| Published December 1999 |
| ISBN 1-903545-00-5 |
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FARCE MAJEURE:
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
SUDAN POLICY 1993-2000
DAVID HOILE
First Published April 2000 by The European - Sudanese Public
Affairs Council
Copyright 2000 David Hoile. All Rights Reserved
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INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1: THE UNITED STATES AND SUDAN:
A BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 2: "CONTROL OF THE AGENDA AND PERCEPTION
MANAGEMENT"
2.1 "THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION WARD"
2.2 TURNING "THE ECONOMIC SCREWS"
2.3 "GETTING OTHERS TO FIGHT YOUR WAR"
CHAPTER 3: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S REPEATED
ABUSE OF ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
3.1 THE LISTING OF SUDAN AS A STATE SPONSOR OF
TERRORISM
3.2 WAIVING ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION FOR DEMOCRATIC
PARTY DONORS
3.3 THE MUBARAK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
3.4 THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIC TERRORISM;
3.5 THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING: CONTRADICTION
AND CONFUSION
3.6 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE AL-SHIFA
FACTORY BOMBING FIASCO
3.7 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE AL-SHIFA
FACTORY:UNTENABLE CLAIMS
CHAPTER 4: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND SUDAN: A SYSTEMIC
INTELLIGENCE FAILURE
4.1 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S WITHDRAWAL OVER
100 FABRICATED"REPORTS ON SUDAN AND "TERRORISM"
4.2 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S REFUSAL OF SUDANESE
REQUESTS FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM TEAMS TO VISIT SUDAN
4.3 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND OSAMA BIN-LADEN
4.4 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: IN SEARCH OF NEW
ENEMIES
CHAPTER 5: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, SUDAN AND
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
CHAPTER 6: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND ALLEGATIONS
OF "SLAVERY" IN SUDAN
CHAPTER 7: SUDAN, OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
CHAPTER 8: SUDAN AND THE GULF WAR
CHAPTER 9: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT
FOR THE SPLA
9.1 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND "PRE-EMINENT
WAR CRIMINALS"
9.2 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
IN SUDAN
9.3 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND DIRECT FOOD
AID TO THE SPLA
9.4 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: TURNING A BLIND
EYE TO WAR CRIMES
CHAPTER 10: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE
REGIONAL ESTABILISATION OF SUDAN
10.1 ENCOURAGING UGANDA, ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA
TO DESTABILISE
10.2 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND AFRICA'S
"FIRST WORLD WAR"
10.3 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: ALIENATING EGYPT
OVER SUDAN?
CHAPTER 11: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: AT ODDS
WITH THE AMERICAN HUMANITARIAN AID COMMUNITY
CHAPTER 12: THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND SUDAN:
POORLY INFORMED AND CONFRONTATIONAL
CHAPTER 13: SUDANESE CALLS FOR DIALOGUE IGNORED
CHAPTER 14: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: OBSTRUCTING
PEACE IN SUDAN
CHAPTER 15: CONCLUSION /
RECOMMENDATIONS
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| INTRODUCTION
The Clinton Administration's policy towards Sudan over the last
eight years has come sharply into focus, largely because of
events and developments in the past 18 months.
It has been an open secret that the Clinton Administration has,
for several years, sought to isolate, destabilise and ultimately
overthrow Sudan's Islamist government which had come to power
in 1989. In justifying its attempts to destabilise Sudan, the
Administration accused the Khartoum government of supporting
international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalist extremism, suppressing
religious freedom and abuse of human rights. Many of the American
policy decisions that were made regarding Sudan, were made in
secret, and were said to have been based on "classified"
material and information not available to public scrutiny.
The Administration has supported southern Sudanese rebels, insurgents
with an appalling human rights record. In so doing, Washington
has artificially prolonged the Sudanese civil war. The Administration
also sought to encourage several of Sudan's neighbours both
to support Sudanese rebels and to themselves militarily destabilise
their neighbour. The dangers inherent in destabilising a country
which straddles the Nile and abuts the Red Sea, a state which
borders with Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo,
Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, and is a near neighbour
of Saudi Arabia, do not seem to have registered with the Clinton
Administration. And, by and large, prior to the Administration's
farcical August 1998 Cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa medicines
factory in Khartoum there had been no meaningful public or private
questioning of its Sudan policy. The al-Shifa attack pushed
American policy towards Sudan, one of the world's poorest countries,
into the spotlight.
The fact is that the short-sighted Sudan policy pursued by the
Clinton Administration, and spurred on by a poorly informed
Congress, is simply no longer credible. The disastrous attack
on al-Shifa brought to a head concerns felt by many governments,
aid organisations, and individuals such as former President
Jimmy Carter, about American policy towards Sudan. The Administration
has self-evidently abused anti-terrorism legislation for political,
partisan and economic ends.
The past eight years has been characterised by a systemic intelligence
failure on the part of the American intelligence community,
a failure which culminated in the disastrous bombing of the
al-Shifa medicines factory. Internationally, the Clinton Administration's
Sudan policy has been either challenged or ignored by those
groupings and countries the United States was supposedly meant
to be leading. The European Union, the Gulf states and Egypt,
and even the United Kingdom, have all questioned, or distanced
themselves from, the American stance on Sudan. Domestically,
the Administration's Sudan policy has also come in for considerable
criticism from the American humanitarian aid community. Reputable
groups such as CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam
America and Lutheran World Relief, no friends of the Sudanese
government, have repeatedly called on President Clinton to make
peace the Administration's primary objective in Sudan, and to
abandon its one-sided hostility towards the Sudanese government.
Equally skewed has been legislation produced by the United States
Congress. The 1999 Sudan Peace Act, and related Congressional
resolutions, provided as unbalanced and prejudiced a picture
of the Sudanese situation as was possible to pen.
The Clinton Administration can be said to have succeeded in
two areas with regard to its Sudan policy. Firstly, Washington
has succeeded in preventing, for the time being, a peaceful
settlement of the Sudanese conflict. Former United States president
Jimmy Carter has bluntly stated that the Clinton Administration's
Sudan policy is the biggest single obstacle to peace in that
country. The Administration has also succeeded in the propaganda
war it has waged against Sudan. Such a "media" war
has, of course, become the hallmark of all recent conflicts.
In the Sudanese context, it has subsequently clearly become
a millstone around Washington's neck. The Clinton Administration
now has to contend with pressure from many groups and constituencies
who are themselves responding to the very projections of Sudan
by the Administration that are now so clearly in question. |
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CHAPTER
1: THE UNITED STATES AND SUDAN: A BACKGROUND
Sudan became independent in 1956. Sudan's immediate post-independence
foreign policy was friendly towards both the West and the Arab
world. The country experienced both civilian and military government,
and in 1969 General Gafaar Nimeiri came to power in a coup
d'etat. Nimeiri abolished all existing political institutions
and parties and assumed the role of president. Politically,
Nimeiri's regime veered initially towards the left until an
attempted coup by the Sudanese Communist Party in July 1971.
He then made overtures towards Washington. These were welcomed
by the American government. In 1972, the Nimeiri regime ended
the civil war in southern Sudan, which had been fought on and
off since 1955, by agreeing that the south would enjoy autonomy.
The American government restored diplomatic relations with Sudan
and resumed economic aid. Sudan received hundreds of millions
of dollars in military, economic and development assistance.
