates meets with Sudanese Finance Minister Al-Shaykh Besh to discuss the Sudanese peace process. The UAE Ambassador expresses support for the unity of Sudan and also promises development help for southern Sudan.

“UAE Ready to Support Development Projects in South, Ambassador Says”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 4 February 2001

6 February 2001
Sudan’s first new opposition paper in a decade, Rai al-Shaab ("People’s Opinion"), allied to Dr Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress, is established

“Sudan’s First Opposition Newspaper in over a Decade Appears”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 February 2001

6 February 2001
Seven police officers are killed by a rebel attack on a police station in the eastern town of Issa al-Haj.

“Rebels Kill Seven Policemen in Attack on Police Station”, News Article by Associated Press, 6 February 2001

7 February 2001
The former southern Sudanese rebel group, the Equatoria Defence Forces, reaffirms its support for national reconciliation and calls for the implementation of the Khartoum and Fashoda peace agreements.


10 February 2001
The National Democratic Alliance claims to have seized and destroyed a government garrison and strategic bridge at Temenya, on 5 February. In an official press release the NDA Unified Military Command “assure[s] the Sudanese people that these surprise attacks will not only be
limited to Eastern Sudan, but will continue all over the theatre of war in the country."

“Press Release: NDA Commando Unit Captures GOS Garrison and Destroys Strategic Bridge”, by Dr Samson L. Kwaje, SPLA Spokesman, Nairobi, 10 February 2001

11 February 2001 Sudan hosts a 15-state summit of the Sahel and Sahara Community, attended by 12 Heads-of-State. The Summit is scheduled to discuss trade, health and drought cooperation, as well as security and peace issues and moves toward an African union.


11 February 2001 Libyan African affairs Minister Ali Triki describes recent meetings in Tripoli between the leaders of Libya, the opposition National Democratic Alliance and the Umma Party as positive and that agreement had been reached to continue dialogue in the framework of the Libyan-Egyptian peace negotiations.

“Libyan Official Describes Meeting of Two Sudanese Opposition Groups as Positive”, News Article by SUNA, 12 February 2001

12 February 2001 At the Sahel and Sahara Community summit Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi states that he felt that the Sudanese were determined about peace and reconciliation. He states: “Opposition leaders Sadiq El Mahdi and Mohammed Osman el Meghani have conveyed to me their desire for reconciliation with the government and I have appreciated their thoughts in this respect...We are hopeful of a similar response from the SPLA so that we can unify the people of Sudan.”

“Leaders Arrive For Sahel-Sahara Summit”, News Article by PANA, 12 February 2001

12 February 2001 At his swearing-in ceremony before 12 African Heads-of-State, Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that national reconciliation should be based on “mutual recognition between the government and the opposition...[that] citizenship is the basis of rights and obligations of the Sudanese...[and that] expression of diversity must be possible”. He re-affirms that government and opposition “must reach a peaceful solution, as part of regional mediation”. He also promises “multiparty elections”.

In a further speech to the Sudanese parliament Bashir calls for John Garang, leader of the rebel SPLA, to embrace efforts toward peace through national reconciliation.
15 February 2001  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi declares the
government of President Bashir illegitimate, but states that dealing with the
government is a fait accompli until fair elections are held. However, he also
states that there was a “common language” with the authorities and that the
political atmosphere is “conducive to a political get-together”.

“We have reached common positions with its representatives, which include the
establishment of principles for a comprehensive political solution in order to
achieve a conference of all factions in Sudan... We are closer now than ever
before to agreement on a comprehensive political solution that has everyone’s
approval.”

Al-Mahdi also states that other opposition groups, the NDA and the SPLA, have
recently adopted a more realistic approach: “We have noticed the NDA’s
realistic positions in terms of clear support for a comprehensive political
solution and a willingness to be part of it, which has prompted us to enter into a
dialogue with its leadership, having previously been robust with it in reaction to
the unrealistic nature of its former positions.”

(London), 15 February 2001; “Sudan’s Opposition Umma Party Says There is a ‘Common Language’ With
Bashir”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 16 February 2001

15 February 2001  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir meets with
Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi and Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi to
discuss possible Umma Party participation in the new government. Al-Mahdi
states that the meeting is “a good step forward”.

“Bashir Meets Al-Mahdi With Attendance of Ghaddafi”, News Article by KUNA, 16 February 2001

15 February 2001  A new political party, the Modern Sudan Party is
officially registered in Sudan. Its Chairman, Al-Amir Ali Umar Al-Tayyib states
that the party will work to establish a cohesive national unity, to achieve
national reconciliation, and to prevent the “internationalisation” of Sudan’s
problems.

“Sudan: Opposition Party Officially Registered”, News Article by SUNA, 15 February, 2001

16 February 2001  Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Dr Awad
Ahmad al-Jaz welcomes the return of Kuwaiti investment to Sudan, especially
in the fields of oil, mining and irrigation.
“Sudanese Minister Hails Return of Kuwaiti Investments to His Country”. News Article by KUNA, 16 February 2001

17 February 2001 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir leaves for Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to attend the annual Tigray region revolutionary day celebrations. Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that Sudan’s participation in the Ethiopian celebrations shows Sudan’s keenness to promote ties with its neighbours. Dr Ismail also states that President Bashir will be holding talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on bilateral relations and the formation of a joint ministerial council, on the proposals for an African Union, and the problem of Somalia.

“President Bashir in Ethiopia for Revolutionary Celebrations in Tigray”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 17 February 2001

17 February 2001 In an interview with The Washington Times Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that the Sudanese government has implemented a federal system of government and responded to the call for a fair distribution of power, wealth and development in Sudan. He argues that the steps taken by the government and its stance in peace negotiations demonstrated its seriousness in achieving peace. He further states that forgiveness and religious tolerance were observed in Sudan, calls for the accommodation of all shades of opinion in order to build a strong and united Sudan and argues that a “foreign agenda” was the major cause of ongoing crises in Sudan.

“President Says Government Keen to Realise Peace in South”, News Article by Sudan TV (Omdurman), 17 February 2001

17 February 2001 The Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council Radio states that the Eritrean government is allowing the rebel SPLA to deploy its forces in the western lowlands of Eritrea in order to hinder the ongoing cordial relations between Ethiopia and also to hinder the plan of constructing roads and pipelines from Sudan to Ethiopia. It states that 5,000 SPLA troops are currently in the western lowlands and that a further 6,000 are expected to join them soon.

“Eritrea Allows Sudanese Rebel Movement to Operate From Its Territory”, News Article by Eletawi Addis, Addis Ababa, 17 February 2001

18 February 2001 In a formal letter from the Sudanese opposition Umma Party to Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir the party turns down an offer of ministerial posts in the new government. The letter states that: “Our participation in the government can only come through a free and fair presidential, parliamentary and municipal election.” The letter also declares that the Umma Party prefers the formation of a national government in which all political organisations are represented. “Such a government”, it declares, “can
only be reached through an all-embracing national reconciliation that restores peace to the country.

Umma Party Chairman Omar Nour al-Diem states that the party will take part in government only after free parliamentary elections and a national accord to end the civil war. He also states that no formal offer of places in the new cabinet had been made by the government, although Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, Secretary-General of the National Congress party, had the previous week stated that the government was waiting for the Umma’s reply to an offer to join the cabinet. However, he also announces that the Party will continue its dialogue with the government on issues of democratic change and peace. He states:

“We will continue to talk to them on the issues of democratic change, the lifting of freedom-restricting laws and a lasting peace in the country...We have stressed to them the need to reject all sorts of violence and urged them to form a joint mechanism for consultation on constitutional matters, the issues of liberties and a just peace.”

“Umma Party Turns Down Offer to Join Government”, News Article by PANA, 18 February 2001;“Sudan’s Umma Party Sets Terms for Joining Cabinet”, News Article by Reuters, 19 February 2001

18 February 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail declares his hope that better ties with Sudan’s neighbours and increased aid to the south will deprive rebel forces of cross-border bases and hasten the end of the civil war. He states: “The more relations with neighbouring countries improve, the more this positively reflects on their relationship to the southern issue...We have an aid programme for the south, and it includes health, education, providing homes and food, and this will encourage the rebels in the jungle to come to the cities where there are services...We are also strengthening the ability of the southerners to rule themselves.”

Ismail also emphasises the high-level appointment of southerners to the new cabinet, namely Moses Machar to one of the two Vice Presidencies (a position traditionally reserved for southerners) and Gatluok Deng as Chairman of the Southern Coordination Council. He expresses his optimism about the chances of peace with the SPLA, but said that talk of a possible meeting between SPLA leader John Garang and President Bashir is premature. “I don’t deny there are efforts at the moment”, he states, “but it’s still too early to talk about meetings”.

“Sudan Sees Aid, Neighbourly Ties, Ending Rebellion”, News Article by Reuters, 18 February 2001

20 February 2001 Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, Sudanese Minister of Culture and Information, states that although it would have been better if the opposition Umma Party had joined in the government, dialogue will continue
via active committees working to bring the two sides together. He adds that the committees have agreed on a number of principles which will be announced in the future.


20 February 2001 The SPLA signs a “memorandum of understanding” with Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress. The agreement states that the two sides will try to coordinate peaceful strikes and protests to force President Bashir to “hand over power for a national consensus government”. It also calls for a “historic settlement and comprehensive peaceful solution to the problems…to end the civil war through a just agreement, real democracy, and the voluntary unification of Sudan”.

However, the SPLA later states that its commitment to “peaceful” action did not mean that it had stopped armed action.


20 February 2001 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir meets with Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi to discuss keeping open the channels of dialogue between the government and the opposition party.

“President Bashir, Opposition Leader Al-Mahdi Meet”, News Article by SUNA, 21 February 2001

21 February 2001 Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, Secretary-General of the ruling National Congress party, condemns the memorandum of understanding between Dr Hassan al-Turabi and John Garang of the SPLA. Dr al-Turabi and several of his supporters are arrested. Culture and Information Minister Dr Ghazi Salehuddin Atabani states that the memorandum is “conspiracy, subversion and a threat of violence…Those who are against the constitution or against peace will be dealt with in the same way the SPLA is dealt with.”


22 February 2001 The Sudanese Ministry of Transport and Communications announces that a detailed study of the construction of an Ethiopian-Sudan railway line is underway, which it states will help further strengthen and intensify bilateral ties between the two countries. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin also echoes his call for strengthened cooperation and partnership.
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22 February 2001 Representatives of all 15 of the registered political parties of Sudan meet to discuss the agreement between Dr Turabi’s Popular National Congress (PNC) party and the SPLA, and issue a statement “totally reject[ing] the said agreement and any other future agreements that would follow the same path of violence, considering that the movement of Garang was still continuing the war and the use of violence against the Sudanese society”. They further draw the attention of the PNC to the fact that as a registered political party it is bound by law to “abandon violence and to exercise rights through the democratic and peaceful means”.

“Political Parties Meet to Discuss Turabi Party, Rebel Agreement”, News Article by SUNA, 22 February 2001

24 February 2001 President Omer al-Bashir announces his new cabinet. It includes ministers drawn from the Democratic Unionist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the National Congress Party.

“Bashir Reshuffles Cabinet”, News Article by PANA, 24 February 2001

24 February 2001 The rebel National Democratic Alliance dismisses the Sudanese government’s cabinet reshuffle as “a mere limited change of faces and an exchange of posts…[that] will not help to solve the Sudanese crisis”.

“Sudanese Opposition Says Cabinet Reshuffle Will Not Help Bring Peace”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 February 2001

24 February 2001 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi travels to Egypt to hold talks with rebel NDA leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani as part of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Mahdi to go to Egypt to Meet With Sudanese Opposition Leader Mirghani”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 February 2001

24 February 2001 A Libyan-Egyptian-Sudanese meeting is held in Tripoli to discuss the implementation of the clauses of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Libyan, Egyptian, Sudanese Officials Meet to Discuss Concord Initiative”, News Article by Great SPLAJ Radio (Tripoli), 24 February 2001

24 February 2001 Muhammad Sirr al-Khatim al-Mirghani, one of the leaders of the opposition Democratic Unionist Party, returns from exile to
Khartoum. He meets with the Secretary-General of the ruling National Congress Party to discuss dialogue between the DUP and the Sudanese government.


25 February 2001  The opposition Umma Party declares that it is currently studying the mechanism for cooperation and coordination with the government to arrive at a national programme for a comprehensive political solution.


26 February 2001  Dr Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress reiterates its commitment to the memorandum of understanding with the SPLA, but reaffirms that “our joint programmes with the SPLA and any other programmes the party might agree upon with any political organisation will be implemented away from any sort of fighting because we are committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict in the country…the memo…called for popular resistance…by peaceful means…[that] can include dialogue, the media and demonstrations in conformity with the constitution and the political parties’ law”.

“Turabi’s Party Stands by Its Accord With SPLA”, News Article by PANA, 26 February 2001

26 February 2001  Dr Hassan Abdin, Sudanese Ambassador to Britain, states that Britain is qualified to effect positive changes in the progress of the Sudanese peace process, and to put pressure on the SPLA to realise peace. He adds that it has invited SPLA leader John Garang to Britain for discussions.

“Britain Can Pressurise Rebels to Realise Cease-Fire, Sudanese Diplomat Says”, News Article by SUNA, 26 February 2001

26 February 2001  Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail, at an Organisation for African Unity meeting in Tripoli, hails the role of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and reaffirms the Sudanese government’s commitment to a policy of openness and reconciliation “despite attempts by certain parties to make the conflict last because it serves their personal interest”.

“Sudanese Minister Hails Libya, Egyptian Mediation”, News Article by PANA, 27 February 2001

26 February 2001  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi meets Egyptian diplomats in Cairo to discuss the peace process. He restates his view that further democratic reforms are necessary in Sudan, but describes the situation there as “promising”, with a degree of political and press freedom.
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“Sudanese Opposition Leader Visits Egypt; Calls for Democratic Reforms”, News Article by MENA, 26 February 2001

26 February 2001

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, leader of the opposition National Democratic Alliance, states that it was agreed with the Egyptian Foreign Minister that the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative would call for a comprehensive national dialogue forum early in March.

“Sudanese Opposition Leader on National Dialogue to be Held in March”, News Article by MENA, 27 February 2001

27 February 2001

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi meets with an official Sudanese trade delegation to discuss Ethiopian investment in Sudan and the development of bilateral relations.


2 April 2001

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail reiterates Sudan’s desire to establish good and solid relations with the USA.

“Sudan Renews Desire for Good Ties With US”, News Article by KUNA, 2 April 2001

3 March 2001

A joint appeal for peace, entitled the “Sudan Call”, is issued by Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi and Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, head of both the Democratic Unionist Party and the NDA umbrella organisation, after a meeting in Cairo. President Bashir welcomes the Sudan Call. The appeal “contains several positive points”, Bashir declares, although he claims that “most of the provisions of the agreement have already been achieved”.

“Sudan’s Bashir Sees Opposition Peace Appeal as Positive”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 3 March 2001

4 March 2001

Sudan formally protests to the United Nations over UNICEF’s secret airlift of around 3,000 child soldiers serving with the SPLA from civil war frontlines to SPLA-held territory in Rumbek. They state that the children should have been returned to their families, and that the UN had reneged on its agreement to maintain transparency in its dealings with Sudan.

“Sudan Formally Protests Against UNICEF Airlift-Paper”, News Article by Reuters, 4 March 2001

4 March 2001

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir issues a press statement on his departure from Libya emphasising pan-African cooperation and looking forward to a new vision of US-Sudanese relations from the new US administration.
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“New US Administration Has New Vision in Dealing With Sudan, Says President Bashir”, News Article by SUNA, 3 March 2001

9 March 2001 Sudanese sources confirm that the US government has sent a “US paper for achieving a comprehensive political solution in Sudan” to government leaders, Sudanese opposition leaders, Egypt and Libya. The paper apparently proposes self-rule for southern Sudan. However, opposition sources deny having received copies of the paper.


5 March 2001 In a meeting with Sudanese ministers the French and Dutch ambassadors in Khartoum both emphasis their keenness to support the peace process and to exert efforts to end the war.


10 March 2001 Yassir Arman, official spokesman of the SPLA, states: “We and the al-Turabi group have common means, which do not include using weapons to overthrow the government. The SPLM has also its own special means. We will continue the armed struggle in accordance with the 1995 Asmara Agreement…We have the means of struggle, which include uprising, armed struggle, diplomatic pressure, and political solution.”

“Southern Rebel Spokesman Interviewed on Agreement With Al-Turabi”, News Article by Al-Sharq al-Aswat (London), 10 March 2001

10 March 2001 Raymond Brown, the US chargé d’affaires in Khartoum, meets with Minister-of-State for foreign affairs Chol Deng, and confirms the desire of the new American administration to build a good relationship with Sudan.

“Minister Meets US Envoy, Discusses Ties With US Administration”, News Article by SUNA, 10 March 2001

11 March 2001 Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, Secretary-General of the National Congress party, calls on the USA to stop providing support to the rebel SPLA and instead to assist in peace efforts.

“Ruling Party Official Urges USA to Stop Supporting Rebels”, News Article by SUNA, 11 March 2001

12 March 2001 The SPLA comments on the Washington-based International and Strategic Studies Centre paper on proposals to end the Sudanese civil war. It rejects the paper’s proposal for two systems within
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Sudan, which it feels is likely to push the government to reinforce its alleged efforts to divide the country. It also stated that the paper ignored the forces under the banner of the NDA.

“Government, Opposition, Rebels Reject US Proposal to End War”, News Article by Al-Ra’y al-Amm (Khartoum), 12 March 2001

13 March 2001 The Arab League Council issues a statement at the end of its 115th session in Cairo calling for the UN Security Council to end its sanctions against Sudan.

“Arab League Council Issues Statement at End of Cairo Meeting”, News Article by Egypt Radio (Cairo), 13 March 2001

13 March 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail announces that the Sudanese diplomatic mission in Washington would be re-opened soon.

“Sudan Set to Reopen Diplomatic Mission in Washington”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 13 March 2001

14 March 2001 President Bashir rejects the report by the Washington-based International and Strategic Studies Centre, proposing the formation of two political entities in the north and south of Sudan as a solution to the civil war. He states: “We categorically refuse both the content and implications of the paper...Still, Sudan does not consider the paper an official US policy statement because it has not yet been adopted by the American administration.”

“Bashir Rejects American Report on Sudan”, News Article by PANA, 14 March 2001

14 March 2001 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination starts its review of reports on how far Sudan has implemented the rights guaranteed in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Sudanese government affirms that the Constitution of Sudan acknowledges that the country is “a multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-cultural country”. It also affirms that this is an era of “constructive dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontation”, and that Government “did not defend wrong practices, and if there were violations, they were admitted”.


16 March 2001 The Roman Catholic Comboni Justice and Peace Commission releases the news that on 22 February SPLA forces attacked and
razed to the ground the town of Nyal, in the Western Upper Nile region. 15,000
people were forced to flee. The Comboni mission and church were also burned.

“Sudan Rebels Raze Town, Comboni Mission”, News Article by CWNews.com/Fides, 15 March
2001

16 March 2001 The US-based Human Rights Watch warns that
faction fighting between Nuer and Dinka factions within rebel forces could lead
to a famine unless the US intervenes diplomatically with rebel forces and other
parties.

“US Urged to ‘Influence South’”, United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network,
Nairobi, 16 March 2001

16 March 2001 Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, in his role as
Chairman of the IGAD subcommittee on the conflict in Sudan, reiterates
IGAD’s commitment to resolve the civil war.

“Kenyan President Willing to Push for Sudan’s Peace”, News Article by XINHUA, 16 March 2001

16 March 2001 Two leading NDA members, Dr Sharif Harir and Dr
Taisier Ali, issue an assessment of the CSIS Report. They state that they are
“dismayed” by the report’s analysis and recommendations. They argue that the
Report’s “focus on SPLM/A and a two systems one Sudan as a viable means of
resolving the conflict” is fallacious.

Dr Sharif Harir & Dr Taisier Ali, “CSIS Report: US Policy to End Sudan’s War. A Reaction From
Two NDA Members on the Eastern Front”, on Sudan-L@listserv.cc.emory.edu

16 March 2001 Prominent NDA activist Mahgoub al-Tigani issues
an “Open Letter to the NDA Leadership”. He denounces the SPLA’s
memorandum of understanding with Turabi’s Popular National Congress, and
denounces all partial and factional agreements by NDA members.

Mahgoub al-Tigani, “Open Letter to the NDA Leadership”, 16 March 2001 on Sudan-
L@listserv.cc.emory.edu

17 March 2001 Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, Sudanese Foreign
Minister, meets a Canadian parliamentary delegation led by Colleen Beaumier,
the vice-chairman of the Canadian parliamentary committee for foreign
relations. He outlines to the delegation Sudan’s developments in human rights,
its relief activities in war areas, and its views on the peace process. He calls on
Canada to play a positive role in attaining peace and stability in Sudan.

“Foreign Minister Briefs Canadian Parliamentary Delegation on Human Rights”, News Article by
Sudan TV, 17 March 2001
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17 March 2001  Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi reaffirms the IGAD commitment to resolving the Sudanese conflict and states his intention to visit Sudanese President Bashir in the near future.

“Moi States IGAD Stand on Sudanese Civil War”, News Article by PANA, 17 March 2001

18 March 2001  The French government urges the international community to work towards an end to the Sudanese civil war. It expresses its concern over the increase in the armed groups operating in Sudan, and affirms that French cooperation minister Charles Josselin will take part in IGAD meetings in Rome on March 21 to discuss the Sudan situation.

“France Warns of Dangers Linked With Sudan Conflict”, News Article by KUNA, 16 March 2001

18 March 2001  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi accepts an official US invitation to discuss with American officials Sudan’s civil war. He states: “We are looking forward to a more effective American role in adopting what comes in line with the will and desire of the Sudanese people...[The US] should back the right national agenda as adopted by our party and it should openly back the democratic transformation...instead of backing the war as well as backing one side of the Sudanese equation.”


21 March 2001  The second ministerial meeting of the Joint IGAD Partners Forum starts in Rome. In his opening speech of welcome the Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini expresses confidence that the IGAD Declaration of Principles “forms the basis of an equitable and sustainable solution to years of domestic strife. A broad consensus now exists that the unity of the country is a priority goal, in the context of democracy, self-determination, religious freedom and respect for human rights, and the multireligious and multi-ethnic character of Sudan”.

“Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Lamberto Dini, at the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Joint IGAD Partners Forum”, Government of Italy, Rome, 21 March 2001, at http://www.reliefweb.int/

23 March 2001  Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the United States should lift sanctions and withdraw its false allegations of slavery and terrorism before it can play a role in ending Sudan’s civil war. He states: “We acknowledge a role for the United States in ending the conflict and achieving peace in the south, and to help with the political and economic problems in the country … This would have to be based on the lifting of sanctions currently in place and an end to accusations that Sudan is a sponsor of terrorism and a haven for slave trading.”
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“Sudan Says Dialogue with US Must Precede America's Role in Ending War”, News Article by Associated Press, 23 March 2001

29 March 2001 The Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi arrives in Khartoum for talks with Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir in an attempt to reinvigorate the peace process.

“Kenya’s Moi Arrives in Sudan to Try to Revive Peace Efforts”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 29 March 2001

29 March 2001 Sudanese Vice-President Professor Moses Machar states that the government is keen and serious to work towards peace in the south and was attempting to create a suitable atmosphere for dialogue by its continuing call for a cease-fire. He commends the efforts of IGAD, and urges the rebel SPLA to respond by accepting the cease-fire and negotiating. He argues that the Sudanese government’s constitution guarantees self-determination for the south, and political freedoms, including freedom of worship.

“Vice-President Machar Urges Rebels to Respond to Calls for Cease-Fire”, News Article by Sudan TV, 29 March 2001

30 March 2001 A joint communique is issued by Presidents Bashir of Sudan and Daniel arap Moi of Kenya concerning the IGAD peace initiative. It states: “The two countries agreed that the search for a just and lasting peace in Sudan should continue under the auspices of IGAD and under the chairmanship of President Moi.” The communiqué also agrees to hold a regional IGAD summit “as soon as possible...to take stock of the mediation efforts and chart the way forward in the interest of peace in Sudan”.

The Sudanese government proposes a federal structure for Sudan, with a general referendum to allow Southerners to choose between federal rule or an independent state of their own.

“Sudan, Kenya Presidents Agree to Peace in Sudan”, News Article by Reuters, 30 March 2001; “Presidents of Kenya, Sudan Call for Regional Summit to Discuss War”, News Article by Associated Press, 30 March 2001; “Moi, El-Bashir Push for IGAD Summit on Sudan”, News Article by PANA, 31 March 2001

30 March 2001 The Islamic Development Bank, based in Saudi Arabia, grants two loans to Sudan totalling US$17.2 million to finance railway development and relief development projects for those displaced by war in the mid-west.

“Sudan Gets 17.2 Million Dollars IDB Loan”, News Article by PANA, 30 March 2001
3 April 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states: “we hope the dialogue and contacts that started with the new [US] administration will result in establishing good relations based on mutual respect and joint cooperation in issues of mutual concern.”


3 April 2001 The Humanitarian Aid Commission in Sudan presents a Sudanese government letter of protest to the Adventist Development and Relief Agency. The government protests the presence of ADRA workers without visas, and their operation near SPLA military bases, giving rise to the suspicion that they were assisting the rebels’ military activities. The ADRA had previously been expelled from the Chukudum region in 1997 for such support.

“Commission Protests Against Activities of Relief Agencies”, News Article by Republic of Sudan Radio (Omdurman), 3 April 2001

3 April 2001 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak tells US President George Bush that “partition of Sudan was not an option”, although whether Sudan adopted a federal system was an internal issue.

“Partition of Sudan Not an Option: Mubarek”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 3 April 2001

5 April 2001 As part of a programme to incorporate international humanitarian law into the training of Sudanese armed forces, 40 Sudanese Air Force officers attend a law of war course in Khartoum organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation in Sudan. The Commander of the Sudanese Air Force affirms his commitment to ensuring that all Air Force personnel apply the law.


6 April 2001 Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin meets with a Sudanese delegation to Addis Ababa to discuss peace and stability in Sudan, and reaffirm their support for the IGAD peace process there.

“Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Sudanese Delegation Discuss Crisis in Somalia”, News Article by Radio Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), 6 April 2001,

7 April 2001 Sudan names Khidr Haroun as the new chargé d’affaires to head the Sudanese diplomatic mission in Washington.

“Sudan Names Diplomat to Take Charge of Reopened Washington Embassy”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 April 2001

7 April 2001 The Sudanese government announces that it will take firm steps against those aid agencies who are aiding rebel forces. It notes the use
of relief planes to ferry SPLA soldiers, and other involvement in rebel military and political activities.

“Official Accuses Unnamed Agencies of Helping Rebels in South”, News Article at Al-Ra’y al-Amm, 7 April 2001

8 April 2001 SPLA rebels threaten to attack international oil workers operating in Southern Sudan.

“Sudan Rebels Threaten Oil Workers”, News Article by BBC News World Service, 8 April 2001

9 April 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail visits Eritrea for talks with Eritrean President Issias Afeworki. To discuss bilateral ties, the IGAD peace process and economic relations.

“Eritrean President Receives Message From Sudanese Counterpart”, News Article by Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea (Asmara), 9 April 2001

10 April 2001 The rebel SPLA accuses the Sudanese government of cooperating with Iraq to produce chemical weapons for use in the civil war. The Sudanese government categorically denies the accusation which it states is “an old allegation…[to] mislead world opinion”.

“Sudan, Iraq Collaborate on Chemical Weapons, Rebels Charge”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 April 2001; “Sudan Denies Military Cooperation With Iraq”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 12 April 2001

11 April 2001 The Sudanese government emphasises the importance of activating the Fashoda peace agreements of 1993/1997 and implementing its articles. It states that there is no intention of amending the Agreement.

“No Amendments to Peace Agreements, Minister Says”, News Article by Akhbar al-Yawm (Khartoum), 11 April 2001

13 April 2001 The Nigerian government pledges to help resolve Sudan’s civil war. It states that it was planning the formation of a forum of African friends of IGAD (to include Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) similar to the IGAD Friends forum involving the US and the EU.


14 April 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail expresses his optimism over the forthcoming IGAD summit. A breakthrough is possible, he states, if the rebel movement shows sincerity and goodwill.
17 April 2001

The SPLA claims that it has repulsed an attack by government forces in Benderu, southern Blue Nile. Its statement declares that the SPLA will continue its armed struggle for “widening the margins of freedoms and capturing all the rights”. Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi urges the SPLA to accept a cease fire in order to participate in peace negotiations.

17 April 2001

Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi expresses his favourable view of the new US administration playing a greater role in Sudanese problems and hopes that it avoid the pitfalls of the previous administration. He also states that the Umma Party is drawing up a comprehensive vision for cooperation between the Party and the government in the light of the new situation.

18 April 2001

Dr Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress declares that although the government should lead efforts to end the civil war, it would not stop its own contacts with the SPLA.

22 April 2001

The UN Human Rights Commission urges Sudan to “take immediate steps in order to put in place a global, lasting and effectively monitored ceasefire as a first step towards a negotiated settlement to the conflict”.

Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that it views the UN call favourably, affirming that the government has always advocated a comprehensive ceasefire as a prelude to a negotiated settlement. He also comments that a ceasefire initiative would be considered at next week’s IGAD summit in Nairobi. He further states: “We are convinced that the south Sudan problem cannot be resolved militarily and a political solution should be sought.”
22 April 2001 Sudanese officials attend a meeting of the Ethio-Sudanese Joint Border Commission and describe the ties between the two countries as “exemplary to other countries’ peace and development efforts”.

“The Ethiopian, Sudanese Officials Praise Bilateral Border Cooperation”, News Article by XINHUA, 22 April 2001

22 April 2001 A Government-appointed legal panel to investigate Umma Party claims for indemnities for its confiscated properties starts its deliberations.

“Government Panel Probes Opposition’s Indemnity Claims”, News Article by PANA, 22 April 2001

23 April 2001 Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress party states that it is ready to negotiate with the Khartoum government on certain conditions.

“Former Speaker Turabi’s Party Said Ready to Negotiate With Ruling Party”, News Article by Akhbar al-Yawm (Khartoum), 23 April 2001

24 April 2001 Former US President Jimmy Carter, now head of the Carter Centre which operates peace and disease control programmes in Sudan, states that the new US administration should strive to bring peace to Sudan rather than overthrow its government. He states:

“It is unfortunate that US policy is not devoted to bringing peace to Sudan where people are suffering from the disease and destruction of civil war…I requested [Vice President Dick Cheyne, Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice] to bring peace in Sudan and not to overthrow the Khartoum government…For the last eight years the US has had a policy which I strongly disagree with in Sudan, supporting the revolutionary movement and not working for an overall peace settlement. My hope is that the new administration in Washington…will be working now towards a reconciliation with the Khartoum government and the revolutionary forces in the south.”


24 April 2001 An official Sudanese Army spokesman claims that government forces are in full control of the Blue Nile area in south-eastern Sudan. He also claims that a number of former rebel commanders have defected to the government. The rebels claim that government forces are engaging in “wide scale, aggressive attacks…intended to wipe out all villages…genocide”. It calls for “armed rebellion” against the government. It claims that “the
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cosmetic calls of freedom, reconciliation, prosperity spread by their [propaganda] media and agents”. The SPLA also claims that it has repulsed government forces and maintains control of key towns.


25 April 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the increased campaign of allegations of slavery in Sudan were started in order to cripple the peace process. He expresses his confidence in Sudan’s ability to refute and overcome the false charges.


25 April 2001 A conference of over 100 pro-government militia force leaders meets in Juba. The conference, taking place under the auspices of the Southern Coordination Council, discusses the cease-fire commission and the Joint Military Committee which should have been formed under the Khartoum Peace Agreement. The Conference emphasises the importance of maintaining the unity of the faction in order to maintain peace.

“Over 100 Pro-Government Militia Commanders Meeting in Juba”, News Article by The Khartoum Monitor, 26 April 2001

26 April 2001 The United Arab Emirates calls upon party leaders within Sudan to discuss possible ways of ending disputes and the armed conflict in Sudan. A joint peace initiative supervised by the UAE-based Zayid Centre for Coordination and Observation and the Carter Centre is proposed.

“UAE, Carter Centre to Form Joint Initiative for Peace in South”, News Article by Republic of Sudan Radio (Omdurman), 26 April 2001

26 April 2001 The Sudanese government welcomes the joint initiative by former US President Jimmy Carter and the United Arab Emirates to end the civil war.

“Sudanese Government Welcomes Carter’s Initiative to End the War in Southern Sudan”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 26 April 2001

28 April 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail rejects the SPLA proposal that it suspend oil operations as a condition for a comprehensive ceasefire.

“Sudan Rejects Proposal to Suspend Oil Operations in Return for Truce”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 April 2001
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29 April 2001  The SPLA claims victory in fighting in the border areas near Ethiopia – claims denied by the Khartoum government. SPLA spokesman Yassir Arman again declares that a comprehensive ceasefire can only take place “if all operations of oil excavation and crude oil exports are also ceased”.

“Sudan’s Rebels, Government Each Claim Upper Hand”, News Article by Associated Press, 29 April 2001

29 April 2001  The International Monetary Fund agrees for the first time in 17 years to lay down a rescheduling formula for Sudan to repay its 20 billion dollar debts.

“IMF Agrees Formula for Rescheduling Sudan’s Debts”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 29 April 2001

30 April 2001  In the bilateral Ethiopian-Sudan meeting in Addis Ababa the Ethiopian Foreign Minister declares that “Sudan and Ethiopia are opening a new chapter in the history of their cooperation”. Both Foreign Ministers express their support for the peace process in Somalia.

“Ethiopia and Sudan Announce New Chapter of Cooperation”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 April 2001

30 April 2001  Sudanese Minister of Information and Communications Dr Ghazi Salehuddin Atabani holds the rebel movement fully responsible for the continuation of the civil war and for putting impossible conditions for a cease-fire. He argues that the US administration should pressurise the rebels to accept a cease fire, and emphasises the government’s concern to enable relief services and supplies to reach all war-affected peoples.

“Minister Says ‘Impossible Conditions’ by Rebels Blocking Cease-Fire”, News Article by SUNA, 30 April 2001

1 May 2001  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir accepts an invitation to visit Egypt to discuss “ways of reviving the Egyptian-Libyan initiative for reconciliation”, as well as trade and economic links.

“Sudanese President in Egypt Next Week: Press”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 1 May 2001

2 May 2001  A Sudanese government spokesman states that SPLA demands that oil development cease as a condition for a comprehensive ceasefire were “unacceptable conditions”. He points out that previous demands were that a “comprehensive political settlement” be reached before a ceasefire could be established. He further states that the Sudanese government feel that
The SPLA does not a “clear cut objective” and were deliberately blocking talks. In contrast, he argues that the Sudanese government would “keep all doors open” to attain a peaceful end to the civil war.


2 May 2001 Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Chol Deng states that the continued inclusion of Sudan by the US government in its list of alleged sponsors of terrorism was “incorrect”, and that US official should know this because Sudan has co-operated with them. The report failed “to reflect” the cooperation that Khartoum has given Washington to ensure there was no support for terrorism within Sudan.


3 May 2001 The United States loses its seat on the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission. Sudan is elected. The United States had held a seat on the body since it was established in 1947. The Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail commented that the ouster of the United States indicates its isolation from the mainstream of human rights issues. He said that it was an unequivocal message that it should reconsider its human rights policies and previous unjust resolutions.


3 May 2001 At the end of the three-day summit between Ethiopia and Sudan a political and cooperation agreement to develop road and trade links is signed. A joint statement also declares that the “two sides also discussed the implementation of a preferential trade arrangement, which would ultimately lead to the creation of a free trade area between the two countries”. It is agreed that entry visas and passports for diplomatic and business travellers will be abolished between the two countries.


4 May 2001 Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi meets SPLA leader John Garang in a meeting sponsored by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo but fails in an attempt to unify opposition ranks for negotiations with the Khartoum government. In an SPLA statement Garang states that the SPLA and the NDA welcomed any call for peace talks with the government, but warned that existing “open channels” of communications with the government
did not need an opposition group to coordinate or mediate, because “this has no meaning”.  

Al-Mahdi and Garang agree to meet again in June in Abuja for further talks.  

“Sudan’s Ex-Prime Minister Meets Rebel Leader in Nigeria”, News Article by Associated Press, 4 May 2001  

5 May 2001 The Umma Party rejects an invitation by the SPLA to rejoin the National Democratic Alliance. Umma Party President Sadiq al-Mahdi states that the NDA is “no longer in existence and has been overtaken by events”.  

“Sudan’s Opposition Umma Party Rejects Invitation to Rejoin Party”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 5 May 2001  

6 May 2001 Sudan announces that a political committee formed from the Sudanese and Ethiopian joint ministerial committee will hold its meeting next October to review and evaluate all bilateral agreements. Security and Military committees will also be formed.  

“Sudanese, Ethiopian Joint Committee Agree to Form Security, Military Organs”, BBC Monitoring Service, 6 May 2001  

8 May 2001 Nigeria sends an envoy to Sudan to pursue a new peace initiative, a week after President Olusegun Obasanjo met rebel and opposition leaders.  

“Nigeria Launches Own Peace Initiative”, News Article by Reuters, 8 May 2001  


“Government to Restructure Peace Advisory Council”, News Article by Al-Ra’y al-Amm (Khartoum), 9 May 2001  

10 May 2001 Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi arrives in Sudan for talks with Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir to discuss the Egyptian-Libyan peace issues, and other issues of bilateral concern.  

“Kadhafi in Sudan to Discuss Bid for Peace”, News Article for Agence France Presse, 10 May 2001 at 09:41:03  

10 May 2001 The Sudanese government accuses the SPLA of shooting and fatally inuring a pilot on a Red Cross relief plane over rebel-held territory.
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“Sudan Accuses Rebels of Killing Red Cross Pilot”, News Article by Reuters, 10 May 2001

11 May 2001

The governments of Uganda and Sudan agree to implement the Nairobi Agreement signed by the two countries in 1999 with the aim of improving their relations. Liaison officers are appointed to work on implementation in both countries, and Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir is invited to attend the swearing ceremony of Ugandan President-elect Yoweri Museveni.

“Uganda, Sudan to Improve Their Relations”, News Article by XINHUA, 11 May 2001

11 May 2001

The Libyan and Sudanese leaders agree to try to arrange talks between the Sudanese government and opposition and rebel groups.

“Libya, Sudan Plan Peace Talks with Sudan Opposition”, News Article by Reuters, 11 May 2001

14 May 2001

The SPLA states that it could not commit itself to an Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative as the IGAD peace process takes precedence. An SPLA statement declares: “It is unfeasible for the People’s Movement to negotiate under the IGAD initiative and other initiatives at the same time on the same issues”.

“Sudanese Rebels Say They Can’t Commit to Egyptian-Libyan Peace Drive”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 14 May 2001

14 May 2001

Opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi blames John Garang and the SPLA for the failure of the recent Nigerian-sponsored talks in Abuja to unify opposition ranks and arrange peace talks with the government. Al-Mahdi states: “Garang has used a clear tactic to add other issues to our discussion (and) bring our meeting in Abuja to a failure.”

Al-Mahdi also argues that some quarters – which he did not name – were dictating to Garang to make him continue fighting.


15 May 2001

At a UN conference on the world’s least developed nations in Belgium, Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that the government is ready to implement “an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire” and start serious negotiations for the achievement of a comprehensive peace, on the condition that the SPLA agrees to the same.

“Government ‘Ready for a Ceasefire’”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 15 May 2001
Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha reaffirms the government’s “commitment to the peaceful political solution rather than the option of confrontation. It is...based on agreement to pursue a rational policy based on pluralism and all the basic human rights that guarantees public and private freedoms and upholds the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary”.

He also states that the government has succeeded in keeping contacts open with “all the political forces” of the opposition and rebel movements, with the exception of John Garang’s SPLA. He adds that, unfortunately, the rebel movement “is meanwhile keeping its own cards to itself, is hesitant and reacts to any initiative or proposals with reservations or rejection”.


Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo launches a new peace initiative to end the Sudanese civil war.

“Nigerian President Continues Talks `to End War in Sudan’”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 May 2001

The Sudanese opposition Democratic Unionist Party, led by Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, states that a group of Sudanese opposition groups will be meeting in Cairo on June 1st in order to revive the joint Libyan-Initiative.

“Sudanese Oppositions to Hold Meeting in Cairo”, News Article by ArabicNews.com, 22 May 2001

Former Sudanese head-of-state retired Field Marshal Abd al-Rahman Swar al-Dahab (who seized power in 1985 but resigned a year later after organising democratic elections) has meetings in Kano with the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo regarding his peace initiative and accuses the US of fomenting the civil war. He states:

“The West, headed by the United States, does not want Sudan to prosper, hence they ignited the civil war which has cost Sudan so much...The United States is strongly supporting the dissidents led by Colonel John Garang. They are giving him arms and money.”

“Former Sudanese Ruler Accuses US of Starting Sudan’s Civil War”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 May 2001

Canadian Foreign Minister John Manley expresses “concern over the tragic situation in Sudan”, criticises both sides in the civil war, and calls the “re-energisation” of the peace process under he auspices of
IGAD. He states that a Canadian special envoy, Senator Lois Wilson, will be travelling to Africa in June to “seek every appropriate opportunity for a more active search for peace in the region”. He also adds that Canada will continue to help funding IGAD.


24 May 2001 The Sudanese government states that it has decided to cease air raids on rebel targets in south Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. Information Minister Dr Ghazi Salehuddin Atabani states that: “[The decision was taken] in pursuance of the state’s set policy for achieving peace and stability, bolstering the reconciliation process and the continued call by the State for a comprehensive ceasefire…[However, the army reserves its right of] protecting its individuals and supply lines and coping with any aggression aimed at achieving any battlefield gains in manipulation of this decision. The government calls upon the other parties for an immediate response for boosting the peace process in the country and appeals to the international community to back up the call for a comprehensive ceasefire.”

However, the SPLA claims a further military victory in the Blue Nile province. SPLA spokesman Yassir Arman states: “SPLA forces have repulsed attacks by government forces in the Chali region, downing helicopters, and scattering the government troops after killing more than 3000 soldiers.”

“Sudanese Government Declares Halt to Air Raids in South”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 May 2001

25 May 2001 The US State Department announces that it has agreed to supply $3 million worth of logistical support to the National Democratic Alliance. This is in addition to $10 million approved by Congress last year for logistical support for Sudanese rebels.


25 May 2001 Stephen Morrison, Director of the Sudan project of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, criticises US aid to the rebel SPLA. He states: “This package [of aid] feeds false hopes and expectations on the part of the southerners and sustains excessive paranoia in Khartoum.”


26 May 2001 The Sudanese government condemns the US decision to aid Sudanese rebels. A statement declares: “[The agreement]
violates all efforts under way to achieve a just and peaceful solution to the problem of southern Sudan. It will only lead to more bloodshed and killings.”


“Sudan Slams Planned US Aid for Southern Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 26 May 2001

27 May 2001 US Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Sudan’s southern neighbours. He promises increased food aid to both sides in the civil war. In a statement in Uganda he declares that the Bush administration’s review of Sudan policy was almost complete. He welcomes Sudan’s cessation of bombing but states that “this is a good step but it can’t just be for a short time...We will measure their behaviour, their response to our actions and see whether or not we have a basis for moving forward”. He also states that the US will soon name an envoy to Sudan as part of more active efforts to resolve the civil war.

“Powell Pledges More Efforts to End Sudan War”, News Article by Reuters, 27 May 2001

27 May 2001 The Sudanese Communist Party harshly criticises its fellow NDA member the SPLA for moving toward a secessionist position. It states that the SPLA “has deviated from its declared unitary stance and begun to call for a confederation and recently for a southern state that includes northern territories”. It also adds that it is not party to the SPLA’s “clandestine objectives”.

“Sudan’s Communist Party Accuses Southern Rebels of Secessionism”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 27 May 2001

28 May 2001 The two main rival rebel movements in Sudan, the SPLA and Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Democratic Front, announce at a meeting in Nairobi that they will merge in order to step up the war against the Khartoum government. However, at the same meeting another small rebel group accuses the SPLA of planning an attack upon it.

“Southern Sudan’s Two Rival Movements Announce Merger”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 May 2001; “Sudan Rebel Group and Former Rivals Reunite”, News Article by Reuters, 28 May 2001

28 May 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, at a press conference in Oslo following a meeting with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, states that he is optimistic that a ceasefire could be agreed upon at the June 2 IGAD meeting. He states that: “Everybody wants this war to stop, everybody wants a ceasefire. And [the Khartoum government] wants this ceasefire to be accommodated by a serious negotiation that could lead to a final settlement.”

“Sudan Government Eyes Peace Ahead of June Meeting”, News Article by Reuters, 28 May 2001
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30 May 2001  

The SPLA launch a major offensive on the eve of the IGAD peace talks, claims to have captured two garrison towns, in southern Sudan, Diem Zubeir and Sopo, to have destroyed a full battalion of government troops. The Khartoum government claims that it is still in control of Diem Zubeir.

“SPLA Rebels Claim Capture of Second Key Town in Southern Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 May 2001

1 June 2001  

In an interview with Newsweek SPLA leader John Garang further accuses the Khartoum government of being a “terrorist state”, of practising “gross human-rights violations...genocide”. He declares himself a “freedom fighter” and the SPLA as a “human-rights movement”. Responding to criticisms of his own forces by some human rights organisations he attributes them to “mistakes that happen” in the context of “a war situation in which you have in places outlaws, people who are against anybody”. He argues for “two states, two separate constitutions” as a solution to the civil war.

“Sudan: ‘Let Us Have Two Constitutions’”, Newsweek, 1 June 2001

2 June 2001  

Thirty minutes before the Nairobi IGAD summit is due to start the SPLA faxes a statement to Associated Press stating that it has captured the southern town of Raga. The statement declares that “this was an excellent timing...The SPLA has the power to meet force with force”.


2 June 2001  

Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi opens the IGAD summit. Hailing the presence of both Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and SPLA leader John Garang, calling on them both to “engage in sustained negotiation with greater determination”. He also urges the two sides to declare a “comprehensive ceasefire”. In his speech Moi also lists the four main obstacles to peace: eligibility to vote in a self-determination referendum for the south; separation of religion and state; the system of government to be installed during an interim period; and the sharing of resources.

However, against the backdrop of a full-scale SPLA offensive, the one-day conference ends with no agreement on a ceasefire. The Kenyan Foreign Minister states: “The parties have committed themselves to work towards concluding a ceasefire agreement but in the circumstances it appears it was not possible to agree today.”

However, it is agreed to appoint permanent negotiating teams to try to restart peace talks and for both leaders to attend another session of task in two month’s
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time. After the summit Garang also states that any ceasefire must also include what he calls “a comprehensive cease-oil...a cessation of the exploration, development and export of oil”.


3 June 2001

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir expresses his disappointment at the failure of the Nairobi IGAD meeting but states that “setting up a permanent committee in Nairobi to pursue dialogue between the two sides is a positive step toward peace”.

“Sudanese President Disappointed in Summit’s Lack of Cease-Fire Progress”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 3 June 2001

5 June 2001

Pro-government Sudanese militias, including the Popular Defence Force and the South Sudan Defence Force, state that they are mobilising to repulse a wave of attacks by rebels in southern Sudan. In a press statement the PDF declares that the SPLA’s rejection of a ceasefire and the “hostile campaign” emanating from abroad necessitate a “mobilisation of nation for confronting the challenges”. The Southern Coordination Council also accuses foreign powers of backing the rebels in the civil war.

“Pro-Government Sudanese Militias Declare Mobilisation”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 5 June 2001

5 June 2001

The Sudanese government calls on the international community to pressure the SPLA rebels to agree to a ceasefire. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Chol Deng states: “It’s time for the international community to take concern that without a cease-fire, people are not likely to develop the right dialogue...The government is committed to talks, it has accepted the right of self-determination for the south even to the extent of secession. Let’s stop fighting and talk...A ceasefire is a necessity. Talking and fighting at the same time cannot take us to any good solution.”


5 June 2001

The 16-member Community of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA) criticises the USA for its $3 million support to Sudanese rebels. It expresses “concern at this announcement of aid, which risks fanning the flames of civil war...[and] interferes in the affairs of a sovereign state”.

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7 June 2001  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir steps up the mobilisation of Sudanese forces and vows “never to relinquish the oilfields”, believed to be the target of current SPLA strategy. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail states that “the government will now continue with the military option for repulsing the aggression, although it is not our top option”.

“Sudan’s Bashir Steps Up Mobilisation Against Rebel Offensive”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 June 2001

8 June 2001  Former US President Jimmy Carter announces that Uganda and Sudan will exchange diplomats within the next few days.

“Uganda, Sudan to Restore Diplomatic Relations”, New Vision (Kampala), 8 June 2001

8 June 2001  The European Union issues a Declaration on the Sudanese peace process. It states: “The European Union has consistently supported the IGAD peace initiative but has also expressed concern at the lack of progress made so far in the peace process...The EU welcomes the commitment by the Government of Sudan to halt aerial bombings, expects that it will be strictly observed and urges the Government of Sudan and the SPLA/M to stop hostilities immediately in order to create a conducive environment for negotiations.”

“Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union, on the Recent Summit of the IGAD Committee on the Sudan, Held in Nairobi on 2 June 211”, European Union, 9393/01 (Presse 221), P 109/01

8 June 2001  At least 20,000 people flee from the town of Raga in the western Bahr al-Ghazal region following its capture by the SPLA.

“Sudan: Civilians Flee Town Under Siege”, Sudanese Catholic Information Office, Nairobi, 8 June 2001

8 June 2001  United Nations sources express extreme concern over the humanitarian situation in the Bahr al-Ghazal region following the SPLA offensives there and the subsequent resumption of bombing by government forces.

“Concern Over Bahr al-Ghazal Fighting”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 8 June 2001

10 June 2001  SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje claims that SPLA forces established firm control of the strategic garrison town of Raga, in western Bahr al-Ghazal on 3 June, during the IGAD peace conference in Nairobi. The capture of Raga is admitted by the Sudanese government. Sudanese Foreign
Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that since the SPLA is adhering to "the agenda of war" so too would the government. He also accuses the SPLA of using the IGAD peace negotiations as a mechanism to persuade the international community that it was working towards peace whilst in reality prosecuting the war and showing no flexibility.


11 June 2001 The United Nations announces that "[f]ighting associated with an offensive by the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its capture of Raga town in western Bahr al-Ghazal have led to the displacement of an estimated 30,000 civilians, according to diverse humanitarian sources”.

"Tens of Thousands Displaced by Bahr al-Ghazal Fighting", News Article by UN Integrated Information Network, Nairobi, 11 June 2001

11 June 2001 The Sudanese government announces that it will "resume air strikes" in the south of the country "to defend itself in the face of continued aggression". It adds that it "will make only limited use of air strikes against specific targets in the fighting zones, far from populated regions".

"Khartoum Announces Resumption of Air Strikes in South", News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 June 2001

11 June 2001 US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher expresses US "concern" over the resumption of bombing in southern Sudan by the Sudanese government in spite of its pledge to end bombings on 25 May. Boucher claims that civilian targets are being bombed and that this is an "outrage". He also states that "Secretary [of State] [Colin] Powell "has repeatedly emphasised that a halt to the bombing is critical to moving forward". Boucher fails to acknowledge, however that the bombing has only been resumed because of the SPLA’s initiation of a massive military offensive in the south and its capture of the strategic garrison town of Raga – an offensive that has displaced 30,000 civilians according to the United Nations.

Boucher states that the US government “calls[s] on the Government of Sudan for a full explanation”. However, the Sudanese government has already issued a statement declaring that it is resuming bombing as a result of the SPLA offensive.

11 June 2001
Following talks with Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa states that the situation in Sudan is “regrettable and dangerous” and expresses his “deep concern at the renewed operations by the SPLM/SPLM against government forces in the southwest Bahr al-Ghazal region, causing tens of thousands of Sudanese to be displaced”.

“Arab League Terms Situation in Sudan as ‘Dangerous’, News Article by XINHUA, 11 June 2001; “Sudan Calls on US to Adopt ‘Impartial Position’ on Civil War”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 June 2001

11 June 2001
Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail reiterates the government’s commitment “to realise a peaceful solution to the civil war in southern Sudan”. He argues that the rebel movement, since the inception of dialogue in 1989, “was avoiding to state a clear-cut stand on the controversial issues...[and] was not willing to pursue a peaceful settlement”.


12 June 2001
The SPLA announces that it has killed 214 government soldiers following an ambush on a convoy escorting oil equipment near the country’s oil fields. They also claim to have captured the garrison town of Boro near the border with the Central African Republic, which “brings to a close the complete liberation of the western Bahr el Ghazal (province)”.

“Sudan Rebels Say Kill 244 Troops in Oil Fields”, News Article by Reuters, 12 June 2001

12 June 2001
The Southern Coordination Council forms a battalion from the South Sudan Defence Forces to go to western Bahr al-Ghazal region to recapture the towns of Raga and Diem Zubeir. The Council Chairman Brig. Galwak Deng accuses SPLA leader John Garang of sticking to war and rejecting peace, being supported by foreign elements.

Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail urges the US to visit the areas attacked by the SPLA forces to see the effect of its support for the SPLA. He also attacks those unregistered relief organisations supporting the SPLA’s military actions.

“Pro-Government Militia to Join Fighting Against Rebels in Southwest”, News Article by The Khartoum Monitor, 12 June 2001

12 June 2001
Mansour Khalid, advisor to SPLA leader John Garang, formally states that the SPLA’s goal is to take control of the oil wells in the south. He also defends foreign interference in Sudan by alleging that the
Khartoum government was sponsoring radical Islamic infiltration in their territory. He further argues that the SPLA’s recent escalation in military activity was “a response to the aerial bombing and the army’s shelling of civilians, hospitals and schools”. He also alleges that the failure of the IGAD peace negotiations in Nairobi was due to the Khartoum government’s refusal to comply with John Garang’s conditions that oil development must be ceased by the government.


12 June 2001 The European Union issues a statement calling “on both parties to halt their military activity...to immediately stop hostilities...[and]...to engage in a continuous and sustained negotiation towards a just and lasting political settlement of the conflict in Sudan”.


13 June 2001 Sudan’s Roman Catholic Information office now estimates that 57,000 people have been displaced by the SPLA attack on the western Bahr al-Ghazal region and that the humanitarian situation is “very desperate”. The United Nations reports that following the SPLA offensive and capture of the towns of Diem Zubeir and Raga there has “been an exodus of civilians north and northwesterwards into areas still controlled by the government”. Over 10,000 of the displaced have concentrated around the village of Timsaha, 144 kilometres north of Raga, where the resident population normally numbers only a few thousand.

“Fighting in Sudan’s Bahr el Ghazal Leaves 57,000 Displaced, Bishop”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 13 June 2001; “People Displaced by Fighting Flee Towards Darfur”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 13 June 2001

13 June 2001 The SPLA announces that it has captured the town of Boro, thereby bringing to a close what the organisation terms the “complete liberation” of Western Bahr Al-Ghazal. The Sudanese government acknowledges the capture of the town and states that the SPLA is continuing its offensive in “an otherwise very peaceful part of Sudan”.

“SPLA Claims Capture of Boro Town”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 13 June 2001

13 June 2001 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak meets Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail to discuss how to reactivate the peace process. Ismail also affirms that the Sudanese government “is keen on hammering out a peaceful settlement for the southern issue in order to reach reconciliation in the country”.

14 June 2001  
Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir names a new ministerial-level peace advisor, Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, and a new minister of information, Mahdi Ibrahim, reportedly reflecting the government’s desire to renew peace negotiations.

“Sudan Names New Peace, Information Minister”, News Article by Reuters, 15 June 2001

15 June 2001  
The Sudanese government appeals to the international community to denounce the recent SPLA offensives in Sudan, and to pressurise the rebels to accept a comprehensive cease fire.

“Sudanese Government Urges Denouncement on Rebel Attacks”, News Article by XINHUA, 15 June 2001

16 June 2001  
Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Sulaf al-Din Salih states that some 15,000 people were still taking refuge from the continued fighting in the western Bahr al-Ghazal region. He also states that the rebel SPLA is threatening relief flights to Au and Awl, the major towns in Bahr al-Ghazal. At a press conference he states that “The rebel movement is aggravating the humanitarian disaster” and calls on the international community to “stop the inhuman acts being perpetrated by the rebel movement” and for the UN to “compel the rebel movement not to obstruct humanitarian flights to Bahr al-Ghazal”.

“Khartoum Says SPLA Threatening Relief Flights”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 16 June 2001

17 June 2001  
Opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi returns from his official trip to America. He attacks the “great mobilisation of American public opinion” against Sudan and its “futile and wrong” backing of the SPLA. He further attacks the SPLA’s duplicity. He states: “What it is is that the SPLA is seeking to escalate the war despite announcing it wants peace.”


18 June 2001  
Phelibe Donoso, deputy head of delegation for Sudan of the International Red Cross ICRC, states that a huge civilian population has deserted the town of Raga in western Bahr al-Ghazal following its capture by rebel SPLA forces.

“Civilians Free North as SPLA Forces Recapture Town”, News Article by Africa Church Information Service, Nairobi, 18 June 2001
18 June 2001  At his swearing in as Sudan’s new Presidential Peace Advisor Dr Ghazi Salehuddin Atabani states that the government has lost hope in the present peace initiative. He praises government attempts to unite all elements in Sudan and emphasises that approaches to internal southern political forces “constitute a major part in the realisation of peace in the country and reactivation of government institutions that are concerned or related to peace issues, such as the Coordinating Council for Southern States”.

Dr Atabani further states that all concerned parties, whether internal or external, and not just the SPLA, must be involved in the peace process. He states that: “We are still trying to create a mechanism on which all Sudanese can agree upon, and this mechanism will include southerners, northerners and all political or cultural bodies.”

Commenting on United States policy toward Sudan he also states that “[t]here exists various extremist views in the US administration, and we are trying to make the American stance positive on Sudan”.

“Sudan Has Lost Hope in Current Peace Initiatives, Presidential Adviser”, News Article by KHM, 18 June 2001

19 June 2001  The United Nations and other relief agencies announce that they have evacuated personnel from the Sudanese garrison town of Wau, in the Bahr al-Ghazal region, due to the imminent SPLA attack on the town.

“UN Staff Evacuated From Garrison Town”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 19 June 2001

19 June 2001  The SPLA claims to have captured a government military post at Kalandi, in Deliny county, in the Nuba Mountains. A Sudanese government spokesman, Muhammad Dirdiery, states that the continued SPLA offensive in the Nuba mountains was in defiance of all international efforts to bring peace to Sudan. “It will prove to be futile” he adds.

“Government Says SPLA Offensive ‘Futile’”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 19 June 2001

19 June 2001  At a six-day conference on peace in southern Sudan, Telar Deng, New Sudan Council of Churches peace facilitator, states that the struggle for power and divided interests amongst the rebel movements in the south are the main obstacles to unity and peace.


22 June 2001  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs states that it is “deeply concerned” about the massive
displacement of the civilian population created by the SPLA offensive in the western Bahr al-Ghazal region. It further states that it is mobilising more resources to assist the displaced. It announces that an emergency response team in Khartoum is supporting the work of the Local Relief Committee in El Daein and that a high-level delegation comprising representatives from both the Sudanese government and the UN are visiting the area to investigate and assess the response to the crisis. The UN also states that the Sudanese government is already providing assistance mainly through food distribution and transport arrangements.

“Deep Concern’ Over Bahr Al-Ghazal Displacement”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 22 June 2001

25 June 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail expresses the government’s hope that the opposition NDA leadership council meeting, to be held the following day, would result in a clear and unambiguous policy vision, in order to hasten the achievement of a comprehensive political solution. He states that future Sudanese government moves would depend on what emerges from the NDA conference. He adds: “We do not want to preempt the events, but we want to give the meeting ample opportunity.”

“Government Hoping for a ‘Clear Vision’ from Opposition, News Article by Al-Ra’y al-Amm website (Khartoum), 25 June 2001

26 June 2001 Sudanese opposition leaders open a three-day conference in Cairo which NDA spokesman Hatem al-Sirr Ali states is “the last chance to reach a concrete proposal for coordinating the two [peace] initiatives”. The absence of the SPLA leader John Garang from the conference is described by some NDA leaders as undermining the chance of its success. The conference appeals to the government “to step up efforts to end this chain of violence and achieve a just peace that would consolidate our national unity”.

However, the SPLA representative Nhail Deng asserts that Sudanese President al-Bashir “is not serious. His only intention is to split the opposition movement and maintain his military power”. Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi refuses to send representatives to the meeting, which he claims is unlikely to result in much. Instead he urges the remaining opposition parties to return to Sudan to organise peacefully there.


26 June 2001 The Egyptian and Libyan ambassadors hand the Sudanese government and the opposition Umma Party a memorandum
containing proposals for reactivating the peace process. The memo is also simultaneously handed to the rebel National Democratic Alliance in Cairo.

“Egypt, Libya Hand Government, Opposition Peace Bid Proposals”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 26 June 2001

**27-29 June 2001** At its three-day conference of the NDA Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, Chairman of the opposition National Democratic Alliance and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, affirms the commitment of the NDA to a comprehensive political solution, considering it as “the only option that would save our country from the disaster of war and destruction”. He further attacks the IGAD peace negotiations as having failed: “The IGAD proved its failure to bring about a solution to the Sudanese problem when it completed its 12th round of talks without any notable progress.” He adds that although the joint Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative has proved slow he “hope(s) that it will take off”.

NDA leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani and opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi accept an Egyptian proposal to form a coalition government. However the SPLA rejects the offer.

At its close the conference “unanimously [approves] a new version of the Sudan peace initiative” proposed by Egypt and Sudan, including the “setting up of a national transition government, with the participation of all Sudanese parties”. The NDA announces that it is drafting a response to the Egyptian-Libyan initiative, requesting the inclusion of additional points regarding the principles of self-determination and the separation of state and religion. The NDA also states that it wants the “formal unification” of the Egyptian-Libyan initiative and the IGAD peace initiative.


**28 June 2001** Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir pledges to establish peace in Sudan. He states that: “This will be one of our greatest battles in the new year…this mission requires the efforts of all honest Sudanese citizens…We will reach peace whatever the difficulties may be.” The 1989 revolution, he further states: “proposed reconciliation programmes to get the country out of its previous experiences…We are seeking a new political practice whereby all political forces would join hands to build Sudan and achieve the country’s goals and interests.”

Bashir also states Sudan’s eagerness to improve its relations with all countries: “We are ready to establish positive relations with all countries of the world
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based on mutual interests and non-interference in the domestic affairs of any country.”

“Sudan’s Al-Bashir Calls for Peace”, News Article by UPI, 28 June 2001; “Bashir to Devote Coming Year for Peace”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 29 June 2001

28 June 2001 The Kenyan government officially invites the Sudanese government and the rebel SPLA to form a permanent peace negotiating committee in Nairobi. Kenyan diplomatic sources are quoted as stating that the Kenyan government had started “activating channels of contact” between the warring parties.

“Kenya Calls for Peace Committee”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 28 June 2001

29 June 2001 The New Sudan Council of Churches brokers a peace deal among warring Nuer factions. At the end of a peace conference in Kisumu, Kenya, 72 local Nuer leaders sign a declaration uniting the two factions, the SPDF and the SSLM.

Amongst the resolutions of the peace conference is a resolution calling for the SPLM to “clarify its position particularly in blocking participation of civilian participants to this conference vis-à-vis the National Convention (1994), Civil Society Conference (1996) and the SPLM-Church Dialogue (1997), and the democratic participants espoused in these documents concerning freedom of movement and assembly”. The Conference also urges the SPLA to take appropriate action to prevent those Nuer who join its ranks from attacking their own people.

The SPLA refuses to attend the Conference. The London-based Sudan Democratic Gazette states that: “it is wrong for people like Garang to prevent the people from attending a conference requested by the people themselves. By doing this he is against the will of the people. This is a crime against humanity and this cannot be allowed to continue.”


30 June 2001 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that: “A national council for peace will be formed to analyse the foreign [peace] initiatives and make recommendations on them…Sudan’s biggest political battle in the next year of revolution is the attainment of peace.” President Bashir also states that efforts to arrive at peace were “at a crossroads”, and that the peace council would work to develop a peace plan “from inside the country”.

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President Bashir further blames the rebel SPLA for the continuation of the war due to their “repeated rejection of cease-fires”.


1 July 2001

It is reported that the National Democratic Alliance rejects the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative as a waste of time. The NDA is reported as declaring that “[the] Egyptian-Libyan peace proposal could not end the…18-year civil war because it ignored key demands, including self-determination for the country’s southern population”. In a press conference NDA spokesman Pagan Amum declares that the NDA will not accept any peace plan short of their specific demands. He states: “We think the proposals are positive and forthcoming, but we need to discuss these points with them [the Egyptian and Libyan governments]…The opposition leadership will not accept any peace plan short of three key demands. These [are]: (1) A Referendum on Self-Determination for Sudanese living in the country’s south; (2) Dismantling the country’s Islamic regime and drafting a new secular constitution and (3) Forming a transitional government to prepare for free and democratic elections.”

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, Chairman of the NDA and head of the Democratic Unionist Party, also states that the Egyptian-Libyan proposal “lacks specifics”.

The NDA also points out that “while the SPLA says it is willing to consider the initiative, it has always favoured a peace plan made by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development”.


3 July 2001

A former rebel military leader, Commander Mohammed Ali Tiyah, together with members of his forces, returns to Sudan. He claims that the SPLA, to which he was formerly allied, has been guilty of numerous human rights violations and is effectively controlled by a foreign power. He calls for other rebels to return to the homeland, work for national unity and a negotiated peace.

“Rebel Commander Defects, Returns to Homeland”, News Article by SUNA, 3 July 2001

4 July 2001

Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that: “The government accepts, without reservation, all nine principles indicated in the memorandum for achieving peace and reconciliation.”
The nine points of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative call for the unity of Sudan, democratisation, recognition of religious, cultural and ethnic diversity, respect for human rights, freedom of speech and formation of an interim government composed of all political forces.

In Nairobi SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje states that the SPLA also welcomed and accepted the initiative but had submitted suggestions as to how it could be improved by inclusion of the right of self-determination for the south and other areas, and a firmer entrenchment of the separation of religion and state. The SPLA also calls for the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative to be merged with the IGAD initiative.

Ismail further states that the government would “as of today” launch a drive for “rallying the greatest possible support” for the initiative and calls upon Egypt and Libya to speed up “practical steps” for achieving the objectives of the memorandum.


4 July 2001 The leader of the Umma Party, Sadiq al-Mahdi, returns from the talks arranged by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo in Abuja at which he was to meet with SPLA leader John Garang, after Garang and the SPLA delegation fail to turn up.

“Umma Party Leader Fails to Meet Rebel Delegation in Nigeria”, News Article by The Khartoum Monitor, 4 July 2001

5 July 2001 The Egyptian government states that it will start organising a broad-based conference to bring Sudan’s civil war to an end.

“Egypt Moves Ahead With Plans for Broad-Based Sudanese Peace Conference”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 5 July 2001

6 July 2001 A Sudanese government spokesman urges the southern rebels to declare a ceasefire, following their acceptance of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. Presidential advisor Abdel Basit Sabdarat states: “The most important step after both the opposition and government approved the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative is to declare a ceasefire jointly.”

“Sudanese Official Urges Rebels to Declare Ceasefire”, News Article by XINHUA, 6 July 2001
6 July 2001  It is reported that a meeting is being arranged between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, head of the opposition NDA.

“President Bashir Expected to Meet Opposition Leader”, News Article at Al-Ra’y al-Amm (Khartoum), 6 July 2001

6 July 2001  In a visit to Juba, the main town in war-torn southern Sudan, President al-Bashir, reaffirms the government’s commitment to the peace process.

“Bashir Weighs Peace Plan on South Sudan Visit”, News Article by Reuters, 6 July 2001

6 July 2001  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan states that he is “deeply concerned” over the SPLA offensive in the southern Sudanese province of Bahr al-Ghazal. He comments that the attacks have caused “massive disruption” at a time when farming communities would normally have been fully engaged in planting for the next harvest season. He further states that “many thousands of civilians have fled into government-controlled areas”, and that there “real fears” of severe food shortages in areas that had once enjoyed surpluses. The area invaded by the SPLA, he points out, has traditionally been the “bread basket” of Sudan, and the consequences of the invasion will be further food crises.

“Annan Urges Warring Parties to Seek Peaceful Settlement in Sudan”, News Article by XINHUA, 6 July 2001; “Annan Decrees ‘Massive Disruption’”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 10 July 2001

6 July 2001  The southern Sudanese rebel faction the South Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A) issues a statement condemning the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative as a “derailment to the IGAD peace process”. It claims that the initiative “does not recognise the inalienable rights of the people of South Sudan of self-determination”. It further accuses the Khartoum government as “oppressing, enslaving, discrimination, eliminating and enforcing a war of genocide and ethnic cleansing against the South Sudanese people” and of having “[violated] every agreement they have ever reached and signed with the South”.


7 July 2001  A Sudanese government spokesman claims to have repulsed an SPLA attack on the West Nuer area in southern Sudan. General Mohammed Bashir Suleiman states: “The attack was aimed at obstructing the development process, disturbing the atmosphere of peace and reconciliation and disconnecting the roads linking parts of the West Nuer region…[The SPLA]
seeks to confuse the reconciliation and peace atmosphere and displays disrespect for the peace initiatives being sponsored by brothers and friends.”

“Government Troops Repulse SPLA Attack”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 July 2001

8 July 2001 Thousands of refugees continue to flee from rebel SPLA advances in southern Sudan.

“Fleeing Rebel Advance, Sudanese Refugees Lose Husbands, Wives and Children on Trek”, News Article by Associated Press, 8 July 2001

9 July 2001 The Arab League welcomes the acceptance by both parties of the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“AL Welcomes Sudan’s Acceptance of Egyptian-Libyan Peace Plan”, News Article by XINHUA, 9 July 2001

10 July 2001 Umma Party President Sadiq al-Mahdi calls for neighbouring countries to back peace efforts in Sudan and to close their borders to anti-government operations to prevent “acts of violence and fighting”.

“Sudan’s Opposition Umma Calls on Neighbours to Back Peace Efforts”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 July 2001

10 July 2001 Dr Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress party welcomes the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. It states that the initiative “has offered an historic and rare opportunity that should be seized in sincerity and honesty for salvaging the country from collapse and disintegration”.

“Opposition Party Welcomes Sudan Peace Try”, News Article by UPI, 10 July 2001

10 July 2001 In an interview with The Washington Times, Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir outlines the peace proposals offered by the government to the rebels. He states:

“The first demand of the rebels was that we create a federal system in the country. We have done that. They also seek equitable participation in the central government. Through their participation in the various levels of the federal system we feel we responded to their demands. They also demand an equitable share of the wealth and we have taken measures to respond to that demand through the constitution and in reality. They also ask for fair development around the country. We have initiated programmes but because of the war we have not been able to deliver what they wanted. In the constitution it says that citizenship is the basis for rights and duties. We guaranteed all kinds of freedom: freedom of worship, speech and education. This is why we are very concerned with our relationship with the United States, because we feel it is the key to stopping the war.”
Commenting on the prospects for peace President Bashir says:

“The base for peace is already there with the conviction of the southern people of the positive role peace can play. The confidence building that has been achieved between the southerners and the northerners through the displacement of southerners to the north has contributed to making an atmosphere conducive to peace.

The aim should be towards eliminating the foreign component and after that we can speak together as Sudanese and make ours the shared goal of achieving peace. The final stage could be implemented in a transitional period under the guarantee of regional and international observers. After the transitional period we can evaluate the situation and reach a final reconciliation and remove all the sources of conflict by removing the weapons and normalising the situation in the war zones.”


10 July 2001  Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail reaffirms the government’s commitment to a peaceful settlement of the civil war “through dialogue to find a solution acceptable to both parties, so that we can live in a united Sudan acceptable to all of us”.

Dr. Ismail describes what he sees as the three main existing obstacles to peace:

1. The SPLA leadership and in particular John Garang…who never attends negotiations and never authorises decisions to be made by his deputies. Garang has refused to meet Bashir despite mediation efforts by the likes of South Africa’s former president Nelson Mandela and Kenya’s President Arap Moi...Garang has had key players in forging a peace killed”.

2. The negative intervention of some IGAD members, especially Uganda. “Uganda’s [President Yoweri] Museveni loves this war”. Pointing to Uganda’s military involvement in both the Congo and Rwanda, he says “Uganda is too small for [Museveni]”

3. The “negative role of the United States” which has provided both direct support to the SPLA and indirect support through NGOs active with the rebels. “The main supporter of the rebels has been the outgoing US administration, which has worked against a ceasefire…[this] does not encourage a shift to a culture of peace”.
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11 July 2001

The officially registered south Sudanese party, the United Democratic Salvation Front, dismisses the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative as “nothing new” and as failing to provide for self-determination in the south.

“Southern Sudanese Party Dismisses Egyptian-Libyan Peace Bid”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 July 2001

12 July 2001

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that he is determined to comply with the Egyptian-Sudanese peace initiative “in a manner that maintains the country’s unity and safeguards the rights of its people”.

“Sudan’s Bashir Determined for Peace”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 12 July 2001

14 July 2001

Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, Secretary-General of the ruling National Congress party in Sudan, states if the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative is accepted by all parties the National Congress party would be prepared to accept defeat in democratic elections: “If our party is not elected, then we are ready to be in the opposition.” Omer also calls on John Garang to endorse the peace plan


16 July 2001

Sudanese Foreign Affairs Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail welcomes the visit of Andrew Natsios, the head of USAID and the United States’ Special Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan, to Sudan as a positive step toward discussing bilateral issues.

“Foreign Minister Describes US Official’s Visit as Positive Step”, News Article by SUNA, 16 July 2001

16 July 2001

The Sudanese government states that it is ready for immediate talks with the opposition and urges Egyptian-Libyan mediators to make arrangements for holding negotiations as soon as possible. Presidential peace advisor Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that Khartoum “is prepared to sit down for negotiations with the opposition in 24 hours time”.

“Sudan’s Government Urges Egypt, Libya to Speed Up Peace Conference”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 16 July 2001
17 July 2001 National Democratic Alliance leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani praises the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative as “the last-ditch bid to solve the Sudanese problem” and created a “new reality” in Sudan. He also expresses his readiness to meet with the Sudanese government for negotiations at any time.


17 July 2001 Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi arrives in Khartoum to meet Sudanese leaders in an effort to promote the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative, having earlier met SPLA leader John Garang.


17 July 2001 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that his government could hold early elections if an agreement is reached with the opposition via the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. He states: “What counts more now is an immediate ceasefire.”

“Sudan Does Not Object to Early Elections if Peace Deal is Reached”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 July 2001

18 July 2001 Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi states that African leaders were opposed to the idea of partitioning Sudan advocated by SPLA leader John Garang.

“African Leaders Against Partition of Sudan: Ghaddafi”, News Article by XINHUA, 18 July 2001

22 July 2001 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail pledges the Khartoum government’s commitment to, and flexibility in, peace negotiations. He states: “The government will be very flexible and will present its vision on the transitional government at the negotiations with the opposition. We will be very flexible as the priority will be for halting the war and reaching a political settlement that leads to the national unity...The government’s clear position s acceptance of the (Egyptian-Libyan) initiative without conditions and remarks and what counts now is to speed up the next step.” He further adds that the recent ruling National Congress party Leadership Council has endorsed the nine points of the Egyptian-Libyan initiative and that the government has formed a number of committees to discuss the proposals related to the initiative, namely recognition of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, introduction of pluralistic democracy, guaranteed basic freedoms and human rights, and a decentralised system of government.

“Sudan Foreign Minister Reiterates Government’s Acceptance of Peace Bid”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 July 2001
7 August 2001  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir reaffirms his government’s commitment to a negotiated settlement of the civil war.

“Sudan’s Bashir Reiterates Commitment to Peaceful Settlement”, News Article by DPA, 7 August 2001

9 August 2001  The SPLA states that it will neither attend any dialogue conference nor pay any attention to comments on the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative. It declares that it insists on the principles of self-determination, the strict separation of religion and the state, and upon IGAD negotiations as a foundation for a peaceful solution to the Sudanese civil war.

“SPLA Insists on self-determination, Separation of Religion from State”, News Article by XINHUA, 9 August 2001

12 August 2001  Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Mahir states that the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative is accepted by all Sudanese parties. He refuses to comment on SPLA leader John Garang’s remarks.

“All Sudanese Parties Accept Egypt-Libya Peace Initiative, Egypt Says”, News Article by MENA, 12 August 2001

13 August 2001  The Libyan government informs all Sudanese parties that it has been making arrangements with Cairo for the holding of a preliminary assembly at which negotiations can be held on the sidelines of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah anniversary of the 1 September Revolution.

The Umma Party also convenes a leadership meeting to discuss developments in the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and the Libyan invitation.

“Libya Reportedly Invites Sudanese Parties for Preliminary Peace Talks”, News Article by Al-Ra’y al-Amm (Khartoum), 13 August 2001

13 August 2001  Sudanese Presidential Adviser on Peace Affairs Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, states that the Sudanese government is trying to ascertain whether or not the SPLA really wanted peace. The statements issued recently by the SPLA, he declares, “clearly indicates that the movement, contrary to its previous declarations, does not want peace to be achieved under the joint initiative...[The Sudanese, Egyptian and Libyan governments are trying to probe] the real stance of the movement, the extent of its interest in peace, and its final position with regards to the joint initiative”.

“Government Seeks Details on SPLM/A Stance”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 13 August 2001
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18 August 2001
Sudanese Presidential Adviser on Peace Affairs Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani reiterates that the Sudanese government unconditionally accepts the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Sudan Reiterates Unconditional Acceptance of Egyptian-Libyan Peace Initiative”, News Article by XINHUA, 18 August 2001

19 August 2001
The SPLA claims to have ambushed and captured government vessels on a tributary of the Nile. SPLA spokesman Yassir Arman states that: “This operation falls within the SPLA’s plan to stop oil production...to tighten the grip on the oil companies and the Sudanese regular forces who protect them”.

A firm running fishing operations in south Sudan states that the boat actually belonged to them, was nothing to with the oil industry, and demands the return of nine of its staff. Government forces also denied that any of their vessels were captured, since they do not patrol in the area in question.

“Sudanese Rebels Say They Have Captured Riverboat and Escorts”, News Article by Associated Press, 19 August 2001; “Sudan Firm Says ‘Oil Boat’ Captured by Rebels Was Fishing Vessel”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 20 August 2001

20 August 2001
The opposition Umma Party announces that it will be holding a series of workshops about the political programme to reach a comprehensive peace settlement.

“Sudan: Umma Party to Hold Workshops on Political Programme — Says Leader”, News Article by The Khartoum Monitor, 20 August 2001

20 August 2001
Following a joint meeting in Nairobi, 12-17 August, the Catholic and Episcopal Churches of Sudan issue a statement calling upon the Sudanese government and rebels to arrive at a negotiated settlement, rather than military victory. They also put forward three proposals as the basis of a settlement: “affirmation of diversity in the national identity; power-sharing through a participatory system of government; and wealth-sharing through an equitable distribution of national resources”. They also call for equal protection of all religious groups and the separation of religion and state. If this could not be achieved, then self-determination for the south and other marginalised areas should be permitted.

“The Catholic and Episcopal Bishops of Sudan Advocate ‘Negotiated Settlement, Not War’”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 20 August 2001

24 August 2001
The SPLA issues a statement declaring that it will only participate in the Egyptian-Sudanese initiative if it takes into account four other issues: separation of state and religion, the right of self-determination, the creation of an interim constitution, and the creation of an interim government. It
also states that it wants the Egyptian-Libyan initiative merged with the IGAD peace process. It states:

“The SPLM will not be party to any type of negotiations with the [Government of Sudan] called by the Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative, or any other peace initiative, that does not incorporate the above four points.”

“The SPLM will not be party to any type of negotiations with the [Government of Sudan] called by the Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative, or any other peace initiative, that does not incorporate the above four points.”

“Sudanese Rebels Repeat Conditions for Joining Peace Bid”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 August 2001

25 August 2001  The opposition National Democratic Alliance states that it is committed to the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“NDA Leader Emphasises Commitment to Egyptian-Libyan Initiative”, News Article by MENA, 25 August 2001

27 August 2001  The Sudanese government appeals to the international community to exert pressure on the rebel SPLA to agree to a resumption of peace negotiations. Reiterating the readiness of the Sudanese government to negotiate “under any forum that will achieve peace and halt the bloodshed”, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry adds that: “We had earlier said that the rebel acceptance of the initiative was only a tactical move. The Agenda of the rebel movement is that of war.”

“Government Urges International Community to Pressure Rebels to Accept Cease-Fire”, News Article by Associated Press, 27 August 2001

27 August 2001  The Egyptian and Libyan governments hold a meeting to discuss ways of activating the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and to draw up a timetable for holding a national reconciliation conference.

“Meeting Opens in Tripoli to Discuss Peace in Sudan”, News Article by PANA, 27 August 2001

30 August 2001  The Sudanese government accuses the SPLA of not being serious about attempts to peacefully resolve the Sudanese conflict. Commenting on SPLA’s demands that the Libyan-Egyptian initiative be significantly altered, the Presidential Peace Adviser, Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, said that this “clearly indicates that the movement, contrary to its previous declarations, does not want peace to be achieved under the joint initiative”. The peace adviser said that Khartoum appreciated Nigerian efforts to secure peace in Sudan. He said that the government is prepared for negotiations “at any time, on the different tracks [IGAD, Libyan-Egyptian and Nigerian]”.

“Sudan Government Accuses SPLA Rebels of Rejecting Peace”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 13 August 2001,
31 August 2000  
Sidahmed al-Hussein, deputy Secretary-General of the opposition Democratic Unionist Party, calls on dissidents in exile to return to Sudan to continue their opposition activities.

“Sudanese Opposition Figure Calls on Dissidents to Return from Exile”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 31 August 2001

4 September 2001  
The Sudanese government receives notification from the IGAD Secretariat of the postponement of the scheduled peace negotiations. The Sudanese government advance delegation had already arrived in Nairobi.

The postponement of the talks are attributed to the non-arrival of the SPLA delegation.


6 September 2001  
The SPLA continues its efforts to prevent a third Abuja Sudan peace conference from taking place. It attacks south Sudanese individuals attempting to organise the conference as “very wicked indeed”. An official SPLA Press Release criticises “rival movements to the SPLA [which] have sprung up, purporting to address issues/objectives they claim are not being catered for by the SPLM”. It claims that any conference would be “redundant” since “Southern Sudanese aspirations are adequately being catered for within the SPLM’s New Sudan vision”. It renews its call for the conference to be boycotted.


6 September 2001  
The Sudanese cautiously welcomes US proposal to appoint a special peace envoy to Sudan. Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states: “The cooperation of the government with the American envoy will depend on the degree of his impartiality and that of the American administration ...It is premature to judge the chances of success of the American envoy as we are still in the process of studying and gathering information.”


8 September 2001  
The Egyptian and Libyan governments hold further talks to “[restart] the Egyptian-Libyan initiative for a global reconciliation in Sudan”. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Mahir states: “There is no other serious initiative for Sudan, since it needs a consensus in Sudan and no other initiative can accept all the Sudanese parties.”
9 September 2001  Attalla Hamad Beshir, executive secretary of IGAD, states that IGAD is expecting a breakthrough in the forthcoming peace negotiations. He also welcomes the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative which complements the work of IGAD.

“IGAD Expects Breakthrough in Sudan Peace Talks”, News Article by XINHUA, 9 September 2001

12 September 2001  The Sudanese Information Minister accuses rebel SPLA leader John Garang of making negotiations to end the civil war impossible. He states: “He changes the agenda, he has opposed all Sudanese governments and all initiatives...[The SPLA] imposed four conditions of the kind that make it impossible to sit down at the negotiating table with them.”

“Government Says Negotiations With SPLM/A ‘Impossible’”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 12 September 2001

15 September 2001  Following meetings with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Mahir, Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi states that he has no reservations regarding the joint Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Mehdi Says No Reservations to Egyptian Libyan Initiative”, News Article by KUNA, 15 September 2001

15 September 2001  Al-Haj Osman Bello, Nigerian Ambassador to Sudan states that invitations are extended to all southern Sudanese leaders inside and outside Sudan and inside and outside the government to attend the third Abuja peace conference. He also states that following a meeting between John Garang and Nigerian President Obasanjo Garang and the SPLA will also attend the conference.

“Nigeria to Hold Conference for Boosting Peace and Accord in Sudan”, News Article by SUNA, 15 September 2001

18 September 2001  The Sudanese government begins studying plans put forward by the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative for a peace conference between the government and opposition forces.

“Sudan Studies Egyptian-Libyan Peace Conference Plans”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 18 September 2001

18 September 2001  Africa Analysis magazine reports that SPLA leader John Garang is “nervous” about the scheduled southern Sudanese leadership
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conference due to be held in Abuja under Nigerian auspices. The journal reports that:

“A number of the southern leaders are...keen to demonstrate that Garang does not represent the south and that there are others – who cannot be described as government ‘puppets’ – who are better placed to serve the interests of the southern Sudanese. Many in southern Sudan also feel that Garang...is leading them nowhere and lacks a clear focus on Sudan’s future.”

“Garang Walks a Tightrope”, Africa Analysis (London), 18 September 2001

18 September 2001 Ugandan Embassy in Khartoum by the end of September, furthering the process of restoring diplomatic ties which were severed in 1995.

“Uganda Reopen Embassy in Sudan After Six Years”, News Article by Reuters, 18 September 2001

24 September 2001 The Sudanese government announces that it plans to call a reconciliation conference early in October, based on the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.


25 September 2001 The Sudanese government and the European Union call for a joint fight against terrorism as they proceed with a two-year dialogue to improve ties. The two sides also renew their condemnation of the “criminal terrorist” attacks on New York and Washington. Sudanese Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Mutruf Siddeiq also briefs the EU on the peace process and calls on the EU to continue its support for the peace process and to helping to find ways to end “the destructive long-running war”.

“Sudan. EU Back Joint Fight Against Terror, Discuss Sudanese Peace Bids”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 25 September 2001

25 September 2001 A document purporting to be an account of meetings in Nigeria between SPLA leader John Garang, Southern opposition leader Bona Malwal of the Civic Forum and Nigerian President Obasango is leaked by SPLA representative Baak Wol. The document reveals that Bona Malwal accused Garang and the SPLA of not “negotiating with the [Khartoum] government in good faith”. It further claims that Garang persuaded both the Nigerian President and Malwal that the proposed third “South-South Dialogue/Conference” conference scheduled to take place in Abuja, Nigeria, should be permanently shelved.
Garang is also quoted as stating that although the SPLA was “committed to a negotiated political settlement and peaceful resolution of the conflict…such negotiations must lead to the dismantling of the NIF regime”. Although claiming that Malwal agreed to this permanent shelving of the plans for a third Southern conference, it also calls for its supporters “to please boycott the all (sic) Civic Forum’s Abuja Preparatory Meetings, as they are of no useful purpose”.