Sudan became one of the key allies of the United States both
regionally and in the Middle East. In September 1983, Nimeiri
introduced Islamic sharia law throughout Sudan. Earlier
that year, southern discontent at administrative changes in
southern Sudan had resulted in the rekindling of the civil war.
This discontent led to the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation
Army (SPLA), led by former Sudanese army officer, Colonel John
Garang.
Nimeiri was overthrown by the Sudanese army in 1985. After a
one-year transitional period, elections were held in 1986 which
resulted in a democratically-elected government headed by Prime
Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Three years of weak coalition governments
followed, governments dominated by two Islamic sectarian parties,
the Umma Party headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the pro-Egyptian
Democratic Unionist Party. Sudan went through a series of political,
economic and military crises. In June 1989, a bloodless military
coup d'etat led by General Omer al-Bashir overthrew Sadiq
al-Mahdi's administration. The American attitude towards the
1989 coup d'etat in Sudan had already been substantially
indicated before its occurrence. The Atlanta Journal and
Constitution newspaper reported in January 1989 that:
(S)ome U.S. officials have begun speculating that a military
coup in Sudan might be preferable to its current parliamentary
government which helped cause southern Sudan's deadly famine
and continues to obstruct relief. "We favor democracy
over dictatorship," said a senior U.S. diplomat. "We
can't be in a position of seeking an undemocratic government
here. On the other hand, we have to treat the government
on its merits, and its performance on the humanitarian tragedy
has not been satisfactory." Three U.S. diplomats who
have frequent dealings with Sudan have suggested to The
Atlanta Journal and Constitution in recent weeks that.they
wonder if a transitional government under a military officer
friendly to the West might be preferable.
Following the 1989 coup, the Sudanese government made
attempts to gradually civilianise itself, and established a
modern Islamic republic in Sudan. Michael Field, in Inside
the Arab World, has stated that: "The only Arab country
that has put into effect modern, republican, Islamist ideas
has been Sudan".
It may be that the independent stance of the Sudanese government,
and the threat that a modern, democratic and republican Islamic
model to America's absolutist and authoritarian allies in the
Middle East, marked it out as a target for American displeasure.
Early American hopes that the government of Sudan would fall,
through either internal political or military pressure have
proved to be without foundation. The government of Sudan decentralised
the administration of the country by introducing a federal system
of government, and, in 1991, limited the Islamic sharia
law initially introduced by Nimeiri to those areas in which
Muslims are a majority population, thereby exempting the largely
animist southern Sudan. The Sudanese government has also held
local, state, national and presidential elections. In 1996,
for example, the Sudanese people were able, for the first time
ever, to directly elect their president. Multi-party politics
has recently been re-established and is entrenched in the new
constitution.
The Khartoum government has also attempted to address the root
causes of the Sudanese civil war. It signed the 1997 Khartoum
Peace Agreement, and other peace charters, with several factions
of Sudan's southern rebels, agreements which included guarantees
of a referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan. The
offer of a referendum has been acknowledged by the SPLA. The
civil war between the government and SPLA, which had been particularly
ferocious in the late 1980s and early 1990s, peaked shortly
afterwards, following the SPLA's loss of rear-bases in Ethiopia
when the Mengistu regime fell and the SPLA fragmented into different
factions. The war was reinvigorated by the Clinton Administration's
support for the SPLA faction led by John Garang, and by Washington's
encouragement of several of Sudan's neighbours to assist the
rebels. The Sudanese government has since also been party to
several attempts to achieve a comprehensive cease-fire in Sudan.
In the field of economics, the present government has revived
an economy that was in chaotic free fall under the al-Mahdi
administration. As the London Guardian newspaper, reporting
from Khartoum in 1998, pointed out:
In the economic field Sudan comes close to being the
perfect disciple of US orthodoxy. According to a United
Nations official in Khartoum, its reforms are even "more
far-reaching" than those recommended even by the International
Monetary Fund. In macro-economics, it is making "tremendous"
progress. Sixteen out of 20 targets have been met or exceeded
and inflation has been slashed from 148 per cent in 1996
to about 13 per cent earlier this year. Every time IMF representatives
some here, they marvel at Sudan's efficiency.
The attempts by the Sudanese government to address those areas
said to be of concern to the United States have been ignored
by the Clinton Administration. This has also been placed on
record by the Guardian newspaper, no friend of Khartoum's
Islamist government, which has observed:
Constantly charged with repression and abuse of human
rights, the regime has promulgated a new constitution which
codifies freedoms, including multi-party pluralism. Also,
European diplomats agree that Sudan has tried to distance
itself from support for terrorists.[H]owever flawed the
regime's self-improvement may be, it has unquestioningly
made the effort. That, diplomats point out, is more than
many regimes in the region, including pro-American ones,
have done.
It is extraordinary that the might of the United States government
came to be directed in such an unaccountable way upon one of
the poorest countries in the developing world. Sudan was desperately
poor even before the American-backed destabilisation sought
to destroy what little developmental infrastructure there was,
especially in the south. |
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CHAPTER
2: "CONTROL OF THE AGENDA AND PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT"
An examination of the Clinton Administration's attempts to control
the agenda on, and to influence perceptions of, Sudan reveals
the questionable basis upon which the Administration sought
to justify its attempts to militarily, politically and economically
destabilise the country.
The Clinton Administration's policy towards Sudan has followed
a set pattern. Judy Butler is an academic who has closely studied
American foreign policy as it applied to other developing countries
such as Nicaragua in Central America. In describing American
foreign policy tactics she states that:
The chief means of delegitimization within the United
States has been the propaganda war. This war has two major
and complementary tactics: "control of the agenda"
.and "perception management".
Butler outlined the five steps American governments took in
their campaigns to isolate and destabilise countries targeted
by Washington. They are "managing perceptions", "divide
and conquer", relegation of the country "to the diplomatic
isolation ward", "turn the economic screws",
and "get others to fight your war". It is very clear
that all these steps have been used by the Clinton Administration
to isolate and destabilise Sudan. The Administration has from
1993 onwards sought to secure "control of the agenda"
and to manage the way in which Sudan was perceived. Propaganda
has been a distinct feature of the Sudanese conflict, just as
it has featured in all conflicts in which the United States
has become involved. American foreign policy has always included
propaganda:
One of the United States' primary assets in influencing
and shaping world politics is its mastery of the use of
propaganda. The art of propaganda resulted in great success
during and after World War II. The United States.turned
this practice into a leading variable in its foreign policy
outlook.the US enhanced the borrowed art, added and deducted
accordingly, to make it fit with the changing political
environment. By far, the art of demonization is the United
States' most unique and most effective technique of them
all.
In his foreword to a National Defence University study of political
warfare, U.S. Navy Vice-Admiral James A. Baldwin, outlined the
framework within which propaganda features:
Warfare is often defined as the employment of military
means to advance political ends.Another, more subtle means
- political warfare - uses images, speeches, slogans, propaganda,
economic pressures.to influence the political will of an
adversary.
The process of demonising Sudan was initially embarked upon
by accusing Sudan of being an extremist Islamic state, and therefore,
by definition, a state sponsor of regional and international
terrorism, and human rights abuser. It was also stated that
Sudan had been an ally of Saddam Hussein in Iraq during the
Gulf War. Sudan's policy of neutrality in that conflict has
cost it dear. And from 1995 onwards the Clinton Administration
would make much of allegations of human rights abuse, religious
intolerance, and "slavery" and "slave trading"
in Sudan. It is ironic that the Administration set about demonising
the Sudanese despite the fact that, as stated by a former American
ambassador to Sudan, the Sudanese people "deserved their
reputation as the nicest people in the eastern half of the African
continent".
2.1: "THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION WARD"
Of all these accusations, the Clinton Administration's placing
of Sudan on its official list of state sponsors of international
terrorism served most to relegate Sudan "to the diplomatic
isolation ward". The United States, and its allies, were
then also able to secure limited United Nations sanctions on
Sudan in the wake of the attempted assassination of Egyptian
president Hosni Mubarak, on the basis of unproven allegations
of Sudanese involvement.
Additionally, American pressure on the United Nations led to
the appointment of a United Nations Special Rapporteur on human
rights in Sudan. Selectivity in concern for human rights is,
of course, not unusual and often dependent on policy objectives.
The U.S. Government's focus on Sudan jarred given that the human
rights situations within most of Sudan's neighbouring countries
were considerably more disturbing. While the Administration's
own human rights reports, as well as other sources have documented
few political detainees in Sudan, human rights groups were alleging
that Egypt had up to 20,000 detainees. Uganda and Eritrea both
have very questionable human rights records and several hundred
if not thousands of such prisoners. These neighbouring countries
are American regional allies, with demonstrably repressive governments.
Donald Petterson, United States ambassador to Sudan from 1992-95,
confirmed that the United States played a prominent role at
the United Nations in originating and lobbying for resolutions
hostile to Sudan. He has written of "the lead [the Clinton
Administration] had taken in the United Nations to bring about
the adoption of resolutions condemning Sudan."
2.2: TURNING "THE ECONOMIC SCREWS"
The Clinton Administration had also clearly sought to "turn
the economic screw" on Sudan. The 1993 listing of Sudan
as a state sponsor of terrorism ended any prospect of bilateral
American aid and related assistance as well as restricting American
economic investment in Sudan. On 3 November 1997, President
Clinton signed executive order 13067, under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703 et seq) and the
National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641 c), which imposed comprehensive
trade and economic sanctions against Sudan. The order declared
"that the policies of Sudan constitute an extraordinary
and unusual threat to the national security and foreign policy
of the United States". On 1 July 1998, the Department of
the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued
the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (63 Fed. Reg. 35809, July
1, 1998). These regulations blocked all property and interests
in property of the Sudanese government, its agencies, instrumentalities
and controlled entities, including the Bank of Sudan, that were
in the United States. The Clinton Administration has also brought
pressure to bear on private banks and multilateral lending agencies
not to lend to Sudan. They also prohibited: (1) the importation
into the United States of any goods or services of Sudanese
origin, with the exception of informational material; (2) the
exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or services
to Sudan or the Government of Sudan apart from informational
materials or donations of humanitarian aid; (3) the involvement
of any American person in the export or reexportation of goods
and services to or from Sudan; (4) the involvement of any American
person in contracts relating to Sudan; (5) the grant or extension
of credits or loans by any American person to the Sudanese government;
and (6) transactions relating to the transportation of cargo.
The sanctions order has been renewed every year since 1997.
On all these occasions the Clinton Administration has claimed
that Sudan "continues to present an extraordinary and unusual
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States". President Clinton's 1998 renewal of sanctions
also stated that his Administration was concerned about human
rights and freedom of religion.
2.3: "GET OTHERS TO FIGHT YOUR WAR"
We have not and will not stop looking for ways
in which to bring about changes in Khartoum's behaviour.
Edward Brynn, U.S. acting Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs.
The Clinton Administration has also clearly sought to "get
others to fight your war". By 1994, while the Administration's
propaganda campaign against Sudan was intensifying, things within
Sudan had settled down markedly from a political and a security
point of view. The military situation was better than it had
been for many years and the Sudanese Government's attempts to
secure 'peace from within' were gaining momentum. It became
increasingly evident that the SPLA, weakened by splits and expelled
from Ethiopia following the fall of the Mengistu regime, was
very unlikely to bring any further significant military pressure
to bear on the Sudanese government.
It is a matter of record that from 1994 until the present the
Clinton Administration has followed a policy of assisting the
SPLA militarily and politically, actively encouraging the rebels
to continue, and intensify, their involvement in what is clearly
a no-win war.
The American government was also instrumental in temporarily
unifying the Sudanese opposition, bringing a variety of groups
together with the creation of the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) in Eritrea in June 1995. Groups within this new entity
included northern opposition parties such as the Umma Party,
Democratic Unionist Party and the Sudanese Communist Party,
as well as the SPLA. The Sudan People's Liberation Army was
in effect to form the NDA's military wing with Garang as the
NDA's military supremo. The National Democratic Alliance established
a political-military committee, committing the organisation
to the violent overthrow of the Sudanese government. The American
ambassador was, in the words of the London-based newsletter,
Africa Confidential, "conspicuous by his presence".
The Clinton Administration then took getting "others to
fight your war" one step further. In 1996, it openly and
unambiguously encouraged the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia
and Uganda not only to afford the SPLA safe rear bases, but
also to both spearhead and support rebel military incursions
into Sudan. This led to attacks into border regions of southern
and eastern Sudan by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ugandan military
forces, often in brigade strength.
The Clinton Administration's determination to control both the
agenda on, and the perception management of, Sudan is all too
transparent. On 15 February 1995, Antony Lake, President Clinton's
then National Security Adviser (and Clinton's unsuccessful nominee
for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA), speaking
before a conference organised by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington-DC stated:
We will be working with other governments in the region
to see how we can best contain the influence of the Sudanese
Government until it changes its views and begins to behave
in accordance with the norms of international behaviour
that we think governments should follow.
Shortly after that declaration, on 22 March 1995, Edward Brynn,
the United States acting Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, speaking before a House of Representatives sub-committee
on Africa, declared:
In short, while we have been successful in keeping attention
focused on Sudan, we have been unable to affect change in
those regime policies and practices of most concern to us.
We will maintain bilateral and international pressure on
Khartoum. We have not and will not stop looking for ways
in which to bring about changes in Khartoum's behaviour.
The Sudanese government must understand that those same
policies and practices which we find threatening and objectionable
will eventually cause its downfall.
The Administration's agenda was repeatedly and openly stated.
In late 1997, for example, John Prendergast, the National Security
Council's then director for Eastern Africa, stated that the
government of Sudan was viewed as "the principle threat
to U.S. security interests on the Continent of Africa today".
He outlined American government policy when he spoke of the
several levels of pressure being brought to bear on Sudan. These
levels included placing Sudan on the list of state sponsors
of terrorism and the unilateral sanctions that measure triggered:
a regional level made up of three initiatives which included
the "Front Line States Initiative" whereby the United
States sought to "seek to include Uganda and Eritrea and
Ethiopia in their effort to defend themselves from Sudan's campaign
of regional destabilization by providing defensive non-lethal
military equipment to those three countries"; the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Drought and Development, (later the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development, IGADD and then IGAD) Peace Initiative
whereby the American government declared IGADD as the "only
viable interlocutor for peace talks on Sudan"; and thirdly,
the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative supporting "African-led
solutions to their own problems". The third level was said
to be the domestic level within Sudan whereby the American government
declared an intention to "build the capacity of Sudanese
organizations, particularly in rebel-held areas, to respond
to.emergencies in war-torn areas of Sudan".