“No Need for a ‘South-South Dialogue/Conference’ At This Time”, by Baak Wol, SPLA Office, London, 25 September 2001

26 September 2001  Both the opposition Umma Party and the National Democratic Alliance state that they will consult other concerned parties in order to draw up their responses for a proposed national peace conference under the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Sudanese Opposition Parties to Consult Over Proposed National Conference”, News Article by PANA 26 September 2001

28 September 2001  The United Nations Security Council agreed to immediately remove diplomatic sanctions it imposed on Sudan on 26 April 1996. The United States chose not to block the move, abstaining on the vote. The Sudanese Information Minister, Mahdi Ibrahim stated: “The decision returns to Sudan its honour and real face, which was distorted by charges of terrorism that had nothing in common with Sudan and its people.”


28 September 2001  The SPLA accuses the Sudanese government of frustrating efforts to end the civil war by postponing indefinitely its participation in the IGAD peace negotiations scheduled for 24 September to 6 October. It claims that “the government of Sudan is backing away from IGAD’s peace process in preference to other initiatives that do not address the root causes of war…The responsibility of continuing the war and prolonging the suffering of the Sudanese people therefore rests squarely on the doorstep of the National Islamic Front junta in Khartoum”.

“SPLA/M Accuses Khartoum of Frustrating Peace Efforts”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 28 September 2001

29 September 2001  The Sudanese government denies SPLA allegations that it was responsible for the postponement of the scheduled IGAD peace negotiations and was in Nairobi and labels them “vexatious rumours”.

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The Sudanese Presidential Adviser on Peace Affairs Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani meets with Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi to discuss the scheduled IGAD peace negotiations. He states:

“I reiterated the commitment of the Sudanese government to the IGAD peace process and, at the same time, emphasised the importance of seeing the process rejuvenated and energised to assume the role it was expected to undertake. The permanent negotiations, which are about to start, are at a crucial stage of the whole IGAD peace process...The credibility of the process, as well as that of the mediators and the parties, is crucially at stake. Practically, we are left with only one option, namely, to succeed.”

Sudanese Presidential Peace Advisor Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that the Sudanese government will give the IGAD peace initiative a “last chance”:

“We have told IGAD chairman, President Daniel arap Moi, of our decision to grant IGAD one last chance in its bid for an end to the war and for reaching peace. The forthcoming round of talks will be a decisive one...The government has become fed up with the failure by IGAD initiative to reach positive results in eight years. IGAD partners have not exercised any pressure on the rebel movement, casting doubts on their intentions”.

The rebel South Sudan People’s Forces (SSPF) deputy chief of staff, Commander James Yiel Biet (who joined the armed struggle in 1975) defects and joins government forces in Nasir Province in Upper Nile State. In a statement he explains that his defection is motivated by a desire to realise peace in southern Sudan. He states that there is a lack of clear vision on the issue of peace in the south. However, he also declares that self-determination is the aspiration of the southern people and that “separation” is the key to peace.
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7 October 2001  The National Democratic Alliance demands the formation of a transitional government before it agrees to a national reconciliation conference. Such a transitional government should then determine the agenda, participants, venue and date of such a conference.

“Sudan Opposition Demands Transitional Government Before Peace Conference”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 October 2001

8 October 2001  Sudanese president Omer al-Bashir sends his peace advisor Dr Ghazi Salehuddin Atabani with a message on the peace process to Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo. Minister of State for Peace Dhieu Mathok says that the message “will inform Obasanjo about the latest developments in the Sudanese peace process in the light of the IGAD and the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiatives in Sudan...Atabani’s talks will also concentrate on the peace process in view of President Obasanjo’s concern with the issue and his sponsorship of the upcoming conference of southern politicians”.

“Bashir Sends Peace Adviser to Abuja”, News Article by PANA, 7 October 2001

11 October 2001  It is announced that IGAD envoys will go to Khartoum later in the month to discuss the forthcoming IGAD talks. The Sudanese Ambassador in Kenya declares that “the government of Sudan welcomes the envoys visit to Khartoum and reiterates its position of giving the IGAD Peace Process one more chance to reach a final settlement of the dispute”. An Embassy spokesman also declares that: “The main challenge which the IGAD envoys are going to face … is to convince the rebel SPLM/A to change its agenda of using the IGAD negotiations to dismantle the government, to an agenda of negotiating in good faith.”

“Consultations on Sudan Peace Process to Start in Late October”, News Article by XINHUA, 11 October 2001; “Sudan: Khartoum Prepares to Give IGAD ‘One More Chance’”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 11 October 2001

13 October 2001  Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi states that his party has intensified its contacts with political forces concerned with the preliminary peace conference, including the National Democratic Alliance.


14 October 2001  Former Sudanese head of state Ahmed al-Mirghani (whose brother heads the opposition Democratic Unionist Party), returns from exile to Sudan.

“Former Sudan Head of State Plans Return from Exile”, News Article by Reuters, 14 October 2001
15 October 2001 The SPLA admits that its forces have made a tactical withdrawal from the western Bahr al-Ghazal town of Raga, but claims to be redeploying around the town. In an official statement the SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje accuses the Khartoum government of “escalating the conflict through barbaric and indiscriminate bombing”.

“Press Release: SPLA Withdraws From Raga”, Dr Samson L. Kwaje, SPLA Spokesman, Nairobi, 15 October 2001

17 October 2001 Returning from an official trip to Brussels, Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail states that the Sudanese government will soon reach an agreement with the European Union on the normalisation of bilateral relations, including the removal of EU economic sanctions against Sudan. A detailed working programme for the renewal of relations between the EU and Sudan is currently being prepared by the Sudanese embassy in Brussels in consolation with the European Commission.

“Sudan, EU to Normalise Relations”, News Article by PANA, 17 October 2001

21 October 2001 The SPLA states it has successfully attacked the government-held town of Bentiu, capital of Unity State, an oil producing area, together with other targets. It claims to have killed 400 government troops and to have destroyed the premises of a number of oil companies. It also states: “The SPLA renews its call to oil companies to withdraw before it is too late from the oil-producing areas which are legitimate military targets.”

The Sudanese government claims that the attacks were repulsed and that seven civilians were killed by the rebels.

“Seven People Killed in Attack on Bentiu”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 20 October 2001; “Sudan Rebels Say They Attacked Oil Region Capital”, News Article by Reuters, 21 October 2001

22 October 2001 Umma Party political bureau member Dr Adam Musa Madibo states that the Umma Party has agreed to participate in the National Peace Council set up by the Sudanese government.

However, Ali Mahmud Hassanaain, a member of the political bureau of the Democratic Unionist Party, rejects participation in the National Peace Council. He claims that the Council is part and parcel of the government system and will never resolve the civil war. He further stresses that peace will only be attained through the IGAD and Egyptian-Libyan peace initiatives.

“Opposition Parties React to Proposal on Representation at Peace Council”, News Article by The Khartoum Monitor, 22 October 2001
25 October 2001  French Minister for Cooperation Charles Josselin ends a two-day visit to Khartoum. He states that the two countries have agreed to strengthen bilateral economic cooperation and urges both sides in the civil war to reach an agreement about an immediate cease-fire.

“French Minister Calls for Cease-Fire in Sudan”, News Article by PANA, 25 October 2001

27 October 2001  Leaders of the Democratic Unionist Party gather in Cairo for a two-day conference to resolve party policy and establish unity prior to an other extraordinary conference of the party.

“Opposition Democratic Unionist Party Officials to Meet in Cairo”, News Article by Al-Ra’y al-Amm (Khartoum), 27 October 2001

30 October 2001  Following the departure of the US State Department delegation, Minister of State Dhieu Mathok states that “the delegation was appraised of the government’s willingness for a peaceful option”. Government sources are also reported as stating that they believe the US is serious about finding an end to the civil war.

“US Sincere in Seeking End to Sudan Civil War: Khartoum Official”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 October 2001

31 October 2001  During a visit to Egypt to prepare for US Special Envoy to Sudan John Danforth’s forthcoming visit to Sudan, US official Charles Schneider states that the Danforth was not promoting a new peace initiative and that it was up to the parties concerned to decide how to proceed with the IGAD initiative and the Egyptian-Libyan initiative. He states: “We’re not going to pick among the initiatives. It’s for the African to decide among themselves”.

Schneider also describes the Egyptian-Libyan initiative as “helpful” and states that: “Unless we have a lot of cooperation from people like the government of Egypt, our ability to do good is very much more limited because we don’t understand the subtleties.” He further states the US government is “willing to take a fresh look at our relationship with Sudan in order to make progress at all the things that are important to us”.

Following a meeting with the delegation preparing for the forthcoming visit by the US special envoy to Sudan John Danforth, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher states that “[a]ny effort to settle the Sudanese problem must be based on the basis of Sudan’s unity”.

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31 October 2001 Following a meeting with a US State Department delegation concerned with US peace envoy John Danforth’s forthcoming visit to Sudan, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Mahir states that: “Any effort to settle the Sudanese problem must be based on the basis of Sudan’s unity.”

“Egypt Says Any Sudan Peace Must Preserve Unity”, News Article by Reuters, 31 October 2001

2 November 2001 Sudanese Health Minister Ahmed Bilal Osman echoes the call made by UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Kenzo Oshima when he visited Sudan in September for a cease-fire for five days every month in southern Sudan to allow the campaign for polio eradication to proceed. Bilal also states that: “The ministry of health is waiting for the response of the rebel movement during the next two days to the call by voluntary organisations for a ceasefire.”


3 November 2001 Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo states that Nigeria is due to host a further peace conference in Abuja.

“Nigeria to Host Sudan Peace Conference”, News Article by XINHUA, 3 November 2001

6 November 2001 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir announces that leading opposition figure and former member of the council of state Ahmed al-Mirghani (brother of Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, Chairman of the National Democratic Alliance) together with other members of the Democratic Unionist Party, will be returning to Sudan after twelve years of exile. He reveals that the Sudanese embassy in Cairo has been instructed to offer al-Mirghani “all facilities required for his return as a national symbol and in recognition of his efforts for peace and reconciliation”.

“Beshir Welcomes Return of Sudanese Opposition Figure”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 November 2001

6 November 2001 The Sudanese Ambassador to Nigeria, Abdelrahim Khali, states that a peace conference – organised by Nigerian President Obasanjo – will take place in Abuja next week, to include representatives of the Sudanese government, all opposition and rebel, factions as well as SPLA leader John Garang, and aiming at finding a comprehensive and binding agreement on all parties. Ambassador Khali states: “With the interest shown by President Obasanjo, he is the right person to ensure that peace is finally achieved in the Sudan.”
7 November 2001 In a press conference in Nairobi Riek Machar, leader of the rebel Sudan People’s Democratic Front, criticises the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative for not properly addressing the issue of self-determination for the south. He states: “The people of southern Sudan have already stated that, if peace is to be attained, let them exercise the right to self-determination.” He further argues that the initiative is “an attempt to sabotage the IGAD process. Why waste resources on an initiative that will not work”.

Machar also says that although the attempt in May to merge his SPDF with John Garang’s SPLA had failed the two groups had “unity of purpose” and agreed on the issue of self-determination.

7 November 2001 Former Sudanese head of state Ahmed al-Mirghani (who left Sudan when the current President Omer al-Bashir seized power in 1989), deputy head of the Democratic Unionist Party, and brother of its leader, reveals that he plans to return to Sudan within a few days. He states: “I cannot say that I am carrying a specific project or an agreement that will bring about a solution or that I can make any promises or pledges. But I come with hope, intent and serious desire to work in the service of the country.”

8 November 2001 Former Sudanese head of state Ahmed al-Mirghani returns to Sudan, together with a number of senior officials of the Democratic Unionist Party. He is greeted by thousands of supporters as well as by senior government officials.

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir describes Mirghani as “a symbol of state” and acknowledges his efforts at unifying Sudan. Al-Mirghani states that he is “returning to Sudan under the present margin of democracy for maintaining and developing it and to work for halting the bloodshed, enhancing national unity and speeding up the comprehensive political settlement”.

A senior Democratic Unionist Party official, Ali Ahmed al-Sayyed, also states that al-Mirghani is returning as part of “the party’s denunciation of violence and its strenuous efforts at achieving national reconciliation and peace as a step for reaching democracy”. He further states that al-Mirghani’s return may help in accelerating the pace of national reconciliation provided that the Sudanese
government “is committed to its pledge of a political openness” towards political parties.

Another DUP spokesman denies that al-Mirghani’s return was a prelude to the return of his brother DUP leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, who has previously said that he would return once a comprehensive political settlement is reached.


The United Nations General Assembly discusses the report on human rights in Sudan prepared by Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights Gerhart Baum. Baum states that the human rights situation in Sudan continued to be a matter of serious concern, in spite of improvements and efforts toward democratisation. Baum does state that it was not true, as some Christian fundamentalist argue, that the Sudanese civil war was a religious war. There was no systematic suppression of Christian churches in Sudan.

The Sudanese government “reaffirmed its commitment to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms...[and was] fully committed to working with the Special Rapporteur”. It reminded the Assembly that the “root causes [of continued problems] were found in the ongoing conflict in southern Sudan...[and the Government] was ready to renew its acceptance to an immediate and comprehensive cease-fire to put an end to the conflict”.

Sudan also responds to claims regarding civilian bombing casualties: “Civilian casualties due to bombings were the result of the continuous use by the rebels of civilian premises for military purposes.” It further responds to the Rapporteur’s claim that oil development had had a negative impact on human rights in Sudan. Oil revenues were being used to improve the infrastructure and social services throughout the country, particularly in the south. It also reaffirms its opposition to abduction in the south, and was “working hard to counter such activities”.


Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo calls on the Organisation of African Unity to back his Sudan peace initiative conference in Abuja. The OAU expresses “solidarity” with the initiative. However, it is also reported that the conference has been postponed indefinitely.


“Nigeria Asks for OAU Backing for New Sudan Peace Plan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 9 November 2001; “Sudan: Confusion Over Nigerian Peace Efforts”, News Article by IRIN,
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Nairobi, 9 November 2001; “Sudan Peace Talks in Nigeria Indefinitely Postponed; Report”, News Article by Associated Press, 8 November 2001

9 November 2001 Opposition leader Ahmed al-Mirghani returns to Sudan, where he greeted by Sudanese government representatives. Al-Mirghani states that “dialogue is the only successful means to achieve national accord”.

“Sudanese Welcome Home Ex-President”, News Article by Associated Press, 9 November 2001

15 November 2001 The scheduled Abuja peace conference organised by Nigerian President Obasanjo is postponed indefinitely, reportedly because of the failure of the Nigerian government to persuade all the interested groups to attend.


11 November 2001 Sudanese Presidential Advisor on Peace Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani denies allegations that there are disagreements between Sudan and Nigeria regarding the convening of a peace conference. He states that consultations between the two countries are underway to determine the issues to be discussed.

Sudanese Ambassador to Nigeria Abdel Khalil commends Nigeria’s attempts to arrange a peace conference. He states: “With the commitment of [President] Obasanjo, who is fully abreast of Sudan’s running civil war [the Sudanese government] was optimistic that his efforts would be fruitful.” Ambassador Khalil further affirms the Sudanese government’s commitment to a peaceful settlement of the civil war and appeals to the rebels to come to the negotiating table: “After several decades of war, it should be clear to those groups still against peace in the Sudan that nothing could be achieved through war, and that every effort should be made to stop the war…All the necessary guarantees are there that any agreement reached would be faithfully implemented. So, I don’t see any justification in continued fighting. It would only cause more suffering for the people, especially in the southern part of the country.”

“Nigeria’s Peace Efforts in Sudan Commended”, News Article by XINHUA, 11 November 2001

12 November 2001 US Special Envoy for Sudan John Danforth arrives in Sudan for his first official visit regarding peace, a three-day visit for discussions with Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, the two Sudanese Vice-Presidents, the Presidential Peace Advisor, and unspecified opposition leaders. He is also scheduled to visit displaced persons camps near Khartoum as well as the Nuba mountains and El-Obeid in central Sudan and Rumbek in southern Sudan.
The Sudanese Health Minister Ahmed Bilal Osman states that the Sudanese government will once again declare a three-day cease-fire in war zones to facilitate a nation-wide campaign for vaccination against polio.

“Afrique. Khartoum. Sudan declares a three-day ceasefire for anti-polio vaccination”, AFPU, 12 November 2001

A spokesman for the Democratic Unionist Party stated that at a meeting in Cairo the party had succeeded in overcoming differences within the organisation. He dismissed positions taken by the “reform” group of party leaders and the eastern Sudan group who either rejected or expressed reservations about the Cairo decisions. He denied that there were differences between the DUP and NDA over the return to Sudan of DUP deputy leader Ahmed al-Mirghani.


US Special Envoy to Sudan John Danforth states that he has no comprehensive peace plan to offer the Sudanese, but that he has proposed four major ideas to Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir to alleviate civilian suffering serve as a confidence-building measure. The proposals involve providing continuous access to the Nuba mountains for relief purposes, creating zones and periods of tranquillity for humanitarian efforts, the cessation of bombing or other military attacks on civilians, and the cessation of abductions. He describes his talk with President Bashir as “positive”, and states that he will present to SPLA leader John Garang in Nairobi later in the week.

Danforth further states that the US will not impose a solution on Sudan and that “the only people who can end the war are the people of Sudan...the answer is right here...It would be nice if someone could breeze in and solve problems. But the only people that could end the war are the people of Sudan”. He also states that “I have set one year for my mission and if I fail, I will go back to President George Bush and tell him that we have failed”. He adds that in the case of failure, another person might be appointed as envoy.

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15 November 2001 US Special Envoy to Sudan John Danforth helps broker a four-week cease-fire in Sudan, allowing the World Food Programme to make its first food drops within the Nuba mountains in more than a decade.

“Sudan Ceasefire Allows Aid Drops”, News Article by BBC News, 15 November 2001

17 November 2001 SPLA leader John Garang has a two-hour meeting with US Special Envoy to Sudan John Danforth in Nairobi. In a formal statement on the meeting the SPLA reiterates its accusations and demands:

1. it calls for the US imposition of “no-fly and safe havens” in southern Sudan
2. it again accuses the Khartoum government of practising “slave trade and slavery” in Sudan
3. it calls for the cessation of oil development, which it alleges is fuelling the war and causing the “massive displacement of local populations”
4. it accuses the Khartoum government of “religious intolerance…religious motivated conflicts”
5. it attempts to associate the Khartoum government with “international terrorism on the domestic scene”
6. it argues that the IGAD peace process “is the only credible process that has identified a mechanism of resolving the conflict in the Sudan”.
7. it argues that there is a “fundamental and irreconcilable difference between the SPLM and NIF [Khartoum government] on the issue of sharia”.
8. it repeats its demands for “a Confederate arrangement between the North and the South (including the associated areas), a transitional government at the centre that includes all parties (but not based on the NIF Islamist State), a comprehensive cease-fire that includes mutual disengagement and withdrawal of forces behind agreed lines, and a referendum on self-determination after an interim period, followed by general elections, in the context of the outcome of the referendum”.

The SPLA-affiliated organisation, the Federation of Sudanese Civil Society Organisations -New Sudan also submits a Memorandum to Special Envoy Danforth which similarly attempts to associate the Khartoum government with “international terrorism”. It further argues that “[t]he present regime has not shown good faith in the search for a negotiated settlement”.
18 November 2001  US Special Envoy John Danforth meets with SPLA forces in the Nuba mountains and with John Garang in Nairobi. He declines to describe Garang’s response to his proposals, but another US official calls Garang “cagey”. In a press conference in Nairobi Danforth reiterates how difficult it will be to achieve peace: “They’ve been at it for a long, long time, and there’s a great deal of distrust between the parties…There’s no reason why it couldn’t go on indefinitely. So I wouldn’t bet much on it…” Describing his four proposals as a “test” he declares that: “They [both sides] can respond to that test with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. If their response is ‘No’, I don’t see anything more that the United States can do…If the response is ’No’, I do not think it is very possible to have a warm and fuzzy relationship with the US.” Danforth further states that he will return to Sudan in mid-January to see if his “good will” test has been adhered to.

Whilst in Nairobi Danforth also meets with Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi to review the Sudanese peace process. The two agree that the IGAD peace initiative must be speeded up and reinvigorated. The US delegation expresses confidence in Moi as the best placed statesmen to spearhead the process within the IGAD framework.

“US Envoy Gives Sudan Parties Two Months to Show Interest in Peace”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 19 November 2001
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23 November 2001  Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, leader of the opposition National Democratic Alliance, arrives in Asmara for a leadership meeting of the NDA. The meeting will be attended by SPLA leader John Garang, all the opposition leaders outside Sudan, and a delegation from the NDA secretariat inside Sudan. An official NDA statement rejects rumours of internal disagreements about the meetings agenda, but expresses regret regarding “hasty stances” adopted by some factions within the organisation.

“Sudanese Opposition Alliance Meets in Asmara, Eritrea”, News Article by Al-Khartoum, 24 November 2001

26 November 2001  It is announced that UN World Food Programme food airdrops in the rebel-held Nuba Mountains are near completion. Humanitarian Aid Commission emergency administration director Khalid Faraj states that the airdrops are proceeding “smoothly and without hurdles”.

“Central Sudan Relief Airdrops to be Completed This Week”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 26 November 2001

27 November 2001  Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir’s response to Special Envoy John Danforth’s four “goodwill” proposals are reported in the press. Bashir is quoted as saying that the government has reservations about the Nuba mountains ceasefire, which must include, in his view, areas through which a government pipeline travels. Bashir expresses his acceptance of the other proposals, but states that the government wants Danforth to produce evidence regarding claims of “slavery” in Sudan.

President Bashir’s peace advisor Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani is also quoted as complaining that Danforth’s proposals put more pressure on the government than on the rebels. He states: “The proposals constitute pressure on the government…The US says the proposals are a test to the positions of both parties, but they are a test to the government only.”

“US ’Technical Team’ to Sudan Next Week”, News Article by Reuters, 27 November 2001

27 November 2001  In a public State Department Special Briefing US Special Envoy to Sudan John Danforth announces the imminent visit of a “technical team” to Sudan to discuss his peace proposals with the Khartoum government. He states: “My meetings were preliminary and the group that’s going out next week is going to be dealing with much more details (sic).” He also announces that he will himself return to Africa for about 10 days from January 7 of next year.

Danforth states that the US purpose in Sudan is to act as “catalyst” for existing peace initiatives. Responding to questions regarding the response to his four
“good will” proposals, he also comments that “[w]e put forward four ideas and nobody threw us out the door”.

Danforth also distinguishes between the issue of Sudan’s assistance to the US in the war on terrorism, and the broader issue of Sudanese-US relations. He states that “regardless of whatever help we are getting on the issue of terrorism, the issue of peace in Sudan has separate value as far as the United States is concerned. It is not going to be possible for Sudan to have a close relationship with the United States so long as the view within the United States is that people are being oppressed”.

In response to questions regarding Sudanese oil development Danforth states his view that although it is unlikely to have exacerbated the conflict, he does believe that it has caused depopulation in certain areas.

“Special Briefing on Danforth’s Travel to Sudan”, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 27 November 2001; “US ‘Technical Team’ to Sudan Next Week”, News Article by Reuters, 27 November 2001

27 November 2001 Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir reiterates the government’s intention to cooperate with the American Special Envoy John Danforth. He emphasises Sudan’s movement from one-party rule to multiparty democracy and urges all groups to participate in elections. He further argues that there is no justification for the existence of political opposition based outside the country.

“Sudan Will Cooperate With US Peace Envoy, President Bashir Says”, News Article by SUNA, 27 November 2001

30 November 2001 In a speech in Asmara before Eritrean government officials, Arab and European ambassadors, and the US ambassador, National Democratic Alliance leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani calls upon opposition factions in the NDA to concentrate on the main issue of peace without causing differences on marginal and irrelevant issues. He further calls on NDA members to come out with a unified vision and response to the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative and calls for a speeding up of the peace process. Whilst calling for flexibility in negotiations he expresses reservations about the Nigerian sponsored Abuja proposed peace conference, arguing that southern and northern discussions at such a conference could have negative consequences on the unity of both the NDA and Sudan as a whole.

“Opposition Leader Comments on Why They Rejected Nigerian Initiative”, News Article at Al-Ra’y al-Amm web site (Khartoum), 30 November 2001

2 December 2001 The SPLA accuses the Khartoum government of bombing villages in southern Sudan. An SPLA press release claims that the
Khartoum government is engaged in “carpet bombings of civilian targets”. SPLA Spokesman Samson Kwaje states that [the Sudanese government] are bombing all over the place...The government is not interested in a peaceful negotiated end to the conflict”. The SPLA statement calls on “the US and the world community to restrain the [Government of Sudan] from carrying out these (sic) senseless targeting of the civilian population...We further ask the Us not to get on the band wagon of the European Union whose members are friendly to the regime despite Khartoum’s miserable record on human rights”.

The Sudanese government denies the SPLA allegations and states that there are no current military operations in southern Sudan and that Khartoum remains committed to its agreement made with US Special Envoy John Danforth which included a cessation of bombing.


2 December 2001  The Sudanese government denies claims made by the rebel SPLA that it had bombed three villages in Awiel East county in the northern Bahr el Ghazal. It states that there are no current military operations in southern Sudan and accuses the rebels of trying to undermine the ongoing US-Sudanese dialogue.

“Sudan Denies Rebel Statements That It Bombed South”, News Article by Reuters, 2 December 2001

2 December 2001  A National Democratic Alliance delegation of domestic Sudanese members leaves Khartoum to attend a leadership conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara. The conference is designed to discuss and formulate the NDA response to Egyptian and Libyan peace proposals and requests for its participants at a proposed national peace conference.

“Sudanese Opposition Allowed to Leave for Asmara Conference”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 December 2001

4 December 2001  UN Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Sulaf Eddin Salih announces that the airdrop of food within rebel-held areas in the Nuba Mountains has been completed...He states that the Sudanese government is assessing the operation and that the issue of extending the truce in the area would be discussed with a US delegation expected soon in Khartoum. He also states that the Sudanese government is currently considering a UN request to drop non-food items such as medicines, blankets and other supplies to inhabitants within the same SPLA-controlled areas.
Commissioner Salih also states that over 50,000 people, mostly women, children and the elderly have moved from SPLA-held zones to areas controlled by the government in the Nuba Mountains, and are in need of food, medicine and shelter. The Sudanese government will be calling for their inclusion in UN-sponsored programmes for displaced persons, he reveals.

“UN Food Airdrops Completed in Sudan’s Rebel-Held Nuba Mountains”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 4 December 2001

7 December 2001 A US technical delegation, led by Jeffrey Millington, head of Sudan affairs at the State Department, arrives in Sudan for discussions with the government over US peace envoy John Danforth’s proposals. The delegation is also scheduled to visit the rebel-held town of Rumbek in southern Sudan’s Lakes State, before moving on to Nairobi for discussions with rebel SPLA officials.

“US Delegation Kicks Off Sudan Talks”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 8 December 2001

8 December 2001 The Sudanese government lifts censorship restrictions on the country’s English-language newspaper, The Khartoum Monitor, which had not been included in the general lifting of restrictions that took place in November.

“Sudanese Government Lifts Censorship Restrictions on Newspapers”, News Article by Associated Press, 8 December 2001

8 December 2001 Umma Party Vice-Chairman Omar Nour al-Diem, rejects a National Democratic Alliance invitation to rejoin the opposition alliance group. He calls the invitation ridiculous and states that the NDA had not changed its ideas, ideas which were an obstacle to a comprehensive political solution. He further states that the NDA had a hidden agenda, that it wanted to cripple the process of arriving at a comprehensive political solution, and that it was indirectly trying to undermine the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Ummah Party’s Reacts (sic) to Invitation to Join National Democratic Alliance”, Al-Khartoum (Khartoum), 8 December 2001

8 December 2001 A US technical team, led by the US State Department official in charge of Sudanese affairs, visits Khartoum for six-day talks on the US Special Envoy’s peace proposals. The Sudanese government states that the discussions centred on the issue of “slavery” and abduction, as well as dealing with whether a truce in the Nuba Mountains region of Sudan should include an oil pipeline.

It is also revealed that the US team is scheduled to visit southern and western Sudan to discuss peace proposals with the SPLA. The Sudanese government
also states that it has dispatched a fact-finding team to investigate allegations of slavery.

“US Team Fleshes Out Sudan Peace Proposals”, News Article by Reuters, 8 December 2001; “US Delegation Kicks Off Sudan Talks”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 December 2001

12 December 2001 US Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner confirms that Sudan has been cooperating with the US counter-terrorism campaign for some time and that this collaboration had reached new levels since the 11 September attacks. He states: “We appreciate Khartoum’s relationship with us. The long-term cooperation is driven by the internal Sudanese situation, particularly the peace process.”

“US Official Accuses Somalia of Harbouring Terrorists”, News Article by XINHUA, 12 December 2001

14 December 2001 Roger Winter, Director of the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, reports that, following week-long negotiations in Sudan, the Sudanese government and the rebel SPLA have agreed to extend a ceasefire in the Nuba mountains. He states: “Anything that gets both sides together to negotiate a ceasefire in Nuba, which has the worst humanitarian situation in Sudan, is a breakthrough.” Winter also comments: “There is a clear commitment by President Bush to improve the situation and also a congressional and popular constituency I’ve not seen since apartheid in South Africa…It remain to be seen whether the parties’ actions will reflect the agreements, but we are encouraged by the progress that has been achieved…Our intention is to have a ceasefire negotiated between the parties…by the time the [US Special Envoy John Danforth] returns [to Sudan] in January.”