Prendergast also stated that the United States government had
decided to "increase its engagement with the.opposition
umbrella, the National Democratic Alliance, to support the non-violent
political objectives of the opposition.To this end, we have
decided to promote development assistance to opposition controlled
areas of Sudan.It will allow us the possibility to support those
in southern and eastern Sudan to promote the rule of law through
the support of local court systems and civil administration,
something that has already been going on for some time now".
Prendergast also said that a third initiative at the domestic
level was an "effort to increase unilateral pressure on
the Sudan government and vigorously condemn their actions on
a consistent basis". |
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3: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S REPEATED ABUSE OF ANTI-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION
You cannot have people saying "We
have proof of certain things" against a whole country
but nobody knows what that proof is. There is a difference
between whether something is proved sufficiently to bring
a man before a court.and whether it is sufficient to prove
to adopt one's political line.
Raymond Kendall, International Secretary-General
of Interpol
The cornerstone of the Clinton Administration's rationale for
its policies towards Sudan is its repeated claim that Sudan
is a supporter of international terrorism. This is made clear
in statements by Administration officials and is constantly
cited in media coverage. The Clinton Administration listed Sudan
as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993. Sudan joined
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Cuba on the American
list. Whatever other states on the list may have done, Sudan
was included despite the fact that there was not a single
example of Sudanese involvement in any act of international
terrorism. And it is also clear that Sudan was listed without
any evidence of its support for terrorism. This much is a matter
of record. Former United States President Jimmy Carter, long
interested in Sudanese affairs, went out of his way to see what
evidence there was for Sudan's listing. Carter was told there
was no evidence:
In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of
state he said they did not have any proof, but there were
strong allegations.
The focus for the Clinton Administration's allegations has been
the United States Department of State publication, Patterns
of Global Terrorism. It is important, first of all, to put
Patterns of Global Terrorism into its legal context.
The publication states that it is prepared in
compliance with United States law, Title 22 of the United
States Code, Section 2656f (a), requiring the Department
of State "to provide Congress a full and complete annual
report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting
the criteria of Section (a) (1) and (2) of the Act. As required
by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments
of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred,
and countries about which Congress was notified during the
preceding give years pursuant to Section 6 (j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list
countries that have repeatedly provided support for international
terrorism).
The 1992 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the year before
Sudan's listing, stated that: "There is no evidence that
the Government of Sudan conducted or sponsored a specific terrorist
attack in the past year, and the government denies supporting
any form of terrorism activity" The report did record that:
"In 1992 the Government of Sudan continued a disturbing
pattern of relationships with international terrorist groups...Elements
of the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestinian Islamic
Movement (HAMAS), and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist
organizations continue to find refuge in Sudan". The London
Independent described this as "keeping dubious
company". The same groups, and many others, can be found
organised and active in Western capitals across the world. In
Britain many of the same "elements" are living as
refugees on state benefits. They have even found a "refuge"
in the United States. HAMAS, for example, held its third world
congress in Kansas city, and has held meetings in Phoenix attended
by Hamas leaders and 4000 supporters and sympathisers.
The 1993 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the first report
which included Sudan on this list, once again clearly stated:
Although there is no conclusive evidence linking the
Government of Sudan to any specific terrorist incident during
the year, five of fifteen suspects arrested this summer
following the New York City bomb plot are Sudanese citizens.
Various newspapers and journals also recorded the simple lack
of evidence for terrorist support before and after Sudan's listing.
The London Independent of 9 June 1993, for example, stated:
"So far, no major terrorist incident has been traced to
the Islamic regime in Sudan. The Sudanese lack the logistical
abilities to run terrorist networks...even if they wished".
The London Guardian of 19 August 1993 reported that:
"Independent experts believe...that these reports [of terrorist
training camps] have been exaggerated, and that Sudan is too
short of money to make it an active sponsor of terrorism".
The Independent's Robert Fisk writing in December 1993,
several months after the American decision, described Sudan
as:
a country that is slowly convincing its neighbours that
Washington's decision to put Sudan on its list of states
supporting 'terrorism' might, after all, be groundless.
Even Western diplomats in Khartoum are now admitting privately
that - save for reports of a Palestinian camp outside Khartoum
like those that also exist in Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and
other Arab countries - there may be no guerrilla training
bases in the country after all.
One year after Sudan's listing, the Independent returned
to the theme. Referring to the presence of Palestinian and Lebanese
dissidents: "Intelligence assessments reckon that these
groups are allowed to live and study and perhaps to plot in
apartments in the capital".
3.1: THE LISTING OF SUDAN AS A STATE
SPONSOR OF TERRORISM
It would seem, therefore, that Sudan was listed as a state sponsor
of terrorism despite a complete absence of any evidence whatsoever
of involvement in any act of terrorism. Donald Petterson, the
United States ambassador to Sudan at the time of Sudan's listing,
stated that he was "surprised" that Sudan was put
on the terrorism list. Petterson said that while he was aware
of "collusion" between "some elements of the
Sudanese government" and various "terrorist"
organisations:
I did not think this evidence was sufficiently conclusive
to put Sudan on the U.S. government's list of state sponsors
of terrorism.
It would appear that Ambassador Petterson, the Clinton Administration's
ambassador to Sudan, was not even briefed prior to the decision
to list Sudan being taken. When he queried the decision, he
was told by an assistant secretary of state that the "new
evidence was conclusive". One can only speculate as to
whether the assistant secretary of state who briefed Ambassador
Petterson was the same assistant secretary of state who told
former President Carter a few days later that the Clinton Administration
did not have any proof, but that there were "strong allegations".
It should be pointed out, in any instance, that the extent to
which inclusion on the list is dependent on policy considerations
at any one moment in time, is highlighted by the case of Iraq.
Iraq was first listed in 1979, was de-listed in 1982 when it
went to war against Iran, which was seen as being in the American
interest, and then put back on the list after the Gulf war.
Nothing had changed in the meantime - Saddam Hussein's government
was in power throughout. Political expediency had dictated Iraq's
removal and then relisting.
The Clinton Administration's listing of Sudan served clear objectives.
Sudan was projected as a state sponsor of terrorism and thereby
to a great extent isolated internationally. Listing also brings
with it specific sanctions, financial restrictions and prohibitions
on economic assistance. These include a ban on arms-related
exports and sales and a tight control of "dual-use"
goods and technologies. The United States must also oppose any
loan from international financial institutions for a country
on the terrorism list.
It is perhaps important to record the Sudanese government's
response to claims that Khartoum in any way supports terrorism:
Sudan has not, and will not, allow its territory to be
used for any act of terror or to be used as a shelter for
terrorists or by those who have eluded justice. Sudan, like
many other states, suffers day after day with those innocent
civilians who lose their lives or who are harmed as a result
of terrorist acts perpetrated in many parts of the world.
Killing women and children, terrorizing peaceful citizens,
destroying property and taking innocent civilians hostage
cannot be accepted under any divine law; nor can they be
accepted by any human being who believes in justice and
peace.
Speaking in 1994, the then director-general of the Sudanese
Foreign Ministry, and subsequently Sudanese ambassador to the
United States, Mahdi Ibrahim Mohamed touched on American double-standards:
How can you prove a negative? We have always believed
that in Western countries the defendant is innocent until
proven guilty. In our case, it is not like that. Until today,
no information has been provided about a terrorist harboured
in our country.
The 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism once again stated
that: "There is no evidence that Sudan, which is dominated
by the National Islamic Front (NIF), conducted or sponsored
a specific act of terrorism in 1994". The report did claim
that people associated with ANO, the Lebanese Hizballah, the
Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Egypt's Islamic Group were present in
Sudan. In what was described as a "positive development",
the report did record that the international terrorist "Carlos",
Illyich Ramirez Sanchez, was extradited to France.
It is clear that the Clinton Administration's listing of Sudan
as a state sponsor of terrorism, in the absence of any proof
or evidence of such activity, was an abuse of United States
anti-terrorism legislation for policy reasons.
3.2: WAIVING ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION
FOR DEMOCRATIC PARTY DONORS
Whenever convenient, however, the Administration has chosen
to ignore its own anti-terrorist legislation for economic and
business reasons. The Clinton Administration has, for example,
granted sanctions exemptions for the import of Sudanese gum
arabic, an indispensable foods, soft drinks and pharmaceutical
stabiliser, of which Sudan has a near monopoly. And, in an equally
clear cut instance of hypocrisy, it is also the case that in
late 1996 the Clinton Administration had sought to grant an
exemption to Occidental Petroleum, an American oil company,
to become involved in the Sudanese oil industry.
The Occidental issue caused the Administration considerable
embarrassment. At a January 1997 press briefing, a State Department
spokesman defended the Administration's position by stating:
"If.individual financial transactions are found not to
have an impact on any potential act of terrorism or to fund
any group that supports terrorism, then these transactions.may
be permitted". The New York Times commented that:
Recent days brought word that last summer business considerations
led the White House to waive a law prohibiting American
companies from doing business with countries that sponsored
terrorism. Specifically, officials gave approval to the
Occidental Petroleum Corporation to take part in a $930
million oil project in Sudan.Washington's policy toward
the Sudanese regime now seems hopelessly confused. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright did little to clarify it at
her introductory news conference last Friday. Even as she
called for new United Nations sanctions against Sudan, she
endorsed the decision to let Occidental bid for the oil
contract.
The Washington Post also commented:
[T]he elasticity of the law as it comes to US economic
interests - and especially when those interests also happen
to contribute generously to the Democratic National Committee
- will not go unnoticed.It can only undercut U.S. efforts
to isolate what it considers - or says it considers - rogue
states.
3.3: THE MUBARAK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
The American government has claimed Sudanese involvement in
the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian president Hosni
Mubarak. In June 1995, while in Addis Ababa, Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak was the target of an assassination attempt. Several
Egyptian terrorists tried to kill him in a gun attack on his
limousine This was one amongst many attempts by Egyptian extremists
to kill Egyptian ministers and government officials. Islamic
extremists had tried to assassination Mubarak on several occasions,
the first attempt being on 25 April 1982. The London Independent
newspaper of 2 July 1995 reported that the Egyptian government
initially accused the Ethiopian government of involvement in
the assassination attempt: "Egyptian investigators claimed
three Ethiopian security officials took part in the failed assassination
attempt". The Ethiopian government issued an official statement
refuting the Egyptian claim, stating:
Egyptian officials have over the past week been spreading
all sorts of self-serving fantastic stories solely based on
their imagination.It is now appearing that the Egyptian appetite
for the fabrication of lies in connection with the crime committed
by Egyptian terrorists is proving to have no limit and they
have at this point reached a state where Ethiopia can no longer
refrain from putting the record straight.The Egyptian authorities
are being requested through this statement.to refrain from
continuing with their unacceptable campaign of lies and defamation,
the full motive of which is known only to themselves.
The then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin blamed the murder
attempt on "Islamic fundamentalists with the encouragement
of Iran". The Iranian government countered by accusing
Israel of involvement in the incident.
Shortly after accusing Ethiopia of involvement, however, Egypt
accused the Sudanese government of having been involved. Sudan
had condemned the incident and strongly denied any involvement.
The Egyptians claimed that three of the gunmen had fled to Sudan.
Thirty-two days after the assassination attempt, the Ethiopian
authorities provided the government of Sudan with the details
of one of the suspects who left Addis Ababa by air on the same
day as the incident. Among the only descriptions of these suspects
were that one wore a Casio watch, and that one was married.
Over the following weeks and months the United Nations demanded
that Sudan extradite these men. The Sudanese government called
in Interpol to assist with the manhunt. The government also
published prominent 'wanted' notices in all the Sudanese Arabic
daily newspapers for three days running. The notice was also
published in the weekly English-language newspaper. Similar
notices were broadcast on national television and radio. The
notices were also sent to all Sudanese states, municipalities
and localities. By March 1996, the Sudanese government had exhausted
most if not all of the options open to it in its manhunt and
stated that it was possible that one or two of the wanted men
may have transited through Sudan. None could be found given
the very meagre information provided by the Egyptian and Ethiopian
authorities.
The only named suspect in the assassination attempt, Mustafa
Hamza, one of the three said to be in Sudan, was subsequently
located and interviewed by the international media in Afghanistan.
A long interview with Hamza was published in Al-Hayat
newspaper on 21 April 1996. Hamza stated that the Egyptian group,
Al Gamaa al Islamiya, was responsible for the murder
attempt. He stated that most of the gunmen involved came from
Pakistan, travelling on passports issued by an Arab country,
and that one or two men had entered Ethiopia from Sudan, having
received visas from the Ethiopian embassy in Khartoum. He said
that only one of the gunmen had left through Sudan and that
he was now in a third country. Hamza stated that Sheikh Omer
Abdel Rahman was the movement's spiritual leader. Al-Hayat
reported that Hamza stated that there were "deep differences
between the ruling Islamic Front in the Sudan and his Group
(Gamaa Islamiya). He accused the Sudanese Government [of following
a] distorted and deviated application of Islam". Simply
put, the Sudanese model of Islam was too liberal for him.
In spite of the fact that at least one of the alleged gunmen
was clearly in Afghanistan, that another was said to be in a
third country, and that the otherwise forthcoming chief suspect
denied that a third suspect had even been in Sudan, the United
Nations, under American pressure, still imposed limited sanctions
on Sudan for not extraditing these suspects. As late as December
1996, and in the face of clear evidence such as the above interview
in Afghanistan, the Ethiopian government was still insisting
that all three of the suspects were still in Sudan. The subsequent
trial of those suspects caught in Ethiopia itself was held in
closed session.
President Mubarak's claims about the attempted assassination
have been questioned. Middle East International reported
in its 7 July 1995 issue that "the Egyptian government
has produced no evidence that the attempted killers were in
fact Sudanese or in any way backed by Sudan. But this did not
prevent Mubarak.from pointing the finger at Egypt's southern
neighbour and its ideological leader Hassan Turabi. His accusations
were vehemently denied in Khartoum. It seems that Mubarak would
rather blame the Sudanese than the Egyptian Islamists his government
have been trying to crush for the last three years.Pointing
the finger at Sudan has ensured that public attention has been
kept off domestic politics." A different article in the
same issue made perhaps the key point in stating: "It will
be difficult to prove - or to disprove - the Sudan government's
involvement in the assassination attempt.But this is not a police
investigation, it is a political clash." The impermanence
of the Egyptian attitude was perhaps also revealed when one
year later, Middle East International reported that,
on the occasion of meetings between Presidents Mubarak and al-Bashir
during the 1996 Arab Summit, the issue of assassination attempt
was described as a "triviality" by the Egyptian state
media.