The US Embassy in Sudan gives further details of the agreement. It states: “The [Sudanese] government and the [SPLA]…agreed to negotiate an internationally monitored cease-fire to cover the entire Nuba Mountains region, and to a relief and rehabilitation programme for all civilians…[the two parties] made a clear, firm commitment to avoid all bombardment of civilian and humanitarian targets.”


15 December 2001 SPLA/SPLM spokesman Samson Kwaje confirms the that there was “more or less” an agreement with the Sudanese government for a six-month ceasefire, but asserts that alleged government bombing did not bode well for its durability and undermined the trust needed to negotiate an end to the war.
19 December 2001 The rebel SPLA issues a statement claiming that it has killed 250 government troops in two battles in the south, at Nihau Id and Fang. It further claims that that the Sudanese government has launched “its ritual dry season military offensive” and warns it “not to escalate the war but rather seek a peaceful negotiated settlement”

7 January 2002 In an interview with the Kenya-based magazine The East African, Mr Mohammed Ahmed Dirdeery, the Sudanese charge d’affaires in Nairobi, comments on the IGAD peace initiative. He states that IGAD has “[u]ntil now...achieved very little” but affirms that it “is the correct forum to realise peace in Sudan”.

Ahmed further attributes the failure of the peace process to the fact that “one of the parties to the conflict is not willing to make peace”. He states:

“Throughout the last eight years, Col. John Garang [of the SPLA] has adamantly rejected all concessions from the government like the right to self-determination, the abrogation of sharia law in southern Sudan and a fair formula for sharing resources, including the revenue from oil. For him, IGAD is the diplomatic continuation of his military campaign”.

7 January 2002 Dr Riek Machar of the Sudan People’s Democratic Front and the Sudan People’s Defence Force and John Garang of the SPLA announce the merger of the two organisations. The “Nairobi Declaration of Unity Between the SPLM/SPLA and the SPDF” attacks what it calls the “recalcitrant and bellicose attitude of the NIF regime” an “illegitimate, fascist and Islamic fundamentalist regime”. It further declares that there will be an “immediate cessation of hostilities and coalescence of previously antagonistic military units [of the SPLA and SPDF]” in order to forge “a single entity to engage the enemy forces in combat operations...To conduct immediate military operations against forces of the NIF regime as well as to intensify all other forms of struggle”.

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8 January 2002

Sudanese First Vice President Ali Osman Taha addresses the IGAD Council of Ministers in Khartoum. He states that he is “gratified…that serious dialogue is prevailing over war. I am also gratified to notice the strong desire to settle conflicts through negotiations as well as the will to establish lasting peace in the region”.

“The Speech of the First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan During the IGAD Session”, The Khartoum Monitor, 9 January 2002, p. 2

9 January 2002

Mutrif Siddiq, under-secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expresses his hope that that the merger agreement signed between the rebel SPLA and Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Democratic Front, will prove to be an important move toward a peaceful settlement of Sudan’s civil war. “Any agreement among the warring Southern Sudanese leaders will help the peace process in the Sudan”, he states.


9 January 2002

A joint humanitarian assessment mission to the Nuba Mountain regions of Southern Kordofan State, in south-central Sudan, by the Sudan government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission, the US Agency for International Development and other relief organisations is reported as proceeding “very well” and to be nearing completion. A complementary multi-agency and multi-sectoral assessment of rebel-held areas in the Nuba Mountains, coordinated by the United Nations, is also initiated, whilst a similar assessment of government-held areas has already started. The missions are the fulfilment of the agreement made by both sides in the civil war following the visit to Sudan of US peace envoy John Danforth.


11 January 2002

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir addresses the opening session of the 9th Ordinary IGAD Summit of Heads of State in Khartoum. He states: “We wholeheartedly condemn terrorism and join the rest of the international community in the fight against this heinous crime, which respects no boundaries, religion or culture.”

On the Sudanese peace process he further states:

“Both as the Current Chairman of IGAD and as the Head of State of Sudan, I would like to reiterate the commitment of my Government towards the IGAD Peace Process on the conflict in Southern Sudan based on the Declaration of Principles. The government of Sudan will continue to engage in good faith with
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the SPLA/M with a view to reaching at a negotiable and a mutually agreed upon solution to the conflict that has, for the last four decades, continued to cause death to our people and destruction to the economy of our country.”

“Opening Address by HE President Omer Hassan Al Bashir, President of Sudan During the 9th Ordinary IGAD Summit of Heads of State”, The Khartoum Monitor, 12 January 2002, p. 3

12 January 2002  Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Mahir returns to Egypt following the completion of the 9th IGAD Ministers summit in Khartoum. Mahir reports that he had meetings with Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, as well as with Libyan, Eritrean, Somali and Norwegian government representatives regarding activating the Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative.

“Egyptian Foreign Minister Comments on Outcome of Sudan Visit”, News Article by MENA, 11 January 2002

14 January 2002  Representatives from the Sudanese government and the rebel SPLA meet at a secret location in Switzerland for talks, co-sponsored by the United States and Switzerland, to discuss a lasting ceasefire. A Swiss Foreign Ministry spokesperson states: “The point [of the discussions] is to define the modalities of the ceasefire. There has not been a commitment so far and the idea is to negotiate this.”

“Sudan Rebels Meet Government for Truce Talks”, News Article by Reuters, 14 January 2002

14 January 2002  US peace envoy John Danforth reveals in an interview in Kenya that Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi has been charged with making a new effort to merge the parallel IGAD and Egyptian-Libyan peace initiatives. Danforth states that “Our hope is [that] a core of support for peace, led by Egypt and Kenya and joined in by the Europeans, Canadians and ourselves, is going to have an effect.”

President Moi states that he will invite all parties interested in the Sudan peace process to a meeting in Nairobi within the next six months, possibly involving face-to-face talks between Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir and SPLA leader John Garang. Moi states that the peace process is in danger of collapse unless it is put on the right track and the impetus created to achieve an early peace agreement.

“Moi Mandated by IGAD to Merge Peace Initiatives”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 14 January 2002

14 January 2002  US peace envoy John Danforth addresses the worshippers at Khartoum’s All Saints Cathedral regarding his peace efforts. He states that “It remains to be seen whether the politicians in this country want peace.” Under a best-case scenario, he adds, comprehensive peace talks could
begin in two months or less. Danforth states: “Will [Sudan] become a secular state? No. The question is will the system allow non-Muslims not just to practice their religion but to be free from the imposition of Islamic restrictions.”

“Danforth Offers Hope for Peace in Sudan”, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 14 January 2002

15 January 2002 European Union Ambassador to Sudan Dr Xavier Marchal describes the IGAD peace initiative as the only one which could resolve Sudan’s civil war. He states that: “Peace is possible in the Sudan, it will come soon, the opportunities are there. I hope the Sudanese will seize them.” Dr Marchal also states that the EU will be drawing up a strategy with the Sudanese government on key issues in Sudan, centring on ending the war. The strategy will also involve civil society projects, food security and economic development.

“EU Reaffirms International Community Stand for Peace”, The Khartoum Monitor, 15 January 2001, p. 1

15 January 2002 Opposition Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi welcomes the IGAD conference’s decision to adopt an open door policy towards other peace initiatives as a positive step toward achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in Sudan. He also stresses the importance of merging the IGAD initiative with other peace initiatives, and welcomes the role that the US peace envoy John Danforth is playing. However, he also emphasises that Danforth has no magic wand enabling him to solve Sudanese problems in a single day.


16 January 2002 US special envoy John Danforth states that he has failed to secure the Sudanese government’s support for a monitoring agreement to protect civilians. He declares: “Progress has been made in the other three proposals I made last November” but that immunity of civilian from military attacks is the “key to all proposals we have made”. “I am sorry to say that we have no real progress there as the government has not been supportive of a monitoring concept yet, although they agreed to a period of four weeks to halt unilateral military attacks…There is no meaning for prospects of peace and for US involvement in peace if there is no understanding on something as absolutely basic and consistent with the Geneva Conventions as the immunity of civilians from military attacks.”

The Sudanese government, however, points to the fact that SPLA rebels use hospitals, schools and relief sites as launching bases for military attacks. It also objects to calls for an end to bombing as a one-sided requirement, since it is the
only party with an airforce. Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir states that he is willing to cease bombing only if the SPLA pledge to suspend their own military attacks - a demand rejected by the SPLA.


17 January 2002 Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that indiscriminate food drops into rebel SPLA-held territory poses problems: “You don’t just drop food anywhere especially when there is a fighting army. You risk being accused of supplying that army with food. I don’t think the US government would do this.” Dr Atabani also alleges that aid flights from Kenya have been covertly shipping weapons to the rebels and has pressed the Americans to allow government inspection of planes before loading.


17 January 2002 Following a trip to Egypt US special envoy John Danforth states that “President Hosni Mubarak’s political advisor Osama el-Baz stressed Egypt’s keenness on cooperation with the US and the IGAD to settle the Sudanese problem”.

“Egypt Keen to Settle Sudan Issue: US Envoy”, News Article by XINHUA, 17 January 2002

17 January 2002 Swiss Foreign Ministry spokesman Livio Zanolari states that negotiations in Switzerland regarding a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains have got off to a positive start in “a very favourable climate”. However, SPLM/A spokesman Samson Kwaje emphasises that “these are technical committee and they will only be discussing a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains. These are not peace-talks; they will only be talking about that cease-fire.”

“Nuba Cease-Fire Negotiations Continuing”, News Article by IRIN, Nairobi, 17 January 2002

19 January 2002 Swiss Foreign Ministry spokesman Livio Zanolari announces that the Sudanese government and the rebel SPLA have signed a six-month ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains, renewable every six months. Under the agreement a truce monitoring commission, staffed by government, rebel, and international observers, will be set up. Mutrif Siddiq, head of the Sudanese government delegation, states that: “This cease-fire agreement is our baby and we shall nurse and nourish it until it matures into a comprehensive and lasting peace.”

Presidential peace advisor Dr Ghazi Salehuddin Atabani states that the agreement “shows that we are on the right track towards the realisation of peace
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and silencing the voices calling for war...It is a step towards normalising life and facilitating relief and rehabilitation operations in the Nuba Mountains and creating an atmosphere conducive to reaching peace...We pray to God that it will herald a lasting peace.”

Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail also states that “This step has to be followed by other steps because we want peace in all regions of Sudan, and not just in the Nuba mountains.”

SPLA spokesman Yasser Arman states: “[The agreement] is an excellent step, but it is limited. We are still waiting to find a comprehensive settlement and to address the causes of the problem which have not yet been addressed.”


19 January 2002

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir’s Peace Advisor Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani issues a statement outlining the Sudanese government’s response to US special envoy John Danforth’s negotiations. He states that many of Danforth’s proposals “were more related to domestic American concerns than to the root-causes of the war in the South”. However, he emphasises that the Sudanese government “thought it beneficial to the peace process to deal constructively with the American efforts” and noted the “positive divergence in the Sudan Policy of the present American Administration from that of the Clinton Administration”.

Dr Atabani notes the “seriousness and credibility” of the Sudanese government’s attempts to comply with Danforth’s requests, a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains, “zones of tranquillity” for relief work, and arrangements for a “US-led mission to investigate accusations of slavery”.

However, addressing US proposals for international monitoring to prevent bombing of civilians in Sudan Dr Atabani declares that: “The [Government of Sudan] had no policy of deliberately targeting civilians by its military activities, contrary to what is widely believed to be the case in the US. The GOS also indicated that the US was in the best position to appreciate the difficulty of sparing civilians collateral damage, as has been shown from US experience in past and current military engagements. The GOS also reiterated its worry that [Danforth’s proposals for international monitoring of all military activities affecting civilians] is unprecedented and unparalleled anywhere in the world, [and] would selectively put its forces at a disadvantage, since the SPLA only
command guerrilla forces that could easily elude the verification mechanism. Such an arrangement would therefore provide the SPLA with a definite military advantage.º

To attempt to demonstrate “flexibility” regarding the issue of bombing and “leave the issue open for future talks”, however, Dr Atabani states that the Sudanese government was prepared to: “reaffirm its commitment to the Geneva Convention and any similar agreement or convention aimed at protecting civilian populations at the time of war...would confirm that it has no policy, overt or covert, to target civilian populations with its military operations...would declare, unilaterally, a four-week voluntary cessation of aerial bombardment, save in case of self defence...would consider discussing the American proposal after the elapse of the four weeks, provided that the two issues, which the Government believe to be closely associated with aerial bombardment are also discussed, namely: 1º. Verification of the neutrality and transparency of humanitarian operations. 2º. Verification and prevention of exploitation of children and civilian populations in the war.”

However, Dr Atabani reveals that the US “did not accept the proposal advanced by the government of Sudan and indicated that failure to reach agreement on this question might put the whole mission in jeopardy.”


20 January 2002 US special envoy John Danforth visits locations in both government and rebel-held areas of southern Sudan, including Kadugli, capital of the state of South Kordofan, and Karkar. At the latter he meets with SPLA forces and officials.

“Sudanese in Remote Region Embrace Danforth”, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 20 January 2002

23 January 2002 Sudanese Armed Forces spokesman Mohammed Beshir Suleiman confirms that the army “fully abided by orders issued by the general command for cessation of firing in line with the ceasefire agreement between the government and the [SPLA]”. He states that all troops in the south-central Nuba Mountains have been briefed on the agreement and “will observe and protect the agreement for restoration of peace and stability”. He also adds that he hopes the agreement “will be an effective step for achieving comprehensive peace” throughout Sudan.

However, the SPLA states that it killed 364 government soldiers in two battles in other locations in the oil-producing regions of western and central upper Nile. SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje claims that the Sudanese government “has
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started its ritual dry-season offensive with military mobilisation and attacks on SPLA positions in oil-rich areas...These unprovoked attacks have been successfully repulsed by SPLA units”. In his statement Kwaje makes further threats against the oil companies, calling them to “heed the voice of reason and prudence, and dissociate themselves from the genocidal policies” of the Sudanese government.

However, the Sudanese government replies that there is “nothing like a dry-season offensive” occurring, and that current clashes around the oil-rich regions had begun “some months ago”. Muhammed Ahmed Dirdeery, Sudanese Charge d’Affaires in Nairobi, states that the western Upper Nile is “almost 100 percent” under government control, with only “a few pockets here and there” still occupied by the SPLA. He further states: “Skirmishes around these places are normal, and the government is always carrying out routine movements to protect oil companies operating in the region.”

Sudanese Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mutref Siddiq also claims that the SPLA launched an attack on the government-held town of Rafu in the Nuba Mountains only hours before the truce was implemented.


27 January 2002 Mutref Siddiq, Sudanese Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, states that people are starting to move freely in the Nuba mountains, largely from rebel-held areas into government-held ones, as a result of the ceasefire. He states: “The movement of citizens has started to take a natural form...This is an indication of the success of the Switzerland (ceasefire) agreement.”

“Sudan Says People Moving Freely in Ceasefire Area”, News Article by Reuters, 27 January 2002

27 January 2002 Presidential Peace Advisor Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that the Sudanese government has officially protested over US President George W. Bush’s decision to approve 10 million dollars in funding for the opposition National Democratic Alliance. He states: “This is an erroneous decision against which we have officially protested and have communicated our protest to [US Special Envoy] Danforth...[it] definitely does not serve the peace process in Sudan...[and] is an undue decision and is clearly biased towards the opposition.” It is “not fair or just”, he comments, for the US government to “benevolently reward the opposition” whilst continuing to impose economic sanctions on Khartoum...Right now, the US is punishing us
on one side while favouring the opposition. We feel that this is not fair mediation... We had been looking for a more fair and just administration. As a mediator, we are assuming that the US will be keen on trying to treat both parties equally.”

The grant is composed of $10 million approved under President Clinton and a further $3 million approved under President Bush.


28 January 2002 Presidential Peace Advisor Dr Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani states that the Nuba Mountain cease fire “has achieved success on the ground”, that roads are open and that normal population movements are occurring.


29 January 2002 The proceedings of two press conferences held by Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir following the 9th IGAD summit are published in the press. Commenting on the issue of “self-determination” for southern Sudan President Bashir states:

“[T]he southerners are for a federal system of government. We are not opposed to this. Already, southern Sudan has been divided into 10 federal states with a significant degree of autonomy. They are free to pursue their cultural practices as they wish with no one imposing on them. The issue of self-determination, however, does not arise. Self-determination can only be an issue if there is colonialism. But no one is colonising southern Sudan so we can only speak of autonomy, not self-determination...The most important point is that we are for power-sharing and the neutral and equal distribution of wealth in Sudan. Within that set-up, all the southern Sudanese can be given the chance to govern themselves in their 10 federal states with a significant degree of autonomy.”

Responding to questions about the issue of religious freedom in Sudan President Bashir states:

“Our constitution clearly points out that we are for the liberty of all our citizens. The rights and duties of our citizens are based on citizenship, not religion or race. In Sudan today, we have a vice president, ministers and ambassadors who are Christians. In central Khartoum, there are more churches than mosques. Friday, which is the day of worship for Muslims, is a day off for Christians as well. On Sundays, Christians have two hours off to attend prayers. In southern Sudan, Sunday is their day off. Christmas which is a Christian holiday, is a public holiday in Sudan.”
President Bashir also responds to the accusations that slavery exists in Sudan and is sanctioned by the government. He replies:

“The allegations of slavery were part of a media campaign against us. Which resulted from the actions and deeds staged in the rebel-controlled areas. In our courts, we have many southerners in the judiciary and they would have been the first to raise concern if the allegations we indeed true. You might have noticed that two-thirds of the southern Sudanese live in the north. Many of these have escaped from the human-rights abuses in the south to the north where the alleged slave-traders should be residing! The irony of this simply shows you that this is mere propaganda. Right here in Khartoum, there are many southern Sudanese co-existing peacefully with their northern brothers. We are prepared to give you the chance to visit those areas where slavery is alleged to be taking place. Sudan is actually one of the few countries that has successfully tackled the problem of internally displaced populations by giving the displaced services and plots to rebuild their homes on.”

President Bashir also roundly condemns terrorism as a force which “threatens to destroy the tenets of modern civilisation” and calls upon Somalia to expel any individuals associated with militant groups there. Responding to the issue of American allegations that Sudan had been a “haven for terrorists” President Bashir declares:

“[I]t is true there has been a significant change in US policy towards Sudan. The previous US government sought to isolate, destabilise and ultimately topple the government in Sudan. They thought they could only realise this agenda through war. In justifying its attempts to establish Sudan, the previous administration accused us of supporting international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalist extremism, suppressing religious freedom and abuse of human rights…Many of the previous administration’s policies that were made regarding Sudan, were made in secret, and were said to be have been based on ‘classified’ material and information not available to public scrutiny. It also supported southern Sudanese rebels, and in so doing, artificially prolonged the Sudanese civil war. The new administration, on the other hand, believes in establishing close contacts and diplomacy.”

“Clinton To Blame For Prolonging Our Civil War”, The East African (Nairobi), 29 February 2002

30 January 2002 The Head of Delegation of the European Commission in Sudan, Xavier Marchall, informs the Sudanese government that the European Union will resume, after a suspension of more than a decade, its development aid to Sudan. He also states that the EU is currently engaged in “political dialogue with Sudan aimed at addressing issues that have divided us
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in the past...These issues are now related to human rights, to democracy and the rule of law, and to the peace process”.

“EU to Resume Financial Aid to Sudan After Decade-Long Break”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 January 2002
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(Editors), Their Brothers' Keepers: Regional Initiative for Peace in Sudan, InterAfrica Group, Addis Ababa, 1997.


THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN

Draft Organic Law to organize Regional Self-Government in the Southern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralized system of the government of their country, it is hereunder enacted:

Article 1. This law shall be called the law for Regional Self-Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force and a date within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 2. This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.

CHAPTER I : DEFINITIONS

Article 3.

a) ‘Constitution’ refers to the Republican Order No. 5 or any other basic law replacing or amending it.

b) ‘President’ means the president of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

c) ‘Southern Provinces of the Sudan’ means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood January 1, 1956, and other areas that were culturally and
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geographically a part of the Southern Complex as may be decided by a referendum.

d) ‘People’s Regional Assembly’ refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.

I. ‘High Executive Council’ refers to the Executive council appointed by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.

I. ‘President of the High Executive Council’ refers the person appointed by the President on the recommendation of the People’s Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces.

I. ‘People’s National Assembly’ refer to the National Legislative Assembly representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.

I. ‘Sudanese’ refers to any Sudanese citizens as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act 1957 and any amendment thereof.

CHAPTER II

Article 4. The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3 (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and be known as the Southern Region.

Article 5. The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and power of which are defined by this law.

Article 6. Arabic shall be official language for the Sudan and English the principle language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any language or languages, which may serve a practical necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Region.

CHAPTER III

Article 7. Neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature which are:
National Defense
External Affairs
Currency and Coinage
Air and Inter-Regional Transport
Communications and Telecommunications
Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities, which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.
Nationality and Immigration (Emigration)
Planning for Economic and Social Development
Educational Planning
Public-Audit.

CHAPTER IV

Article 8. Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a People’s Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and condition of membership of the Assembly shall be determined by law.

Article 9. Members of the People’s Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot.

Article 10.

d) For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the People’s Regional Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed one-quarter of the Assembly.

I. The People’s Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its business in accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during its first sitting.

I. The People’s Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, provided that the first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the High Executive Council.

Article 11. The People’s Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, interim security, efficient administration and the development
of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the following:

a) Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region.

a) Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.

I. Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.

I. Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions.

I. Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development.

I. Promotion of local languages and cultures.

I. Town and village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programs

I. Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders’ licenses and formation of co-operation societies.

I. Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.

I. Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centers, dispensaries and dressing stations.

I. Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade.

a) Promotion of tourism
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a) Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organizations of trade and cultural exhibitions.

I. Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.

I. Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards.

a) Land use in accordance with national laws.

I. Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.

a) Development, utilization, and protection of forests crops and pastures in accordance with national laws.

a) Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.

a) All other matters delegated by the President or the People’s National Assembly for legislation.

Article 12. The People’s National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of administration in the Southern Region.

Article 13.

a) The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the President of relieve the President or any member of the High Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such request.

a) in case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.

Article 14. The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens
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of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, accede to such request.

Article 15.

a) The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the President to withdraw any Bill presented to the People’s National Assembly which in their view affects adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending communication of the views of the People’s Regional Assembly.

b) If the President accedes to such request, the People’s Regional Assembly shall present its views within 15 days from the date accession to the request.

b) The President accedes to such request, The People’s Regional Assembly together with his own observation if he deems necessary.

Article 16. The People’s National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts of the People’s Regional Assembly for their information. The People’s Regional Assembly shall act similarly.

CHAPTER V: THE EXECUTIVE

Article 17. The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of the President.

Article 18. The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government Agencies it shall act with approval of the President.

Article 19. The President of the High Executive council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the People’s Regional Assembly.

Article 20. The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council

Article 21. The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the President and to the People’s Regional Assembly for efficient administration in the Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President.
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Article 22. The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings of the People’s Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the right of vote, unless they are also members of the People’s Regional Assembly.

CHAPTER VI

Article 23. The president shall form time to time regulate the relationship between the high Executive Council and the central ministries.

Article 24. The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the Regional Public Service.

CHAPTER VII: FINANCE

Article 25. The People’s Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislation and orders to guarantee the collection of all public monies at different levels.

(One) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:—

a) Direct and indirect regional taxes.

a) Contribution from People’s Local Government Councils

a) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with the National Plan.

a) Funds from the National Treasury for established services.

a) Funds voted by the people’s National Assembly in accordance with the requirements of the Region.

a) The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the People’s Regional Assembly for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the Southern Region as envisaged in the declaration of June 9, 1968.

a) See Appendix B.

a) Any other sources.
(Two) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure of regional services, security, administration, and development in accordance with national plans and programme and shall submit it to the People’s Regional Assembly for approval.

CHAPTER VIII : OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 26.

i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People’s Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region.

i) the use of the People’s Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national defense shall be controlled by the President of the advice of the President of the High Executive Council

i) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People’s Armed Forces in the Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol on Interim Arrangements.

Article 27. The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the provisions of the National Constitution provided the People’s Regional Assembly, after receiving the President’s views, may reintroduce the Bill.

Article 28. The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the People’s Regional Assembly.

Article 29. Any member of the People’s Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial Bills shall not be presented without sufficient notice to the President of the High Executive Council.

Article 30. The People’s Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National Constitution.

Article 31. All citizens are guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen solely on grounds of public health and order.

Article 32.
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a) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.

b) No law adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.

Article 33. Juba shall be the Capital of the Southern Region and the seat of the Regional Executive and Legislature.

APPENDIX A: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

1. A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship

I. Equality of citizens.

a) All citizens, without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sec, economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.

b) All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the rights to institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay prejudicing their interest.

2. Personal liberty.

a) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited.

b) The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty.

b) Retrospective penal legislation and punishment should be prohibited.

I. The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed.
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I. No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the due process of law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than twenty-four hours without judicial order.

I. No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation of torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in his favor or against him or against any other person, and no humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted person.

   a) Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion and of conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favor of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.

I. Parents and Guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance with the relation of their choice.

5. Protection of Labor.
   i) Forced and compulsory labor of any kind should be prohibited except when ordered for military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law.

   ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.

I. Freedom of minority to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.

APPENDIX B: DRAFT ORDINANCE ON ITEMS OR REVENUE AND GRANTS-IN-AID FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION

1. Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products of the Southern Region.

I. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the Central list of the Ministry of Treasury.
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I. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consumed in the Southern Region.

I. Profits on sugar consumed in Southern Region.

I. Royalties of forest products of the Southern Region.

I. Royalties on leaf Tobacco and Cigarettes.

I. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.

I. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects (5 percent of net profits of factories, co-operative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).

I. Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the Region shall bear maintenance expenses e.g., Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms and documents, stamp duties and any other item to e specified from time to time.

I. Licenses other than those provided for in the People’s Local Government Act, 1971.

I. Special Development Tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region the rate of which should be decided by the People’s Regional Assembly.

I. Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the local and national civil services as well as in the Army, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political Establishment.

I. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run by the Regional Government (5 percent of the initial cost).

I. Contribution from the Central Government for the encouragement of construction and development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise (20 percent of the initial cost as assessed by the Central Government).

I. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Government units, and for which funds are allocated, shall receive grants from the National Treasury in the following manner:
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Education institution, 20 percent of expenses.
Trunk and through Roads and Bridges, 25 percent of expenses.
Relief and Social amenities, 15 percent of expenses.
Tourist attraction projects 25 percent of expenses.
Security, 15 percent of expenses.
Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the Sudan, 20 percent of grants, outside the Sudan 30 percent of grants.
Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural Activities, 25 percent of expenses.

AGREEMENT OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

Article 1. This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified for the ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 2. There will be an end to all military operations and to all armed actions in the Southern Region from the time of cease-fire.

Article 3. All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the time of the cease-fire.

Article 4. Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence.
Any underground activities contrary to public order shall cease.

Article 5. Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the areas under their control shall be allowed only if these individuals are unarmed and authorized by their respective authorities. The plans for stationing troops from the National Army shall be such as to avoid any contact between them and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement combat forces.

Article 6. A joint Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all questions related to the cease-fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint Commission shall include members from all the countries bordering on the Southern Region as well as representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, World Council of Churches, all Africa Conference of Churches and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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Article 7. The joint Commission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by both parties in dealing with all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot.

Article 8. Each party shall be represented on the Joint Commission by one senior military officer and maximum of five other members.

Article 9. The headquarters of the Joint Commission shall be located in Juba with provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau.

Article 10. The Joint Commission shall appoint local commission in various centers of the Southern Region composed of two members from each party.

PROTOCOLS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

(Political, Local Government and Civil Service)

Article 1. The President of the Democratic Republic of Sudan shall, in consultation with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (S.S.L.M) and branches of the Sudanese Socialist Union in the Southern Region, appoint the president and members of an Interim High Executive Council.

Article 2. The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and other members with portfolios in:

2. Education
3. Information, Culture and Tourism
4. Communication and Transport
5. Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries.
7. Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons).
The interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national laws, establish a Regional Civil Service subject to ratification by the People’s Regional Assembly.

Article 4. The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive Council determine the date for the election to the People’s Regional Assembly, and the Interim High Executive Council shall make arrangements for the setting up of this Assembly.

Article 5. In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and regional institutions, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and communicate lists of citizens of the Southern Region outside of the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform.

Article 6. The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations with effect from the 1972-73 Budget for such placements and appointments.

Article 7. The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a period of 18 months.

CHAPTER II: TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION.

Article 1. These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the President of the request of the President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent of the People’s Regional Assembly.

Article 2. The People’s Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the Southern Command composed of 12,000 officers and men of whom 6,000 shall be
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citizens from the Region and the other 6,000 from outside the Region.

Article 3. The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region within the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.

Article 4. The joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military officers from each side. Decision of the Joint Military Commission shall be taken unanimously. In case of disagreement such matters shall be referred to the respective authorities.

CHAPTER III: AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 1. No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any person in any court of law for or on account of any act or matter done inside or outside the Sudan as from the 18th day of August 1995, if such act or matter was done in connection with mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.

Article 2. If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article 1 is instituted before or after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement such a suit shall be discharged and made null and void.