Despite the unanswered questions surrounding the Mubarak assassination
attempt, the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions
1044, 1054 and 1070. Resolution 1054 introduced limited diplomatic
sanctions, the scaling down of Sudanese embassy staff and restrictions
on travel by Sudanese government officials. Resolution 1070
had sought to impose restrictions on the international flights
of Sudanese airlines but was never implemented. The fact that
in May 1997, the United States government was still expecting
Sudan, under pain of continued sanctions, to extradite someone,
Mustafa Hamza, , who had clearly been in Afghanistan for almost
two years, far beyond Sudanese jurisdiction, shows how the issue
is being clearly exploited for propaganda and policy reasons.
3.4: THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIC
TERRORISM
It may well be the case that the American government were eager
to deflect as much of the focus on the issue of "Islamic
terrorism" onto other shoulders. As James Adams, the London
Sunday Times Washington correspondent, has pointed out,
it was the United States which had spent three billion dollars
in training, equipping and, where necessary, motivating Islamic
fundamentalist combatants:
The roots of this new terrorism lie not in Tehran but
in the ten-year war in Afghanistan which began after the
Soviets invaded the country in 1979. Following the invasion,
the American government embarked on what was to become one
of the largest covert efforts ever to fund, arm and train
a guerrilla army. Over ten years, the US spent a total of
£3 billion in secret aid, which was running at around £600m
a year just before the Soviets withdrew in 1989. That money
was spent largely on supplying the guerrillas who were trained
and housed by the Pakistan government. Other Arab countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia, also contributed to the underwriting
of the guerrilla effort...At the time the covert operation
was under way, there was little concern in Washington about
who actually received the money or guns.
The Economist in April 1993, touching on Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak's concerns about Islamic terrorism:
During the 1980s, America provided full-scale support
for the fundamentalist mujahideen, including the 20,000
or so outsiders who at one time or another joined the Afghan
fighters...Times change, but the Afghan veterans continue
to cause trouble, in Algeria as well as Egypt. Mr Mubarak
blames America for creating the basis of a terrorist network;
some conspiracy-minded Arabs believe that the old links
between fundamentalists and their American ex-supporters
cannot simply have faded away.
Adams echoes the Economist's reporting when he states
that "Both the Pakistanis and the Egyptians blame the CIA
for this legacy of terror". The London Observer
newspaper referred to this phenomena as the "Frankenstein
the CIA created".
Given the American Government's own clear involvement in the
funding and sponsorship of what it itself would subsequently
come to describe and define as Islamic terrorists and international
terrorism (much of it subsequently focused upon American allies
such as Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, and then on America
itself) it makes considerable sense for Washington to cast around
for people they can transfer blame to. Sudan is one such candidate.
It is also convenient for the Egyptian government to blame Sudan
for its problems just as it has previously blamed the USA for
creating a terrorist network.
The fact is that the United States government through its various
defence and intelligence agencies had spent up to three billion
dollars in training Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas from around
the world, as well as Afghans, not only in the use of weapons
of war and explosives but also how to master the logistics of
how to supply and carry out acts of war and sabotage against
a variety of targets. All this training took place within CIA-supervised
camps in Pakistan. The United States government had also extensively
armed these same Islamic fundamentalists, providing them with
assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, explosives and
quantities of American Stinger surface-to-air missiles.
3.5: THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING:
CONTRADICTION AND CONFUSION
The World Trade Center in New York was bombed in February 1993.
Several people died and dozens were injured when a car-bomb
exploded in the Center's car-park went off. In March 1994, four
Arabs were convicted of having caused the explosion. Ten other
people were later also convicted in connection with the World
Trade Center bombing and other terrorist conspiracies. In a
remarkably clumsy way, the Clinton Administration has sought
from time to time to insinuate that Sudan was somehow involved
in the bombing.
Given the Clinton Administration's obvious eagerness to attribute
any act of terrorism to Sudan, it is clear that had there been
the slightest evidence of the Sudanese government's involvement
in such a direct attack on the United States, it would not only
have immediately trumpeted it around the world, but savage retaliation
would have followed. Given that the World Trade Center/New York
conspiracies had been extensively penetrated by both the CIA
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as was clearly revealed
during the trials , had there been the remotest link between
Sudan and the bombings it would have been documented. It is
an ironic fact, as the Economist has also documented,
that several of the suspects in the bombing of the World Trade
Centre had 'Afghani' connections. One of the prime suspects,
Mahmoud Abu-Halima, was himself an 'Afghani', having been militarily
trained in Pakistan at an American-sponsored base.
In its attempts to implicate Sudan in the World Trade Center
bombing, the Clinton Administration has contradicted itself
on several occasions. In March 1993, for example, the United
States government stated that the World Trade Center bombing
was carried out by a poorly trained local group of individuals
who were not under the auspices of a foreign government or international
network. In June 1993, the American authorities again stated
there was no evidence of foreign involvement in the New York
bombing or conspiracies. The American government then reversed
its position in August 1993 alleging Sudanese involvement in
the New York bomb plots. This finding was then comprehensively
contradicted in 1996 by Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr., the
Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism. On the
occasion of the release of the 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism,
on 30 April 1996, Ambassador Wilcox made it very clear that
there was no Sudanese involvement whatsoever in the World Trade
Center bombings:
We have looked very, very carefully and pursued all possible
clues that there might be some state sponsorship behind
the World Trade Center bombing. We have found no such evidence,
in spite of an exhaustive search, that any state was responsible
for that crime. Our information indicates that Ramzi Ahmed
Yousef and his gang were a group of freelance terrorists,
many of whom were trained in Afghanistan, who came from
various nations but who did not rely on support from any
state.
Yet, earlier that month, on 3 April, the then American ambassador
to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, in meetings at the United Nations,
claimed that two Sudanese diplomats had been involved in the
World Trade Center bombing, and other "plots". This
presents an interesting situation. The political appointee,
Mrs Albright, with a political and policy line to follow, claiming
one thing, and the professional anti-terrorism expert, Ambassador
Wilcox, saying something completely different. On something
as serious as allegations of terrorism, allegations involving
the murderous bombing of the World Trade Center and a conspiracy
to bomb other targets in New York, such a divergence is totally
remarkable and yet again only but undermines the credibility
of American claims with regard to Sudanese "involvement"
in terrorism.
It is disturbing to note that in March 2000, seven years after
the World Trade Center bombing, and four years after Ambassador
Wilcox gave the definitive answer stating there was no Sudanese
involvement, President Clinton's special envoy to Sudan, former
Congressman Harry Johnston, was still insinuating Sudanese involvement,
stating that all those involved in the bombing has carried Sudanese
passports. First of all, as stated above, only five of the fifteen
people arrested were Sudanese. Nationality in and of itself
is no evidence for a state's involvement in terrorism, and particularly
in the case of the World Trade Center bombing. A number of those
involved were Egyptian, would this mean that Egypt was complicit
in the bombing? Others were Americans and Palestinians. Two
other American citizens have been indicted for their involvement
in the East African embassy bombings. Does this necessarily
imply that the American government was somehow involved?
An even clearer example of the Administration's misuse of anti-terrorism
legislation for political reasons followed President Clinton's
cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa medicines factory in Khartoum.
It is now abundantly evident that this attack, on an alleged
chemical weapons facility owned by Osama bin-Laden, was a disastrous
intelligence failure. As will be outlined, every one of the
American claims about the al-Shifa factory proved to be false.
Clinton Administration officials also subsequently admitted
that when they attacked the factory they did not know who the
owner was, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stating
that who owned the plant "was not known to us".
When, several days later, the American government learnt, from
subsequent media coverage of the attack, who actually owned
the factory, that person, Mr Saleh Idris, was then retrospectively
listed under legislation dealing with "specially designated
terrorists". On 26 August, 1998, the Office of Foreign
Assets Control, the unit within the U.S. Treasury Department
charged with the enforcement of anti-terrorism sanctions, froze
more than US$ 24 million of Mr Idris's assets. These assets
had been held in Bank of America accounts. On 26 February 1999,
Mr Idris filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, for the release of his assets, claiming
that the government's actions had been unlawful. His lawyers
stated that while the law used by the Clinton Administration
to freeze his assets required a finding that Mr Idris was, or
had been, associated with terrorist activities, no such determination
had ever been made. Mr Idris had never had any association whatsoever
with terrorists or terrorism. On 4 May 1999, the deadline by
which the government had to file a defence in court, the Clinton
Administration backed down and had to authorise the full and
unconditional release of his assets.
The listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism provides
a macro example of the Clinton Administration's abuse of anti-terrorist
legislation. The case of Mr Idris provides a micro example of
this misuse. The Clinton Administration's clear abuse of anti-terrorist
legislation and its manipulation and abuse of legal measures
for political expediency and convenience is not just immoral;
it also discredits American anti-terrorist legislation internationally.
3.6: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE
AL-SHIFA FACTORY BOMBING FIASCO
[T]he strike in regards to the Khartoum
chemical plant cannot be justified.These are pretty harsh
words. I know one thing for sure. The intelligence agencies
of other countries look at that and they think, 'Wait a minute,
if you hit the wrong target or if in fact the justification
was not accurate, it is either ineptitude or, to get back
to the wag-the-dog theory, something else is going on. That
gets to our credibility. And that is why both the administration
and the Congress must insist on a foreign policy where if
you draw a line in the sand, if you make a statement, your
credibility is remendously important.
U.S. Senator Pat Roberts
On 7 August 1998, terrorist bombs devastated United States embassy
buildings in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds of people, some of
them American, were killed in the explosion in Nairobi and dozens
in the blast in Dar-es-Salaam. Thousands more were injured.
The American government linked Osama bin-Laden, the Saudi-born
millionaire funder of Islamic extremism with these attacks.
It is worth noting that the Sudanese government immediately
and repeatedly condemned the embassy bombings. The Sudanese
foreign minister, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, stated, for example,
that: "These criminal acts of violence do not lead to any
goal." On 11 August, Agence France Presse reported the
Sudanese foreign minister's statement that "We must pool
our efforts to eradicate all the causes of terrorism" and
he had called for:
the solidarity and cooperation of all the nations in
the region and the international community to stand up to
international terrorism.
It is a matter of record that the Sudanese government took its
condemnation of the Kenyan and Tanzanian bombings one step further.
Sudan offered to help in tracking down the terrorists involved.
The foreign minister stated that: "Sudan supports Kenya
in its efforts to reach the people who committed the incident
and is prepared to cooperate fully with it in this regard."
The government of Sudan also immediately granted United States
requests for access to Sudanese airspace to evacuate American
diplomatic staff and citizens from Kenya, and to provide emergency
assistance to those affected in the bombing. When the United
States requested further humanitarian overflight authorisations
they too were granted. No one, not even the Clinton Administration,
has claimed that the Sudanese Government in any way supported
or even sympathised with these bombings.
On 20 August, the United States government launched missile
attacks, involving 75 Cruise missiles, on installations said
to be part of Osama bin-Laden's infrastructure inside Afghanistan.
Washington also chose to attack the al-Shifa pharmaceutical
factory in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, alleging that it
was making chemical weapons as part of Osama bin-Laden's infrastructure
of international terrorism. The al-Shifa plant was badly damaged
by the 17 Cruise missiles used in the American attack. Several
workers were injured in the attack. A nightwatchman died of
his injuries. Two food processing factories were also damaged
in the strike.
The United States government made several, widely-reported,
claims about the al-Shifa factory. In the news briefing given
by United States Defence Secretary, William Cohen, on 20 August,
he stated that the al-Shifa factory "produced the precursor
chemicals that would allow the production of.VX nerve agent".
Secretary Cohen also stated that Osama bin-Laden "has had
some financial interest in contributing to.this particular facility".
The American government also claimed that no commercial medicines
or drugs were made at the factory. The New York Times,
for example, reported: "statements by a senior intelligence
official hours after the attack that the plant in Khartoum.produced
no commercial products." President Clinton's National Security
Advisor, Sandy Berger, went on record stating:
There is no question in our mind that facility, that
factory, was used to produce a chemical that is used in
the manufacture of VX nerve gas and has no other commercial
distribution as far as we understand. We have physical evidence
of that fact and very, very little doubt of it.
ABC News also stated that senior intelligence officials had
claimed that: "there was no evidence that commercial products
were ever sold out of the facility."
In the briefings shortly after the bombing United States officials
also claimed that the al-Shifa facility was heavily guarded.
In a briefing on the al-Shifa factory soon after the strike
on Khartoum, a senior American intelligence official told reporters
in Washington that: "The facility also has a secured perimeter
and it's patrolled by the Sudanese military."
One would presume that the intelligence officials involved in
these, and other briefings, would have been the cream of the
American intelligence community. They would also be presenting
the latest intelligence material the United States government
had to hand to justify its Cruise missile attack on Sudan -
information which would have been gathered by the intelligence
agencies of the most powerful country on Earth, intelligence
agencies which have budgets running into billions of dollars.
Every one of their claims proved to be demonstrably false.
Within hours of the attack, the Sudanese President, Omer al-Bashir,
said that Sudan would be bringing an official complaint at the
American action before the United Nations Security Council and
that the Sudanese government would also ask the United Nations
to establish "a commission to verify the nature of the
activity of the plant." President al-Bashir flatly denied
American claims that the al-Shifa plant was being used to make
chemical weapons. He accused President Clinton of lying:
Putting out lies is not new for the United States and
its president. A person of such immorality will not hesitate
to tell any lie.
President al-Bashir also stated that Sudan was critical of the
United States government, and not of American companies or citizens:
"We have no animosity towards the American people and non-government
agencies." In a formal letter to the United Nations Security
Council, Bishop Gabriel Rorich, the Sudanese Minister of State
for External Affairs, condemned the American attack on the factory.
The Sudanese government stated that the factory was privately
owned and had been financed by several Sudanese investors and
the Bank of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), also known as
Comesa. The factory produced more than half of Sudan's need
for medicines. The Sudanese government stated:
The allegations in U.S. statements that Osama bin-Laden
owned this factory and that it produced chemical weapons
and poisonous gases for terrorist purposes are allegations
devoid of truth and the U.S. government has no evidence
for this.