Article 3. All persons serving terms of imprisonment or held in detention in respect of offences herein before specified in Article 1 shall be discharged of released within 15 days for the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 4. The joint Cease-fire Commission shall keep a register of all civilian returnees, which register shall serve to certify that the person therein named are considered indemnified within the meaning of this Agreement provided that the commission may delegate such power to the Sudan in the case of citizens from the Southern Region living abroad and to whom the provisions of this Agreement apply.

Article 5. In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces the Joint Military Commission shall keep a similar
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register of those persons who shall be treated in the same manner as provided for in Article 4.

Article 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 above a Special Tribunal with ad hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and decide on those cases which in the estimation of the authorities do not meet the conditions for amnesty specified in Article 1 of this Agreement. The Special Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the President of the Republic and not more than four members named by the Cease-fire Commission.

Article 7. Cases referred to in Article 6 shall be brought to the attention of the Special Tribunal by request of the Minister of Justice.

Article 8. The Amnesty Provision contained in this Agreement as well as the powers of Special Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the President after consultation with the commissions referred to in this

Article 9. Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons is administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government the present conditions in the Southern Region dictate that efforts of the whole nation of the Sudan and International organizations should be pooled to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall co-ordinate activities and resources of the Organization within the country.

Article 10. The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within the Sudan in the following order:
I. 1Persons presently residing in overcrowded centers in the Southern Region, and persons desirous to return to their original areas and homes;

I. 2Persons returning from the bush including Anayanya Supporters;

) 3Handicapped persons and orphans

Article 11. The second priority shall be given to returnees from the neighboring and other countries according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide for:
The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement

1. Adequate reception centers with facilities for shelter, food supplies, medicine and medicaments;

I. Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of origin.

3. Materials and equipment.

Article 12. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall:

1. Appeal to international organizations and voluntary agencies to continue assistance for students already under their support particularly for students in secondary schools and higher institutions until appropriate arrangements are made for their repatriation;

I. Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of financial support from the Sudan Government.

Article 13. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the education of all returnees who were attending primary schools.

This agreement is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the month of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D, in this city Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement on the other. It shall come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Leader of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. It shall be ratified by the said by two Leaders in person or through their respective authorized Representatives, in this city, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of the month of March, in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D.

In witness whereof, we the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement hereby append our signatures in the presence of the Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.
The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

I. Abel Alier-Wal Kuai, Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs.
II. Dr. Mansour Khalid, Minister for foreign Affairs.
III. Dr. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit, Minister for Local Government
IV. Major-General Mohammed Al Baghir Ahmed, Minister of Interior.
V. Abel Rahman Abdalla, Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform.
VI. Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman
VII. Colonel Kamal Abashar.

FOR THE SOUTHERN SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT

II. Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, Secretary of the Delegation.
III. Mading deGarang, Spokesman of the Delegation.
IV. Colonel Frederick Brian Maggot, Special Military Representative.
V. Oliver Batali Albino, Member.
VI. Anelo Voga Morjan, Member.
VII. Rev. Paul Puot, Member.
VIII. Job Adier de Jok, Member.

Witnesses

I. Nabiyalul Kifle, Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia.
II. Leopolda J. Niilus, Representative of the World Council of Churches.
III. Kodwo E. Akrah, Representative of the World Council of Churches.
IV. Burgess Carr, General Secretary All Africa Council of Churches.
V. Samuel Athi Bwogo, Representative of the Sudan Council of Churches.

Attestation

I attest that these signatures are genuine and true.
Burgess Carr, Moderator.
THE KOKA DAM DECLARATION

24 March 1986

I. On the basis of experience of the past years making up the post-independence period, and mindful of the heroic achievement of our people in their continuous mass political and armed struggle against all forms of injustice, oppression and tyranny; a struggle which was expressed in the course of two (2) decades through two (2) great revolutions.

And rejecting all forms of dictatorships and absolutely committed to the democratic option.

And out of the conviction and absolutely committed to the democratic option.

And out of the conviction that it is necessary to create a New Sudan in which the Sudanese individual enjoys absolute freedom from the shackles of injustice, ignorance and disease in addition to enjoying the benefits of real democratic life; a New Sudan that would be free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism and all causes of discrimination and disparity.

And genuinely endeavoring to stop the blood shed resulting form the war in Sudan.

And fully aware that the process leading to formation of a New Sudan should begin by the convening of National Constitutional conference.

And in the firm belief that the propositions put forward and herein spelt out by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) and the National Alliance for the National Salvation as essential perquisites for convening the said constitutional Conference do constitute a sound basis for the launching of such a process.

The delegation of the National Alliance for National Salvation and that of the SPLM/SPLA, both of whom shall herein after be together preferred to as the “The TWO SIDES”, agree that essential prerequisites which would foster an atmosphere conductive to the holding of the proposed National constitutional Conference are:
The 1986 Koka Dam Declaration

One) A declaration by all political forces and the government of the day of their commitment to discuss the Basic Problems of Sudan and not the so-called problem of Southern Sudan and that shall be in accordance with the Agenda agreed upon in this “Declaration”.

Two) The lifting of the State of Emergency.

Three) Repeal of the “September 1983 Laws” and all other laws that are restrictive of freedoms.

Four) Adaptation of the 1956 Constitution as amended in 1964 with incorporation of “Regional Government” and all other such matters on which a consensus opinion of all the political forces shall be reached.

Five) The abrogation of the military pacts concluded between Sudan and other countries and which impinge on Sudan’s National Sovereignty.

Six) A continuous endeavor by the two sides to take necessary steps and measures to affect a cease-fire.

3. The SPLM/SPLA believes that a public commitment by all the political forces and the government of the day, that the said government shall dissolve itself and to be replaced by a New Interim Government of National Unity representing all the political forces including the SPLM/SPLA and the Armed forces as shall be agreed upon at the proposed conference, is an essential prerequisite for convening the proposed Constitutional Conference. Consequently the two sides have agreed to defer the matter for further discussions in the near future.

4. The two sides have agreed that the proposed Constitutional Conference shall be held under the banner of peace, justice, equality and democracy.

They have further agreed that the agenda for the conference should comprise the following:-

(a) One) The Nationalities Question
Two) The Religious Question.
Three) Basic human Rights
The 1986 Koka Dam Declaration

Four) The system of Rule
Five) Development and Uneven Development
Six) Natural Resources
Seven) The Regular Forces and Security Arrangements.
Nine) Foreign Policy.

b) The two sides have provisionally agreed that the above agenda does not in any way purport to be exhaustive.

5. The two sides have provisionally agreed that the proposed Constitutional Conference shall be held in Khartoum during the third week of June 1986, to be preceded by preliminary meetings, and that the conference shall actually be held after the government of the day provides and declares the necessary security arrangements and the necessary conducive atmosphere.

6. Mindful of the need for regular consultation with one another, the two sides have agreed to set up a joint liaison committee comprising five members from each side.

The two sides have further agreed that Wednesday, May 7th, 1986 shall be the date for conducting the committee’s first meeting, which shall take place in Addis Ababa.

7. This “Declaration” is issued in both English and Arabic. The two sides have agreed that the English text of the same shall be the “Original” and in the event of any discrepancy it shall prevail over its Arabic equivalent.

8. Having issued this “Declaration” the two sides appeal to the Sudanese people as represented in their various political parties, Trade Unions and Associations to work earnestly for the realization of the objectives of this “Declaration”.

LONG LIVES THE STRUGGLE OF THE SUDANESE Masses.

For Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA).

Lt. Col. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol,
The 1986 Koka Dam Declaration

Deputy Commander in Chief of SPLA and Deputy Chairman of SPLM Provisional Executive Committee.

For National Alliance for National Salvation

Awad El Karim Mohamed

Secretary General for the National Alliance for National Salvation.
SUDAN CHARTER:
NATIONAL UNITY AND DIVERSITY

First: Religious Affiliation and the Nation

1. The People

A) Sudanese are one nation:

- United by common religious and human values, and by the bonds of coexistence, solidarity and patriotism,
- And diversified by the multiplicity of their religious and cultural affiliations.

B) The Bulk of Sudanese are Religious: The following principles shall therefore be observed in consideration for their dignity and unity:

1. Respect for religious belief, and for the right to express one’s religiousness in all aspects of life. There shall be no suppression of religion as such, and no exclusion thereof from any dimension of life.

2. Freedom of choice of religious creed and practice, and sanctity of religious function and institutions. There shall be no coercion in religious affiliation, and no prohibition of any form of religious practice.

3. Benevolence, justice, equality and peace among different religious affiliates. They shall not prejudice or hurt any another by word or deed. There shall be no hostility in religion - none shall excite antagonism, impose domination, or commit aggression among religious individuals or communities.

C) The Muslims are the majority among the population of the Sudan: The Muslims are unitarian in their religious approach to life. As matter of
faith, they do not espouse secularism. Neither do they accept it politically. They see it as a doctrine that is neither neutral nor fair, being prejudicial to them in particular: it deprives them of the full expression of their legal and other values in the area of public life, without such detriment to those non-muslim believers whose creed is exclusively relevant to private and moral life. Historically, the Muslims are not familiar with secularism, which developed from a peculiar European experience - arising from the conflict between the Christian Church and secularists in politics, economics and science. The doctrine is, therefore, of little relevance to the historical development or the legacy of the Islamic civilization. The Muslims, therefore, have a legitimate right, by virtue of their religious choice, of their democratic weight and of natural justice, to practice the values and rules of their religion to their full range - in personal, familial, social or political affairs.

D) In the Sudan there is a large number of those who adhere to African religions, a substantial number of Christians and a few Jews: These have their particular beliefs, and do not believe in Islam, and should in no way be prejudiced or restrained only for being in minority. That is their due by virtue of their own creed, in concurrence with the Islamic Sharia and the fundamental rights of all men to freedom and equality. Non-Muslims shall, therefore, be entitled freely to express the values of their religion to the full extent of their scope - in private, family or social matters.

2. The State

The State is a common affair among all believers and citizens of the Sudan. It observes the following principles:

A) In the Sphere of Freedom & Equality:

Freedom of creed and cult for all is guaranteed, (in a context of the prevalence of general freedom, of the supremacy of the constitution, of the rule of law and of government that is judicially and religiously responsible). The privacy of every man is also guaranteed; his intimate personal affairs are immune against the powers of government; every one may conduct his devotional life in the manner he chooses. None shall be penalized for any act or omission, if such is a recognized ceremonial or mandatory practice of his religion. None shall be legally barred from any public office only because of his adherence to any religious affiliation. But religiousness in general may be taken into consideration as a factor of the candidate's integrity. The freedom of religious dialogue and propagation is guaranteed; subject to any regulation that may
ensure social tranquility and regard for the respective religious sentiments of others.

B) In The Sphere of Law:

The state shall establish a legal system in full consideration of the will of the Muslim majority as well as the will of the non-muslims. Wherever the entire popular mandate is harmonious, a basis of national consensus is thereby provided for all laws and policies. Where mandates diverge, an attempt shall be made to give general, if parallel, effect to both. In common matters where it is not feasible to enforce but one option or system, the majority option shall be determinative, with due respect to the minority expression. The Sudan does not conform to the doctrine of centralism or absolute universality of law. (Its people have in fact been simultaneously governed by various legal systems, Islamic, civil or customary, applied according to person, subject matter or district). The scope of some laws can be limited as to particular persons or places - such that a general legal order is established intersected by personalized or decentralized sub-orders. Thus: Islamic jurisprudence shall be the general source of law:

- It is the expression of the will of the democratic majority.

- It conforms to the values of all scriptural religions, its legal rules almost correspond to their common legal or moral Teachings.

- It recognizes, as source of law, the principles of national justice and all sound social customs.

- It specifically recognizes the principles of religious freedom and equality in the manner mentioned above; and allows for partial legal multiplicity in regard to the religious affiliation of persons or to the predominance of non-muslims in any particular area, in the manner detailed below. Family law shall be personal, as rules of conduct intimately relating to a person’s private religious life, where - in a variable legal system can be practically administered with reference to the specific religious affiliation of the parties in a limited, stable social unit: the family. Thereby the privacy and the religious and cultural autonomy of the family is safeguarded. Thus:

a) Every parent is entitled to bring up his issue in the religious manner of his liking. The freedom of religious education and its institutions is ensured.

b) The rules relating to marriage, cohabitation, divorce, parenthood, childhood and inheritance shall be based on the religious teachings of
The National Islamic Front’s 1987 Sudan Charter

the couple. To the Muslims shall apply the Sharia. To scriptural religious denominations shall apply their respective church laws. To the followers of local cults shall apply their special customs. Any of these or others can of course choose to be governed by Sharia.

The effectiveness of some laws shall be subject to territorial limitations, considering the prevalence of certain religions or cultures in the area at variance with the religion dominant in the country at large, and regarding matters where an exception can be made from the general operation of the legal system - not according to each person’s or family’s choice but to the dominant choice in the area. In these matters exclusive local rules can be established in the area based on the local majority mandate - any local minority remaining subject to the democratic principle. Thus the legislative authority of any region predominantly inhabited by non-Muslims can take exception to the general operation of the national law, with respect to any rule of a criminal or penal nature derived directly and solely from a text in the Sharia contrary to the local culture. The said authority can instead opt for a different rule based on the customs or religion prevailing in the area. The general presumption, otherwise, is for law to be effective country-wide over all persons and regions, except for any limitation deriving from the requirement of the constitutional decentralization system or from the very letter and purpose of a particular law.

Second: Ethnicity and Nationhood

The Sudan is one country:

- Whose people are bound by one common allegiance to nation and land.

- But are diverse as to ethnic origin, local custom or cultural association.

- Wherein Arab origin is mixed with African origin, Arab culture with African culture, with inputs from other origins or cultures.

- Ethnic and tribal origin shall be duly respected. Customary rules of solidarity and conduct, special to a specific tribal or local precinct may be observed. But ethnicity is a natural trait not deriving from human attainment and no good as a basis for discriminating between people or citizens in socio-political or legal relations. Moreover the expression of ethnic arrogance, rancour or strife should not be allowed.

- Local subcultures (tongues, heritages, ways of life, etc...) are respected and may be freely expressed and promoted -without
deviation towards the excitement of animosity between fellow countrymen, or the hampering of free dialogue and interaction, between subcultures towards the development of a national human culture, and without derogation from the national education policies or from the status of the official language.

- In its foreign and domestic policy, the state shall show consideration for the import of its different cultures. It shall pay regard in its international relations to the sense of cultural attachment or geographical neighborhood of the different sub-nationalities or inhabitants of the Sudan. It shall, for example, allow for no discrimination between nationals of different origins in policies of information or housing, and shall not show bias in foreign relations towards the development of pan-Arab rather than pan-African ties.

Third: The Region and the Country

The Sudan is a united state:

- Independent by virtue of its own national sovereignty,

- Whose people are mobilized in one central political allegiance,

- But diverse as to its far-flung regions inhabited by heterogeneous populations wherein prevail different needs, circumstances and standards of life.

- The nature of the Sudan generally calls for an increased national effort to reinforce the unity of the land and to strengthen the central national allegiance.

- It requires also with respect to the governance of the country due consideration from regional remoteness and socio-political disparity.

- In consideration for the identity of the different regions and the special needs, conditions and cultures of their inhabitants, and for the difficulty of administering the Sudan from one centre, there shall be established separate regions governed autonomously in certain regards and integrated into the national government otherwise.

- For the same considerations the composition of the central government Leadership shall incorporate elements from all regions. Government shall be organized in collegial and composite forms to allow for this representation. Some regional balance shall also be
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observed as far as possible in public service enterprises and in the
different institutions of national government and administration.

- In consideration for the unity of the land, the national constitutional
system shall preserve the integrity of those national powers necessary
for maintaining a united sovereign country and for promoting the
development and insurgence of the nation or coping with the states of
national emergency. The general laws and policies shall also ensure the
oneness of the national territory by regulating and facilitating contact,
communication and intercourse as well as the free circulation of
persons, goods and information across regions towards a closer
interaction and a more perfect union of the entire nation.

A) The Sharing of Power

- The regional self-government system established in the South by
virtue of the Self-Government Agreement of the early seventies, and by
constitutional amendment in the North since the early eighties, is based
on the principle of assigning to regional authorities the right of the
legislative initiative and executive autonomy with respect to certain
matters, without restraining the central authority from legislating on the
same matters with absolute authority that overrides regional laws.

- A federal system would transfer to the federated regions matters of an
even wider scope, but, more importantly, attribute to regional measures
immunity from interference by central authorities through participation
or abrogation, except with regard to a matter specifically designated as
concurrent.

- In view of the scope and degree of federal autonomy, federalism
requires the setting up of adequate infrastructure - material and human,
and presumes the provision of sufficient financial resources
independently raised by or transferred to the regions. All this may not
be possible except through a process or a period of preparation and
gradual transition to be duly conceived. The detailed evaluation of the
respective government powers and relationships in the Sudan may lead
to preference for a mixed system -comprising federal and regional
elements in any equation or with respect to different matters. Besides
this system of decentralization, a measure of deconcentration may be
introduced. This is an administrative policy that merely broadens the
scope of delegation to regional departmental branches with full central
political control.
- Some of the major powers normally reserved for the centre to be administrated with high centralization or with administrative deconcentration are: national defence and security, foreign relations, nationality immigration and aliens, trans-regional means of communication and transport, the judicial system and the general legal codes, the financial order and its institutions, external and inter-regional trade, the natural resources - fluvial subterraneous and atmospheric, the general education and economic plans,... etc.

- Some of the matters normally assigned to the regions to enjoy thereto the initiative or the monopoly of legislation, according to the regional or federal principle respectively, are: regional security and administration, local government, culture, social affairs, tourism, education, health and social services, agriculture and industry, regional commerce,... etc.

- Some of these matters or of any other residual powers may be concurrent, for joint action by the centre and the regions.

- Provision should be made for a sharing formula between the centre and the regions with respect to land, internal revenue resources, joint major economic projects, the organization of professions and trades, the institutions of higher education, ... etc.

- Provision should also be made for safeguards of the freedom of communications, traffic and the passage of information, persons and goods, for the immunity of lands, projects, institutions and functionaries belonging to one authority as against the interference of another authority.

- Provision should likewise be made for a defined emergency regime that permits the national authorities to transgress the normal limits and equations, of power sharing to the extent of the necessity (wars, calamities, constitutional collapse...).

- Provision should finally be made for the participation of the regions in all constitutional amendments that relate to their legal status.

- Consideration for regionalism can also be confirmed by special arrangements in the composition of central agencies response for the planning of national policies. The political traditions and the financial means of the Sudan may not make a bicameral legislature commendable as long as the national deputies are in fact representatives of regional constituencies. As to the leadership of the
executive branch of government, the parliamentary system of government might be preferred, as it is based on collegiate executive power and allows for any political convention or usage governing regional representation or balance. The balanced presence of regions may also be observed in any consultative councils or permanent committees under the auspices of the executive, or even in the civil service.

- The National Islamic Front stands for the adoption of a federal system in the constitutional regulation of decentralization in the Sudan, with equal regard to all regions, or with special arrangements for some, and through any process of gradual transition.

B. The Sharing of Wealth:

- In view of the wide discrepancy in the relative economic standard of the regions, and in order to ensure a fully integrated economic development, so that no region in the land would claim exclusive rights to natural resources within its borders, the national government would not be deprived of the means necessary for the upkeep of the common weal, no region would be left too far behind in the general progress of the country and no region would be left too far behind in the general progress of the country and no region would develop without positive contributions for the development of the country at large - through contributions to central state resources, the attraction of emigrant labour and the intensification of economic exchange in the national market: The state shall adopt a comprehensive plan for economic development with a view of promoting general prosperity and ensuring the balance of regional development through the encouragement, direction and dispensing of projects towards depressed sectors and areas. In the transfer of national funds in support of regions, the state shall take into consideration the relative size of the population and the feasibility of utilization as well as a positive preference for less developed regions to further their growth towards parity. Notice should be taken, in the composition of national economic and planning agencies for the balance representation of the different regions. The persons and the institutions of the private sector should be encouraged to intensify their economic initiatives in those regions that are disadvantaged. The same should be observed in the extension of administrative, funding or taxation concessions. The state shall endeavour to link all the regions of the country through roads and other means of communication and transport, so that the economic movement should freely and evenly roll on across the national territory. Every region where a national project is situated, may retain a
reasonable share of the opportunities and returns provided thereby, without prejudice to the due share of the state as a whole in all national opportunities and resources.

**Peace, Transition and Constitution**

In the pursuit of peace and stability the substantive issues which have always been in dispute among Sudanese are better taken up first for dialogue and resolution. Only thereafter should procedures and measures necessary for implementing any national consensus be dealt with. The most important of the latter is an agreed arrangement determining the destiny of the present political institutions, of the various national political forces as to participation in public life. The national concord and the program for its implementation shall be decided upon in a general constitutional conference whose legal resolutions shall be ultimately put before the constituent authority for adoption in the permanent constitution or in appropriate legal measures. Political resolutions shall be the subject-matter of a national charter. A national body, agreed upon by all parties concerned, shall be charged with preparation for the conference - undertaking studies, organizing the paper work and extending invitations to participants. A government agency shall handle the necessary technical and administrative work under the supervision of the above-mentioned body. The various political forces shall conduct preliminary consultations and dealings designed to coordinate stands and points of view, and shall promote a favorable political climate to ensure the success of the conference. Participation in the conference is open to all national political forces, whatever the respective weight and irrespective of recognition of, a participation in the present government or political set-up or otherwise and of operation inside or outside the Sudan. (The participation of Sudan People Liberation Movement is subject to an agreed cease-fire arrangement). Observers from African countries as well as international regional organizations and the United Nations Organization may be invited to attend the conference. The conference shall determine all the issues of substance concerning the ordering of public life in the Sudan, especially its justice as to differences of religious association and cultural identity or as to distribution of power or wealth, and shall consider any constitutional or political matter relating thereto. The conference shall also settle the issues of transition, including: The completion of the Constituent Assembly as to full regional representation. The form of government during the transition. The administration of southern and northern regions pending the establishment of a final constitutional system. The plight of those citizens who were displaced, or who incurred damage, deserted the public service or left the country because of the state of fighting and insecurity. The resolutions of the conference shall be adopted by unanimity, while recommendations may be adopted by majority.
THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT
Khartoum: JUMADA I, 1407
The National Islamic Front’s 1987 Sudan Charter
The National Islamic Front’s 1987 Sudan Charter
THE ABUJA 1SUDANESE PEACE CONFERENCE

26 May - 4 June 1992

COMMUNIQUE

The parties to the Sudanese conflict, namely, the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement / Sudanese People’s Liberation Army SPLM/A met in Abuja Nigeria from May 26-June 4 under the good offices of President Ibrahim Babangida.

1. All parties to the dispute agree that the current conflict can be resolved through peaceful negotiation. They therefore agree to continue their discussions, under the good offices of President Babangida even after he has left office of Chairman of the OAU. In order to build upon the gains achieved in Abuja.

2. The parties to dispute recognize that Sudan is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious country. They recognize the diversities of Sudan and the need to work towards an institutional/political arrangement to cope with and encourage such diversities as is the case in Nigeria.

3. The parties agreed to work towards an interim arrangement aimed principally at allaying the fears of the component parts of Sudan, building confidence and ensuring devolution of powers to enable the component parts to develop in an atmosphere of relative peace and security. The parties, however, agreed to consult their Principals with a view to determining the structures and character of the interim arrangement as well as ascertain the wishes of the people concerned thereafter.

4. All the parties to the dispute recognize the need for equitable sharing of national wealth. Towards this goal, it was agreed that the interim arrangement shall include a Revenue Allocation Commission to deal with the equitable sharing of wealth among the component parts of the country.

5. The parties to the dispute recognize that the war has caused dislocation of families and the destruction of the infra-structure in Sudan. The government of Sudan and the interim Administration will use the interim period, with the assistance of the international community, to embark upon a deliberate process
The 1992 Abuja 1 Sudanese Peace Conference

of reconstruction of war affected areas, and the rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees displaced by war and famine.

6 Parties to the dispute agreed to support efforts aimed at creating a conducive atmosphere towards arriving at a more amicable settlement which is being worked out to create a conducive atmosphere for continued negotiations.

7 All parties to the dispute agree to meet again at a time to be fixed by Nigeria, to discuss mainly the question of political interim arrangement for the transition period.

8 The parties to the dispute express deep appreciation and gratitude to President Babangida for the initiative in calling the Peace Conference. They also thank the people of Nigeria for the hospitality extended to them.

DELEGATION OF
THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE SUDAN

(Signed)
1. H.E. Mohammed El-Amin Khalifa
   Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly

(Signed)
2. H.E. Brig-George Kongor
   Government of Bahr El-Ghazal State

(Signed)
3. H.E. Dr. Hussein Sulayman Abu Salih
   Minister of Social Welfare And Development

DELEGATION OF
THE SPLM/A

(Signed)
1. Cdr. William Nyoun Bany
   Leader of Delegation

(Signed)
2. Cdr. Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin
   Deputy Leader of the Delegation

(Signed)
3. Mr. Elijah Malok Deng
   Secretary to the Delegation

OBSERVERS FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA

(Signed)
1. Dr. Tunj Olagunju
   Hon. Minister of Internal Affairs

(Signed)
2. Col. Lawan Gwadabe
The 1992 Abuja I Sudanese Peace Conference

(Signed)

3. Ambassador Olu Sanu
President Special Envoy on the Sudan Conflict.
The 1992 Abuja I Sudanese Peace Conference
THE ABUJA II
SUDANESE PEACE CONFERENCE

26 April - 17 May 1993

PRESS STATEMENT

The Second Abuja Peace Conference on the Sudan was hosted by Nigeria, in Abuja, from 26th April to 17th May 1993. The Conference was between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) (mainstream) led by Dr. John Garang. The Government of the Sudan sent a high-powered delegation led by Col. Mohammed Alamin, Speaker of the Sudanese Transitional Council and includes: 1 Governor, 6 Ministers and other top ranking officials of the Sudanese Government. The (SPLM/SPLA) (mainstream) delegation was led by Commander Salva Kiir Mayardit and included 12 top ranking commanders of the (SPLM/SPLA), and a Technical Advisory team of 5 Sudanese nationals.

1. The Conference was declared open by the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Admiral Augustus Alkhomu on Monday, 26th April, 1993 at the International Conference Centro, Abuja. The purpose of Abuja II was to consolidate the gains of Abuja I Peace Conference which was held in this same capital from 26th May to 4th June 1992.

2. It should be recalled that at the end of that 1st Conference both parties agreed on the need:-
   a) to resolve the Sudanese conflict through peaceful negotiations,
   b) to work towards an institutional/political arrangement to cope with the multiple diversities of the Sudanese nation.
   c) to work towards an interim arrangement aimed principally at allaying the fears of the component parts of the Sudan to enable the country (to) develop in an atmosphere of peace and security and
   d) t consult with their principals in order to determine the structure and character of the Interim arrangement as well as ascertain the wishes of the people concerned.

3. For the past three weeks both sides have engaged in frank and meaningful exchanges of views on all issues that have threatened the Unity of Sudan. We have made considerable progress in our march towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Indeed, agreements have been reached by both
The 1993 Abuja 2 Sudanese Peace Conference, parties on some areas of conflicts. Notably amongst the areas of agreement are the following:-

1) A reconfirmed commitment to achieving a just and durable peace through negotiations.

2) A continuation of the prevailing cease-fire between the parties to allow access of relief materials to the war-affected areas while the talks are continuing.

3) A renewed determination by both parties to continue negotiations on the sensitive issue of State and religion.

4) A commitment to the Unity of the Sudan, subject however to continued negotiations on the kind of political arrangement to be adopted for the future.

5) A proper devolution of powers between the Central and State Governments in such a way that there shall be clearly defined responsibilities and function between the Central and State governments in the Sudan. In the interim period, there should be a fairer representation of the component parts of the country in the institutional arrangement of the Central Government.

6) Establishment of a Cease-fire Commission.

7) Establishment of a National Revenue Allocation Commission (with Nigeria as an Observer member).

4. There are however, some areas of disagreement, which are central to the core issue of the conflict. Even on these areas, there is agreement that talks should continue till a meaningful and acceptable solution is found. Such areas are as follows:-

a) STATE AND RELIGION

On this issue, the Government of Sudan’s position is as follows:

1- Sharia and customs shall be the two main sources of legislation in the Sudan. During the Interim period the southern states shall not be subject to any punishments based on Sharia law and alternative punishments shall be provided instead.

2- The central government officials shall be subject to the laws of the State, which is the seat of Government.

3- Personal laws shall be governed by the religion or custom of the litigants.