Sudan requested the convening of the Security Council to discuss
the matter, and also requested a technical fact-finding mission
to verify American claims. The United States deputy ambassador
to the United Nations, Peter Burleigh, dismissed Sudanese calls
for independent verification of the site: "I don't see
what the purpose of the fact-finding study would be. We have
credible information that fully justifies the strike we made
on that one facility in Khartoum".
The Sudanese government also stated that it was prepared to
allow Americans to visit Khartoum to establish whether the al-Shifa
factory was involved in the production of chemical weapons.
The Sudanese interior minister, Abdel Rahim Hussein, repeated
invitations to investigate the site to the London Sunday
Times: "We are ready to receive specialists from the
Americans and the West to investigate that the factory had nothing
to do with chemical weapons."
The Sudanese foreign minister also invited an investigation
committee from the United States government itself to come and
investigate "whether this factory.has anything to do with
chemical (weapons)." On 22 August, the Sudanese President
invited the United States Congress to send a fact-finding mission:
We are fully ready to provide protection and all other
facilities to enable this mission to obtain all information
and meet anyone it wants.
In the weeks and months following the al-Shifa bombing, the
Sudan would repeatedly call on the United Nations and United
States to inspect the remains of the factory for any evidence
of chemical weapons production. The Americans have steadfastly
refused to inspect the site. This is ironic given that in 1998,
the United States and Britain militarily attacked Iraq because
that country would not allowed the inspection of certain factories
and the remains of factories, but when the Sudanese requested
a similar inspection of a site claimed to have been a chemical
weapons factory, the Clinton Administration pointedly refused.
The Washington Post quoted a Sudanese diplomat at the
United Nations:
You guys bombed Iraq because it blocked U.N. weapons
inspectors. We're begging for a U.N. inspection and you're
blocking it.
Almost immediately following the American attack and their claims
that the factory was producing chemical weapons, credible voices
began to doubt the American justification for their strike.
Amongst these voices were several Britons who had either worked
at the factory, or who had visited it. What the factory produced,
and its ownership, was addressed by Ghazi Suleiman, the lawyer
representing Saleh Idris, the owner of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical
factory. It should be noted that that Mr Suleiman is no friend
of the present government in Sudan. He is, in the words of The
Economist, "the country's leading human-rights lawyer
and an outspoken critic of the regime". He spent 25 days
in detention earlier in 1998. Mr Suleiman said that Mr Idris
did not know Osama bin-Laden, and that the factory produced
only drugs, not chemical weapons. He said:
I think the Americans are under bad information and they
are not well briefed.... I think it would have been prudent
before destroying the plant to come and investigate the
site.
The factory had been designed by an American, Henry Jobe, of
the world-renowned MSD Pharmaceutical Company. Interviewed by
the London Observer newspaper, Mr Jobe stated: "We
didn't intend a dual use for it. We didn't design anything extra
in there. The design we made was for pharmaceuticals."
It is perhaps indicative of the incompetence of American intelligence
in its assessment of the al-Shifa factory, that Mr Jobe revealed
that he was interviewed for the first time by the CIA about
the plant and its equipment, one week after the American
missile strike.
The Sudanese government invited journalists from the print and
electronic media into the country to inspect the bombed factory.
The Washington Post reported that, whereas the
government has "routinely declined visas to American journalists
because the United States has declared it to be a terrorist
state" it now "ushered in reporters by the score.to
photograph, videotape and broadcast live". The Washington
Post reported that visiting reporters from American, British,
French, German, Japanese and Arab media outlets were "picking
through the rubble".
Amongst the dozens of journalists and news services who visited
the site, was the flagship American international news gatherer,
CNN. It reported:
The utter destruction in the wake of a missile attack.Laid
out in display: what the government says are remnants of
the missiles salvaged from the rubble, all part of a concerted
campaign to persuade the international community that Sudan
has nothing to hide. And repeated calls, too, for an independent
inspection team to investigate the site. The government
here apparently confident that no trace of any agent used
in the manufacture of chemical weapons will be found.
It is evident that there was distinct unease amongst Khartoum's
foreign diplomatic corps at the targeting of the al-Shifa factory.
It was reported that the German ambassador to Sudan, Werner
Daum, had immediately contradicted United States claims about
the factory. In a communication to the German foreign ministry,
he stated: "One can't, even if one wants to, describe the
Shifa firm as a chemical factory." The German ambassador
also stated that the factory had no disguise and there was nothing
secret about the site.
The Guardian, reporting from Khartoum, stated that "most
European diplomats here are as aghast at the raid, and above
all the choice of target, as they (the Sudanese government)
are". The paper interviewed a senior European diplomat
who said that: "There was absolutely nothing secret about
the plant and there never has been."
3.7: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE
AL-SHIFA FACTORY: UNTENABLE CLAIMS
The American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory
fell by the wayside one by one. The United States government
made five claims about the al-Shifa factory in its attempts
to justify its Cruise missile attack on the plant. These were
as follows: the al-Shifa plant was making precursors to the
VX nerve gas, namely a compound known as EMPTA; that Osama bin-Laden
either owned or had a financial link to the al-Shifa factory;
that the al-Shifa factory did not produce any medicines or drugs;
that the al-Shifa factory was a high security facility guarded
by the Sudanese military; and that there were weapons of mass
destruction technology links between Sudan and Iraq. An examination
and assessment of the evidence released by the United States
found it to be confused, inconclusive and contradictory. After
just over one week of sifting through American government claims,
The Observer newspaper spoke of:
a catalogue of US misinformation, glaring omissions and
intelligence errors about the function of the plant.
The claim that the al-Shifa plant was making precursors to the
VX nerve gas was immediately challenged by American and European
scientists, chemists and chemical warfare experts. Evidence
of such claims was demanded. While claiming to have "physical
evidence" to support their attack on al-Shifa, United States
officials initially said that they would not be able to release
it for security reasons. Speaking on CNN's Late Edition on 22
August, the President's National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger,
refused to describe the "physical evidence" the government
had, saying that it was necessary to protect intelligence methods
and sources. In the days following the attack, Bill Richardson,
the United States ambassador to the United Nations, said that
that the United States government was in possession of "undeniable
physical evidence" that al-Shifa was being used to manufacture
chemical weapons. He admitted that the American government had
not presented this evidence to the United Nations Security Council,
but that it had been shown to United States congressional leaders.
Richardson stated that "We believe that is sufficient".
After further international pressure, the United States government
officials then stated on 24 August that the United States had
material from the plant, including equipment and containers
which carried residues of a chemical substance with no commercial
uses, but which it was said was exclusively used in VX nerve
gas. It was additionally stated by the two anonymous officials
that the CIA had used light spectrum data collected by spy satellites
to analyse emissions from the plant and that they may also have
employed banded migratory birds that fly through Khartoum to
gather information about production at the plant.
The United States position then shifted, and on 25 August it
claimed that the key evidence justifying its destruction of
the al-Shifa plant was in fact a soil sample of a precursor
chemical in the making of the VX nerve gas obtained months previously
from the factory. The United States government then refused
to identify what they claimed to be the precursor. The White
House press spokesman, Mike McCurry, speaking on 24 August,
stated, for example, that: "The nature of that information
is classified now." After several days of attempting to
avoid naming the compound, the American government stated that
the chemical was said to be O-ethylmethyl-phosphonothioic acid,
or EMPTA.
The American Under Secretary of State Thomas Picke | |