4- Khartoum is both the country’s capital and a state, and as such it is subject to the law prevailing in Khartoum State.
The 1993 Abuja 2 Sudanese Peace Conference,

The SPLM/SPLA wants Sharia only as a source of personal laws or in the alternative, the introduction of pre-1983 laws in Southern Sudan with special arrangement to cover non-northerners resident in Khartoum.

b) DEFINITION OF THE SOUTH

The Government of Sudan knows “South” as the three states of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile while SPLM/SPLA views “South” as all the war-affected areas which in addition to the 3 already mentioned also include, Nuba Mountains and Ingessena.

c) SECURITY OF THE SOUTH DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD

The SPLM wants only the SPLA as the army in the South. The Government of Sudan fees the Sudanese army should be in a position to operate all over Sudan.

d) COMPOSITION OF THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION

The Government of Sudan wants only the Sudanese, the SPLM/A (mainstream) and the other factions as members, while Nigeria is to be the sole Observer. SPLM/SPLA wants other Observers from Kenya, Uganda, EEC and USA.

e) REVENUE ALLOCATION COMMISSION

Both the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A agree on the establishment of a Revenue Allocation Commission. The Government of Sudan prefers to have a Sudanese national Chairman while SPLM/A wants a Nigerian nominee on the commission as the Chairman. The SPLM/A suggests that the Commission should have 3 member each while the government of Sudan prefers that the number to serve on the Commission should be a subject of further negotiations.

f) JUDICIARY

The Government of Sudan wants a partial decentralization of Judiciary to the state but with a centralized Judicial Commission for the appointments/recruitment, transfer, discipline, promotion of Judges, etc., whereas the SPLM/A insists on Control of the machinery for the appointments,
The 1993 Abuja 2 Sudanese Peace Conference, transfer, discipline, promotion of Judges etc., up to Court of Appeal level in the States, with the Supreme Court serving as Appellate Courts from the States.

g) DEVOLUTION OF POWERS

Both parties agree on the devolution of some subject matters to both state and Central Authorities but there are still some substantial areas of disagreement on some subject matter.

h) SUPREMACY RULE

The Government of Sudan wants laws of the Central Authority to be supreme in case of conflict between the laws of the Central Authority and the State while SPLM/A wants State laws to be supreme.

5. the two parties discussed very frankly on all these issues. It is now felt that after 3 weeks of discussions and having achieved some progress on some issues it is desirable to have a recess to allow both parties to hold further consultations with their principals with a view to obtaining fresh directives on matters that are still outstanding. Hence, our decision to adjourn the talks.

6. I have tried to give you a full background of the events of the past three weeks, indicating in detail areas of agreement and areas yet to be discussed or agreed upon. We had thought our achievements was sufficient for a full communiqué to be signed by both parties. Unfortunately, we were proved wrong. A last minute hitch occurred which made it impossible for the two parties to agree on the content of the communiqué.

Basically disagreement was what to do about “Residual” powers.

The SPLM/A believes that after allocating powers to both central and state authorities, they believe that the residual powers automatically revert to the state. The Government of Sudan believes that the issue of “residual” powers should be held in abeyance and discussed at a later date. Despite all effort, our attempt to reconcile the two parties failed.

We believe that it is better not to sign a truncated communiqué than to sign one that does not reflect the sum total of the work done in the past three weeks.
The President, Government and people of Nigeria have put the disposal of our brothers in Sudan all the facilities at our disposal to assist them at arriving at an acceptable solution to the conflict. Nigeria stands ready to continue to help in an objective and unbiased manner, as long as it is the wish of both parties that we continue to do so. We remain committed to peace in the sisterly country of Sudan.

I thank you all.
The 1993 Abuja 2 Sudanese Peace Conference,
The 1993 Abuja 2 Sudanese Peace Conference,
THE IGAD DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

We, Representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (hereinafter referred to as the GOS). The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army-United (hereinafter referred to as the SPLM/SPLA and SPLM/SPLA-United respectively).


Cognizant of the importance of the unique opportunity by the IGAD peace initiative to reach a negotiated peaceful solution to the conflict in the Sudan;

Concerned by the continued human suffering and misery in the war-affected areas;

Hereby agree in the following Declaration of Principles (DOP) that would constitute the basis for resolving the conflict in the Sudan:-

1. Any comprehensive resolution of the Sudan conflict requires that all parties to the conflict fully accept and commit themselves to that position that:-

   1.1 The history and nature of the Sudan conflict demonstrate that a military solution can not bring lasting peace and stability to the country.
   
   1.2 A peaceful and just political solution must be the common objective of the parties to the conflict.

2. The rights of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed; and
The 1994 Igad Declaration Of Principles

3. Maintaining unity of the Sudan must be given priority by all the parties provided that the following principles are established in the political, legal, economic and social framework of the country:

3.1 Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed.

3.2 Complete political and social equalities of all people in the Sudan must be guaranteed by law.

3.3 Extensive rights of self-administration on the basis of federation, autonomy, etc., to the various people of the Sudan must be affirmed.

3.4 A secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan. Freedom of belief and worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in full to all the Sudanese citizens. State and religion shall be separated. The basis of personal and family laws can be religion and customs.

3.5 Appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various peoples of the Sudan must be realized.

3.6 Human rights as internationally recognized shall form part and parcel of this arrangement and shall be embodied in Constitution.

3.7 The independence of the Judiciary shall be enshrined in the Constitution and laws of the Sudan.

4. In the absence of agreement on the above principles referred to in 3.1 – 3.7 the respective people will have the option to determine their future including independence, through a referendum.

5. An interim arrangement shall be agreed upon, the duration and the tasks of which should be negotiated by the parties.

6. The parties shall negotiate a cease-fire agreement to enter into force as part of the overall settlement of the conflict in the Sudan.

The 1994 Igad Declaration Of Principles
The 1994 Igad Declaration Of Principles
THE 1997 SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT

Preamble

We the parties to the conflict in Sudan;

Deeply committed to an immediate end to the current armed conflict through peaceful and political means;

Aware that the attainment of a just and lasting peace requires courage, statesmanship, political daring and challenging vision from the parties;

Aware that only a sustainable peace based on justice, equality, democracy, and freedom can lead to a meaningful development and progress which would assist in the solution of the fundamental problems of the people of the Sudan;

Fully cognizant of the fact that the unity of the Sudan cannot be based on force or coercion, but on the free will of the people;

Hereby agree to make and abide by this agreement.

CHAPTER ONE

1st DEFINITIONS

In this agreement unless the context otherwise requires the following words shall have the same meanings assigned to it.

“Southern States” means the ten Southern States arising from the former provinces of Bahr El Gazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile with their boundaries as stood on 1st January 1956.

“Interim Period” means the transitional period having the defined functions to this agreement, the end of which shall be the announcement of the referendum results.

“Constitution” means the constitution of the Sudan including such parts or articles of the agreement as shall be designated to be part thereof.
The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

“Agreement” is this peace agreement signed on April, 21st, 1997 between the Sudan Government on the one hand and UDSF, SPLM, SSIG and EDF on the other.

“President of the Coordinating Council” refers to the person appointed by the President of the Republic of the Sudan to preside over the Coordinating Council.

“Custom” in the States of South Sudan means the African Custom.

2nd GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

1. The general principles contained in the political charter signed in Khartoum on 10th April 1996 shall be part of this agreement and shall guide and explain its provisions.

2. During a four-year interim period South Sudan shall enjoy a special status as defined in this peace agreement.

I. The interim arrangements shall be preceded by a declaration of permanent cease-fire and general amnesty proclamation.

I. The people of South Sudan shall exercise the right of self-determination through a referendum.

I. The problem of Abyei has been discussed and a final solution is referred to a conference on Abyei that will be convened in the area within the interim period.

CHAPTER TWO

1. AGREEMENT

A. Parties to the Agreement:

1. The Government of Sudan.

I. The South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) comprising of:

) 1The South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM)

II. 2The Union of Sudan African Parties (U.S.A.P), and
The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

1. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)

I. The Equatoria Defense Force (EDF), and

I. The South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG).

All represented by the signatories thereunder.

B. Commencement of Agreement:

1. This agreement shall come into force as from the date of signature by the President of the Republic.

I. This agreement shall be endorsed by the National Assembly and considered as an organic law, which has the effect of a constitutional decree.

CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL ISSUES

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MATTERS

1. Religion and the State:

1- Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi religious society. Islam is the religion of the majority of the population and Christianity and the African creeds are followed by a considerable number of citizens. Nevertheless the basis of rights and duties in the Sudan shall be citizenship, and all Sudanese shall equally share in all aspects of life and political responsibilities on the basis of citizenship.

2- Freedom of religion, belief and worship shall be guaranteed.

3- A suitable atmosphere shall be maintained for practicing, worship, dawa, proselytization and preaching.

4- No citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or religion.

5- There shall be no legislation, which would adversely affect the religious rights of any citizen.

6- a) Sharia and Custom shall be the sources of legislation
The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

b) On the issue of Sharia, the parties agreed on a formula under which laws of a general nature that are based on general principles common to the States shall apply at the National level provided that the States shall have the right to enact any complementary legislation to Federal legislation on matters that are peculiar to them. This power shall be exercised in addition to the powers the States exercise on matters designated as falling within their jurisdiction, including the development of customary law.

2. The Constitutional Guarantees:

1- The Supreme Court is the custodian of the Constitution and is thus entrusted with the protection and interpretation of the Constitution.

2- The Constitution shall enshrine the following principles:

1) There shall be no punishment except as provided for by the law.

2) Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

3) Litigation before courts is a right guaranteed for every person.

4) The Constitution shall guarantee the equality of all citizens before law without any discrimination, no immunity shall be without law.

5) The Constitution shall guarantee the application of the Rule of Law.

3- The bill of rights and freedoms shall be enshrined in the Constitution.

4- Any law or decision that contravenes the Constitution may be challenged in court by any aggrieved person.

5- All personal matters such as marriage, divorce, parentage and inheritance shall be governed by the religion and custom of those involved.

4. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms:

Under the concept of the rule of law the following basic human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed:
The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

1- The right to life and inviolability of the human person.
2- The right to equal treatment irrespective of gender, race, color, religion or origin.
3- The right of family life and privacy
4- The right to freedom of thought and conscience.
5- The right to property
6- Freedom of expression
7- Freedom of movement
8- Freedom of the press
9- Freedom of association and assembly as shall be regulated by the law.
10- Immunity arbitrary arrest, detention and torture.
11- Freedom of religious worship, preaching, dawa, proselyzation and religious propagation.
12- Freedom of expression and development of cultures and languages.
13- All other basic rights and freedoms that are recognized by and guaranteed under the International Conventions and Protocols ratified by the Government of Sudan.

5. The Judiciary:

1- The Judiciary in the Sudan shall be independent and decentralized.
2- Every State shall have judicial organ, which is composed of a Court of Appeal, Province Courts, District Courts and Local Courts.
3- Appeals from the Court of Appeal shall be submitted to the Supreme Court.
4- Administration of justice in the State shall be vested in the State Judicial Organ.
5- Judges at all levels shall be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the High Judicial Council.
6- Matters related to qualification, emoluments, privileges, promotions, training, retirements, etc. should be regulated by law.

6. Democracy:

1- Participatory democracy shall be realized through congress and national convention or conference.
2- In promotion of participatory democracy the congresses and national convention shall be organized.
   1) To accommodate forums for all citizens.
   2) To discourage all forms of intolerance and totalitarianism.
3- The parties to this Agreement shall be guaranteed full participation in the political and constitutional process in Sudan.

POWER SHARING
A. THE FEDERAL POWERS

The following powers shall be exercised by the Federal Institutions:

1. Foreign Affairs
2. Armed Forces and Defense Affairs
3. Maritime Shipping and Navigation
6. External Communications, External and Inter-State Postal and Telecommunication services, Civil Aviation and the operation and maintenance of International Airports.
7. Judiciary.
8. Federal Rail Ways and Inter-State Highways.
9. Weights, measures and determination of time.
11. Fishing and Fisheries in and beyond territorial waters.
12. Mining.
13. Inter-State Waterways.
15. Customs.
17. International Boundaries and Inter-State Boundary Disputes.
20. Federal Legislation:
   a) on matters within Federal Powers
   b) on matters common to the States.
22. Education Planning.
25. Federal Taxation.
27. Epidemic Control.

B. STATE POWERS:

2. Wildlife, Tourism, Hotels, Inn, etc.
3. Land use and conservation without prejudice to the Federal Policies.
4. Local Government.
5. State Taxes.
The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

6- Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries including the establishment of Training Institutions in these fields.
7- Promotion of Languages, Cultures, Folklore, Arts, etc.
8- State Radio, TV, Newspapers and Printing Press.
9- Quarrying.
11- Irrigation and embankment, pastures and their development.
13- Libraries and Museums.
14- Industrial and commercial development.
15- Missionaries activities, Charities and Endowments.
16- Specialized Hospitals and Clinics.
17- Establishment of Banks in accordance wit the Central Bank Policies.
18- State Public Audit.
19- State Electricity Network.
20- State Attorney General.
21- State Legislation.
   1) In matters within State Powers.
   2) Complementary to federal laws in matters peculiar to the State.
   3) Customary laws.
22- State Economic Development and Planning in accordance with Federal Planning.
23- Recruitment of Specialized technical expertise in various fields of development.
24- Health care and Establishment of all types of medical institutions for treatment and training of qualified medical personnel.
25- Registration of Birth and Death, and Marriages.
26- Statistics.
27- Scientific Research and Development.
28- Administration of Meteorological Services.
29- Education Management, Planning and Training up to the University level within the Framework of the National Planning.

C. RESIDUAL POWERS.

1- The State shall exercise the residual powers without prejudice to the powers allocated to the Federal authorities.
2- The Federal authorities shall exercise the residual powers without infringing on powers allocated to the states.
3- In case of dispute over the residual powers between the State and Federal authority the dispute shall be referred to the Federal (Supreme) Court.

4. WEALTH SHARING:
1- The Federal Government shall lay down a comprehensive economic and social plan to develop the country in general and to bridge the gap between the various States in particular, so that within a definite period, a parity in provision of basic need such as security, employment, water, food, education, health and housing could be reached.

2- In order to consolidate the economic policies:

1) The economy in the Sudan shall be based on free market forces.
2) The Federal Bank of the Sudan shall be responsible for regulating internal and external value of the Sudanese Currency.
3) There shall be an independent Stock Exchange Bureau for selling and floating shares, bonds and premiums of companies and currency regulation to enhance free market economy.
4) There shall be established development projects to promote and maintain peace and stability among the people of the Sudan.

3- Major Federal Development projects and big mining and oil projects shall be considered as national wealth and be managed on national basis provided that:-

1) The Federal Government shall observe to allocate an equitable percentage of the Returns to be fixed by the Revenue Allocation Commission to the State where the project is located (see annex 3).
2) Ensure participation of the States in the management of such projects.
3) Ensure recruitment and training of citizens of the State in order to participate in such projects.
4) Any other fringe benefits.

4- Revenue Allocation Commission shall be established to recommend revenue sharing formula for the whole country. The Coordinating Council shall be represented.

5- The Federal Government shall observe the following for the purpose of distribution of national revenue among the States and for site selection of major development projects:-

1) Giving priority to the less developed States according to their state of underdevelopment
2) Economic feasibility of projects and their efficient functioning.
3) Effect of the project in the realization of self-sufficiency in the basic needs of the country.
The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

4) Balance relationship between development and density of population and environment.
5) Establishment of special fund to take care of crash development programs and maintenance of peace.

6- In the field of rehabilitation of the war affected areas, the following shall be observed:-

1) The Federal Government and the Coordinating Council shall work to attract loans and aid from the sisterly and friendly countries and international benevolent organizations to rehabilitate the economic projects, which ceased to function or were damaged because of the war. It shall also work for the reconstruction of the war-affected areas and resettlement of returnees and displaced persons.
2) The Federal Government and the Coordinating Council shall launch a plan and joint international appeal for the reconstruction, rehabilitation repatriation and development of the southern States and other war affected areas.
3) The Coordinating Council shall also establish a relief, resettlement rehabilitation and reconstruction commission to manage and administer the resources acquired for the above purposes.

7- The sources of revenue of the Southern States shall consist of the following:-

1) State taxes and generated revenue.
2) Fees, excise duties and licenses.
3) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects based in the Southern States.
4) Funds from Federal treasury for established services in the States until such a time when they become self-reliant.
5) Any development assistance and donations from foreign sources.
6) Revenue allocation from the Federal Government for socio-economic development.
7) State share of Federal taxes levied on Federal projects and services functioning within the Southern States.
8) Business profit taxes.
9) Corporate taxes on factories and agricultural enterprises in the State, other than Federal ones, established in Southern States.
10) Property taxes.
11) The share of fees on licenses for mineral and oil explorations (see annex 3).
12) Profits accruing form the Customs, Airports Services, Roads, Postal and Telecommunication Services and River Transport in
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Southern States shall be allocated to the Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Repatriation Commission.

8- The State Government shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure on services, administration and development of the State to be submitted to the State Legislative Organ for approval.

9- No project adversely affecting the people, ecology and natural environment of State may be implemented without consulting the State Council.

10- The Federal Government and the Coordinating Council shall encourage and promote foreign investment and procurement of development assistance for the Southern States and shall encourage establishment of branches of public sector institutions, development corporations and specialized banks.

11- The Coordinating Council shall prepare a development budget for the Southern States and to submit the same to the President.

5. PARTICIPATION OF THE SOUTHERN CITIZENS IN THE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS.

1- Mindful of the present participation of the Southerners in the Federal Institutions, this Agreement is putting forward further balanced representation in the Federal institutions.

2- The participation shall be based on values of efficiency, qualification, honesty, justice, responsibility and equality between all the citizens without discrimination.

3- The Southern citizens shall participate in all Federal, political and constitutional institutions in number commensurate to the demands of the interim period taking into consideration population size and provided that the criteria for eligibility are met.

4- The Southern citizens shall have the right to participate in the Federal Institutions as follows:-
   1. The Presidency.
   2. The Federal Council of Ministers.
   3. The National Legislative Assembly.
   5. The Supreme Court.
   8. Foreign Affairs.
   11. The Armed Forces.
5- The Federal Career Selection Commission (FCSC) shall have an office at the seat of the Coordinating Council.

CHAPTER FOUR

6 THE INTERIM PERIOD:

a- The length of the interim period shall be four years, however, it may be shortened or extended if need arises by recommendation from the Coordinating Council to the President of the Republic.

b- The Interim period shall commence as from the date of the formation of the Coordinating Council and shall end as soon as the referendum is accomplished and the results are declared.

c- The Coordinating Council shall carry out the following activities during the interim period:-

1. To assist repatriate, resettle, and rehabilitate the displaced and the returnees.
2. To reconstruct the war devastated areas.
3. To remove effect of war by clearing mine fields, opening up roads and water ways.
4. To promote reconciliation, peace and confidence building amongst the Sudanese citizens.
5. To draw development plans for the Southern States and solicit funds from national, regional and international bodies and institutions for implementation of the peace agreement.
6. To draw a political mobilization plan to strengthen peace and unity in different parts of the country.
7. To strengthen the Federal rule in the Southern States.
8. To reassemble and train manpower in order to re-establish the public service in the Southern States.
9. To strengthen the capacity building of the people in the Southern States to become self-reliant. In this regard plans shall be drawn to receive support for educational, health, food security and social services institutions.
10. To educate and mobilize the people of Southern States on the process of referendum.
11. To provide adequate security in the Southern States in order to create conducive atmosphere for the referendum.
12. To participate in conducting census in the Southern States.
13. To assist register voters for the referendum.

CHAPTER FIVE
7- THE COORDINATING COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN STATES.

DEFINITION:

1- In accordance with this Peace Agreement, there shall be established a Coordinating Council in Southern States during the interim period. The Coordinating Council shall be responsible for coordinating, supervision, social-economic planning, confidence building, peace nurturing, policy-making as well as political mobilization.

2- The President of the Coordinating Council shall be accountable to the President of the Republic.

3- The President of the Republic in consultation with parties signatory to this Agreement shall appoint the President of the Coordinating Council.

4- The President of the Coordinating Council in consultation with Southern political forces shall recommend his cabinet including the Governors (Walis) to the President of the Republic for appointment.

5- The Ministers in the Coordinating Council shall enjoy status of Federal Ministers.

6- The Governors of the Southern States in consultation with the political forces in their respective States shall recommend appointment of members of their governments including commissioners to the President of the Coordinating Council who shall pass the same to the President of the Republic.

7- Until the atmosphere is conducive for elections of State Assemblies to take place, the President of the Coordinating Council in consultation with the political forces shall recommend to the President of the Republic new member of legislative assemblies in the Southern States for appointment.

8- The Coordinating Council shall act as a link between the Federal Government and the Southern States.

9- The Coordinating Council has the right to choose its seat.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COORDINATING COUNCIL:

The Coordinating Council shall have following functions:

1- General Supervision of the implementation of this peace agreement as well as all peace matters.

2- Voluntary reparation of the returnees, and the displaced, rehabilitation and reconstruction of war affected areas in the Southern States.

3- Ensuring confidence building measures among the Sudanese Cities.

4- To embark on mobilization of the people there in for the referendum.

5- Legislative Functions:-
1) The Coordinating Council shall establish an Advisory Council for perfection of the legislative process.
2) The Coordinating Council shall coordinate legislation with the Southern States Legislative Assemblies in matters common to these States.
3) The Coordinating Council may request adjournment of any legislation tabled in the National Assembly if deemed to adversely Coordinating Council presents its opinion.

6- Encourage establishment and supervision of foreign consulates, UN agencies and NGOs in South Sudan in coordination with the Federal organs concerned.

POWERS OF THE COORDINATING COUNCIL:

The Coordinating Council shall exercise the following powers:-

DEVOLVED POWERS:

1. Education planning up to University in accordance with National policies.
2. Planning and supervision of Southern States security, public order and good governance.
3. Economic development and planning in accordance with National policies.
4. Planning and programming for electricity network and other public utilities in the Southern States.
5. Organization of scientific research, technological, industrial and commercial development.
6. To conduct International agreements on culture, trade, including border trade, and technical co-operation, the procurement of foreign capital investment and development assistance from governmental and non-governmental organization (NGOs) in coordination with the Federal organs concerned.

CONCURRENT POWERS:

4- The Coordinating Council shall exercise the following powers concurrent with the Federal organs:-
   1. Planning for survey and land disposition.
   2. Planning and supervision of the Public services in the Southern States.
   4. Drawing of environmental conservation policies.
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5. Cultural planning and regulation, supervision of Radio, TV, newspaper and printing press.
6. Supervision of trade union disputes.
7. Audit within the Audit General
10. Copy rights, patents and publishers rights.

5- In addition to the above-devolved and concurrent powers, the President of the Republic and any Federal Ministry or Federal Organ may delegate powers to the Coordinating Council for policy, planning and general supervision in Southern States.

6- The Coordinating Council shall receive regular reports from the Government and other Institutions of the Southern States and shall report the same to the President of the Republic.

7- The Coordinating Council shall take over the responsibilities and functions of the Supreme Council for Peace and its organs.

8- The Coordinating Council membership shall be as follows:-

1. The President of the Coordinating Council.
2. The Vice President of the Coordinating Council and Minister of Local Government Affairs and Public Security.
3. Minister for Cabinet Affairs.
5. Minister for Education and Instruction Affairs.
6. Minister for Legal Affairs.
7. Minister for Public Service and Labor.
8. Minister for Information, Culture and Social Affairs.
9. Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources.
10. Minister for Health Affairs.
11. Minister for Peace and Political Mobilization.
14. Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and Rehabilitation

9- Besides the members mentioned above the Governors (Walis) of the Southern States shall be members in the Coordinating Council by virtue of their post.

10- There shall be established in Southern States a Relief, Rehabilitation, Resettlement Repatriation Commission (SSRRRRC) which shall be supervised by the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs.
The Coordinating Council shall prepare its annual budget to be submitted to the President of the Republic. The Coordinating Council shall issue regulations to direct its activities and specify the functions, duties and roles of its various departments. The President of the Coordinating Council shall recommend to the President of the Republic relief from office, acceptance or rejection of resignation of any member of the Coordinating Council including the Governors. The State Governors shall recommend to the President of the Coordinating Council relief from office, acceptance or rejection of resignation of any member of the State Governors including commissioner. The President of the Coordinating Council shall pass the same to the President of the Republic for approval.

CHAPTER SIX

8- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DURING INTERIM PERIOD

1- The South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) shall remain separate from the National Army and be stationed in their locations under their command. Police, Prisons, Wild Life, Civil Defense, Fire Brigade and public Security in the Southern States shall be drawn from the people of Southern Sudan. The size of the Sudanese Armed Forces in South Sudan reduced to peace time level once peace is established. Joint Technical Military Committee of equal numbers shall be constituted from the Sudanese Armed Forces on one hand and the (SSDF) on the other for the purpose of supervision and implementation of the security arrangements in this agreement (see Annex 1). The Joint Technical Military Committee shall oversee and supervise the activities of the Cease-fire Commission and peacekeeping observers. The Joint Technical Military Committee shall coordinate with the Army General HQs provision of supplies, training, armament, emoluments and other facilities for the SSDF. Joint Military Cease-fire Commission shall be established to monitor cease-fire violations and the disengagement of troops in Southern States (Annex 1). The Movement of the armed parties shall be coordinated and controlled by the Joint Technical Military Committee, and its subcommittees (Annex 1). In accordance with this agreement the President of the Republic of the Sudan shall declare general amnesty to members of SSDF from any criminal or civil culpability relating to acts committed during period of the war with effect from the date of signing this Peace Agreement (see Annex 2). There shall be established a Joint Amnesty Commission to follow up the implementation of the General Amnesty Proclamation (see Annex 2).
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11- War wounded, widows, orphans and other war victims shall be rehabilitated with assistance from national, regional and international agencies.
12- The annexes are considered as guidelines with a degree of flexibility to the said committees/commission.

CHAPTER SEVEN

9- REFERENDUM

1- By this Agreement the right of the people of Southern Sudan to determine their political aspiration and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development is hereby affirmed.
2- The people of Southern Sudan shall exercise this right in a referendum before the end of the interim period.
3- Options in the referendum shall be:
   1) Unity
   2) Secession
4- Referendum shall be free, fair and be conducted by a Special Referendum Commission (SRC) to be formed by a Presidential Decree in consultation with the Coordinating Council.
5- Eligible voters for the referendum shall be Southern Sudanese People who attained the age of eighteen years and above residing inside and outside of South Sudan.
6- The vote shall be by secret ballot.
7- To ensure free and fair conduct of the referendum, the SRC shall invite observers as follows:-
   1) OAU, Arab League, UN, Religious bodies, IGAD, National and foreign NGOs and any other countries.
   2) National and international media and journalists.
8- The parties agree to respect, abide by and implement in good faith the result of the referendum.

CHAPTER EIGHT

10- FINAL PROVISIONS.

1- Language:

Arabic is the official language of the Sudan, English is the second language in the Sudan. The Government shall endeavor to develop other languages.

2- Amendment of Agreement:
The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement

1) No amendment bill on this Agreement shall be presented to the National Assembly without consulting the Coordinating Council.

2) For amendment on this agreement the Coordinating Council may present its petition to the President of the Republic provided that such a bill is passed in the Coordinating Council by two third majorities.

Signed

For the Sudan government

For United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF)
And South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A)

Cdr. Dr. Riek Macher Teny D.
Chairman & C-in-C (SSIM/A)

For Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/A)

Cdr. Karubino Kawanyn Bol
Chairman C-in-C (SPLM/A)

For South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG)

Cdr. Kawac Makwei
Chairman C-in-C (SSIG)

For Equatoria Defense Force (EDF)

Dr. Thiopholus Ochang Loti
ANNEXE 1
AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN SOUTH SUDAN DEFENCE FORCE (SSDF) AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SUDAN ARMED FORCES

In pursuance of the Political Charter of 10th April 1996, the following Agreement for the total cessation of hostilities and permanent cease-fire is hereby concluded and declared.

1- Definitions:

In this agreement the following words shall have the meanings hereinafter assigned to them.

1. The “Parties” means the parties to the cease-fire agreement that are the Government of the Sudan represented by the Sudanese Armed Forces on one hand and the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), SPLM, SSIG and EDF represented by SSDF on the other.

2. The “Joint Technical Military Committee” means the Joint Technical Military Committee consulted from officers of Sudanese Armed Forces and SSDF under Article 3 below.

3. “Joint Cease-fire Commission” means Joint Cease-fire Commission, established under Article 4 below from officers of the Sudanese Armed Forces and SSDF.

2- Cessation of Hostilities and Cease-Fire
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1. There shall be total cessation of all forms of hostilities amid a permanent Cease-Fire in all areas of conflict effective as from _______ Hours, __________, 1997;

2. The parties shall promote peace through mass media, public rallies, conferences, seminars, etc.,

3. The parties shall refrain from any propaganda or information policy that is inconsistent with the process of peace;

3-Joint Technical Military Committee

1. The parties shall constitute a Joint Technical Military Committee from capable officers of the parties as follows:
   a. Five (5) officers from each side;
   b. Other support staff;
   c. Headquarters.
   d. Chairmanship shall alternate for three months

2. The HQ of the Joint Technical Military Committee shall be in Khartoum at the General Military Headquarters.

3. Duties of the Joint Technical Military Committee
   a. To supervise the work of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission;
   b. To deal with any administrative matters connected with implementation of the Cease-Fire; and
   c. Any other relevant matters pertaining to the implementation of the security arrangements.

4. Decisions of the Joint Technical Committee shall be taken unanimously and in case of disagreement such matters shall be referred to the leadership of the parties.

4- The Joint Cease-Fire Commission

a. Composition
   It shall be constituted by the parties as follows:
   a. Ten officers from each side;
   b. The Chairmanship shall alternate for three months.

   The HQ of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission shall be at the headquarters of the Coordinating Council and shall have local branches at each State, Province and Local Council levels in the areas affected by the conflict.

5- Duties of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission

1. To ensure that the Cease-Fire is enforced and consolidated;
2. To constantly observe and report any breaches of the Cease-Fire;
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3. To investigate alleged violations of the Cease-Fire and to take appropriate measures;
4. To send regular reports to the Joint Technical Military Committee on the general military and security situation;
5. To supervise local Cease-Fire Committees at State, Province and Local Council levels.

6- Local Cease-Fire Commissions

1. There shall be established local Cease-Fire Committees at the State, Province or Local Council levels in areas where SSDF and Sudanese Armed Forces are in close contact.
2. Each local Cease-Fire Committee shall consist of seven (7) members and shall be formed by the Joint Cease-Fire Commission, and its members may be drawn from Military personnel, civil administrators, chiefs and community leaders.

7- Acts that are Prohibited

As of that date in which the Cease-Fire and the cessation of hostilities comes into effect the forces of the parties to the agreement and any allied militia shall refrain from the following:

1. Hostile military operations against each other by means of forces or individuals under control;
2. Acts of terrorism, sabotage or harassment against each other;
3. Acts of violence against the civil population;
4. Interference with free movement of the civil population and services or looting of their property; and
5. Any hostile conduct which is inconsistent with the spirit of peace and stability.

8- Free Movement of Forces

1. Subject to the prior notification of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission, forces of the parties shall enjoy freedom of movement in areas controlled by each side whether as military units or as individuals for any of the following purposes:
   a. To carry out troops rotation or relief;
   b. To carry out liaison and coordination activities between command and units on the move;
   c. To deliver logistical supplies; and
   d. To go on leave or seek medical care or for other humanitarian reasons.
2. After receiving notification of troops movement the Joint Cease-Fire Commission or the Local Cease-Fire Committee, as the case may be, shall acknowledge the information and shall transmit the same to the next higher authorities for information and record. Individual members of SSDF and the Sudanese Armed Forces exercising the freedom of movement for family, humanitarian or whatever reasons, for which they have been granted permission by their military units, must carry the necessary departure orders duly signed by the commanders of their units.

3. The Joint Cease-Fire Commission shall systematically evaluate the progress being made in ensuring compliance with the Cease-Fire agreement. If it notes that a situation is developing which might result in a crisis, it shall draw such conclusions and make recommendations as may be necessary to prevent a collapse of the Cease-Fire or a crisis of public order. It shall transmit its conclusions and recommendations to the Joint Technical Military Committee and subsequently to the leadership of the parties.

ANNEXE 2

GENERAL AMNESTY PROCLAMATION ORDER 1997:

The parties agree that the President of the Republic of Sudan shall declare a general and unconditional amnesty for all offenses committed between 16th May 1983 through .........., 1997 in accordance with the common will of the people of the Sudan.

1. The general and unconditional amnesty shall cover the period from 16th May 1983 to .........., 1997 to all (SSDF) forces, to the effect that nobody shall be prosecuted or punished for acts or omissions committed during this period.

2. No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any persons in any court of law or any place for, or on account of, any act, omission or matter done inside or outside Sudan as from 16th May 1983 to .......... 1997, if such act or omission or matter was committed by any member of (SSDF).

1. **Civil Actions:**

   All civil suits instituted before .........., 1997, relating to acts committed or matters referred to in Article 2 above or as scheduled in Article 8 in this Proclamation Order are covered by this amnesty and shall be discharged and made null and void.
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1. Discharge of Prisoners and Detainees:

All persons serving terms of imprisonment or being held in detention in respect of offences committed in relation to the war or persons being detained or sentenced to imprisonment for political or politically-motivated crimes, and falling within the offences mentioned in the schedule in Article 8 below shall be discharged and set free from the day of signature of this Proclamation.

I. Freedom of Movement:

There shall be freedom of movement of people, goods and services throughout the Sudan. The relevant authorities shall Implement this provision accordingly.

Joint Amnesty Committee:

1. The parties shall set up an ad hoc Joint Amnesty Committee to follow up implementation of the provisions of this Amnesty Proclamation and shall compile and report about all those persons who were in prison or under detention, whether civilians or military personnel, and who should have been released in response to the terms of the amnesty, and the degree of freedom of movement of persons, goods, and services inside Southern States.

2. The members of the Joint Amnesty Commission shall be drawn from the parties to the conflict and members of the National Human Rights groups.

3. The Joint Amnesty Commission shall be composed of three from each of the parties.

4. Special Amnesty Tribunal:

1. The parties shall set up special tribunal with judicial powers to receive, examine and determine cases which are covered by this Amnesty Proclamation.

2. The tribunal shall be composed of three persons from each party.

Schedule of offences covered by the Amnesty:

The undermentioned are offences covered by the Amnesty Proclamation Order covering the period from 16th May 1983 through ......... 1997.

1. Treason.
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2. Mutiny
3. Desertion.
4. Defamation.
5. Any other political and war-related offences committed during the above-mention

ANNEXE 3

Guidance for Revenue Allocation Commission

1. Table for Allocating Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Sources of Income</th>
<th>Federal Union</th>
<th>Coordinating State %</th>
<th>Council %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oil Revenue</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mining of Metals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Federal Taxes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Public Corporation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Other Sources of Revenue</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Experience of the National fund for States Support.
3. Nigerian Experience and any other Similar Country experience.
THE NUBA MOUNTAINS PEACE AGREEMENT

In the same framework of the Sudan Peace Agreement concluded on 21.4.1997, a separate peace agreement has been signed between the Government of Sudan and the Nuba Mountains United SPLM/A. The then Secretary-General of the Supreme Council for Peace, Republic of the Sudan Mr. Mohammed El-Amin Khalifa has signed the agreement on behalf of the Government, while Commander Mohammed Haroun Kafi Aburass chairman of SPLM/A Nuba Mountains Central Committee has signed on behalf of Nuba Mountains United SPLM/A. The most outstanding significance of this agreement is that it recognised for the first time since Sudan independence in 1956, the fact that there has been a long-standing problem in the Nuba mountains area. This agreement is based upon the “Declaration of Principles” agreed upon by the two parties on 31.7.1996 in Nairobi, Kenya. Hereunder is the text of the above mentioned Declaration of Principles:

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE NUBA MOUNTAINS’ PROBLEM (SUDAN)

Out of our conviction that both peaceful and political dialogues are the ideal, and appropriate means for resolving all the Sudan’s conflicts and problems. Having realized and acknowledged the fact Nuba Mountain’s state problem is one of the Sudan’s historical and long standing problems that requires a solution through an objective and constructive dialogues between the concern parties so as to create a conducive atmosphere and a peaceful co-existence as well as achieving a prosperous future for the Nuba Mountains state. - And in recognition of the parties to the peculiarity and the unique nature of the solution of the Nuba Mountains’ state problem in comparison to that of any other regions in the Sudan.- And in recognition of those efforts exerted by the region’s sons internally and externally, the parties referred to hereafter declare, commitment to the following principles as means for reaching a final and ever lasting just solution for this problem in question:-

1. To recognize that there has been a long-standing problem in the Nuba Mountains state which has led to the armed struggle since 1984.
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2. The parties, therefore confirm their commitment to the peaceful and political solution channelled through constructive dialogue as an ideal means to solve all the Sudan’s problems, conflicts and disputes.

3. The two parties have acknowledged their abiding and! observing the unity of the Sudan with its geographical and political borders of 1956.

4. The parties have acknowledged the importance and necessity of taking stand and a vision of the problems from regional perspective and within the frame of a united Sudan as the ideal means for solving the Nuba Mountains state question far from that of the SPLM/A of Dr. John Garang’s faction.

5. The parties have agreed to consider the political charter “10th of April 1996” as a general frame for solving and as a ground for embodying the rest of Sudan’s problems and questions of a national nature.

6. The sharia and the customary laws shall both be equally the legislative sources of the Nuba Mountains state, in addition the region has the right to legislate complementary laws to those federal ones on questions and problems peculiar to the Nuba Mountains state.

7. Citizenship, shall be the basis for the rights and duties that include freedom, equality, justice and human rights.

8. The parties acknowledge, and are self-committed to principles of the religious and faiths right, including creation of a peaceful, satisfactory and conducive atmosphere for worshipping, preaching and practices. Without forcing any citizen to believe/ accept any faith or religion contrary to his/her will.

9. The parties acknowledge the federal system as a vehicle of governance that can provide the region’s citizens with their rights to participate in the administration of their regions affairs and its development, together with their balanced and full participation in the federal power.

10. Powers and resources are shared on equal and just basis between the Nuba Mountains state and the federal government, details shall worked out by the two parties in separate protocol.

11. Eradication of any and all kinds of socio-economic, cultural injustice and grievances. That include any agricultural, none agricultural and other lands which have been unfairly distributed or owned, headed by agricultural schemes reforms and redistribution in a way that preserves
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respect of the natives and avail greater opportunity and priorities for the indigenous people of the area to invest and develop their land.

12. To join efforts for eradication of all kinds of backwardness, illiteracy and ignorance which have caused such situation of injustice and grievances. This alongside with the designing, implementation and execution of a special development programme for the Nuba Mountains state in a such a way that achieves equitable development between the Nuba Mountains state and other regions in the country for a purpose of achieving the region’s welfare.

12. The government of the Sudan shall abide and undertake a special humanitarian programme for relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement for solving and dealing with all kinds of negative effects shortcomings resulting from the war. This shall also include an emergency crush programme for facing the humanitarian urges and needs, such as the relief and otherwise as appropriate.

14. To acknowledge the local cultures and their development as well as to support equal opportunities to reflect them and be expressed within other cultures of the people of the Sudan in all fora mass of expression accredited by both the Nuba Mountains state and federal government.

15. The war has badly and effectively led to the destruction of the natural resources, environment and gross violation of human rights in the Nuba Mountains state. The two parties therefore, undertake to deal with these negative effects resulted during the twelve-years war.

16. The parties have asserted the unity of the Sudan, condemnation and rebuff of the tribal acts and practices. The parties, therefore undertake assurance of the democratic rights of the people of the Nuba Mountains state for achieving and gaining their national and regional just rights, equal and identical within the framework of the united Sudan. This in the eve of any political changes without having any influence from internal and external forces.

17. There are some issues outside the armed conflict and disputes which has been agreed upon by the parties. Such issues have been dealt with in a separate document attached to this declaration.

18. The two parties shall work together in developing a detailed programme for the general principles mentioned in this declaration. This shall be implemented by joint efforts which shall be required for
The 1997 Nuba Mountains Peace Agreement

mobilization towards achieving of these principles ending the war in order to realize the comprehensive peace and stability.

Note: attached is the document referred to in article 17

ENGINEER ISMAIL ALI SAAEELDIN
Deputy Chairman of Central Committee of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement and Peoples Liberation Army, Nuba Mountains and Chairman of its Negotiations Team.

AHMED MOHAMED HAROUN
Director General of Peace Resettlement Administration, South Kordofan and Chairman of Government of Sudan Negotiations team.

Nairobi, Kenya. 31/7/1996

WITNESSED BY

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF SPLA/M NUBA MOUNTAINS

Engineer ABDELBAGI HAMDAN KABEIR
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Spokesman.

2. ENG. RIZIGALLLA BAKHAT KAHMIS
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment Secretary

3. DR. AMAR JADELKARIM MAHMOUD
Secretary of Health Affairs

4. CDR. AKASHA ALSAID AKASHA
Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Social Welfare

5. A/CDR. ELTAJ ELTIGANI ARWA

6. A/CDR.. NASRELDIN HAROUN KAFI ABURASS.

SUDAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

1. ISMAIL DIGLES NEJAR
Deputy Secretary General for South Kordofan State Government.

2. MUSA SOMI RAIIMATAIA
Chairman of Peace Committee Council in South Kordofan State

3. AHMED MUSA HARIN
Member of National Council

4. HASSAN KUNDA TORUBA
Member of the Supreme Council for Peace

5. REV. YUNTHAN HAMMAD KUKU
Member of the Supreme Council for Peace

ACCREDITATION BY:
The 1997 Nuba Mountains Peace Agreement

CDR. MOHAMED HAROUN KAFI ABURASS
Chairman of SPLA/M Nuba Mountains Central Committee

(R) BRIG. psc HAMAD ABDEIKARIM ELSAID
Minister of Finance, South Kordofan State and head of Government of Sudan Delegation

Nairobi, Kenya. 31/7/1996

The Sudan government delegation in its negotiation with the SPLM/A Nuba Mountains Central Committee has taken notice of the report which has been prepared by Dr. Abdel aati Badr Suleiman, Deputy Chairman of the Production Unit of the International Atomic Energy Agency (report attached in two languages) about the existence of an atomic radiation in Miri dam and its extensions around Kadugli town. On this respect, the Sudan government delegation declares its undertaking to work side by side with the SPLM/A Nuba Central Committee and specialized authorities for all necessary arrangements and procedures dealing with that report. The delegation, therefore values very much the tremendous effort made by the member of SPLM/A Nuba Mountains Central Committee, for finding and acquiring this important document.

Signed by:

ENG. RIZIGALL BAKHAT KHAMIS
Secretary for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, Central Committee, SPLM/A Nuba Mountains.

(ENG. ABDEL BAGI HAMDAN KABEIR on behalf of ENG. RIZIGALL BAKHAT KHAMIS)

AHMED MOUSA HARIN
Member National Council, Sudan Government Delegation

Nairobi, Kenya. 31/7/1999
The 1997 Nuba Mountains Peace Agreement
The 1997 Nuba Mountains Peace Agreement
The 1997 Nuba Mountains Peace Agreement

THE FASHODA PEACE AGREEMENT

The delegations of the Sudan Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM-United) met in Fashoda on 18-20 September 1997 under the mediation and chairmanship of His Majesty Reth Kwongo Dak Padiet, the Reth of the Shilluk. The opening session was addressed by His Majesty the Reth of the Shilluk, Dr. Riek Machar Teny, President of the Co-ordinating Council on behalf of the Government of the Sudan, and Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, Chairman of the SPLM – United on behalf of the Movement. The two parties discussed the Sudan Peace Agreement of April 21, 1997. After serious and frank discussions the two parties agreed on the following amendments and additions to the said agreement.

1. The SPLM-United shall be guaranteed full legality of status and participation in the political and constitutional processes in the Sudan during the interim period.
2. The parties to the agreement shall have the right to freely propagate their respective options in the referendum among the people.
3. The 14th Constitutional Decree may not be amended except by (2/3) two thirds majority of the Co-ordinating Council and confirmed by a joint session of the advisory council and the ten Southern States’ Assembly in a meeting to be held for that purpose at the seat of the Co-ordinating Council.
4. The office of the President of the Co-ordinating Council shall fall vacant on:-

   1) The end of the term of office.
   2) Death
   3) Permanent disability or incapacitation.
   4) Resignation.
   5) A motion of impeachment is carried by three quarters of the Advisory Council.

SIGNED

1. Cdr. James Gatdual Gatlual
   Vice Chairman of SPLM – United
2. Cdr. Akwoch Mayong Jago
   Secretary for Military Affairs.

1. Mr. Musa el Mek Kur
   Minister of Animal Resources,
   Sudan Government.
2. Major General Bushra Osman Yousif
   Upper Nile Military Cdr.

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The 1997 Fashoda Peace Agreement

Witness

His Majesty Reth Kwongo Dak Padiet,
The Reth of the Shilluk

Fashoda, Upper Nile State, 20 September 1997

THE WUNLIT DINKA-NUER COVENANT
Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference
Wunlit, Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan

27 February - 8 March 1999

Dinka and Nuer Chiefs, church, civil and community leaders, elders, women and youth have met in a peace and reconciliation meeting in Wunlit, Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). We have established this Covenant of peace and reconciliation and declare an end to seven and a half years of intense conflict. We the participants hereby make and adopt the following Covenant and pledge ourselves to observe and implement it scrupulously and conscientiously in keeping with the solemn vows of peace, reconciliation and familial co-existence. We initiated our Conference with the sacrifice of the White Bull (Mabior Thon/Tu-bor) and have sealed the Covenant in Christian worship and traditional sacrifice.

We declare the following:

• All hostile acts shall cease between Dinka and Nuer whether between their respective military forces or armed civilians. A permanent cease-fire is hereby declared between the Dinka and Nuer people with immediate effect.

• Amnesty is hereby declared for all offences against people and property committed prior to 1/1/99 involving Dinka and Nuer on the West Bank of the Nile River.

• Freedom of movement is affirmed and inter-communal commerce, trade, development and services are encouraged.
The 1999 Wunlit Dinka-nuer Covenant

- Local cross-border agreements and arrangements are encouraged and shall be respected.
- It is hereby declared that border grazing lands and fishing grounds shall be available immediately as shared resources.
- Displaced communities are encouraged to return to their original homes and rebuild relationships with their neighbours.
- The spirit of peace and reconciliation this Covenant represents must be extended to all of southern Sudan.

All Resolutions adopted by the Conference are hereby incorporated into this Covenant. We appeal to the SPLM/A and the UDSF/SSDF to endorse, embrace and assist in implementation of this Covenant and its Resolutions. We appeal to the International Community to endorse, embrace and assist in implementation of this Covenant and its Resolutions.

Official version: 10 March 1999
THE 1999 HOMELAND CALL

On the 25th of November 1999, and in response to an initiative by H.E President Ismail Omar Gaili of the Republic of Djibouti, H.E President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir met with Sayed Alsadig Al-Mahdi in Djibouti to discuss means of enhancing national reconciliation in the Sudan. H.E President Ismail Omar Gaili attended the meeting. Both parties agreed on a declaration of principles for realizing a comprehensive political solution in the Sudan according to the following

First: Peace Agreement

Parties to the conflict adopt and commit themselves to end the civil war and conclude a just peace agreement based on the following:

1. Citizenship shall be the basis for constitutional rights and duties.
2. No particular national group of citizens shall be privileged because of ethnic, cultural or religious affiliation.
3. International human rights charters and covenants shall be adhered to.
4. Recognition of the religious, cultural and ethnic multiplicity of the Sudan.
5. The country shall be ruled on federal basis with equitable devolution of powers between the center and states.
6. Qualifications and professionalism shall be the basis of assuming’ offices at national institutions. Special consideration shall be given to the least developed states.
7. Just participation in power at all levels and wealth sharing.
8. Elimination of the effects of the civil war and building of confidence among Sudanese people leading to realization of voluntary unity.
9. These procedures shall be completed within an interim period of four years, at the end of which a referendum shall be held for Southern Sudan with its 1956 borders, to choose either voluntary unity with decentralized powers to be agreed upon or secession.
10. Resolving Nuba Mountains and Ingassana Hills questions in a manner that meets their respective demands for power and wealth sharing within the framework of the united Sudan.
The 1999 Homeland Call Declaration

Second: System of Governance:

1 Sudanese political forces shall be committed to pluralistic democratic system that guarantees human and basic freedoms.
2 The democratic system that suits Sudan is the federal presidential system that defines federal and state powers and separates between constitutional authorities.
3 Religious and cultural multiplicity in the Sudan shall be considered for coexistence and shall be included in the guiding principles of the constitution.
4 Commitment to realize sustainable development as a national goal for building infrastructure, social development and free market mechanism to attain social justice.
5 Identify and address all grievances.

Third: Regional and International Relations:

1 The establishment of special relations with neighboring countries having interdependent interests with the Sudan to maintain developmental stability and security.
2 Sudan’s International relationships shall be based on principles of international cooperation, consolidation of international security, peace and legitimacy.

Fourth: Political System:

1 The national initiative constitutes the axis of Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue and understanding and it works for boosting efforts and comprehensive political solution through IGAD and the joint Egyptian-Libyan initiatives.
2 Efforts shall be exerted for making the Libyan-Egyptian initiative a success and speeding up the convening of the all-party conference as soon as possible.
3 Affirming the support for IGAD initiative, being one by neighboring countries concerned with the Sudanese affairs, and their role for realizing, peace in the Sudan.
The 1999 Homeland Call Declaration

4 Underling the importance of coordinating between the two initiatives through a Sudanese- Sudanese dialogue and the agreed upon declaration of principles.

This agreement represents the aspirations and hopes of our Sudanese peoples to achieve peace, democracy and stability. We herewith urge all the political forces to support this declaration for comprehensive political solution and join and boost it in order to realize unity, peace and agreement. We also appeal to all brothers and friends to support the achievement of national accord among all Sudanese.

Finally we would like to extend our thanks to H.E President of the republic of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Gaili, for his honorable initiative, hospitality and appreciated efforts for concluding this agreement.

Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail               Mubarak Abdallah Alfadil
Minister of External Relations        Secretary for Foreign Relations
Republic of the Sudan                 Umma Party
The 1999 Blue Nile Peace Agreement

THE BLUE NILE PEACE AGREEMENT

22 December 1999

Observing its steadfast commitment to realise lasting and comprehensive peace and stability in Sudan based on the durable responsibility of the concerned parties; Sudan Government faithfully negotiated and successfully concluded another peace agreement with a former rebel faction namely “Blue Nile Citizens Front”. The respective agreement “The Blue Nile Agreement” was signed in an august ceremony took place in the Republican Palace in Khartoum on 22.12.1999. H. E. the First-Vice President Sayed Ali Osman Mohamed Taha attended the signing ceremony.

The agreement was signed by Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, the Presidential Adviser for Peace Affairs on behalf of the Government of Sudan, and by the tribal Chief Obaid Mohamed Abou-Shutal on behalf of (Blue Nile Citizens Front). Sayed Abou-Shutal was the former Rebel Movement Deputy Governor of (Blue Nile Region).

The Agreement provided that the two sides, responding to the peace calls, looking for the development and the upgrading of the Blue Nile state, are committed to work together for implementation of its various provisions.

The 12-point Agreement has called for the democratic rule in the Sudan and for working seriously to preserve the unity of the Sudanese people and territories and to distribute the Sudanese national wealth in a just manner while working for the development of the less developed regions of the country.

It underlined the two parties’ commitment to the Federal system of government, a system that allowed the citizens of every state to govern their own region on both the executive and the legislative levels, saying there should be a continued effort to develop it.

The Agreement said the two sides would work seriously to resolve all tribal conflicts in the region and to boost the coexistence between the ethnic groups there with the view to realize stability and to serve the national interests away from fissures and splits.

It said the two sides will at the same time deploy all the suitable means for reaching such an objective including the organization of seminars, workshops and training sessions for the local leaderships.
The 1999 Blue Nile Peace Agreement

The agreement called for giving a special consideration to the citizens of the Blue Nile state in representation into the various federal posts so that they would work for serving the homeland. Qualifications and labour law should be taken into account.

Pointing out the riches of the Blue Nile state the agreement provided that special attention be given for the developing the region in the animal, agriculture, forest, fisheries and energy resources.

The Agreement called for diversifying the good use of the agricultural lands in the region and that priority should be given for allocating land plots to the citizens of the region.

It urged the improvement of basic services in the region with particular emphasis given to the health and education services and that they should be expanded and improved in the rural areas. It said voluntary organizations should be encouraged to work for the development of the Blue Nile area and to rehabilitate what was destroyed by the war in the region.

The Agreement called for the establishment of a specialized organization to operate in the Blue Nile area and whose objective would be the development of the region and attracting state, federal and voluntary contributions to the area.

The Agreement called for giving a special consideration to the local administration in the region so that these local administrations would contribute in propagating the culture of peace in collaboration with the other concerned state and federal organs.

The Agreement stipulated a general amnesty for all those who were carrying arms and returned to the homeland and that the returnees be accommodated and be employed in the various society organizations.
LILIIR PEACE CONFERENCE
EAST BANK NILOTIC PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE
UPPER NILE, SUDAN

9-15 May 2000

A gathering of traditional and civil leaders was convened in Liliir (Bor, county), to reconcile the differences and conflicts between the Anyuak, Dinka (Bor & Padang), Jie, Kachipo, Murle (Boma) and Nuer (Gawaar & Lou), and to establish harmony and peace amongst themselves. The spirit of the conference was reflected at the opening by the ceremonial sacrifice of a ‘White Bull’, and concluded with the declaration of a joint covenant between the represented ethnic groups. The covenant was sealed with the sacrifice of a ‘White Ox’, the offering of Christian worship, and the signatures of each of the participating delegates and observers, publicly recorded. The following outlines their covenant:

“Under the facilitation of the NSCC, and witnessed by many church leaders and other citizens of Sudan, we, the delegates of the Liliir conference have established a covenant of peace and reconciliation between us. We declare our intention today to cease from hostile acts, and commit ourselves to the practical measures necessary to ensure the integrity and sustainability of our agreement. Recalling the spirit and wisdom handed down from our ancestors, and the memory of our daughters and sons who have unnecessarily died over the past 10 years, we pledge ourselves to observe and implement this covenant and its accompanying resolutions.

We have unanimously agreed that:

- all traditional hostilities will cease among us, and that all military (and militia) groups are to respect the civilian population and abide by, and protect, this covenant;

- the conditions necessary to foster local peace and development are brought about by our communities and leaders, and the provision of
basic essential services for the people are made available and improved;

- an amnesty will be upheld for all offences against our people and their property prior to the conference, in the spirit of reconciliation and unity. The amnesty takes effect from this date;
- all abducted women and children are freely returned to their places of origin, and where necessary, marriage customs are fulfilled;
- freedom of movement across our common borders is upheld, and trade and communication is encouraged and supported;
- all cross border agreements are respected and the authority of the border chiefs and police patrols are justly observed;
- access to common areas for grazing, fishing and water points will be regulated and shared peacefully among us;
- we will demand good governance from our leaders for the achievement of unity and the observance of human rights;
- we will advocate on behalf of our sisters and brothers who have been scattered and displaced, especially those from the Bor area, for their return to their homeland with the encouragement and co-operation of their communities, leaders and civil authorities of origin.

In conclusion, we appeal that the people from Upper Nile who were either blocked or did not have an opportunity to participate in the conference be told about our deliberations and be encouraged to meet with us in the near future so that the East Bank peoples’ peace process can be widened and deepened. This covenant reflects the will of the people represented at Liliir. It incorporates the resolutions of the conference (attached), and we urge that they be implemented with the full assistance and protection of the civil authorities under all of the southern liberation movements. We hope that the friends of Upper Nile will support our efforts and consolidate our desire for peace.”

15 May 2000
LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN THE SUDAN

Confident in the strategic ties between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Great Jamahiria and the Sudan. Based on the historical responsibility to preserve the unity, security and stability of the Sudan and its wish to activate and speed up the agreement on specific steps to pave the way for starting the dialogue and pushing the negotiations forward. The Sudanese Concerned Parties, in expression of their true desires, hereby declare their Commitment to work towards realizing Peace and Comprehensive national reconciliation in the Sudan, which is based on the following basis and Principles:

1. The unity of Sudan should be preserved

2. Citizenship should be the basis for exercising rights and duties.

3. Recognition of the racial, religious and cultural diversity of the Sudanese people

4. Safeguarding the principle of democratic pluralism and freedom of expression; separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers

5. Guarantees for basic freedoms and observance of human rights

6. Establishing of a decentralized system of government that will achieve balanced development and a just distribution of wealth and power

7. A foreign policy that observes higher national interests

8. Formation of an interim government in which all political forces would be represented. This government would oversee the implementation of all the points laid out in the political agreement and the organisation and convening of a national conference to revise the constitution and set a date for holding general elections.

9. An Immediate Cessation of Hostilities.
DECLARATION OF THE COMBONI MISSIONARIES WORKING IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Nairobi, 19 January 2001

We, the Comboni Missionaries working in the “liberated areas” of Southern Sudan, gathered for our annual assembly, have painfully analysed and evaluated the present tragic situation of war and violence. We have come to the unanimous conviction that the situation of war in Sudan at the present stage has become immoral and a tragic farce. It is not any longer a struggle for freedom of the Sudanese people and for the defence of human rights. The war has become a struggle for power, business and greed. Many heartless people are taking advantage of it and enrich themselves at the expense of the poor. Global interests have the Sudanese resources at heart, not the wellbeing of the Sudanese people. Religion is distorted and misused as a means for other interests. The number of victims is escalating, especially among women and children. Spiritual, human and cultural values are getting lost. Corruption, tribalism and fratricidal hatred are fostered. Degradation, underdevelopment and anarchy increase. Humanity in Sudan is getting lost. The word “liberation” is abused. What improvement do we see? Oppressors and oppressed are running for their life. Northerners against Southerners, Northerners against Northerners, Southerners against Southerners, Nuer and Dinka are fighting against Arabs. Nuer and Arabs are fighting against Dinka; Dinka against Dinka; Nuer against Nuer, Didinga against Dinka. There are no winners. All are losing. NGOs and churches prolong the fighting through the relief aid that unknowingly supports also the warring factions. The country has so much wealth and natural resources that would guarantee a good livelihood for all Sudanese.

We Comboni Missionaries, working in the Liberated Area of Southern Sudan, have decided to “break the silence” and intensify our commitment against the injustice that fuels the war in Sudan. We appeal to you leaders of the warring sides: “In the name of God, lay down the guns! Stop fighting!” We appeal to all people of goodwill: “break the silence” and intensify your mediation for peace in Sudan! We appeal to you, political and economic powers of the world: “Give up your greed and your selfish interests! Help Sudan to regain its lost humanity and identity.”

Agreed upon by 30 Comboni Missionaries working in Southern Sudan.

Justice and Peace Committee Co-Ordinator, Fr. Michele Stragapede, MCCJ

ENDS